UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Implementation Issues Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 **Docket AD16-16-000**

COMMENTS OF

NORTHWEST AND INTERMOUNTAIN POWER PRODUCERS COALITION

The Northwest & Intermountain Power Producers Coalition (NIPPC) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Commission's invitation to participate in its Technical Conference regarding its implementation of the Public Utilities Regulatory Act, commonly known as PURPA.

NIPPC is a policy advocacy organization representing Independent Power Producers (IPPs), marketers, and service providers active in the Pacific Northwest and Intermountain West. Our footprint includes Idaho, Oregon and Washington State. Collectively, within those three states our members operate approximately 5000 MW of thermal and renewable energy capacity while transacting tens of thousands of megawatt hours across the western interconnection.

It is well known that our corner of the country is far behind in creating an organized regional market. NIPPC has been a vocal supporter of forming a Westwide market since our incorporation in 2002. We look forward to the day when PURPA folds into a narrow band as outlined in Section 210(m) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

While substantial progress has been made toward forming organized markets in our region, much work remains to be done and obstacles overcome before the competitive marketplace FERC supports arrives. In the interim, the Pacific Northwest and

Intermountain West remain bastions of monopsony power. Simply put, we essentially reside in a traditional vertically integrated paradigm.

Two examples will serve to underscore the nature of this environment. The following two episodes, one that is still unfolding while the other story has just concluded demonstrate how challenging it is for IPPs to conduct business with the IOUs operating in Idaho, Oregon and Washington.

In 2013, Portland General Electric ("PGE") selected Abeinsa, an affiliate of the Spanish multinational corporation Abengoa, to build the utility owned 440-MW natural gas-fired Carty Generating Station. The selection was the result of a competitive RFP process and was blessed by Oregon's PUC, despite concerns raised by other bidders about Abengoa's creditworthiness after recent credit downgrades by both Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investor Service. Unfortunately, shortly after construction began, Abengoa began talks with its creditors to avoid the largest bankruptcy filing ever in Spain.

PGE has since had to step in and take over the construction at the Carty Station, which places ratepayers at risk for having to pay increased prices. While the original bid estimated Carty at \$514 million, which necessitated a 4.8 rate increase to Oregon customers, its true costs are undoubtedly much higher. PGE made a filing with securities regulators estimating a 30 percent cost increase and has signaled that it may attempt to recover cost overruns from its customers. Steve Corson, a spokesperson for PGE, sums up the problem, noting "We felt comfortable, the independent evaluator felt comfortable, and the PUC had also affirmed we used an appropriate process in evaluating the bidding." In short, PGE chose profits over doing what was best for its customers in Oregon.

In 2003, ("PacifiCorp") self-built a 525-MW natural gas-fired power plant, Currant Creek project, for a bargain price of only \$350 million. However, in 2012, a Utah jury found that PacifiCorp obtained that bargain in part by "willfully and maliciously misappropriated a trade secret from USA Power" effectively sidestepping the bid USA

Power submitted in PacifiCorp's RFP and building USA Power's project without the developer. Court documents demonstrate that after detailed negotiations and a series of counteroffers with USA Power under a confidentiality agreement, PacifiCorp informed USA Power that it decided to utilize the Oregon Commission's RFP process instead. USA Power submitted a bid, which was not selected, and felt that the result of that RFP process was PacifiCorp choosing itself to build a replica of USA Power's design.

These two episodes, one that is still unfolding while the other story is concluded demonstrate how difficult it is for IPPs to secure contracts with the IOUs operating in Idaho, Oregon and Washington.

In our corner of the country, PURPA serves an indispensible function. The option of developing a project that beats the utilities' marginal cost of energy and leads to a PURPA off-take contract is one reason developers remain active. They know that if they fail to win a bid or negotiate a fair power purchase agreement (PPA) or asset transfer with the utility, they can convert their efforts into a PURPA project.

It bears noting since ultimately the ratepayers are the most interested party, that by definition PURPA contracts come in below the utilities cost of energy. And as consumer advocates will confirm, even the "threat" of competition saves consumers dollars.

In short, PURPA, only where it is viable, creates a safety net for ratepayers and the sole opportunity for entrepreneurs who hope to sell power or projects to IOUs. All this in spite of genuine disinterest on the part of the state regulators and outright hostility on the part of the IOUs.

We think of PURPA challenging utilities' heretofore unchecked privilege to build the next round of capacity as the result of IPPs beating utility benchmark prices. When

USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, No. 20130442, 2016 WL 2866139, at *7 (Utah May 16, 2016) (affirming the jury award of more than \$133 million).

avoided costs are fairly and accurately calculated, the lowest cost provider should always win.

But now that PURPA projects, as congress originally intended, threaten to erode existing utility capacity coupled with declining load from energy efficiency, the stakes are higher. These higher stakes help explain the latest push to "modernize PURPA," which in turn has led to the Commission's Technical Conference. To be sure, the phrase "modernize PURPA" is Orwellian oxymoronic doublespeak at its best. Reverting to the bad old days of Samuel Insull and unchecked monopoly and monopsony power is not modernization.

A number of assertions have been made in recent months suggesting that PURPA has become obsolete as a result of new commercial opportunities. There is no basis for these cynical, self-serving claims.

While PURPA as a formalized safeguard against monopsony power could be obsolete, that prospect is theoretical. PURPA, where it functions, is a proven check on utilities' monopsony market power. In several states in the Pacific Northwest and Intermountain West PURPA is the only reliable pathway for IPPs to deliver ratepayers alternatives to conventional utility-owned generation.

In reviewing claims made by representatives of the ever-expanding Berkshire Hathaway Energy empire before Congress, one is reminded of the adage made famous by the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan: "everyone is entitled to their own opinion but no one is entitled to their own facts."

The Commission need be aware of the degree to which PURPA's critics have turned the facts on their heads in arguing for its obsolesce.

One such claim is that competitive procurement policies at state utility commissions offer sufficient opportunities to IPPs such that PURPA is no longer needed. Would that it were so.

The heralded competitive bidding guidelines developed and deployed by the Oregon Public Utility Commission have so far failed to deliver genuine competition. PacifiCorp and Portland General Electric have consistently won nearly every "competitive" bid conducted under its aegis. In fact, 95 percent of the new generating capacity built to serve utility ratepayers has been built by IOUs in the ten years since the OPUC enacted its guidelines.

The Carty Generating Station described earlier emerged from a competitive bid overseen by an Independent Evaluator and run entirely consistent with OPUC policies.

PacifiCorp recently demonstrated how it views the OPUC's policies by ignoring all of them and proceeding without the Oregon Commission's acknowledgement to seek renewable capacity on an exclusive build own transfer basis.

The Idaho Commission adopted Oregon's guidelines as its own but has yet to put them to a test. The last major resource acquisition by Idaho Power was advertised as "competitive" but despite vocal criticism and virtually no meaningful competition led to construction of the 300 MW Langley Gulch gas-fired CCCT unit in 2013.

There is absolutely no basis to claim that competitive procurement policies have made PURPA obsolete.

A similarly *prim face* false claim is that the new Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) run by the CAISO offers IPPs sufficient marketing opportunities that PURPA is no longer necessary.

There are no IPPs connected to the EIM and no mechanism to bring them into the burgeoning energy market. In a vivid indication of what IOUs really think of integrating PURPA generators into the grid, one need only consider Portland General's strenuous objection to PURPA projects dynamically scheduling into its system, a position

PacifiCorp supports. Furthermore, in a sign of what's not to come, PacifiCorp resists inter-tie bidding for the EIM.

Certainly, a robust market would have to, by definition, include IPPs but there is no sign of progress that the EIM is ready to accommodate non-utility generation any time soon. Simply put, an EIM does not, and is not designed to create a competitive retail market such that PURPA is rendered obsolete. You already have a process under Section 210(m) to reassess the need for PURPA in those competitive retail markets. But in those vertically integrated, traditional, monopoly markets, like the Pacific Northwest, PURPA is needed more than ever.

The very fact that FERC is there as a recourse of last resort, a credible "backstop," for frustrated IPPs to appeal to has mitigated what are often difficult – indeed even hostile --policy environments at the state level.

FERC's commitment to implementing PURPA as Congress originally envisioned it has been exceptional. The Commission's continued dedication is what originally propelled and, which has since protected PURPA in the Pacific Northwest and Intermountain West. Meanwhile, the Commission's respect for "cooperative federalism" has helped to a meaningful extent blunt ill will amongst most state commissions. Still, the Commission's diplomacy is a work in progress that has yielded mixed results.

It is important to recognize that as a result of FERC's posture that for every case, which has come before the Commission, there are easily ten more that could have made it to the Commission but did not. One reason is that cooperative federalism sometimes spurrs resolution encouraging the otherwise domineering IOU to settle in order to avoid FERC action. More often, however, utilities with access to unlimited ratepayer money to fund their litigious response to PURPA, outlast, outspend and out-lobby the PURPA industry to the point they simply cannot carry on the battle. The irony here, of course, is that the utilities use ratepayer funds to fight PURPA developers who offer the only lower cost alternative to utility ratebased resources. So the ratepayers pay twice, they pay the

utilities' legal bills to fight PURPA development and they pay higher rates for utility sponsored resources than they would for PURPA developed projects.

The volume of litigation over PURPA in Idaho, Oregon and Washington testifies to the resistance IOUs put up to its implementation at the state level. It is important to note, however, that the large volume of PURPA litigation is only the tip of the iceberg as an indicator of the overwhelming resources IOUs have brought to their forty year long mission to repeal PURPA through the back door of state commission litigation.

The unprecedented level of litigation in Idaho reached its apex in the spring of 2013 when FERC, for the first and only time, actually filed a lawsuit against a state commission for its failure to properly implement PURPA. At issue was the point in time when a QF creates a legally enforceable obligation (also known as a LEO) The Idaho Commission had improperly denied LEO status to several wind QFs based on the fact that a contract had not been fully executed by both parties. Prior to the lawsuit, FERC had entered multiple orders declaring that the Idaho Commission's decisions were not in compliance with PURPA. Finally, obviously out of exasperation, FERC sued the Idaho Commission in federal court to stop the Idaho Commission's obstruction of federal law.

The case was settled on the afternoon of Christmas Eve, 2013, with the Idaho Commission and FERC extolling the virtues of PURPA's cooperative federalism and the ability of the state and federal governments to work together to implement PURPA. At the end of the day, however, the Idaho Commission conceded that a LEO could indeed be created by a QF WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE UTILITY. Which, of course is the heart of PURPA, because without such a right, PURPA would be a toothless wish list with no practical effect.

Unfortunately, as is evidenced by the Idaho Commission's recent reduction of PURPA contract terms to just two years, the intent and spirit of that settlement has been thrown on the trash heap. Cooperative federalism is a two way street. FERC has done its part by giving the state commissions great leeway in how the many ambiguous terms in PURPA

may be interpreted and implemented. That said, limiting PURPA contracts to just two years eviscerates the act and, once again puts utilities in the driver seat when it comes to protecting their monopsony powers.

In all, more than 80 PURPA cases² have been litigated at the three commissions over the last ten years. These include specific complaints, generic dockets or disputes over tariffs.

Dated at Boise, Idaho, this 7th day of June, 2016.

/s/Peter J. Richardson

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 $^{^{2}}$ See Attached list of PURPA filings in ID, OR and WA 1996 - current.

Oregon PURPA Filings 2006-2016

Case Type	Filing	Last	Case No.	Case Name
G 1	Date	Filing	AR 526	OPUC Rulemaking to Update
General	Apr-	Jul-	AK 320	Division 029 Rules
Policy	2008	2008	AR 593	Obsidian Renewables LLC Petition
General	Nov-	Mar-	AK 393	to Amend OAR 860-0290040,
Policy	2015	2016		Related to Power Purchases by
				Public Utilities from Small QFs
General	Oct-	Dec-	DR 45	Petition for Declaratory Ruling by
	2010	2010	DR 43	Central Oregon Irrigation District
Policy	Jun-	Jun-	UE 235	PacifiCorp Revises Schedule 37,
Rate Filing	2011	2014	OE 255	Avoided Cost Purchases from QFs
	2011	2017		of 10,000 kW or Less (Third Party
				Transmission Costs)
Utility	Sep-	Oct-	UE 241	Idaho Power Application to Lower
Application	2011	2011		Standard Contract Eligibility Cap
Application	2011	2011		and to Reduce Standard Contract
				Term
Utility	Jan-	Aug-	UE 244	Idaho Power Co. Request for
Application	2012	2012		Approval of Tariff Change
TPPI				Lowering Standard Contract
				Eligibility Cap for QFs
Rate Filing	Apr-	May-	UM 1129	Request to Change Avoided Cost
	2007	2007		Rates
General	Jan-	May-	UM 1129	OPUC Investigation into Electric
Policy	2004	2005	Phase I	Utility Purchases from QFs
General	Jul-	Sep-	UM 1129	Compliance Filings
Policy	2005	2006	Phase I	
General	May-	Aug-	UM 1129	OPUC Investigation into Electric
Policy	2005	2007	Phase II	Utility Purchases from QFs
General	Aug-	Nov-	UM 1129	Compliance Filings
Policy	2007	2008	Phase II	OPLICE OF THE P
General	Oct-	Jun-	UM 1396	OPUC Investigation Into Resource
Policy	2008	2011	Phase I	Sufficiency Pursuant to Order No.
	<u> </u>			06-538
General	Dec-	Apr-	UM 1396	OPUC Investigation Into Resource
Policy	2011	2015	Phase II	Sufficiency Pursuant to Order No.
				06-538

Case Type	Filing	Last	Case No.	Case Name
	Date	Filing	TIN # 1 401	ODITO I di di di
General	Nov-	May-	UM 1401	OPUC Investigation into
Policy	2008	2014		Interconnection of PURPA
				Qualifying Facilities With
				Nameplate Capacity Larger Than
				20 Megawatts to a Public Utility's
				Transmission or Distribution
				System
General	Dec-	Jan-	UM 1409	OPUC Investigation to consider
Policy	2008	2012		adoption of new federal standards
				contained in the Energy
				Independence and Security Act of
				2007
QF	Aug-	Dec-	UM 1441	Farmers Irrigation District v.
Complaint	2009	2010		PacifiCorp
Rate Filing	Aug-	Dec-	UM 1442	OPUC Investigation to Determine
•	2009	2009		if PacifiCorp's Rate Revision Is
				Consistent With the PURPA
				Methodologies and Calculations
				Required by Order No. 05-584
Rate Filing	Aug-	Dec-	UM 1443	OPUC Investigation to Determine
<i>B</i>	2009	2009		if PGE's Rate Revision Has Been
				Consistent With the PURPA
				Methodologies and Calculations
				Required by Order No. 05-584
QF	Sep-	Nov-	UM 1449	International Paper Co., v.
Complaint	2009	2009		PacifiCorp
QF	Jul-	Aug-	UM 1546	Threemile Canyon Wind LLC v
Complaint	2011	2014		PacifiCorp
QF	Aug-	Mar-	UM 1552	Tumbleweed Energy II, LLC v.
Complaint	2011	2012	01.11332	Idaho Power Co.
QF	Aug-	Mar-	UM 1553	Western Desert Energy, LLC v.
Complaint	2011	2012	0111 1333	Idaho Power Co.
Rate Filing	Nov-	May-	UM 1561	PGE Quarterly Non-Firm Avoided
Rate Fining	2011	2014	OW 1501	Cost Rates
OF	Dec-	Oct-	UM 1566	PaTu Wind Farm, LLC v. PGE
QF Complaint	2011	2015	OWI 1500	Tara windrain, DDC v. 1 OD
-	Jan-	Jan-	UM 1572	Kootenai Electric Coop., Inc. v.
QF Complaint	2012	2014	0141 13/2	Idaho Power Co.
			UM 1596	Lower Ridge Windfarm, LLC
QF Application	Apr-	May-	OIVI 1390	Request for Waiver of the Five-
Application	2012	2012		_
0 1	T	T	IIM 1610	Mile Radius Requirement
General	Jun-	Jun-	UM 1610	OPUC Investigation into QF
Policy	2012	2014	Phase I	Pricing and Contracting

Case Type	Filing Date	Last Filing	Case No.	Case Name
General Policy	Apr- 2014	Aug- 2014	UM 1610 Phase I	Compliance Filings
General	Jun- 2014	May- 2014	UM 1610 Phase II	OPUC Investigation into QF Pricing and Contracting
Policy General	Jun-	May- 2010	UM 1610 Phase II	Compliance Filings
Policy Utility Application	Jul- 2013	Oct- 2013	UM 1664	PGE Application to Update Schedule 201 Qualifying Facility Information
Utility Application	Apr- 2015	Pending	UM 1725	Idaho Power Co. Application to Lower Standard Contract Eligibility Cap and to Reduce the Standard Contract Term, for Approval of Solar Integration Change, and for Change in Resource Sufficiency Determination
Rate Filing	May- 2015	Jun- 2016	UM 1728	PGE Updates to Schedule 201 QF
Rate Filing	May- 2015	May- 2016	UM 1729	PacifiCorp Schedule 37 Avoided Cost Updates
Rate Filing	May- 2015	Jun- 2016	UM 1730	Idaho Power Update to Schedule 85 Avoided Cost Rates
QF Complaint	May- 2015	Sep- 2015	UM 1731	Pacific Northwest Solar, LLC v. Idaho Power Co.
QF Complaint	May- 2015	Nov- 2015	UM 1733	Gardner Capitol Solar Development, LLC v. Idaho Power Co.
Utility Application	May- 2015	Pending	UM 1734	PacifiCorp Application to Reduce the Qualifying Facility Contract Term and Lower the Qualifying Facility Standard Contract Eligibility Cap
QF Complaint	Jun- 2016	Pending	UM 1742	Surprise Valley v. PacifiCorp

Oregon Total Cases: 39

Idaho PURPA Filings 2006-2016

Case Type	Filing	Last	Case No.	Case Name
	Date	Filing		TODG INIC
FERC	Mar-	Dec-	1:13-CV 141	FERC v. IPUC
Civil	2013	2013	(D. Idaho)	
Complaint	_			O To '1 W' 1 - A-i-to Com
QF	Dec-	May-	AUV-E-10-06	Orem Family Wind v. Avista Corp.
Complaint	2010	2011		
Utility	May-	Oct-	AVU-E-09-04	Petition of Avista Corp. for an
Petition	2009	2009		Order Determining Ownership of
				RECs and Stay of any Requirement
				to Award RECs to A PURPA
				Developer
QF	Dec-	May-	AVU-E-10-05	Mariah Wind v. Avista Corp.
Complaint	2010 _	2011		
Civil	Apr-	Settled	CV OC	Agpower Jerom, LLC v. IPUC
Complaint	2010		2007143	
General	Nov-	Mar-	GNR-E-10-04	Joint Petition Regarding Avoided
Policy	2010	2011		Cost Issues By Idaho Power, Avista
	i			and PacifiCorp. Fourteen Separate
			l ⁱ	PURPA Related Parties intervened
				and Participated in The Docket.
General	Feb-	Jun-	GNR-E-11-01	Investigation into Disaggregation
Policy	2011	2011		
General	Jun-	Aug-	GNR-E-11-03	Solar and IRP Avoided Cost
Policy	2011	2013		Methodologies
QF	Sep-	Aug-	IPC-E-06-21	Complaint Cassia Wind Park v.
Complaint	2006	2007		Idaho Power
QF	Jul-	Feb-	IPC-E-07-13	Complaint Exergy Development
Complaint	2007	2008		Group of Idaho v. Idaho Power
QF	Apr-	Jan-	IPC-E-10-11	Complaint Agpower Jerome v.
Complaint	2010	2011		Idaho Power
QF	Apr-	Aug-	IPC-E-10-13	Complaint New Energy v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2010		Power
QF	Nov-	Nov-	IPC-E-10-29	Complaint Grouse Creek Wind v.
Complaint	2010	2010		Idaho Power
QF	Nov-	Nov-	IPC-E-10-30	Complaint Grouse Creek Wind II v.
Complaint	2010	2010		Idaho Power
QF	Nov-	Oct-	IPC-E-10-31	Complaint Fall River Reca v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2011		Power
QF	Nov-	May-	IPC-E-10-32	Complaint Alpha Wind v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2012		Power

Case Type	Filing Date	Last Filing	Case No.	Case Name
QF Complaint	Nov- 2010	May- 2012	IPC-E-10-33	Complaint Bravo Wind v. Idaho Power
QF	Nov-	May-	IPC-E-10-34	Complaint Charlie Wind v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2012	n c B io s i	Power
QF	Nov-	May-	IPC-E-10-35	Complaint Delta Wind v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2012	11021035	Power
QF	Nov-	May-	IPC-E-10-36	Complaint Echo Wind v. Idaho
Complaint	2010	2012	11021000	Power
QF	Aug-	Jan-	IPC-E-11-15	Complaint Grand View Solar v.
Complaint	2011	2014		Idaho Power
QF	Jan-	May-	IPC-E-12-01	Complaint Grand View Solar Three
Complaint	2012	2014		and Four v. Idaho Power
QF	Feb-	Jun-	IPC-E-12-10	Complaint interconnect Solar v.
Complaint	2012	2012		Idaho Power
Complaint	Mar-	Jun-	IPC-E-12-11	Rainbow Ranch Petition to Modify
Complant	2012	2012		Order
QF	Jul-	Dec-	IPC-E-12-18	Complaint Hidden Hollow Energy
Complaint	2012	2015		v. Idaho Power
Complaint	Jul-	Aug-	IPC-E-12-20	Complaint Idaho Power v. Cotton
	2012	2012		Wood Wind Park et. Al
Complaint	Jul-	Aug-	IPC-E-12-22	Complaint Idaho Power v. Notch
	2012	2012		Butte Wind Park
Complaint	Jul-	Aug-	IPC-E-12-23	Complaint Idaho Power v. Lava
1	2012	2012		Beds Wind Park
Complaint	Nov-	Oct-	IPC-E-12-25	Complaint Idaho Power v. New
	2012	2014		Energy Two
Complaint	Nov-	Oct-	IPC-E-12-26	Complaint Idaho Power v. New
1	2012	2014		Energy Three
QF	Oct-	Apr-	IPC-E-13-19	Complaint Idaho Wind Partners v.
Complaint	2013	2014		Idaho Power
Complaint	May-	Jul-	IPC-E-14-09	Idaho Power Application to
1	2014	2014		Suspend Purchases of Solar QF
				Power
Complaint	May-	Nov-	IPC-E-14-13	Idaho Power Application to
_	2014	2014		Suspend Purchases From Certain
				Solar QF Power Developers
Utility	Jul-	Feb-	IPC-E-14-18	Idaho Power Application to
Application	2014	2015		Implement Solar Integration Rate
Utility	Jan-	Nov-	IPC-E-15-01	Idaho Power Application to Modify
Application	2015	2015		QF Contract Terms
Civil	Sep-	Jan-	SUP-E-11-02	Cedar Creek v. IPUC
Complaint	2011	2012		

Idaho Total Cases: 36

Washington PURPA Filing 2006-2016

Case Type	Filing Date	Last Filing	Case No.	Case Name
General	Apr-	Aug-	UE-060649	The Commission's Investigation of
Policy	2006	2007		Public Utility Regulatory Policies
				Act Standards Pertaining to Smart
				Metering and Time of Use Rates
General	Feb-	Mar-	U-090222	Review of PURPA Standards in
Policy	2009	2010		The Energy Independence and
_				Security Act of 2007
Tariff		Mar-	UE-130043,	UTC v. PacifiCorp General Rate
Revision		2015	UE-111190,	Case(s)
			UE-140762	
Tariff		Jan-	UE-100467,	UTC v. Avista Corp. General Rate
Revision	:	2016	UE-110876,	Case(s)
			UE-120436,	
			UE-140188,	
			UE 150204	
Tariff		May-	UE-111048	UTC v. Puget Sound Energy
Revision		2012		General Rate Case(s)
Tariff	Dec-	Feb-	UE-144160	PacifiCorp proposal to eliminate
Revision	2014	2015		capacity payments
Utility	Dec-	Apr-	2016 WL	PacifiCorp v. Washington UTC
Application	2016	2016	2343036 (Ct.	(holding that the Commission did
**			App. Wa.)	not violate PURPA by not allowing
				recovery of avoided costs)

Washington Total Cases: 8