Docket Nos. ER22-983-000, ER22-983-001
I concur with the Commission’s Order because, importantly, it finds that ISO New England has not fully complied with Order No. 2222’s metering and telemetry requirements. The Commission requires ISO New England to adhere to the plain text of Order No. 2222, which requires the DER Aggregator, and not host utilities, to provide metering and telemetry information to the ISO.[1] And it finds that ISO New England must either provide a better explanation as to why its approach to metering for behind-the-meter Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) was necessary and does not impose undue barriers to market participation, or else modify its proposal to address undue barriers and make participation more workable.[2] I write separately to urge ISO New England to take the latter course on compliance, and to pursue steps that genuinely open its markets to DERs like behind-the-meter resources.
ISO New England faces an immediate and dangerous grid reliability threat.[3] Given these challenges, ISO New England should be pursuing all possible options to increase electricity supply and reduce demand. Yet despite the Commission’s clear directive in Order No. 2222 that it must open its markets to DER aggregations and allow them to provide all services they are technically capable of delivering, ISO New England put forth a proposal that was almost universally panned by prospective market participants seeking to integrate behind-the-meter resources into its markets.
Advanced Energy Economy (AEE), PowerOptions, and the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) state that “ISO-NE’s compliance proposal fails to meet the basic directive of Order No. 2222 to allow all DERs to provide all the services they are technically capable of providing through aggregation.”[4] The Advanced Energy Management Alliance (AEMA) argues that the proposal “fails to remove significant barriers to entry, that, if allowed to remain, will prevent a large portion of the [DERs] proliferating behind the meter from participating in the ISO-NE market as part of an aggregation.”[5] Voltus, Inc. declares that ISO New England’s “compliance filing retains existing or even erects new barriers to the participation of [DER Aggregations] in the wholesale market in New England.”[6] And the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office (Massachusetts AG) asserts that “under the ISO-NE proposal, Behind the Meter (BTM) resources such as residential and small commercial DERAs will have no commercially viable way to participate in the New England wholesale markets.”[7] To put it simply, stakeholders think that ISO New England’s proposal for behind-the-meter DERs is patently insufficient to meet the basic objective of Order No. 2222 of opening its markets to behind-the-meter DER.
In reading ISO New England’s filings in this proceeding, one comes away with the impression that developing a workable participation framework for behind-the-meter DER is nearly impossible. For example, it contends that its approach to submetering, which stakeholders argue stymies virtually all potential market participation,[8] is necessary in order to prevent double counting.[9] Yet somehow, other regions, including those that do not have universally-deployed Advanced Metering Infrastructure, have found a way to guard against double counting without blocking behind-the-meter DERs’ ability to participate.[10] ISO New England is like an architect declaring that it is impossible to construct higher than a 50-story building, even as competitors have already built the Empire State Building and Sears Tower, and are making plans for One World Trade Center.
Perhaps understanding its deficiency as compared to other RTOs, ISO New England goes so far as to argue that the Commission should ignore information juxtaposing its restrictive approach against the more workable alternatives put forward by other regions.[11] While ISO New England is correct that we must judge its compliance proposal against the requirements of Order No. 2222 and not whether its participation framework is as good as or better than others’, information from other regions is undeniably relevant to addressing the question of whether barriers imposed by the ISO are necessary, or whether the barriers are undue because it could have facilitated participation without imposing them. Nor do the unique circumstances of ISO New England necessarily provide an excuse for not adopting an approach similarly to those successfully pursued elsewhere. ISO New England ignores its own agency and ability to change the market paradigm. The market framework in New England is not set forth from on high and irreversibly inscribed into stone tablets. Rather than declaring that wood is not strong enough, facing a Commission directive to build a skyscraper, the ISO should procure steel.
ISO-NE's deficiency is all the more troubling in light of other facets of New England’s regulatory landscape that enhance the ability of ISO New England to integrate DER into its markets, and the potential increased reliability payoff of doing so. As the New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE) recently observed, “[t]he New England states have long been leaders in energy efficiency and demand response programs.”[12] NESCOE urges States and ISO New England to “prioritize investments in energy efficiency and demand response as part of our region’s response to energy adequacy risks.”[13] And the Massachusetts Attorney General’s offices notes that Massachusetts “has ambitious targets for the addition of DERs over the next few years, including another 2,650 MW of solar under the SMART program and 1,000 MW of battery storage by 2025.”[14]
ISO New England is at an inflection point. I support the Commission’s demand for, at minimum, better explanation from ISO New England. But the ultimate impact of this Order will depend heavily on the approach the ISO takes on compliance. Will it roll up its sleeves and pursue a problem-solving approach to integrating behind-the-meter resources, as other RTOs have done? Will it work to collaboratively embrace and leverage all potential resources the region can rely on to lower costs for consumers and prevent dangerous blackouts? Or will it rigidly defend a status quo metering framework that stymies this critical opportunity to improve reliability? The Commission’s forum in Burlington, VT and the record filed in response to it have strengthened my view that the only way to address the reliability threat in New England is for ISO New England and member states to put every possible supply and demand resource type on the table and work together to remove all barriers to participation across the board. I strongly encourage ISO New England to do everything in its power to find solutions.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] See Order at P 169. See also Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247, at P 266 (2020), order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197 (2021), order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-B, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021) (“[T]he distributed energy resource aggregator . . . is the single point of contact with the RTO/ISO, responsible for managing, dispatching, metering, and settling the individual distributed energy resources in its aggregation.”).
[2] See Order at PP 163-168.
[3] See, e.g., RENEW Northeast, Inc. and the American Clean Power Association v. ISO New England Inc., 182 FERC ¶ 61,085 (2022) (Clements, Comm’r, concurring, at P 3) (describing the reliability threat presented for the region and the urgent call to action following the Commission’s September 2022 New England Winter-Gas Electric Forum). Commenters are seeking long-term solutions to the energy security problem. See, e.g., FirstLight Power, Inc., Post-Forum Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 2-3 (filed Nov. 7, 2022); New England States Committee on Electricity, Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 4 (filed Nov. 7, 2022); Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 2 (filed Nov. 7, 2022); Repsol Energy North America Corporation, Comments on the New England Winter-Gas Electric Forum, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 1 (filed Nov. 7, 2022); Vistra Corp., Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 1 (filed Nov. 7, 2022); ISO New England, Post-Forum Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 3 (filed Nov. 7, 2022).
[4] AEE, PowerOptions, and SEIA Protest at 11.
[5] AEMA Protest at 1.
[6] Voltus Protest at 6.
[7] Massachusetts AG Protest at 2.
[8] See, e.g., AEE, PowerOptions, and SEIA Protest at 15-16, 18-23; AEMA Protest at 7, 23-24; Environmental Organizations Protest at 4-10; Massachusetts AG Protest at 5; Voltus Protest at 11-14.
[9] ISO New England April 2022 Answer at 8.
[10] In finding that ISO New England has failed to articulate steps it “contemplated to avoid imposing unnecessarily burdensome costs on the distributed energy resource aggregators and individual resources in distributed energy resource aggregations that may create an undue barrier to their participation in RTO/ISO markets,” the Commission’s order rightly notes “that other RTOs/ISOs have proposed alternative metering and telemetry solutions to reduce burdens on behind-the-meter DERs.” Order at P 166.
[11] See ISO New England April 2022 Answer at 32-33.
[12] NESCOE, Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 13 (filed Nov. 7, 2022) (in response to the Commission’s inquiry into winter reliability issues in the region).
[13] Id. at 14. Similarly, Connecticut encourages the development of clean solutions to address the region’s winter reliability needs, including more robust participation from active and passive demand response. Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection and the Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, Comments, Docket No. AD22-9-000, at 4-5 (filed Nov. 7, 2022).
[14] Massachusetts AG Protest at 1.