Chairman Richard Glick Statement
March 30, 2021
Docket No. ER21-1001-000
Today’s order marks another important step forward in the integration of energy storage resources (ESRs) in RTO and ISO markets. I commend New York Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (NYISO) efforts to develop these market reforms allowing for the co-location of ESRs with Intermittent Power Resources (IPRs).[1] I agree with NYISO that allowing these resources to co-locate and share a single point of interconnection will increase resource performance and flexibility and reduce development costs, amongst other benefits.[2] Further, as I have previously expressed, I firmly believe that eliminating barriers to the participation of ESRs in the wholesale markets will lead to a “more robust grid that can, among other things, help to accommodate the ever-increasing demand for clean, renewable resources,” and “enhance the reliability and resilience of the grid while reducing rates.”[3]
I write separately to reiterate my belief that it is nonsensical to apply buyer-side market power mitigation to entities that are not buyers or that lack market power.[4] When participating in NYISO’s capacity market, ESRs are not buyers, much less buyers with market power.[5] Accordingly, the provisions of NYISO’s Tariff that subject those resources to buyer-side market power mitigation rules are per se unreasonable and will serve only to prop up prices, protect incumbent generators, and impede state clean energy policies.[6]
Although today’s order applies NYISO’s existing buyer-side market power rules to co-located ESR and IPR resources, I nevertheless concur because NYISO has not proposed any substantive changes to those rules.[7] But that does not mean that I have to come to terms with those rules. To the contrary, I urge NYISO and its stakeholders to move expeditiously to replace those rules with a model that moves beyond minimum offer price rules as a means for mediating the interaction between state policies and wholesale markets.[8] In the event NYISO and its stakeholders cannot settle upon a replacement for its current buyer-side market power rules, then we will be left with little choice but to step in and establish such rules ourselves.[9]
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
[1] NYISO’s proposed reforms received unanimous support from the NYISO stakeholders. NYISO Filing at 2.
[2] N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 174 FERC ¶ 61,242, at P 3 (2021).
[3] Statement of Commissioner Richard Glick regarding Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by RTOs and ISOs, Docket Nos. RM16-23-000 et al. (May 22, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/commissioner-richard-glick-statement-regarding-electric-storage-participation.
[4] See N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 173 FERC ¶ 61,060 (2020) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at P 1).
[5] Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 21, 26).
[6] Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 3-19) (explaining why buyer-side market power mitigation should only be applied to buyers with market power).
[7] NYISO Filing at 13-14 (explaining that the co-location reforms require only clarifying edits to the existing buyer-side market power mitigation rules and that the resources participating in the co-location will be examined separately pursuant to existing mitigation measures and eligible for any exemptions applicable to that particular resource type).
[8] See ISO New England Inc., 173 FERC ¶ 61,161 (2020) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting at PP 2, 14).
[9] See 16 U.S.C. § 824e; Technical Conference Regarding Resource Adequacy in the Evolving Electricity Sector, Docket No. AD21-10-000, Tr. at 9:10-20 (Mar. 23, 2021) (Comments of Chairman Richard Glick) (“I think we should to the extent we can, allow . . . the RTOs themselves, and the stakeholders to come up with their own proposals, to organically come up with an approach that’s different on the current MOPR rules around the country. . . . But to the extent they don’t come up with something, I think we have an obligation under the Federal Power Act to act where rates and terms of these markets are unjust and unreasonable.”).