Today, we take historic action to push our country’s electric markets and economy into the future—a future of fair cost allocation, unprecedented transparency for the American ratepayer, respect for states’ rights, efficient markets and speed to power. Last October, Secretary Wright articulated the monumental, generational and “urgent” challenge FERC must solve for our country when he directed us to develop “reforms to ensure the timely and orderly interconnection of large loads to the transmission system.”[1] I strongly agree. And now, through this suite of six orders, we deliver.
Simply put, the show cause orders the Commission issues today to each of the six electric markets subject to its jurisdiction find that the status quo across much of the country is not good enough. Nowhere close. The record prompted by the Secretary’s ANOPR leaves no doubt that most of the markets (and their existing rules) are inherently slow and prohibitive of the dexterity necessary to adapt to and power societal evolution—whether brought about by technological innovation or sustaining the great industrial economy that anchors America.
I wholeheartedly, fully concur with these orders, which we carefully crafted to execute upon the problems the Secretary identified in a manner that is quick, efficient, and legally durable. I write separately to highlight certain considerations underlying the Commission’s procedural approach to delivering on the ANOPR and to today’s orders.
Based on my analysis of the extensive record and numerous ongoing substantive stakeholder interactions, I have determined that the most productive way to “build upon the principles”[2] in the ANOPR and “work expeditiously”[3] towards a solution is to issue individualized orders to show cause to each market.[4] That is so for two main reasons.
First, the record the Commission collected in response to the challenges identified in the ANOPR and subsequent resulting developments indicate that an approach that honors the ANOPR principles but accounts for widening regional variation may now be more efficient than a one-size-fits-all rule.[5] The world has changed a great deal since last October. The ANOPR itself, including the articulated principles, appears to have shifted the playing field and prompted great progress across several electric markets. This change (and the Commission’s alignment with the Secretary) is well illustrated by a number of landmark orders approving several market new constructs that we issued since October, which together operationalize the Secretary’s principles and laid groundwork for meaningful reform and today’s actions.[6] While working to develop those orders, the Commission has simultaneously devoted significant attention to evaluating the various procedural paths through which we might comprehensively deliver.
Individual show cause proceedings will allow the Commission to ensure that solutions to the problems the Secretary identified are tailored to the specific, varied circumstances and market constructs of each region. Indeed, a careful review of today’s six orders reveals the many ways in which those orders are customized for each market’s unique circumstances and progress (or lack thereof) towards serving large load. To name just a few examples, the orders recognize ongoing stakeholder processes in various regions and are adapted to existing tariff provisions concerning large and co-located loads; account for regional variances in allocating rights and responsibilities among RTOs/ISOs and the transmission owners; leave room for each market to tailor operational requirements for large loads that are particular to their region; and otherwise account for incumbent regional differences on topics such as cost allocation and cost transparency, study processes, and network upgrade procedures.
Proceeding via show cause proceedings will also allow the markets (and their respective transmission owners) to explain, in the first instance, how to address the Commission’s concerns. These entities have the deepest understanding of their respective regions and are best positioned to implement solutions we identified, in the most expeditious manner. The Commission will promptly evaluate their responses to today’s orders, and, with input from stakeholders, swiftly establish appropriate reforms.
Second, proceeding via individual show cause orders will allow the Commission to act more quickly than through traditional rulemaking. Notice-and-comment rulemaking may not capitalize upon individual market progress prompted since October and would be unduly time-consuming,[7] as it also inevitably would require the additional steps of accommodating the regional variations of the approach we take today. Rulemaking efforts can be particularly inefficient when, as here, they risk incubating uncertainty after progress has begun, and diverting scarce stakeholder resources away from other endeavors, such as the development of market-specific reforms submitted to the Commission under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA). (To be clear, we very much encourage 205 submissions encapsulating the principles we articulate in the 206s, and with all due deliberate haste.)
Furthermore, rulemaking requires a lengthy series of steps before the proposed reforms would actually take effect—e.g., a NOPR, then a final rule, then potential orders on rehearing, and then a “compliance” process in which affected parties make filings (or, more likely, multiple rounds of filings) explaining how they intend to implement the rule. By their nature, these procedures take time. For example, the compliance process for the Commission’s Order No. 2023[8] (which matured out of an ANOPR issued in July 2021 and a NOPR issued in June 2022) still is not fully complete as of June 2026. The compliance process for Order No. 2222[9] (NOPR issued in November 2016) could be considered completed in May 2026; however, even with that timing, not all of the RTOs/ISOs have yet fully implemented their Commission-accepted market rules. I provide these examples not to suggest that the completion of a rulemaking process on the interconnection of large loads would take this long,[10] but rather to make clear the scope of the years-long delays in implementation that might be expected if the Commission elected to proceed via a NOPR. By contrast, we expect that individual show cause proceedings for each of the RTO/ISOs will enable the Commission to spearhead lasting reform much more expeditiously.
The six markets together cover nearly two-thirds of load subject to Commission-jurisdictional rates, and therefore focusing initially on those regions is a prudent first step. But I am under no illusion that the challenges discussed in today’s orders are somehow unique to the RTO/ISO regions. Our actions today do not foreclose the possibility of a future rulemaking, and nor do they prevent us from acting on filings made under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. I encourage transmission providers and other stakeholders outside RTO/ISO regions to make individual filings to address the issues we discuss today.
FERC is no longer the sleepy, responsive agency of the past—our country cannot afford for it to be. This is a time for the best thinkers we have to collaborate on solving our biggest problems, and thus it is my great honor to deliver a solution that honors the Secretary’s goals. For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
________________________
Laura V. Swett
Chairman
[1] Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANOPR) Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Oct. 23, 2025) (ANOPR); see Letter from Chris Wright, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 23, 2025) (Secretary’s Letter).
[2] Secretary’s Letter at 2.
[3] Id.
[4] See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (“[A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. . . . [T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that the decision whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication lies within the broad discretion of the agency.”).
[5] “[T]he Commission may rely on ‘generic’ or ‘general’ findings of a systemic problem to support imposition of an industry-wide solution.” Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n of Am. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 18, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). However, the Commission “has long allowed different regional transmission organizations to follow different rules, in recognition of regional variations including potential differences in ‘geographic size and location.’” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC, 138 F.4th 531, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted).
[6] See id. P 2 & nn.6-11.
[7] See, e.g., Comments of Talen Energy Corporation, Docket No. RM26-4, at 5-6 (filed Nov. 21, 2025).
[8] Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procs. & Agreements, Order No. 2023, 184 FERC ¶ 61,054, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2023), order on reh’g, Order No. 2023-A, 186 FERC ¶ 61,199, errata notice, 188 FERC ¶ 61,134 (2024).
[9] Participation of Distributed Energy Res. Aggregations in Mkts. Operated by Reg’l Transmission Orgs. & Indep. Sys. Operators, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020), order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-A, 174 FERC ¶ 61,197, order on reh’g, Order No. 2222-B, 175 FERC ¶ 61,227 (2021).
[10] I do not mean to suggest that the public utilities subject to compliance under these rulemakings—or the Commission itself—have been derelict. The time-consuming nature of the compliance process is a natural consequence of complex, nuanced efforts toward tariff reform. As Chairman, I will continue to evaluate Commission directives to ensure that obligations on regulated entities are not unduly burdensome and to make certain that Commission action during the compliance process is as timely as possible.