Docket No. ER26-1707-000
We concur with the findings in today’s order except for the decision to reject NV Energy’s proposal that would require interconnection customers that have been in the queue for ten years to meet minimal readiness showings before NV Energy agrees to extend their in-service date into a second decade.[1] Clogged interconnection queues are a main driver in the national delays in connecting new generation we need to meet critical energy and reliability needs. NV Energy’s proposal is a modest tool toward clearing out speculative and non-viable projects. We respectfully dissent from the decision to reject this proposal because we would encourage reasonable steps like these.
Currently, NV Energy requires prospective generators to agree to in-service dates within 7 years of entering the queue and offers exceptions to extend those dates up to 10 years.[2] To move beyond the 10‑year mark, the Tariff allows further extensions only by mutual agreement between the interconnection customer and NV Energy, with “such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld.”[3] Here, NV Energy seeks to clarify that when the interconnection customer hasn’t shown at least minimal progress toward commercial operation by year 10—a financial deposit and site control, or a regulatory limitation preventing site control—then it is reasonable for NV Energy to withhold agreement. NV Energy is simply asking to put meat on the bone of an existing Tariff provision that gives NV Energy reasonable discretion to reject in-service date extensions beyond a decade by specifying what circumstances are and are not “reasonable.” In our view, this sets a very low bar for projects that have already been in development for at least a decade. It’s not unreasonable to ask for readiness demonstrations at that point, especially when, too often, the alternative is to let non-viable projects languish in the queue while keeping other projects from accessing available headroom.
Today’s order rejects NV Energy’s proposal because the majority is concerned with upsetting settled expectations. While we are sympathetic to potential concerns that a rule change could pose issues for some interconnection customers approaching the 10-year mark, none of those customers—or anyone else—protested this aspect of NV Energy’s filing. Commission policy does not require categorically rejecting proposals under FPA section 205 that set reasonable requirements for interconnection customers even after they execute LGIAs, particularly given the urgent challenges from substantial queue growth.[4] Also, any expectation shift would be minimal. Before and after today’s order, NV Energy can reasonably withhold agreements to extend an interconnection customer’s in-service date beyond 10 years. We are hard pressed to imagine a scenario where it would be unreasonable for a transmission provider to exercise its prerogative to withhold agreement if the interconnection customer lacks site control ten years into the process and cannot point to a regulatory barrier blocking its way. In our view, today’s proposal would give interconnection customers more transparency and certainty about the criteria to extend their in-service date beyond 10 years. And despite all that, if any small number of true inequities might arise during a transition period implementing this Tariff clarification, the Commission could address them through its equitable waiver authority.[5]
In short, we would have accepted NV Energy’s proposal because it is a step in the right direction to force projects to come to fruition or get out of too-crowded interconnection queues. At a time when it still takes far too long for generators to connect to the grid, we would say yes to a fair measure that would move us closer to meeting our nation’s energy needs at the pace we so urgently need.
For these reasons, we respectfully dissent in part.
[1] Nev. Power Co., 195 FERC ¶ 61,104 at PP 38-39 (2026).
[2] Nevada Power Company, Open Access Transmission Tariff, Attachment N, Standard Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (2.6.0), § 3.4.2 (Initiating an Interconnection Request).
[3] Id.
[4] See El Paso Elec. Co., 191 FERC ¶ 61,120, at P 83 (2025) (accepting proposed revisions to El Paso’s LGIP to apply withdrawal penalties to interconnection customers with an executed LGIA, finding that “executed LGIAs … are subject to change if the underlying tariff changes”).
[5] We encourage NV Energy to consider resubmitting this proposal—perhaps one with even more teeth in its 10-plus-years readiness requirements—but with a transition period that may assuage the majority’s concerns.