Commissioner Mark C. Christie Statement
March 25, 2022
Docket Nos. CP20-50-000, et. al.
Orders: C-2, C-3 and C-4

I concur with the order.  I am entering essentially the same concurrence in this matter as in two other certificate cases that the Commission approves today.[1]  The fundamental issues I address are substantially the same in all three cases.

“Judges are not policymakers,” says D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals judge and U.S. Supreme Court nominee Ketanji Brown Jackson.[2]  I agree, and would add:  judges should not be policymakers—certainly not on major questions of public policy, which in any liberal democracy worth the name are questions reserved to legislators elected by the people.

The nation’s response to climate change is obviously just such a major policy question.  Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because of their climate impact is a compelling national policy goal, but how the goal is pursued will affect the lives of literally all Americans because energy policy is also economic policy and national security policy.  Whichever carbon policies are chosen will forcibly redistribute trillions of dollars, will affect the jobs of tens of millions of American workers, and will impact every American family’s ability to afford to heat their homes and pay their monthly power bills (and whether that power is reliable).  The choice of carbon policies will determine whether thousands of communities in the energy-producing regions of this country are impoverished with no hope of recovering vitality in the lifetimes of their residents or their children.  Carbon policies will affect even the country’s national security, as recent events in Ukraine and Europe illustrate.

So, determining these monumentally important questions of public policy is for elected legislators, not unelected judges, and not for unelected administrative agencies such as this one, unless Congress has unambiguously given the agency clear authority and specific direction to implement a policy regarding GHG emissions and their impact on global climate change.  Suffice it to say, Congress has not given this Commission the requisite specific authority or guidance.

It is highly likely that at least one, if not all, of these three certificates we approve today[3] will be appealed, most likely to the D.C. Circuit, the forum of choice for those seeking to overturn FERC approvals of certificates for pipelines or to have them remanded on procedural grounds, delaying the projects and increasing their costs and already daunting uncertainties.  As I noted in my dissent to the two certificate policy statements approved last month[4] and suspended today,[5] it is undeniable that there is a well-funded national campaign of legal warfare (“lawfare”) that seeks to achieve the policy goal of eliminating the use of natural gas by using administrative agencies and courts to prevent the construction of pipelines and related infrastructure, such as compressor stations, which are essential to transport natural gas from producers to consumers.[6]  This campaign does not need to win all its challenges to gas facilities; simply by challenging permits in every available administrative and judicial forum, whether it wins or loses an individual case, it drives up the costs of even seeking a permit to construct a facility, thus deterring any future projects.[7] 

Citing this national legal campaign against natural gas is relevant because it illustrates that the debates attendant to FERC’s duties and authorities in certificate cases are really about policy, not law.  Groups opposed to the use of natural gas and all fossil fuels certainly have the right under the First Amendment to advocate for such policies, but the decision to ban the use of natural gas or prevent the construction of any new natural gas facilities is a major question of public policy by any measure, and thus is a decision that must be made by the elected legislature.  With that relevant context in mind, let me note the following specific to these cases.

With regard to the Commission’s NEPA duties, in all three cases they have been performed to the standards the courts have set for this Commission.  NEPA, as has been stated many times, is a procedural statute that requires the agency to fully inform itself and the public of the environmental consequences of its decisions.  As the D.C. Circuit itself said in Sabal Trail, NEPA is “primarily information-forcing,” and courts should not “flyspeck” an agency’s environmental analysis.[8]  The Supreme Court has said that it also is “well-settled that NEPA does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process . . .  NEPA merely prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”[9]  In all three cases herein both an Environmental Assessment (EA) and a much more costly and time-consuming Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was performed.  Regardless of whether conducting an EIS after the EA had already been performed was necessary or appropriate, there is no question here that the Commission has fulfilled its duties under NEPA.  The EIS was done and it was done professionally by Commission staff exercising their special expertise.

In all three cases, the EIS included estimates of the quantity of GHG emissions that would be directly caused by the facility’s construction and operation.[10]  In the two pipeline cases, since both serve LNG export facilities, no estimate of downstream indirect impacts was required.[11]  In the compressor case, the EIS estimated downstream GHG emissions as 2.41 metric tons per year.[12]  

Now we come to one of the fundamental questions which will likely be relevant on appeal.  Should or even can the Commission credibly characterize the impact of estimated GHG emissions from a single facility on global climate change?  And since there is no separate climate for Louisiana, Mississippi or Texas, nor even for the United States, there can only be an impact to consider on global climate.  The answer to this question is self-evidently no, the Commission cannot credibly gauge the impact on the global climate from a single facility.  The Commission can estimate a quantity of GHG emissions in terms of tonnage directly from a facility.  That is within our wheelhouse, and it can and should be used to order mitigation of direct emissions.  And to satisfy the D. C. Circuit’s decision in Appalachian Voices,[13] incorporating the Sabal Trail “reasonably foreseeable” requirement, the Commission can meet its NEPA duties by providing an upper bound estimate of the quantity in tonnage of indirect downstream GHG emissions. 

But estimating a quantity of GHG emissions, direct or indirect, is fundamentally different from predicting the impact of that tonnage on global climate change or making a finding whether the impacts on global climate are “significant” or insignificant.[14]  Any such prediction or finding would have no intellectual rigor whatsoever and certainly should not be used to reject a natural gas facility that would otherwise be found needed to serve the public under the Natural Gas Act.  And let’s be honest:  that is really the end game of those advocating for FERC to characterize a facility’s GHG impacts on global climate.  This is obviously true since FERC has no jurisdiction whatsoever over upstream or downstream actors and has no authority to order mitigation of downstream (or upstream) emissions.  Thus, outright rejection of the facility will have to be among the remedies on the table if global climate impacts are found to be “significant.” 

To illustrate how unhinged from reality rejection of a certificate due to the alleged global climate impacts would be, consider that FERC has, of course, no jurisdiction over other countries which are also affecting climate change. For example, currently the power capacity of China’s massive fleet of coal-fired generating stations is alone roughly equal to the total installed generation capacity of the entire U.S. power system, and China is moving forward with plans to expand that already huge coal fleet by another 25%, many of which are already under construction.[15]  Nor is China alone in continuing to expand, not retire, coal-fired generation.  Other countries, including India, Vietnam and Indonesia, have plans to build more coal generation.[16]  Compared to the volume of climate-impacting GHG emissions continuously being produced by the coal fleets of China, India and other large consumers of power, any purported GHG impacts that can be ascribed to a single natural gas pipeline in the United States is, quite literally, infinitesimal.[17]   

And that brings us to the central issue:  Reading into the Natural Gas Act the power for FERC to reject a natural gas facility otherwise needed to serve the public, based on a purported impact of the facility on the global climate, is a public policy decision of immense magnitude.  Telling FERC it has the authority, even the duty, to do so is a public policy decision of equally immense magnitude.  It will affect the lives and livelihoods of tens of millions of American families and the country’s energy, economic and national security.  As Judge Brown Jackson said, “Judges are not policymakers.”  Nor should they be. 

For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

 

 

[1] Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022); Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022); Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 178 FERC ¶ 61,200 (2022).

[2] See, e.g., Molly Christian, “Judges are not policymakers,’ Supreme Court nominee Brown Jackson says,” S&P Global Market Intelligence, March 24, 2022.

[4] Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, 178 FERC ¶ 61,107 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, dissenting); Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Natural Gas Infrastructure Project Reviews, 178 FERC ¶ 178,61,108 (2022) (Christie, Comm’r, dissenting) (Christie Dissent).  My dissent, identical in both orders, is also available online at:  https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/items-c-1-and-c-2-commissioner-christies-dissent-certificate-policy-and-interim.

[5] Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Facilities, 178 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2022).

[6] See, e.g., Bloomberg Philanthropies, https://www.bloomberg.org/environment/moving-beyond-carbon/ (“Launched in 2019 with a $500 million investment from Mike Bloomberg and Bloomberg Philanthropies, Beyond Carbon . . . . works . . . to . . . stop the construction of proposed gas plants.”) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) (emphasis added); Sierra Club, https://www.sierraclub.org/policy/energy/fracking, (“There are no ‘clean’ fossil fuels.  The Sierra Club is committed to eliminating the use of fossil fuels, including coal, natural gas and oil, as soon as possible”) (emphases added) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022); Natural Resources Defense Council, https://www.nrdc.org/issues/reduce-fossil-fuels (“Oil, gas, and other fossil fuels come with grave consequences for our health and our future. . . . NRDC is pushing America to move beyond these dirty fuelsWe fight dangerous energy development on all fronts”) (emphases added) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022); Press Release, NRDC Receives $100 million from Bezos Earth Fund to Accelerate Climate Action (Nov. 16, 2020), available at https://www.nrdc.org/media/2020/201116 (“The Bezos Earth Fund grant will be used to help NRDC advance climate solutions and legislation at the state level, move the needle on policies and programs focused on reducing oil and gas production”) (emphasis added) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022); Sebastian Herrera, Jeff Bezos Pledges $10 Billion to Tackle Climate Change, Wall Street Journal (Feb. 17, 2020) (“Mr. Bezos . . . said the Bezos Earth Fund would help back scientists, activists, [non-governmental organizations]”) (emphasis added); see also, Ellie Potter, Environmentalists launch campaign to ban gas from US clean energy program, S&P Global Platts (Sep. 2, 2021) (quoting Collin Rees, U.S. Campaign Manager for Oil Change International, “Clean energy means no gas and no other fossil fuels, period.”) (emphases added); Sean Sullivan, FERC sets sights on gas infrastructure policy in 2022, S&P Capital IQ (Dec. 31, 2021) (quoting Maya van Rossum, head of Delaware Riverkeeper Network, “we are not changing course at all:  We continue to take on every pipeline, LNG, and fracked gas project as urgently as we did before, knowing we will have to invest heavily to stop it . . .”) (emphases added).

[7] Laurence Hammack, “Legal fights continue over the Mountain Valley Pipeline,” Roanoke Times, Jan. 8, 2022 (“Even if this pipeline survives, opponents say their legal battle will not be a lost cause.  ‘You haven’t seen another huge, several hundred mile pipeline proposed since Mountain Valley,’ said [Gillian] Giannetti, [senior attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council] … ‘Developers know that a similar venture today would be met by “an army” of opposition,’ she said.”

[8] See Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Sabal Trail) (quoting Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

[9] Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989) (citations omitted; emphases added). 

[10] Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022) at P 88; Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022) at P 47.  The Iroquois Enhancement by Compression Project’s EIS included estimates of emissions for the entire lifecycle of the project, from upstream to construction and transportation, to end use.  Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 178 FERC ¶ 61,200 (2022) at PP 49-50.

[11] Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022) at P 87; Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022) at P 46.  Despite not having been required, the information was still provided.  See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022) at P 72 & n.148; Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022) at P 31.

[12] Iroquois Gas Transmission, L.P., Docket No. CP20-48-000, Final EIS at 23 (Nov. 12, 2021).

[13] Appalachian Voices v. FERC, 2019 WL 847199 (Feb. 19, 2019) (unpublished, per curiam).

[14] See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022) (Glick, Chairman, concurring) at P 5.

[15]See, e.g., Kenneth B. Medlock III, China’s Coal Habit Will Be Hard to Kick, Barron’s, Oct. 6, 2021; see also, Amy Gunia, China Is Planning to Build 43 New Coal-Fired Power Plants.  Can It Still Keep Its Promises to Cut Emissions? [ed.:  No, it cannot and will not.], Time (Aug. 20, 2021) (“Gunia”); see also, Michael O’Boyle, China Doesn’t Need Another Coal Power Plant, Forbes (Aug. 18, 2021).

[16] Gunia, supra, n. 15.

[17] Nor does use of the artificial construct known as the “Social Cost of Carbon” provide any intellectual rigor or basis for assessing the impact on the global climate of a single facility, or of evaluating environmental impacts more broadly.  In both of today’s pipeline certificate cases the Social Cost of Carbon has been calculated using CEQ-EPA formulae and the information is provided.  Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 178 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2022) at P 93; Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC, 178 FERC ¶ 61,198 (2022) at P 52.  For reasons I will not go into now, but save for later, these purported social carbon cost calculations are utterly devoid of legal, policy or economic validity.  I concur with these orders because the Social Cost of Carbon is not used herein as the basis for our decisions in any of the cases.

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