




Exploring the Impacts of Price Formation Enhancements in PJM's Wholesale Energy Markets

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Key Statistics

Member companies	1,040+
Millions of people served	65
Peak load in megawatts	165,492
MW of generating capacity	178,563
Miles of transmission lines	84,042
2017 GWh of annual energy	773,522
Generation sources	1,379
Square miles of territory	243,417
States served	13 + DC

- 28% of load in Eastern Interconnection
- 20% of transmission assets in Eastern Interconnection



As of 2/2018

- Fast-Start Pricing
- PJM Day-Ahead Market Clearing
- PJM Real-Time Market Clearing
- Integer Relaxation Simulations
- Results
- Questions

Fast-Start Pricing

Fast-start resources can start up quickly and typically have shorter minimum run times than other resources.

Definitions of fast-start resources vary across ISOs/RTOs

CTs are usually offered as **inflexible** (i.e., block-loaded, where economic minimum = economic maximum). This means they **cannot set price naturally**.

- For block-loaded CTs that are eligible to set price, **relax their economic minimum** by a specific factor (currently 0.8)
- The wider the relaxed dispatchable range, the better chance a resource has to set price
 - But with a wider dispatchable range, the dispatch solution may be far below its economic minimum

- Combustion turbines are generally **unable to set price** even though they are committed and dispatched economically
- Relaxing economic minimum values in the dispatch solution **distorts the system energy balance** and can lead to inefficient system dispatch
- Distortions must be **managed by regulation** at potentially higher cost than a balanced energy dispatch

	PJM	CAISO	ISO-NE	MISO	NYISO
Separate Pricing and Dispatch Runs					
Economic Minimum Relaxation					
Includes Start-up and No-Load Costs					

- PJM is required to implement fast-start pricing
 - Separate dispatch and pricing runs
 - Define fast-start resources as those with a total time to start (TTS) and minimum run time (MRT) of less than or equal to **one** hour
 - Use lost opportunity cost (LOC) use to remove incentive to deviate from dispatch
 - Implement in day-ahead and real-time markets whenever a fast-start unit is committed and running
 - Amortize start-up and no-load in “effective” offer using **integer relaxation**

- Solve the pricing run using a single-time period optimization similar to the dispatch run
- Allows resources to be partially committed for pricing calculations
 - Equivalently, resources are allowed to be **fully dispatchable** between 0 and their economic maximums
- Start-up and No-load offers are considered in setting the price
 - Equivalently, the bid blocks of resources can be modified to **incorporate the proportional start-up and no-load offers**

- For example, under integer relaxation with a single offer block, in the pricing run the total offer cost of dispatching a resource is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \textit{Total Offer Cost} = & \textit{Incremental Energy Cost} \times \textit{Dispatch} + \\
 & \textit{Startup Cost} \times \textit{Commitment Status} + \\
 & \textit{Noload Cost} \times \textit{Commitment Status}
 \end{aligned}$$

Where:

$$\textit{Commitment Status} = \frac{\textit{Dispatch}}{\textit{Economic Maximum}}$$

- As a result, the total offer cost of dispatching a resource in the pricing run can be rewritten as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Total Offer Costs} = & \boxed{\text{Incremental Energy Cost}} \times \text{Dispatch} + \\
 & \boxed{\frac{\text{Startup Cost}}{\text{Economic Maximum}}} \times \text{Dispatch} + \\
 & \boxed{\frac{\text{Noload Cost}}{\text{Economic Maximum}}} \times \text{Dispatch}
 \end{aligned}$$

- A resource’s “effective” offer is equal to the sum of all three components in the boxes above




PJM Day-Ahead Market Clearing

Objective:

Develop a set of **least-cost** financial schedules that are **physically feasible** subject to:

- Full transmission system model
- Reserve requirements
- Unit commitment constraints

Using bid-in supply offers and demand bids



- Provides **optimized least-cost solution** to aid DA Market Operator
- Performs a Three Pivotal Supplier (TPS) test for **market power mitigation**
- Considers:
 - All constraints
 - PAR limits
 - Unit parameters
 - Submitted transactions (including virtual bids)
 - Zonal factors



PJM Real-Time Market Clearing




PJM Real-Time Market Clearing, Dispatching and Pricing Engines

Ancillary Services Optimizer (ASO)

Clearing and assignment of regulation and inflexible reserve resources (Solved 60 minutes prior to target time, looks ahead 60 minutes beyond target time)

Intermediate-Term Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (IT SCED)

Demand Trajectory, generator loading strategy, Demand Response commitment for energy, CT commitment and inflexible synchronized reserve recommendations (Solved 30 minutes prior to target time, producing 4 solution intervals that looks ahead 15, 45, 45 and 120 minutes beyond target time)



Real-Time Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (RT SCED)

Final dispatch contour and assignment of non-synchronized reserve and flexible synchronized reserve resources (Solved 10 minutes prior to target time, looks ahead 10 minutes beyond target time)

Locational Pricing Calculator (LPC)

5 minute energy and ancillary service prices



- Performs “re-optimization” in retrospect starting from the actual real-time PJM grid dispatch
- Designed to provide a baseline measure of grid operational performance
- Minimizes **total system bid production cost**
- Provides optimal N-1 security-constrained unit commitment and dispatch
 - Assuming all system conditions are known in advance

Integer Relaxation Simulations

- Used PROBE DA and PD to simulate the effects of **Integer Relaxation** in the pricing run in the DA and RT markets
- Minimum Run Time (MRT) and Total Time to Start (TTS) eligibility for **Integer Relaxation** treatment:

Day Ahead (MRT and TTS ≤)	Real Time (Perfect Dispatch) (MRT and TTS ≤)
None	None
2 hours	2 hours
24 hours	24 hours

- Integer Relaxation treatment is **not** applied to reserves
- Integer Relaxation treatment is **not** applied to self-scheduled units
- Ramping constraints are **not** enforced in the pricing run for units receiving Integer Relaxation treatment
- Pump Storage unit's dispatch is **fixed** in the pricing run to be the same as the dispatch run
- Start-up offer based on the unit's state at the time of its starting is used and applied to all the following intervals during each commitment period
- Each unit's start-up offer is equally divided among its minimum run time (MRT) intervals
- Each unit's minimum run time is rounded up to the next integer

- Same Integer Relaxation assumptions and start-up and no-load cost treatment as in PROBE DA except for rounding each unit's MRT to the nearest integer
- Only allow the **recommitment** of CTs and diesel units to mimic the operation of IT SCED during the operating day

Day Ahead
(298 days)


Case	Average Gen. Weighted LMP	% Change	Uplift	% Change
Base	\$31.09	-	\$156,268.63	-
2 Hour MRT/TTS	\$32.40	4.2	\$149,952.94	-4.0
24 Hour MRT/TTS	\$34.57	11.2	\$26,997.12	-82.7

Real Time
(355 days)

Case	Average Gen. Weighted LMP	% Change	Uplift	% Change
Base	\$31.86	-	\$263,159.17	-
2 Hour MRT/TTS	\$33.65	5.6	\$207,325.59	-21.2
24 Hour MRT/TTS	\$35.39	11.1	\$52,416.94	-80.1




2018 Day-Ahead Average Daily Generator Weighted LMPs






Day-Ahead Average Generator Weighted LMPs on February 20, 2018



- Base
- 2 Hour MRT & TTS
- 24 Hour MRT & TTS





Day-Ahead Average Generator Weighted LMPs on June 17, 2018






Day-Ahead Average Generator Weighted LMPs on August 28, 2018








Real-Time Average Generator Weighted LMPs on January 8, 2018






Real-Time Average Generator Weighted LMPs on June 2, 2018



Real-Time Average Generator Weighted LMPs on August 28, 2018



- PROBE Day-Ahead and Perfect Dispatch were used to simulate the impacts of integer relaxation treatment in the pricing run for the day-ahead and real-time markets, respectively
- Expanding the number of units eligible for integer relaxation treatment results, on average, in increases in the LMP and decreases in uplift
- Expanding integer relaxation treatment to units that have longer total time to start and minimum run times results in consistently higher off-peak prices but potentially lower on-peak prices

- Current pricing run implementation optimizes over a single period
- Multi-period integer relaxation solves the pricing problem looking forward over multiple periods
- Allows start-up and no-load costs to be allocated non-uniformly over a resource's operating hours
- For example, start-up costs can be allocated to peak load hours in order to minimize uplift payments