In this case, SFPP, L.P. (SFPP) filed an application to increase its West Line rates primarily because changes in its throughput allegedly attendant to increased throughput on its East Line, led it to under recover its costs. On exceptions, the Commission, in Opinion No. 511, affirmed or modified a number of rulings below including but not limited to the appropriate test year, operating expenses, capital structure and cost of capital, income tax allowance and allocation of corporate overhead costs. SFPP filed to comply with Opinion No. 511, and it also petitioned for rehearing of that opinion. On rehearing, the Commission mainly upheld its earlier opinion, but did grant rehearing on several issues. Among them were that SFPP’s compliance filing did not have to meet the “substantial divergence” standard of 18 C.F.R. § 342.4(a) capturing the threshold showing for changing a rate by the cost-of-service method, and that at hearings pursuant to section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the determination to be made is limited to whether rates are just and reasonable.

These matters are in the compliance phase.
134 FERC ¶ 61,121
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

OPINION NO. 511

SFPP, L.P.                                      Docket No. IS08-390-002

OPINION AND ORDER ON INITIAL DECISION

(Issued February 17, 2011)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

SFPP, L.P.                                      Docket No. IS08-390-002

OPINION NO. 511

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Appendix A
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134 FERC ¶ 61,121
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman;
Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.

SFPP, L.P.

Docket No. IS08-390-002

OPINION NO. 511

ORDER ON INITIAL DECISION

(Issued February 17, 2011)

1. This order reviews the December 2, 2009 initial decision issued in the captioned
docket.¹ The 2009 ID addresses the reasonableness of rates that SFPP, L.P. (SFPP) filed
on June 30, 2008 to increase its West Line rates. This order generally affirms the 2009
ID’s conclusions regarding good-will, the allocation of costs among SFPP’s affiliates and
between SFPP’s jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional services, and most capital structure,
cost of capital and income tax allowance issues. This order also modifies the 2009 ID’s
findings regarding throughput, purchase accounting adjustments, the allocation of
litigation costs, and some rate base and secondary cost of service issues. SFPP must file
an enhanced overhead cost recovery analysis, revised tariffs, and an estimated report on
refunds that are consistent with the conclusions of this order.

I. General Background

2. On June 30, 2008, SFPP submitted, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 342.4(a), revised
FERC Tariff Nos. 171 and 172 to reflect proposed cost-of-service rates which would
result in a rate increase for all shipments on SFPP’s West Line between Watson Station,
Los Angeles County, California and Phoenix, Arizona. The proposed rates were
protested by BP West Coast Products LLC and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (together
“ExxonMobil/BP”), Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company (Tesoro), ConocoPhillips
US Airways, Inc., Chevron Products Company (Chevron), and Valero Marketing and
Supply Company (together the ACV Shippers). The protesting shippers alleged that
SFPP failed to demonstrate a substantial divergence between SFPP’s actual costs and its

current ceiling rates such that the ceiling rates would preclude SFPP from being able to charge just and reasonable rates. The protesting parties raised numerous issues of material fact regarding SFPP's claimed actual costs and proposed rate levels.

3. SFPP supports its proposed rate increase arguing that the rate increase responds to a decline in volumes on SFPP's West Line that are a result of a corresponding increase in throughput to Phoenix from SFPP's East Line. The East Line runs from El Paso, Texas to Phoenix, Arizona, and was expanded in two phases. The second of these was placed in service in December 2007. SFPP claims a 32 percent decrease in throughput on the West Line in the first five months of 2008, from an average of 114,120 barrels per day (bpd) to 77,810 bpd. To offset the reduced throughput, SFPP seeks the following rate increases: a 12.3 percent increase in rates for volumes from the Watson and East Hynes Stations in California to Phoenix, a 26.6 percent increase for volumes transported between Colton Transmix Facility in California to Phoenix, and a 10.6 percent increase for shipments between Watson and East Hynes Stations to an interconnection with Calnev Pipe Line L.L.C. at Colton in San Bernardino County, California.

4. SFPP calculated its cost of service for the test period at $47,162,000. SFPP's test period revenue under its then-existing rates would have been $41,988,000, resulting in an under-recovery of approximately $5,174,000 or 12.3 percent. SFPP projected that the test period revenue under the proposed rates would be approximately $47,157,000. SFPP used calendar year 2007 as the base period for actual costs, revenue, and throughput data. SFPP used the first nine months of 2008 (January through September) for the test period to adjust the base period for known and measurable changes.

5. By order issued July 29, 2008, the Commission accepted and suspended SFPP's proposed rates for the West Line to become effective August 1, 2008 subject to refund. The issues surrounding the proposed West Line rates were set for hearing and settlement judge procedures. After settlement discussions reached a stalemate, a hearing was held in June 2009. The Presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued the 220 page 2009 ID on December 2, 2009. The principal sections of the 2009 ID address: (1) the base and test periods, (2) allowed return, (3) income tax allowance, (4) the level and allocation of operating and maintenance expenses, (5) the throughput volume level for determining rates, and (6) classification of costs for Account No. 590. The 2009 ID concludes that the just and reasonable going-forward rates for the West Line are those rates calculated after all of the adjustments ordered by the ALJ are implemented.

6. Subsequently, the parties filed briefs on exceptions and briefs opposing exceptions. During that post-hearing briefing phase, SFPP filed a motion on February 1, 2009.

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2010 urging the Commission to reject the ACC Shippers’ and Valero’s briefs on exceptions because their briefs exceed the page limits contained in the Commission’s procedural regulations. SFPP essentially argues that the ACC Shippers and Valero pursued a joint litigation strategy, including the filing of a common protest and the use of the same witnesses, such that they should be considered a single party subject to the page limitations governing briefs on exceptions. The ACC Shippers and Valero replied that regardless of whether they might have a coordinated strategy in some regards, they are nonetheless independent parties and should be treated as such for purposes of the rules. They assert that in this instance they elected to do so given the complexity of the issues and in order to specialize on the issues that they address. The Commission notes that while these parties filed joint interventions, we note that they always retain the right to take different positions as the proceeding progresses where it appears to suit their respective interests. As such, they are reasonably considered to be independent parties notwithstanding some coordination of their litigation strategies, and therefore the Commission denies SFPP’s motion to strike and accepts the ACC Shippers’ and Valero’s briefs on exceptions. The remainder of this Order addresses (1) test year definition and throughput; (2) operating expenses; (3) the allocation of overhead costs; (4) capital structure and the cost of capital; (5) income tax allowance issues; and (6) substantial under-recovery.

II. Test Year Definition and Throughput

7. The issues of test year definition and throughput were addressed as separate topics in the 2009 ID and in some of the briefs on exceptions. However, the 2009 ID selected a test period consisting of actual data from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008, based primarily on its reliance on the throughput levels to be adopted in this proceeding. Thus the proper throughput level and the base and test period used to determine that throughput level are inextricably intertwined, and the Commission addresses the exceptions to these issues together.

8. Section 346.2(a) of the Commission’s regulations defines the base and test period for oil pipelines as follows:

(i) A base period must consist of 12 consecutive months of actual experience. The 12 months of experience must be adjusted to eliminate nonrecurring items (except minor accounts). The filing

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3 The joint interventions were under the caption of the ACV Shippers as defined in paragraph. However Valero filed a separate brief on exceptions and the remaining joint intervenors are captioned the ACC Shippers for the purpose of filing exceptions to the 2009 ID.
carrier may include appropriate normalizing adjustments in lieu of nonrecurring items.

(ii) A test period must consist of a base period adjusted for changes in revenues and costs which are known and are measurable with reasonable accuracy at the time of filing and which will become effective within nine months after the last month of available actual experience utilized in the filing. For good cause shown, the Commission may allow reasonable deviation from the prescribed test period.

In this case, the base period is from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2007. The nine-month adjustment period for test period changes is from January 1, 2008, through September 30, 2008.

9. The 2009 ID held that all throughput and all related operational and maintenance issues\(^4\) should be calculated using actual data from the 12-month period of October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008,\(^5\) consisting of the last three months of the base period and the nine month adjustment period. The 2009 ID stated that using data from October 2007-September 2008 was consistent with section 346.2(a)(ii) of the regulations\(^6\) and Commission precedent. The 2009 ID acknowledged that the October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 data included at least two months of data before the East Line expansion, which caused significant reductions in West Line volumes. However, the 2009 ID also reasoned that the January 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 throughput data had been depressed due to the recession and was not likely to reflect future volumes. Thus, the 2009 ID concluded that use of a full 12-months of data provided a fairer representation of the factors impacting the West Line. The 2009 ID further concluded that the post-test period throughput data cited by the parties was unclear.

\(^4\) These issues include: (1) allocation factors between interstate and intrastate service and between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional service, (2) fuel and power costs, (3) oil losses and shortages expenses and (4) appropriate allocation of expenses to interstate and intrastate service.


A. Exceptions

1. SFPP

10. SFPP asserts that the Commission should use throughput from the base period of 2007, adjusting throughput levels for deliveries to Phoenix by using annualized data for the five month period of January 1, 2008, through May 30, 2008. SFPP proposes this adjustment due to a 32 percent reduction in volumes on the West Line to Phoenix that occurred following the East Line expansion. SFPP states that its proposal complies with Commission regulations because it contains “known and measurable changes at the time of filing” which would “become effective within nine months after the last month of available actual experience utilized in the filing.” SFPP therefore concludes that the 2009 ID is inconsistent with the Commission’s test period regulations. First, SFPP asserts that the regulations only allow deviations from base period data for known and measurable changes, and that, although the East Line expansion produced a known and measurable change for volumes to Phoenix, the other destinations on the West Line were not subject to this same known and measurable change. Second, SFPP asserts that by incorporating actual data for 2008 that became available only after SFPP’s filing, the 2009 ID violated the regulatory provision that requires all adjustments to be “known and measurable” at the time of filing.

11. In addition to criticizing the 2009 ID’s application of the Commission’s test period regulations, SFPP contests the 2009 ID’s determination that the 12-month actual data for October 2007-September 2008 is a “more representative sampling” than the throughput level proposed by SFPP. As factual support, SFPP asserts that the West Line’s actual deliveries during the nine-month adjustment period January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 were within one percent of SFPP’s proposed throughput. SFPP had proposed a throughput level of 196,951 bpd and the West Line actually delivered 198,321 bpd during that nine-month adjustment period.

12. If data outside the test period is considered, SFPP acknowledges that deliveries to Phoenix were higher during the first part of 2009 than SFPP’s proposed throughput levels. However, SFPP asserts that this was because Flying J, Inc. (“Flying J”), the then parent company of Longhorn Pipeline (“Longhorn”) filed for bankruptcy in December of 2008. SFPP contends that in order to avoid Longhorn, which is a feeder pipeline into the East Line, shippers began transporting more volumes to Phoenix via the West Line.

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7 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 39 (quoting 18 C.F.R. § 346.2(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2010)).
8 Id. at 40 (citing Ex. SFP-57 at 120).
9 Id. (citing Ex. ACV-235HC at 3).
SFPP avers that after Flying J announced on June 19, 2009 that it had acquired a stalking horse bidder for Longhorn, West Line throughput returned to the levels consistent with SFPP’s proposal. SFPP further asserts that the throughput level adopted by the 2009 ID (using throughput from October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008) incorporated three months of data in its test period before the East Line expansion becoming fully operational.10

13. SFPP also asserts that because the East Line expansion caused a 32 percent decline in West Line volumes, these months are not representative of SFPP’s future volume levels. SFPP also objects to the 2009 ID’s proposal to depart from the 2007 base period data for all throughput, not just the throughput to Phoenix. For the other three interstate West Line destinations (Calnev, Luke, and Yuma), SFPP proposes to use the actual, unadjusted 2007 base period volumes to represent its 2007 base period volume levels. SFPP explains that it only adjusted Phoenix volumes because the East Line expansion only affected Phoenix deliveries and no structural changes occurred affecting future throughput to other destinations. Moreover, SFPP notes that at the time of the West Line tariff filing, the West Line’s average daily deliveries to locations other than Phoenix were lower than the average daily deliveries to those locations during 2007.11

14. SFPP also objects to the 2009 ID’s contention that SFPP incorporated volumes from a “period with reduced levels of demand” in its test period adjustment. SFPP avers that the West Line’s throughput is not expected to return to its 2007 levels for a number of years, if ever. SFPP cites U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projections that national consumption of liquid fuels will not return to its 2007 level through at least 2020 and a study by Energy Analysts International, Inc. in December 2008. SFPP also cites statements by the Chief Executive Officers at BP and ExxonMobil that demand for gasoline “has probably peaked” in the United States. SFPP also contests the 2009 ID’s statement that SFPP’s internal studies indicate an imminent rise in volumes and profitability. SFPP avers that two of the three growth projections cited by the 2009 ID

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10 SFPP also states that although East Line Phase II was implemented on December 1, 2007, the volume shift from the West Line to the East Line did not begin until January 2008 because of logistical reasons. SFPP Brief on Ex. at 42, n.66 (citing Ex. SFP-185 at 2-3).

11 Id. at 43 (citing Ex. ACV-235HC at 3). SFPP adds that Calnev deliveries for 2008, when adjusted for a leap year were 116,197 bpd, compared to 116,122 in 2007, a variation of less than .06 percent.
are outdated\textsuperscript{12} and that a third projection\textsuperscript{13} was a qualified prediction for a number of Kinder Morgan Energy Partner (KMEP) assets and not limited to the West Line.

2. Shippers

15. The ACC Shippers urge the Commission to adopt the annual throughput to Phoenix of 32,460,787 barrels per year proposed by ACV witness Mr. O’Loughlin.\textsuperscript{14} To determine the increase in East Line volumes due to the expansion, Mr. O’Loughlin compared the increase in volumes on the East Line to Phoenix for the first nine months of 2008 to the total volumes shipped on the East Line to Phoenix relative to the first nine months of 2007, which were prior to the expansion. Then, assuming that all of the increased volume on the East Line had previously used the West Line, O’Loughlin deducted on a barrels per day basis the increase on the East Line from the base period volumes for January 1, 2007 through December 5, 2007, the date before the East Line expansion entered into service on December 6, 2007. The ACC Shippers contend that, unlike the volume levels adopted by the 2009 ID, their proposed throughput is consistent with the Commission’s regulations, which require use of 12-months of actual base period data adjusted for changes that are “known and measurable” within the following nine months.\textsuperscript{15}

16. The ACC Shippers concur with the 2009 ID that the cyclical downturn caused 2008 throughput data, which was used in different ways both by SFPP and the 2009 ID, to be unrepresentative of future volumes. For further support, the ACC Shippers point to the reports issued by the EIA after the recession. The ACC Shippers emphasize that SFPP’s own projections indicate rising volumes in the near future, showing a steady 2.5 percent annual growth rate in Phoenix demand between 2008 and 2017.\textsuperscript{16} The ACC Shippers also note that increased volumes on the West Line are supported by SFPP’s planned expansion of Calnev Pipeline LLC, an increase of 277,000 barrels on Calnev from 2007 to 2008, and SFPP’s modeling analysis showing a 2.5 percent annual growth in West Line interstate volumes to Calnev between 2008 and 2017. Based upon the assertion that the downturn depressed 2008 data, the ACC Shippers assert that the 2009 ID and SFPP inappropriately adjust the 2007 throughput levels using anomalous and

\textsuperscript{12} Id. (citing Ex. ACV-13; Ex. ACV-252).
\textsuperscript{13} Id. (citing Ex. ACV-210).
\textsuperscript{14} ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 70 (citing Ex. ACV-1 at 7-9, 21-24).
\textsuperscript{15} Id. at 71 (quoting 18 C.F.R. § 346.2(a) (2010)).
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 76 (citing Ex. ACV-210; Ex. ACV-252; Ex. ACV-13; Ex. ACV-1 at 12-13; Ex. ACV 7 at 7 n.1).
unrepresentative 2008 volumes. The ACC Shippers state that the incorporation of anomalous data is inconsistent with the purpose of the Commission’s base and test period procedures.

17. Tesoro states that the 2009 ID’s adoption of data from October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 violates the Commission’s rules by including three months of the base period and disregards the cyclical character of the severe economic recession in 2008. Tesoro also contends that the October 2007 – September 2008 data improperly include two months before the expansion of the East Line, which altered West Line volume levels. Tesoro urges the adoption of 32,889,676 barrels as the annual throughput level for the West Line to Phoenix. Tesoro witness Mr. Ashton calculated this number by annualizing the first eleven months of 2008 and adjusting this data for the effects of the economic downturn by adding the difference between the 2007 base period volumes for total East and West Line deliveries to Phoenix (4,483,799 barrels) to the annualized deliveries for the first 11 months of 2008 on the West Line to Phoenix (28,405,877). Tesoro adds that even assuming that the 2009 ID correctly used throughput data for the October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 period, the 2009 ID incorrectly determined the total throughput volume because the 2009 ID included only the Watson to Phoenix delivery volumes, when the throughput should also include the Colton to Phoenix volumes for a total throughput of 30,224,800.

B. Briefs Opposing Exceptions

1. SFPP

18. In opposing the exceptions proposed by Tesoro and by the ACC Shippers, SFPP reiterates that the proposed volume levels are representative of future West Line deliveries and that the throughput levels proposed by Tesoro and the ACC shippers are not. Furthermore, SFPP asserts that the throughput proposals of the ACC Shippers and Tesoro do not comply with the Commission’s regulations. SFPP asserts that the only basis provided by the ACC Shippers and Tesoro for excluding the decline in volumes at Phoenix was an assumption that volumes at Phoenix would immediately rebound once the recession ends, which SFPP characterizes as speculative and contrary to the Commission’s regulations. SFPP states these regulations require test period adjustments that are “known and are measurable with reasonable accuracy at the time of filing” and that will “become effective within nine months after the last month of available actual experience.” SFPP emphasizes that the record shows continuation of the lower volumes outside the base and test period. SFPP cites several reports and studies that it claims indicate continued lower throughput, for example noting that in April 2009, the EIA projected that national consumption of liquid fuels would not return to 2007 levels.
through at least 2025. SFPP argues that the recession had particularly hit Arizona and that there was no reason to believe that Arizona’s gasoline consumption would rebound quickly.

19. SFPP states that throughput levels developed by Mr. O’Loughlin and Mr. Ashton failed to distinguish between the volume decline from the recession and the decline from implementation of the East Line expansion. SFPP elaborates that these witnesses merely determined how much the East Line volumes increased during certain periods in 2008 and subtracted that amount from the total decline in West Line volumes during the same period. Moreover, SFPP objects to the contention that the planned expansion of the Calnev system establishes that volumes will increase on the West Line, noting that no physical construction has begun on the expansion, that the expansion is not planned to be operational until sometime in 2011, and that the expansion cannot be considered in any event because it is well beyond the test period.

2. Shippers

20. The ACC Shippers assert that SFPP’s use of data from the first five months of 2008 is inconsistent with Commission regulations because it discards the 2007 base period data entirely and relying solely on five months of data from 2008. The ACC Shippers assert that if the SFPP’s projection and the actual data from the nine-month adjustment period both reflect anomalous conditions, there is no reason to adjust the base period data using either of them. The ACC Shippers emphasize that the record evidence supports the 2009 ID’s conclusion that 2008 West Line volume data reflects cyclical economic conditions and is anomalous. They therefore aver that the 2009 data does not support SFPP’s claim that the Flying J bankruptcy caused the higher volumes recorded in the first part of 2009 on the West Line. This is because the data cited by SFPP does not include volumes on the East Line or indicate whether any West Line volume changes had any connection to shippers on Longhorn who may move product to Phoenix.

21. The ACC Shippers further assert that SFPP’s proposal to adjust West Line deliveries to Phoenix by using annualized data from the first months of 2008 incorrectly includes the economic downturn as well as the structural changes due to the economic downturn. The ACC Shippers represent that SFPP witnesses testified repeatedly that some of the decline in West Line Phoenix throughput reflected in SFPP’s proposed adjustment was attributable to the economic downturn, and that SFPP witnesses were unable or unwilling to separate the two effects. The ACC Shippers reject SFPP’s argument that national demand for liquid fuels will not reach 2007 levels until 2020 national projections based on a January 2009 report from the Energy Information

17 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 45 (citing Ex. SFP-348 at 2).
Administration (EIA). They assert that EIA projections for the Mountain region (which includes Arizona) projecting demand to revive and exceed 2007 levels by 2010 for motor gasoline and 2011 for liquid fuels.\textsuperscript{18} The ACC Shippers further state that Arizona’s population has been increasing and is projected to continue to increase significantly in the coming years.\textsuperscript{19} The ACC Shippers argue that SFPP disregarded EIA projections taking into account the federal government’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus package, which estimated that motor gasoline demand would exceed the 2007 level by 2010 in the Mountain region\textsuperscript{20} and 2011 nationwide.\textsuperscript{21} The same projections showed that liquid fuels demand would exceed the 2007 level by 2011.

22. The ACC Shippers further contend that SFPP’s reliance on a study by Energy Analysts International (EAI) largely supports a conclusion opposite to the one that SFPP advocated.\textsuperscript{22} In response to SFPP, the ACC Shippers discount the statements of chief executive officers of BP and ExxonMobil as mere opinion. Moreover, the ACC Shippers also state that SFPP’s internal studies related to the East Line Expansion project volume increases in the near future. The ACC Shippers state that SFPP’s analyses projected a steady 2.5% annual growth rate in Phoenix demand between 2008 and 2017.\textsuperscript{23} The ACC Shippers state that SFPP’s modeling scenarios from the same expansion also showed steady growth in West Line Phoenix demand in all scenarios.\textsuperscript{24} The ACC Shippers also assert that SFPP seeks to improperly dismiss a presentation by one of its executives in January 2009 projecting significant demand growth.\textsuperscript{25} The ACC Shippers contend the document accounted for the recession and was not qualified as SFPP claims. Moreover, the ACC Shippers further contend that SFPP’s attempt to minimize the relevance of the exhibits because they cover the entire Pacific region is inconsistent with SFPP’s usage of nationwide EIA data.

\textsuperscript{18} ACC Shippers Brief op. Ex. at 27 (citing Ex. S-10 at 16; Ex. S-9 at 30; Tr. 1748-51; Ex. ACV-306 at 6).
\textsuperscript{19} Id. (citing Ex. S-10 at 18; Ex. S-9 at 31).
\textsuperscript{20} Id. at 30 (citing Tr. 1753-55; Ex. ACV-306 at 14).
\textsuperscript{21} Id. (citing Tr. 1755-57; Ex. ACV-306 at 11).
\textsuperscript{22} Id. (citing Ex. SFP-157HC at 191, 193, 199).
\textsuperscript{23} Id. at 32 (citing Ex. ACV-7 at 7 n.1).
\textsuperscript{24} Id. (citing Ex. ACV-1 at 12; Ex. ACV-13; Ex. ACV-1C at 16-17; Ex. ACV-18C).
\textsuperscript{25} Id. (citing Ex. ACV-210).
23. Opposing SFPP’s exceptions, Tesoro states that the throughput levels advocated by SFPP are improperly based upon only five months of actual data from 2008. Tesoro further alleges that SFPP’s proposed throughput is distorted because SFPP fails to adjust for the 2008 increase in West Line volumes that occurred at Yuma (3.0 percent) and Calnev (3.8 percent) in the first 11 months of 2008. Moreover, Tesoro asserts that SFPP’s projected throughput volume (like the throughput proposed in the 2009 ID) failed to adjust for the temporary effects of the economic recession.

3. Trial Staff

24. Trial Staff avers that the 2009 ID correctly used data for October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008 to determine throughput and all issues impacted by throughput amounts. Trial Staff states that the Commission requires the use of actual data from the last twelve months of the test period because this is the best available data. Trial Staff emphasizes that the use of a full test period is particularly appropriate due to the Flying J bankruptcy and the recession. Trial Staff asserts that, contrary to SFPP’s assertions, the 2009 ID did not strip SFPP’s initial filing of its relevance – SFPP was still permitted to select the end-of-test period date of September 30, 2008. Trial Staff responds to Tesoro, ACC Shippers, and SFPP by asserting that using the last 12-months of data is consistent with Commission regulations and precedent.

25. Regarding SFPP’s projections, Trial Staff argues that it is irrelevant that SFPP’s projections were close to the actual throughput during the adjustment period because “[i]t is the well-established policy of the Commission to prefer the use of end-of-test period actuals over any other method.” Trial Staff disputes SFPP’s claim that including two months prior to completion of the East Line expansion results in unrepresentative data. Trial Staff claims that SFPP would not have expanded if volumes were permanently shifting from the West to the East Line, and, if this in fact occurs, that it would be unfair to charge West Line shippers for the excess capacity. Moreover, Trial Staff stresses that


27 Trial Staff noted that even in Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P., 84 FERC ¶ 61,086, at 61,472 (1998), which was cited by ACC Shippers, the Commission made clear that when available, the use of end-of-test-period actuals was the preferred method.

28 Trial Staff Brief op. Ex. at 36.
SFPP failed to demonstrate that depressed economic conditions incorporated into its projections will continue, and Trial Staff emphasizes that based upon internal SFPP market studies it is unlikely that the recent decline in volumes to Phoenix is likely to be prolonged.

26. In response to shippers, Trial Staff asserts that Tesoro violated Commission policy by including post-test-period data (October and November of 2008) in its throughput recommendation. Trial Staff further argues that although Tesoro is correct that Colton Transmix to Phoenix volumes were not included in Trial Staff's Phoenix West Line volumes, Colton volumes were included in Trial Staff's fully allocated cost rate calculations.

C. Discussion

27. The Commission reverses the 2009 ID. The Commission finds that throughput and related cost-of-service items should be derived from a test period using annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008. Although the Commission has previously adopted throughput levels derived from actual data consisting of the last three months of the base period and the nine-month adjustment period, the Commission has used this data because it was the most representative of future throughput. However, Commission policy does not support using data that is not likely to be representative of future throughput levels. Regarding the October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 data adopted by the 2009 ID, the months of October 2007 and November 2007 were prior to the completion of the East Line expansion, which all parties concede significantly altered West Line throughput by causing shippers to transfer their volumes from the West Line to the East Line. Moreover, the East Line expansion did not begin service until after customers scheduled December throughput, and, thus, West Line volumes were not transferred to the East Line until January 2008. Thus, as the 2009 ID acknowledged, the volumes on the West Line to Phoenix dropped considerably, from an average of 97.7 thousand barrels per day over the last three months of 2007 to 77.5 thousand barrels per day in the first nine months of 2008. The Commission rejects the October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 data adopted by the 2009 ID because these data reflect unrepresentative volume levels from October, November and December of 2007.

28. Rather, the Commission adopts as the test period for all volumes to all destinations on the West Line, the annualized throughput data for January 1, 2008, through

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29 See n.34, infra.

30 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at 605 (citing Ex. SFP-185 at 3).
September 30, 2008. 31 Within the base and adjustment period, the January 1, 2008, through September 30, 2008 data provides the most comprehensive sample of West Line volumes coinciding with the full operation of the East Line expansion. The use of nine months of actual data by the Commission is preferable to SFPP’s proposal to use only five months. SFPP claims that the five months of data were the only data that were “known and measurable” at the time of filing. However, the Commission’s regulations allow and Commission precedent permits consideration of the actual data from the entire adjustment period to evaluate the cost-of-service levels proposed by the pipeline. 32 SFPP’s position would effectively bar the refinement of test period adjustments using the latter part of the actual data from the adjustment period. Moreover, using this larger sample of representative data should increase the accuracy and confidence in the test period throughput levels.

29. The Commission rejects arguments from the ACC Shippers and Tesoro that it is necessary to adjust 2008 data to account for the effects of the economic downturn. 33 When the record has demonstrated changes in the adjustment period from base period volumes, the Commission has taken these changes into account and used the actual data from the adjustment period in order to obtain more representative data. 34 Rather than adjusting anomalous data, the West Line to Phoenix throughput levels proposed by the ACC Shippers (32,460,787 barrels annually or 88,934 barrels per day) and Tesoro (32,889,676 barrels annually or 90,109 barrels per day) significantly exceed the average West Line to Phoenix volume levels of 77,510 barrels per day experienced during the nine-month adjustment period ending September 30, 2008. On a barrel per day basis, the

31 In adopting the annualized 2008 volumes, the Commission is not endorsing Tesoro’s argument that when adjusting for known and measurable changes, Commission regulations prohibit the consideration of any actual base period volumes.


33 The record reflects that the decline in West Line volumes in 2008 as compared to 2007 was not entirely due to the additional capacity on the East Line because the 2008 increase in East Line throughput following the expansion was less than the 2008 declines on the West Line. Ex. ACV-1 at 8.

volume levels proposed by Tesoro and the ACC Shippers exceed the average volume level of every single month in the adjustment period. The ACC Shippers and Tesoro defend their departure from the adjustment period volumes due to various projections and studies that they claim show future volume increases that are inconsistent with the West Line volume levels experienced during the first nine months of 2008. However, the projections in the record are speculative and do not provide a basis to depart from the actual data presented by the adjustment period. Furthermore, the post-adjustment period actual data from October 2008 – September 2009 does not provide “good cause” for departure from the general regulatory practice of limiting consideration to the base and adjustment period data. In sum, there is little evidence that the 2008 economic decline and resultant decreased volumes were an ephemeral occurrence with effects that

35 See Ex. SFP-187.

36 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 76-77 (citing Ex. ACC-13; Ex. ACC-18C; Ex. ACC-210; Ex. ACC-252; Ex. SFP-157HC). The ACC Shippers also contend that EIA projections for the Mountain region from March and April of 2009 show that demand in the Mountain region would revive and exceed 2007 levels by 2010 for motor gasoline and 2011 for liquid fuels. ACC Shippers Brief op. Ex. at 27-28 n.7 (citing Ex. ACV-306 at 6).

37 To the extent that these studies may be entertained, the Commission notes that more recent official government publications appear to indicate that petroleum and fuel consumption may not rebound any time soon. The Commission takes administrative notice that the more recent 2010 EIA Energy Outlook issued May 11, 2010 projected that the 2008 Mountain Region levels Shippers protest as too low will not be equaled until 2013 for motor gasoline and liquid fuels. The 2007 levels will not be exceeded until 2018 for liquid fuels and 2017 for motor gasoline. Whether or not these projections reflect ultimate usage levels, they demonstrate the uncertain nature of such projections and the reason why the Commission prefers to rely upon actual data. U.S. Energy Information Agency, Energy Outlook 2010, Supplemental Table 8, Mountain Region, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo10/aeoref_tab.html (Released May 11, 2010).

38 18 C.F.R. § 346.2(a)(ii) (2010). In 2009, volumes increased on the West Line. SFPP has presented evidence indicating that the bankruptcy of Flying J, the parent company of a major feeder pipeline onto the East Line, caused shippers to shift temporarily volumes from the East Line to the West Line. However, after Flying J announced in June 2009, that it had acquired a stalking horse bidder for Longhorn, West Line throughput returned to 2008 levels.
disappeared shortly after the adjustment period. Rather, there are indications that the diminished volumes will persist.\textsuperscript{39}

30. Finally, the Commission finds that SFPP must adjust its throughput to all West Line destinations, not just Phoenix to reflect the revised test period. Although the East Line expansion may only have affected West Line destinations to Phoenix, to the extent that the Commission uses a particular time period to consider one movement on the system, the Commission prefers to use a similar time frame for determining the total volumes. Such an approach synchronizes volumetric and cost data across the entire cost-of-service, and minimizes the opportunity for manipulation of throughput levels by selectively utilizing different time periods for different destinations.

\textbf{III. Operating Expenses}

\textbf{A. Litigation Costs}

31. The 2009 ID determined that SFPP could recover a test period regulatory litigation expense of $1,830,978 to be collected annually for three years for a total recovery of $5,492,934. The 2009 ID rejected SFPP’s proposal to include litigation costs of $2,200,000 as a regular cost of service item in SFPP’s future cost based rate.\textsuperscript{40} The 2009 ID determined that the costs relied upon by SFPP are speculative and are not known and measurable with reasonable accuracy at the time of the filing, as defined by 18 C.F.R. Sec. 346.2(b)(2).

32. On exceptions, SFPP advocates the litigation cost proposed by Mr. Ganz, consisting of a test period adjustment of $2.2 million, which includes (1) $0.6 million representing the litigation expenses associated with the West Line portion of Docket No. OR03-5-000, amortized over three years and (2) $1.6 million representing the estimated litigation costs associated with this docket (Docket No. IS08-390-000) amortized over three years. Unlike the surcharge adopted by the 2009 ID, SFPP proposes to retain the litigation charges as a permanent component of its cost-of-service rates. SFPP emphasizes that Mr. Ganz determined that this level was representative after analyzing SFPP’s litigation expenses during the prior 20 year period.

\textsuperscript{39} The cost-of-service components adopted by the Commission reflect the realities of the base and adjustment periods. To the extent that shipper claims regarding increased future volumes eventually come to fruition, the Commission’s regulations and the Interstate Commerce Act allow the shippers to file a complaint.

\textsuperscript{40} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 838.
33. SFPP argues that the three year litigation surcharge of litigation costs of $1.8 million during the test period are not representative of the West Line litigation costs, and thus inconsistent with SFPP’s right to recover its full litigation expenses. SFPP emphasizes that the 2009 ID’s one-year “snapshot” failed to consider dramatic annual litigation cost fluctuations. Moreover, SFPP notes that the costlier phases of this particular proceeding (most of discovery, the hearing, and subsequent briefs) had not begun by the conclusion of the October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2008 test period adopted by the Initial Decision.

34. Opposing exceptions, the ACC Shippers and Trial Staff contend that the 2009 ID provides a just and reasonable recovery for known and measurable litigation expenses. Tesoro also opposes SFPP’s exceptions.41 Trial Staff, Tesoro, and the ACC Shippers contend that the litigation costs proposed by SFPP are not “known and measurable” as required by section 346.2(a) of the Commission regulations. Trial Staff and the ACC Shippers further assert that it is not appropriate to embed regulatory expenses associated with large-scale litigation into a prospective rate on a permanent basis. In further support of the 2009 ID’s conclusion, Trial Staff adds that litigation expenses should be recovered from those shippers who were most directly involved in the litigation. Trial Staff argues that Commission precedent requires such non-recurring regulatory costs to be recovered over a three-year period and then eliminated from the pipeline’s rates.42

35. Consistent with the Commission precedent, SFPP may recover its regulatory litigation expenses attributable to this proceeding through a three-year surcharge. SFPP will be permitted to develop the surcharge to reflect the costs incurred in this proceeding (Docket No. IS08-390-000) during the hearing, rehearing and compliance phases. A similar litigation recovery surcharge has been previously adopted in complaint

41 Opposing exceptions Tesoro states its preference for a test period using the annualized nine-month adjustment period and a five-year amortization period. However, on exceptions, Tesoro failed to raise any objections to the 2009 ID’s holdings involving litigation costs, including Tesoro’s preference for a five-year surcharge, as opposed to a three-year surcharge. By failing to argue for a five-year amortization period on exceptions, Tesoro waived this objection. 18 C.F.R. § 385.711(d)(2) (2010).

42 Staff Brief op. Ex. at 33-34 (citing Tarpon Transmission Co., 58 FERC ¶ 61,354, at 62,181 (1992)).
proceedings involving SFPP. Although this matter involves a rate increase proposed by the pipeline, the rationale that applied to the earlier SFPP complaint proceedings remains applicable here. Where significant litigation costs have been incurred and it is uncertain whether those litigation costs will continue into future years, a surcharge based upon actual litigation costs provides an appropriate means to avoid both over-recovery and under-recovery. The protracted litigation that has historically involved SFPP creates unique circumstances rendering it very difficult to determine a representative level for SFPP's future regulatory litigation costs. Under these circumstances, there is little assurance that base period data, test period data, or any other normalization would provide sufficiently representative estimates of future expense levels. The surcharge allows recovery of actual costs without creating a risk of substantial over-recovery in the future. Although prior SFPP decisions have applied a five-year surcharge, the Commission finds that a three-year surcharge is an appropriate time period for recovery of litigation costs in this proceeding because the costs have been incurred over three years of litigation regarding this rate filing.

36. As the ACC Shippers and Staff correctly note, a rate filing leads to a temporary spike in legal costs. However, as SFPP notes, due to the timing of the litigation process and ending dates of the base and adjustment periods, the costliest phase of the litigation will occur after the rate filing and will not be fully reflected in the actual data during the base and adjustment period. Thus, limiting a pipeline to 12-months of actual data in the base/adjustment period: (1) excludes significant expenditures associated with the costliest phase of the rate litigation, and (2) imposes a 12-month time period of relatively lower expenditures for determining litigation costs. The remedial approach advocated by SFPP, however, is also defective as it relies upon speculative, estimated costs, and would cause unrepresentative costs to be included in its cost-of-service and in its West Line rates.

37. The Commission finds that while SFPP may not permanently embed a litigation recovery surcharge in its rates, it may include a limited three-year surcharge to recover reasonable legal costs of the proceeding in Docket No. IS08-390-000, et al. that have been incurred by SFPP. SFPP must include in its compliance filing the litigation costs it

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44 BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1294.

45 Opinion No. 435-B, 96 FERC at 62,074-75.
has incurred in this proceeding through its compliance filing and the amount of the surcharge to be charged. The surcharge may be updated to include any changes to the compliance filing required by the Commission and for related pleadings through the completion of the compliance phase.

B. Depreciation

38. SFPP had three main line systems in 2008 (West, East, and Oregon). SFPP has used one depreciation rate for all of its systems that is based on a 1991 depreciation study prepared by the Commission staff. Trial Staff was the only party to challenge SFPP’s depreciation rate, asserting that the remaining life of the pipeline extended to 2043, 13 years beyond the 2030 expiration of the remaining economic life projected by the 1991 study. The 2009 ID determined that Trial Staff had the burden to prove that SFPP’s existing depreciation rates were not just and reasonable since SFPP has not proposed to change its existing depreciation rates in this proceeding. The 2009 ID held that Trial Staff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the 1991 depreciation study should no longer be used. Specifically, the 2009 ID determined that Trial Staff did not adequately address in sufficient depth issues such as demand projection; whether there are significant changed circumstances since the 1991 study; why a new useful life calculation of 35 years is necessary; and the level of prospective competition.

39. On exceptions, Trial Staff asserts that the 2009 ID erred in upholding SFPP’s use of system-wide depreciation rates based upon the 1991 depreciation study to calculate the West Line’s depreciation rates. Staff asserts that SFPP has the burden of proof to demonstrate that its proposed rate change is just and reasonable, including the burden to support the depreciation rates incorporated into the cost of service. Trial Staff asserts that this burden exists even if the component in the cost of service is not changed. Trial Staff states that the 2009 ID improperly relied upon complaint proceedings, as opposed to cases in which a pipeline filed for new rates, to assign the burden of proof to Trial Staff.

40. Trial Staff further asserts that that the 1991 depreciation study used by SFPP is outdated and inapplicable. Trial Staff emphasizes that their study includes more recent information and that the analysis presented by Trial Staff witness Pewterbaugh is specific

46 Ex. SFP-149.

47 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 815 n.275 (2009) (citing SFPP, L.P., 63 FERC ¶ 61,014, at 61,124-25, aff’d on reh’g, 63 FERC ¶ 61,275, reh’g denied, 65 FERC ¶ 61,028 (1993); Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 795 F.2d 182, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Public Serv. Comm’n of the State of New York v. FERC, 642 F.2d 1335, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 812-13 (1973)).
to the West Line, whereas the 1991 depreciation study only provided results on an overall system basis. Trial Staff stresses that relying on system-wide depreciation rates for each individual system is inappropriate because the values that factor into the depreciation rate clearly differ for each line. Trial Staff urges that the different vintages of the various lines should be taken into account for specific depreciation rates for each line.

41. Trial Staff further asserts that their study adequately addressed demand projection beyond 2030, averring that demand for petroleum products is expected to increase so that demand will not negatively impact the remaining economic life of the West Line. Trial Staff further asserts that projected population growth in Arizona supports continued demand for product on the West Line. Trial Staff states that their study also includes twenty years of additional data up to 2030 from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) whereas the 1991 study stopped at 2010. Trial Staff further contends that a new useful life calculation of 35 years is necessary, and that the 35-year remaining economic life is not arbitrary. Trial Staff contends that 35 years is well within the typically accepted norms for oil pipelines.

42. Trial Staff further argues that prospective competition will not shorten the remaining economic life on the West Line. Trial Staff asserts that SFPP greatly overstates the ease with which shippers can shift volumes between lines. Trial Staff asserts that there is no evidence that competition from ethanol will decrease the remaining economic life of the West Line, contending that ethanol could actually increase economic life by providing an additional market for the pipeline. Trial Staff further avers that SFPP’s reliance on the effects of a projected refinery is without basis, contending that there is no evidence that the necessary permits to build and to operate the refinery have been obtained.

43. Opposing exceptions, SFPP asserts that Trial Staff possesses the burden of proof because SFPP has not proposed to change its depreciation rates. Moreover, SFPP notes that Trial Staff counsel represented to the Presiding Judge that Trial Staff had the burden of proof regarding Trial Staff’s proposed changes to SFPP’s West Line depreciation rates. SFPP avers that Staff should not be allowed now, on exceptions, to reverse course after SFPP relied upon Trial Staff’s representations in cross-examining Trial Staff’s witness on the depreciation rates at issue here. SFPP also argues that Commission regulations only allow a carrier to request that its composite depreciation rates for each account be changed to individual component rates, and that depreciation rates can only

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48 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 93-94 (18 C.F.R. Part 352, General Instruction 1-8(b) (2009)).
be revised prospectively from the date of a Commission order changing those depreciation rates.\textsuperscript{49}

44. Furthermore, SFPP argues that Staff did not adequately support its proposed depreciation rates. SFPP asserts that when determining whether a new depreciation analysis should be conducted, the appropriate approach is to start with the assumptions underlying the existing depreciation rates and then determine whether new information exists that requires a re-evaluation of those underlying assumptions and a new depreciation analysis. SFPP avers that Trial Staff failed to demonstrate that the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2009 Early Release projects oil supply and demand for refined petroleum products any differently than the 1991 study projects such supply and demand.\textsuperscript{50}

45. In addition, SFPP alleges that Staff failed to support the 13 year extension of remaining economic life underlying its proposed West Line depreciation rates calculated by Trial Staff. SFPP states that the only basis that witness Pewterbaugh provided for expanding the life of SFPP's West Line facilities to 35 years is that any data beyond 35 years is too speculative. SFPP emphasizes that the EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2009 used by Mr. Pewterbaugh treated any estimates beyond 2030 as too speculative, and the Arizona population projections on which Pewterbaugh relies only extend to 2025. SFPP also asserts that the ID correctly held that Staff's depreciation analysis failed to consider the effects of the construction of the East Line expansion. SFPP further argues that Trial Staff failed to adequately address the effects of ethanol and the construction of a refinery outside of Phoenix, Arizona, by the Arizona Clean Fuels project to be completed in 2013.

46. The Commission finds that the 2009 ID erred by assigning the burden of proof to Trial Staff rather than to SFPP as to whether the depreciation rates incorporated by SFPP into its proposed cost-of-service proposal are just and reasonable. Well-established Commission precedent requires that where the pipeline proposes a rate increase, the pipeline has the burden to establish that the depreciation rates included in its cost-of-service are just and reasonable, even if the depreciation rates themselves remain unchanged from prior filings.\textsuperscript{51} In those cases, as the Commission explained, each

\textsuperscript{49} Id. (citing 18 C.F.R. § 347.1(d)(1) (2009)).

\textsuperscript{50} To support this proposition, SFPP compares EIA's 2009 Annual Energy Outlook projected total liquids consumption in 2008 of 20.74 million bpd and 20.92 million bpd in 2030, Ex. SFP-348 at 2, with the 20.74 bpd projected by EIA's 1990 Annual Energy Outlook.

\textsuperscript{51} Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 107 FERC ¶ 61,164, at P 24 (2004); Northwest Pipeline Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 62,038-39 (1999); Northern Border

(continued...)
component of a cost-of-service is integral to any pipeline’s proposal to increase rates based upon a proposed increase in its overall cost of service. Thus, the pipeline’s burden of showing that a proposed rate is “just and reasonable” necessarily includes the burden of supporting each component of the cost of service, including the unchanged as well as the changed components.\(^5^2\)

In contrast, as the Commission has previously explained, the D.C. Circuit decisions relied upon by SFPP and the 2009 ID involved allocation and rate design. Because the unchanged allocation and rate design methodologies themselves were not cost-of-service components (the sum of which justifies the pipeline’s proposed rate change) parties wishing to challenge the unchanged allocation and rate design methodologies were required to proceed with the burden of proof as though those parties had filed a complaint.\(^5^3\)

47. Thus, contrary to the holding of the 2009 ID and SFPP’s briefs opposing exceptions, the fact that SFPP does not propose to change its depreciation rates does not shift the burden of proof away from SFPP. Because SFPP is proposing to increase its transportation rates, SFPP has the burden of proof to support the depreciation rates that are incorporated into its proposed cost-of-service.\(^5^4\)

However, having assigned the burden of proof to SFPP to support its proposed depreciation rates, the Commission finds that the record provides adequate support for the depreciation rates included in SFPP’s proposed cost-of-service. In its proposal, SFPP relied upon the Commission’s 1991 depreciation study, and applied the system-wide depreciation rates developed in that

\[\text{Pipeline Co., 88 FERC } \downarrow 61,201, \text{ at 61,687-88, order on reh’g, 89 FERC } \downarrow 61,185, \text{ at 61,574-76 (1999); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 25 FERC } \downarrow 61,020, \text{ at 61,108 (1983), reh’g denied on this issue, 26 FERC } \downarrow 61,109, \text{ at 61,263-64 (1984); BP Pipelines Inc. v. TAPS Carriers, 123 FERC } \downarrow 61,287, \text{ at P 46 (2008); Trunkline Gas Co., 90 FERC } \downarrow 61,017, \text{ at 61,052 (2000).}\]

\(^5^2\) E.g., Northern Border Pipeline Co., 89 FERC at 61,575. Although many of the Commission orders involved rate filings under the Natural Gas Act, there is no reason why the underlying reasoning would be any different in the context of the ICA, and the Commission has applied the same distinction to oil pipelines under the ICA. BP Pipelines Inc. v. TAPS Carriers, 123 FERC \(\downarrow 61,287\) at P 46.

\(^5^3\) Id. For further analysis of this issue see Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 133 FERC \(\downarrow 61,162\), at P 63-67 (2010) (Opinion No. 486-D).

\(^5^4\) The 2009 ID is correct that to the extent the Commission rejects SFPP’s proposed depreciation rate, the Trial Staff has the burden of proof to establish that Staff’s proposed depreciation rates are just and reasonable. However, this does not change SFPP’s burden of proof with respect to the depreciation rate that SFPP proposed in the cost-of-service that SFPP is using to justify the rate increase.
study to the West Line. In a prior rate proceeding, the Commission accepted the methodology used in this study as providing just and reasonable depreciation rates for the West Line.

48. The record provides little support for Staff’s contention that continued usage of the depreciation rates developed in the 1991 study for determining the West Line cost-of-service is unjust and unreasonable. Staff witness Pewterbaugh states: “The main reason for the difference between SFPP’s rates and my recommended rates is the length of time over which those rates would recover SFPP’s remaining plant investments.” However, Trial Staff witness Pewterbaugh explained that even if the depreciation rate proposed by Staff were adopted, SFPP would recover its current West Line Investment in 25.4 years as opposed to recovering the same investment costs over 23 years. Given that Trial Staff only proposes to extend the 23-year time frame for recovering full depreciation by a mere 2.4 years and because estimates two decades into the future by necessity involve some uncertainty, it is not clear that the depreciation rates proposed by Staff actually serve to enhance intergenerational equity.

49. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the 1991 study incorporated a relatively conservative 40 year economic life, which is at the high end for an oil pipeline and which is actually more conservative than the 35 year economic life advocated by Trial Staff witness Pewterbaugh in this proceeding. Although Trial Staff correctly notes that the passage of time has made more information available regarding the expected economic life of the West Line, the analysis provided by Trial Staff only further supports the proposition that the depreciation rates developed in the 1991 study continue to be within the zone of reasonableness. The Commission thus finds that the depreciation rates developed in the 1991 study remain just and reasonable for application in the West Line cost-of-service.

C. Allocation Factors Between Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Services

50. The West Line provides intrastate deliveries within California as well as interstate deliveries to Arizona and to Nevada (indirectly through the interconnection with Calnev Pipeline, L.L.C. at Colton, California). Consequently, the costs for West Line facilities providing both intrastate and interstate services (joint-use facilities) have to be separated between these two carrier services. The 2009 ID adopted the allocation percentages for interstate services proposed by Trial Staff:

55 Ex. S-9 at 4.
56 Id. at 5.
57 Ex. SFP-149 at 4.
51. Additionally, both the West Line and the East Line deliver to the Phoenix Terminal. Thus, Phoenix Terminal costs must be separated between West Line and East Line services. The 2009 ID adopted the separation percentages proposed by Trial Staff for the allocation of Phoenix Terminal costs:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Interstate Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA1 Watson</td>
<td>42.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA2 Watson to Ontario</td>
<td>55.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA3 Ontario to Colton</td>
<td>56.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA4 Colton to Niland</td>
<td>85.74%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA5 Beyond Niland</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

52. As the 2009 ID explains, both SFPP and Trial Staff propose to allocate joint use direct facility investment costs and operating costs on the West Line system using a volumetric route directory. The separation factors in the route directory are developed using volumes which are delivered in interstate and intrastate service, or in the case of cost allocation at the Phoenix Terminal, on the East and West Lines. The separation factors are then applied to the specific West Line facility investment and operating costs to determine the proper allocations.

53. The 2009 ID adopted the allocation percentages proposed by Trial Staff because Trial Staff uses data from the last twelve months of the test period (October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008), whereas SFPP uses unadjusted 2007 base period data for all West Line destinations except Phoenix. For Phoenix deliveries, SFPP annualized the first five months of throughput for 2008 to calculate its yearly projection.

54. On exceptions, SFPP renews its objections to the 2009 ID’s adoption of actual throughput data for the period October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008, as conflicting with the Commission’s base and test period regulations and as not representative of the level of throughput SFPP will experience during the time the West Line rates are in effect. With respect to SFPP’s proposed test period adjustment to the route directory volumes to reduce West Line deliveries to Phoenix (and to make a corresponding increase to East Line deliveries), SFPP argues the 2009 ID erred in concluding SFPP’s usage of unadjusted base period volumes for all destinations other

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**Notes:**

58 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 818 (citing Ex. S-17 at 15).

59 Id. P 819 (citing Ex. SFP-17 at 15).
than Phoenix resulted in an inaccurate allocation of costs to the West Line interstate service. SFPP asserts its proposed volume adjustment at Phoenix was a known and measurable change that had a corresponding known and measurable effect on the West Line percentage of total deliveries to Phoenix.

55. In contrast, according to SFPP, the decline in West Line volumes at Phoenix did not have the same corresponding known and measurable impact on the interstate percentage of total volumes transported through the joint-use facilities in California. Citing the testimony of Mr. Ganz, SFPP explains that it is not possible to determine a known and measurable change in the interstate portion of total throughput unless the changes anticipated in SFPP's intrastate throughput are also known and measurable. SFPP states that although the intrastate portion of total West Line volumes decreased in the first five months of 2008 by almost 10 percent, there was no discrete known and measurable change (e.g., a refinery closure) that could be identified to account for any change in intrastate volumes. Thus, SFPP explains that it did not adjust the interstate percentages, but concluded instead that using unadjusted base period throughput would provide reasonable and representative results.

56. Opposing Exceptions, Trial Staff asserts that SFPP's proposed route directory should be rejected because SFPP used the wrong base and test period as addressed elsewhere in this proceeding. Trial Staff concludes that the 2009 ID correctly adopted the route directory proposed by Staff based upon unadjusted throughput for the twelve-month period of October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008. Tesoro also opposes SFPP's exceptions, averring that the 2009 ID correctly adjusted throughput levels to all locations.

57. Consistent with the Commission's discussion of West Line throughput, both the allocation of expenses between interstate and intrastate costs should use the annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008 for all destinations. This will ensure the use of consistent test period data to develop SFPP's cost-of-service, while also ensuring that the data used to determine throughput at Phoenix adequately reflect the effects of the East Line expansion.

D. The Allocation Factors for Certain Operating Expenses

58. The 2009 ID held that costs in Account 590, "Other Expenses," should be classified as non-distance related costs because Commission regulations provide that

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68 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 862-864.
Account 590 "shall include the cost of expenses expended for administrative and general expenses."\(^{61}\)

59. On exceptions, SFPP argues the 2009 ID erred and that the costs in Account 590 are distance related costs. SFPP represents that the costs in Account 590 consist of fees paid to the California Fire Marshall, the Commission, and the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). SFPP states the fees paid to the California Fire Marshall are associated with interstate and intrastate pipeline safety and integrity.\(^{62}\) SFPP avers that because the fees are directly related to pipeline facilities, the bulk of the costs are assessed by the California Fire Marshall based upon pipeline mileage.\(^{63}\) Similarly, SFPP states charges paid to DOT are also related to pipeline safety and integrity. SFPP states that the fees to DOT are "based on usage (in reasonable relationship to volume-miles, miles, revenues, or a combination of volume-miles, miles, and revenues) of the pipeline."\(^{64}\) SFPP further states the Account 590 regulatory fees paid to the Commission are assessed on the basis of operating revenues, which in turn are based in part on distance and throughput.\(^{65}\) Finally, SFPP asserts the 2009 ID’s ruling was internally inconsistent. While ruling here that costs contained in the 500 series of accounts (headed "General") are not distance-related, the 2009 ID held elsewhere that Pipeline Taxes in Account 580 are in fact distance related.\(^{66}\)

60. Opposing exceptions, Trial Staff, much like the 2009 ID, emphasizes that Account 590 is defined in the Commission’s regulations as an expense account for administrative and general services. According to Trial Staff, Commission precedent holds that such costs are comprised of non-distance related costs. Trial Staff emphasizes that SFPP has presented no justification and otherwise failed to meet its burden of justifying its classification of costs in Account 590 as distance-related.

61. Trial Staff asserts that SFPP witness Ganz agreed that Account 590 is an expense account for administrative and general expenses and that as a general rule, administrative and general expenses are not distance sensitive. Trial Staff also allege that SFPP witness Ganz failed to demonstrate how any of the costs in Account 590 are distance sensitive. Trial Staff contends the fees paid to the California Fire Marshall are administrative


\(^{62}\) SFPP Brief on Ex. at 62 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 51010, \textit{et seq.} and § 51019).

\(^{63}\) \textit{Id.} (citing 19 Cal. Admin Code § 2040).

\(^{64}\) \textit{Id.} (citing 49 U.S.C. § 60301(a)).

\(^{65}\) \textit{Id.} (citing 18 C.F.R. § 382.203 (2010)).

\(^{66}\) \textit{Id.} (citing 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 863).
expenses and are not typically distance related. Similarly, Trial Staff asserts the fees charged by DOT are “user fees” that are also not distance related. Finally, Trial Staff state the fees assessed by the Commission are based on operating revenues that are determined by volumes and thus are also not distance related. However, to the extent some of the costs in Account 590 might be distance related, Staff argues there is nothing in the record identifying which specific costs are distance related.

62. The Commission affirms the 2009 ID. The Commission’s regulations define Account 590 expenses as “general and administrative costs.” Although SFPP has identified DOT and California State Fire Marshall regulations indicating that a component of some of the fees may be related to mileage, as the 2009 ID determined, such “general and administrative costs” are not considered by the Commission to be distance related. Furthermore, SFPP has not provided sufficient detail in the record to enable the Commission to determine what, if any, portion of SFPP’s Account 590 expenses should be charged on a per barrel-mile basis or, to the extent these charges are directly related to pipeline integrity and safety, how these charges should be treated in relation to SFPP’s other pipeline integrity expenses.

E. Oil Losses and Shortages

63. Oil losses and shortages are recorded in Account 340 (Oil Losses and Shortages) and include the cost of settlements with shippers for oil losses or undelivered volumes due to operating causes during the course of transportation. The 2009 ID held that it was appropriate to use the actual test period amounts for Oil Losses and Shortages over the twelve-month period October 2007 through September 2008, which results in a gain (or credit to SFPP’s cost of service) of $897,252. The 2009 ID rejected a gain of $1.88 million proposed by ACC witness O’Loughlin which was derived using the base period data.

64. On exceptions the ACC Shippers aver that the 2009 ID calculated the Oil Losses and Shortages expense using an inappropriate test period adjustment. The ACC Shippers emphasize that no “unique or compelling circumstances” exist to permit the use of actual data from the adjustment period for the Oil Losses and Shortages account. The ACC Shippers contend that no data or analysis exists to suggest that data from October 2007 to September 2008 better represents going-forward levels than the 2007 base period data. Furthermore, the ACC Shippers allege that the 2009 ID’s adoption of actual adjustment

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period data will incorporate a “cyclical” change, rather than a “lasting” change, which change is best represented by the actual 2007 level.

65. Opposing exceptions, SFPP states that it opposes the 2009 ID’s adoption of data from October 2007 through September 2008 for throughput, as well as, for operational and maintenance expenses (including Oil Losses and Shortages). However, SFPP avers the West Line’s actual Oil Losses and Shortage expense for the base period was a gain that was approximately $550,000 higher than it was for the test period, annualized. SFPP asserts this difference is material and the ACC shippers have presented no valid basis to ignore the change. SFPP contends the most representative Oil Losses and Shortages expense is the West Line’s actual annualized expense for the adjustment period of January 2008 through September 2008.

66. Consistent with the discussion regarding the appropriate base and test period data to be utilized in this proceeding, the Commission adopts the annualized Oil Loss and Shortage expense level proposed by SFPP for the period January 2008 through September 2008.

F. Environmental Remediation

67. The 2009 ID determined that the appropriate level of environmental remediation expenses should be no more than $1,877,610. 69 The 2009 ID concluded that SFPP will continue to incur remediation costs of a similar magnitude on a recurring, long term basis and that such costs have been shown to be directly associated with spills or accidents on the West Line.

68. On exceptions, Trial Staff asserts that the 2009 ID erred by failing to remove costs that Staff alleges result from releases from non-carrier facilities, incurred at sites not currently used in interstate shipments, or associated with non-interstate shipments. Trial Staff contends that the releases from Colton Terminal and Norwalk Defense Fuel Supply Center, which Staff states constitute over 85 percent of total remediation expenses, are not from jurisdictional carrier facilities. Staff also asserts that SFPP witness Hanek was unable to confirm that environmental remediation costs stemmed from the release of interstate shipments. Trial Staff allege that to the extent groundwater contamination occurred at Colton Terminal, it has been commingled with contamination that resulted from historical spills and that to that extent the First Quarter 2009 Groundwater Monitoring Report for Colton Terminal does not address any spills from West Line carrier property. Trial Staff further alleges that SFPP seeks recovery for remediation expenses for events that occurred long ago at facilities which are no longer in service.

69 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 824.
Staff alleges that SFPP failed to establish that environmental remediation costs can be specifically and exclusively attributable to interstate shipments.

69. SFPP claims that Trial Staff failed to raise the jurisdictional arguments in its initial testimony, and that Trial Staff only asserted that the environmental costs related to non-jurisdictional claims on the last day of hearing after all testimony had been filed and after all of SFPP's witnesses had been cross-examined. SFPP further avers that Trial Staff is incorrect to claim that environmental remediation costs do not relate to jurisdictional facilities or shipments. SFPP explains that SFPP witness Hanek could not identify that a particular barrel was interstate or "military" because the pipeline carries interstate, intrastate, and military movements, and leaks occur gradually over a long period of time and include whatever particular product is being shipped. SFPP states that most of the leaks at Colton resulted from a release at C-18, which is used as a breakout tank for transportation services on the West Line. Moreover, SFPP explains that it applied the West Line interstate volume percentage to the total 2007 Colton expenses and included only the resulting interstate amount in the West Line rates. Regarding the Norwalk facilities, SFPP states that it applied the West Line interstate volume percentage to the total 2007 Norwalk environmental remediation expenses and included only the resulting amount in SFPP's proposed West Line rates.

70. The Commission upholds the 2009 ID. The Commission finds that Trial Staff has not provided substantial evidence that the Initial Decision improperly included non-jurisdictional environmental remediation expenses in the adopted cost figure of $1,877,610. These facilities on the West Line are not used exclusively for jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional shipments and the Commission is not persuaded that the environmental costs can be attributed exclusively to non-jurisdictional service. Thus, SFPP has properly allocated these costs using the same volumetric methodology used to allocate other costs between interstate and intrastate costs.

G. Definition of Carrier Service

71. On exceptions Trial Staff and SFPP disagree about the definition of "carrier services" and its import for this proceeding. At hearing Trial Staff argued that SFPP should modify its filing to distinguish between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional services in preparing its rate filing. Trial Staff asserted that SFPP's definition of "carrier services" violates 18 C.F.R. § 341.0(a) because SFPP does not limit its definition to jurisdictional services regulated by the Commission. In contrast, SFPP asserted that the only non-carrier services were unregulated services, which are primarily some of its

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70 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 824.
71 18 C.F.R. § 341.0(a) (2010).
terminal storage services. SFPP asserted that Trial Staff's position was based on the definition of "carrier" in 18 C.F.R. § 341.0(a) and that the definition of carrier services is more inclusive. SFPP stated that the Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Oil Pipeline Companies at 18 C.F.R. Part 352\textsuperscript{72} instructs carriers like SFPP to treat all types of pipeline transportation as carrier services except those not associated with pipeline operations. SFPP asserts that the annual report required from pipelines, FERC Form No. 6, draws a similar distinction. It further concludes that there is no practical impact for this proceeding from the point Trial Staff is making.\textsuperscript{73} The 2009 ID concluded that Trial Staff's definition should be adopted to provide greater consistency and transparency in oil pipeline filings.\textsuperscript{74} On exceptions Trial Staff and SFPP advance the positions they took at the hearing.

\textsuperscript{72} The Commission finds that the accounting regulations governing oil pipeline record keeping and the FERC Form No. 6 do not precisely distinguish between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facilities and services operated by interstate oil pipelines. However SFPP is correct that under current Commission practice, all oil pipeline transportation property, revenues, and expenses are commingled in the pipeline's accounts under the terms of 18 C.F.R. Part 352 if used in oil pipeline transportation.\textsuperscript{75} Portions of FERC Form No. 6 also commingling interstate and intrastate balance sheet and expense items under current practice,\textsuperscript{76} while in contrast page 700 of Form No. 6 specifically refers to interstate revenues only.\textsuperscript{77} Thus the separate reporting of inter- and intrastate data is imperfect at this time. However, given that an industry wide reporting practice is involved, an individual pipeline proceeding is not the place to modify it. This is particularly the case since, as SFPP states, the matter makes no practical difference here because the revenues and expenses are allocated based on the volumetric and mileage factors previously discussed in this order. The 2009 ID is therefore reversed in this regard.

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at Part 352.
\textsuperscript{73} See 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 529-533.
\textsuperscript{74} Id. P 813.
\textsuperscript{75} See 18 C.F.R. Part 352 (General Instructions, 1-1 Classification of Accounts) at p. 971 (Account 30), and at p. 982 (Accounts 620 and 621).
\textsuperscript{76} See FERC Form No. 6 at p. 114.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at p. 700.
IV. Allocation of Overhead Costs

73. This section reviews the methodology for allocating overhead costs to SFPP as a member of a large group of affiliated enterprises and the related issue of how to allocate those overhead costs between SFPP’s jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional functions, and between certain of its jurisdictional functions. The allocation of overhead costs to SFPP as one operating entity within a complex corporate structure is governed by the so-called Massachusetts Formula. The allocation of overhead costs between SFPP’s jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facilities, and among SFPP’s different jurisdictional activities, is governed by the so-called KN Method. Neither SFPP nor its owning master limited partnership KMEP has any employees. Instead, as explained below, all operating and administrative services and all related overhead functions are provided by Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI) and Kinder Morgan General Partner Services (GP Services). Both KMI and GP Services provided overhead services to various KMEP operating units, including SFPP, during the 2007 base year at issue here. Thus, the issue before the Commission is how to allocate overhead costs incurred to support KMEP’s operating units among those units. To this end, this part of the order first summarizes the relevant corporate and accounting structures and then analyzes the issues raised by the Massachusetts Formula and the KN Method. A number of cost accounting issues are reviewed to the extent these affect how the calculations would be performed under either the Massachusetts Formula or the KN Method.

A. The Corporate Structure

74. SFPP’s position in the KMI ownership structure reflects the evolution of the KMEP master limited partnership within which SFPP is embedded. While the management and cost accounting structures differ from the ownership structure, a synopsis of the latter is essential to understanding the former. The overall ownership structure is reflected in Exhibit No. SFP-194. SFPP is at the lowest level of the KMI corporate structure and is owned 99.5 percent by a general partner OLP-D. Ninety-nine

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78 See Northwest Pipeline Corp., 71 FERC ¶ 61,253, at 61,984 (1995).
80 KMI is now Knight Inc. after KMI became a privately controlled Subchapter C corporation. It is still referred to as KMI here. See Ex. SFP-188 at 42.
81 See Ex. SFP-39 at 1 for a schematic of Kinder Morgan, Inc. in 2007. See also Ex. SFP-139, Ownership of SFPP, L.P. – 2007, reproduced as Appendix A to this order. See also Ex. ACV-60 for a detailed schematic of KMI’s and KMEP’s structure.
82 A .5 percent (.005) limited partnership interest is owned by the partnership which sold SFPP to KMEP in late 1998.
percent of the OLP-D limited partnership interests are owned by KMEP and the remaining one percent general partnership interest is owned by Kinder Morgan General Partners Inc. (KMGP). KMGP also owns a one percent general partner interest in KMEP, as well as a one percent general partner interest in the other OLP entities that own various operating assets. The OLP entities constitute the second level of the KMI ownership structure.\(^{83}\) KMGP thus owns the general partnership interests of the OLP entities, and KMEP owns the limited partnership interests of the intermediate entities. KMGP and KMEP thus constitute the third level of ownership. KMGP and KMEP are owned at a fourth level as follows. KMI owns 100 percent of KMGP (which controls all general partnership interests) and a portion of the limited partnership interests in KMEP.\(^{84}\) The remainder of the KMEP limited partnership interests is publicly held.

Finally, it should be noted that KMEP does not own all of the operating entities involved in the KMI corporate structure. KMI owns and operates a number of natural gas entities and joint ventures and also operates a number of entities that are included in KMEP’s structure.

B. The Accounting Structure

75. This section summarizes the management and accounting structure KMI uses to manage the various entities owned and operated by either KMI or KMEP.\(^{85}\) This functional structure differs from the ownership structure. SFPP’s description of KMI’s accounting structure and its purpose are not at issue here. Rather, what is at issue is whether that structure and methodology are appropriate given the goals of Commission regulation, and if so, whether the methodology is sufficiently accurate that it may be adopted in this proceeding as the means for allocating certain overhead costs to SFPP for the purpose of determining its West Line rates.

76. SFPP states that there are four basic types of operating entities within the overall KMI structure: (1) KMEP-Operated Entities; (2) KMI-Operated Entities; (3) KMI-Owned Entities; and (4) Joint Ventures. The KMEP-Operated Entities are owned by KMEP and are operated by GP Services on behalf of KMEP. The KMEP-Operated Entities are grouped into the following three distinct business groups or “tiers”: (1) the products pipeline division, of which SFPP is a member (Tier 2); (2) the CO\(_2\) pipelines

\(^{83}\) These are OLP-C, OLP-B, and OLP-A, as well as CO\(_2\). The term OLP stands for operating limited partnership.

\(^{84}\) This allows KMI to file a consolidated return with KMGP as its 100 percent shareholder and also to receive pass through limited partnership income from KMEP.

\(^{85}\) The summary is derived from the testimony and materials SFPP submitted at hearing and certain of SFPP’s exhibits are included in Appendices A through C.
division (Tier 3); and (3) the terminals division (Tier 4). To the extent possible, GP Services directly assigns the costs incurred on KMEP’s behalf to individual entities within these three groups, to a group as a whole, and in the case of products pipelines, by certain geographic areas. The remaining residual costs are allocated to the KMEP-Operated Entities through KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. SFPP asserts that the costs generated by GP Services are incurred only by the KMEP-Operating Entities and are not incurred by any other entities in the KMI structure, including eight natural gas pipelines that are owned by KMEP but operated by KMI.

77. The assignment of costs to different operating levels within the KMEP structure is the basis for what SFPP calls the “tier” costing methodology. SFPP states that the use of the tier methodology provides an accurate picture of how expenses are related to the business of KMEP and its subsidiaries, provides an accurate accounting of those costs, and attempts to match cost incurrence with cost allocation. Under this method, Tier 1 encompasses all KMEP-Operated Entities. The costs included in Tier 1 are those applicable to all of the KMEP-Operated Entities, that is, the “residual overhead costs” that cannot be directly assigned to another tier. Tier 2 is comprised of KMEP’s products pipeline subsidiaries. SFPP is in Tier 2. Thus, the costs included in Tier 2 are those that are incurred on behalf of all of KMEP’s products pipelines and related facilities and can be directly assigned to that tier. Tier 2 is further subdivided into four regional groups, and all costs that can be directly assigned to a specific regional group are assigned to that group and then allocated among the subsidiaries in that group. The Tier 2 overhead costs that cannot be attributed to any one of the regional groups are allocated to all of the members of Tier 2. Tier 3 assigns and allocates costs exclusively to KMEP’s CO₂ pipeline entities. Tier 4 assigns and allocates costs specific to bulk terminals and the terminals that are not associated with the products pipelines contained in Tier 2.

78. The KMI-Operated Entities comprise eight natural gas pipeline systems that are owned by KMEP but are managed and operated by KMI. SFPP states that most of the KMI-Operated Entities were originally owned by KMI, but were transferred to KMEP for

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86 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 56-56 (citing Ex. SFP-38 at 23-24).

87 The four regional groups are the Pacific Operations group, the Mid Continent Operations Group, the Eastern Operations Group, and the Southeast Operations Group, each of which controls a group of product pipelines and their related facilities. SFPP is a member of the Pacific Operations Group along with Calnev Pipe Line, LLC and certain pacific coast terminal companies. See Ex. SFP-38 at 17; cf. 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 298.

88 Ex. SFP-38 at 23-24; 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 56-57.
tax purposes. The fact that these natural gas companies were once owned by KMI is the primary reason that KMI continues to operate and manage them. SFPP states that KMI directly charges four of the KMI-Operated Entities for all operations and maintenance costs where possible. KMI allocates residual amount to these four KMI-Operated Entities through the operation of a KMI Massachusetts Formula. For the remaining four KMI-Operated Entities, KMI is compensated for the general and administrative overhead expenses through fixed fees that those four entities pay to KMI. SFPP asserts that none of these costs are incurred directly or indirectly by KMEP and thus none are allocated or incurred by SFPP.

79. The KMI-Owned Entities are owned and operated by KMI and include several natural gas pipeline systems. The KMI-Owned Entities are assigned costs directly by KMI where possible and the residual costs are allocated through the KMI Massachusetts Formula. The fourth group of entities in the KMI structure are joint ventures in which KMEP is a minority partner or for which all operating and overhead functions are performed and billed by a third party. A relatively new KMEP affiliate is Kinder Morgan Canada (KM Canada), which controls three Canadian entities. SFPP states that these Canadian entities are managed almost exclusively by their own employees pursuant to the requirements of Canadian law. SFPP states that few if any direct or indirect costs of these last three groups are allocated to KMEP, and that in any event it has assured that

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89 See Ex. SFP-38 at 26, 27-30 and Ex. SFP-129 at 31-32. The eight KMI-Operated Entities (but KMEP owned) in 2007 were Casper-Douglas Natural Gas Gathering and Processing Systems (Casper-Douglas); Tejas Gas LLC (Tejas Consolidated); Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission (KMIGT); Trailblazer Pipeline Company (Trailblazer); KM North Texas; KM Gas de Natural de Mexico (KM Mexico); TransColorado Gas Transmission Company (TransColorado); and Rockies Express Pipeline (REX).

90 The full list of entities included in the KMI Massachusetts Formula model in 2007 shown in Ex. SFP-44. This list contains 24 separate legal entities, but only the eight KMEP-Owned, but KMI-Operated, entities listed in the previous footnote are relevant to the analysis in this part of the order. As discussed below, there is no rational basis for including all of the KMI-Owned and KMEP-Owned entities in a single Massachusetts Formula calculation.

91 The joint ventures are Heartland Pipeline Company (Heartland), Red Cedar Gas Treating LLC (Red Cedar), Thunder Creek Gas Services LLC (Thunder Creek), and the International Marine Terminal (Marine Terminal).

92 KM Canada includes the Vancouver Wharves Terminal, Cochin Canada Pipeline, and Trans Mountain Pipeline Company.
none of their costs flow to SFPP. SFPP concludes that given KMI's accounting methodology and a minor amount costs removed from KMEP's cost structure, the KMI-Operated Entities, the joint ventures, and KM Canada are properly excluded from KMEP's Massachusetts Formula even though KMEP owns them.

80. As discussed, with the exception of KM Canada, only two KMI entities have employees: KMI and GP Services. GP Services employees operate and manage only the KMEP-Operated Entities for KMEP. Thus, GP Services employees perform no work for either KMI-Owned Entities or KMI-Operated Entities. The KMI-Owned Entities and KMI-Operated Entities are operated and managed only by KMI employees. SFPP further explains that all KMI employees fall into one of two categories. The employee is either (1) a KMI-dedicated employee, serving only the KMI-Owned Entities and the KMI-Operated Entities, or (2) a KMI-shared employee serving the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities, and also the KMEP-Operated Entities. This distribution of responsibility is reflected in the following chart, which is reproduced from SFPP witness Dale D. Bradley's (Bradley) Exhibit No. SFP-39.93

![Chart showing KMI and KMEP employees and entities]

The chart demonstrates how costs flow to the KMEP-Operated Entities from two sources: (1) GP Services, whose costs flow down to the KMEP-Operated Entities by direct assignment or through the KMEP's Massachusetts Formula, and (2) KMI-Shared Employees, through a cross charge to the KMEP Massachusetts Formula for the costs incurred on behalf of the KMEP-Operated Entities.94 As discussed, SFPP is a KMEP-operated entity that would be located below the far right hand box. If additional boxes were shown beneath the KMI-Operated Entities box, the first one down would be that for

93 Ex. SFP-39 at 2.

94 An example of a KMI-Shared Employee cross-charge is the charge for costs incurred on behalf of the KMEP-Operated Entities by the office of KMI's chairman.
the Products Pipeline Group, then that for the Pacific Group, and then that for SFPP. The chart does not show the employees for the joint ventures and Canadian entities as SFPP states that the relevant costs are billed by the joint venture partner controlling the employees or by the Canadian entities.

81. SFPP further explains that KMI’s accounting system is based on the concept of responsibility centers (RCs). Specifically, costs are captured in responsibility centers and flow to the subsidiaries (including various operating entities) that each responsibility center serves. Thus employees within KMI and GP Services (and their associated costs) are divided into responsibility centers based on their functional duties and the geographic locations of the subsidiaries they support. SFPP states that each responsibility center has its own budget and tracks and assigns costs to the subsidiaries it supports. SFPP further asserts that the use of responsibility centers allows KMEP and KMI to isolate, identify, and control costs by business segment and by region. SFPP claims, within each responsibility center, employees use either time sheets (hourly time recording) or salary splits (percentage-based time recording) to track the time they spend working for various entities or groups.95

82. SFPP further asserts that because GP Services’ responsibility centers and their employees perform no work for any KMI-Operated Entity or KMI-Owned Entity, the GP Services costs that cannot be directly assigned to an individual KMEP-Operated Entity or Tier are distributed through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. SFPP asserts that all GP Services’ costs incurred for the benefit of a limited group of subsidiaries, such as those in a particular business segment (e.g., products pipelines), are directly assigned to that group of subsidiaries. Those costs are then allocated among the members of that group as a “shared cost distribution” using the three allocators of the Massachusetts Formula derived from the members of the particular group or subgroup involved.96 SFPP states that the remaining “residual” GP Services costs incurred for the benefit of all KMEP-Operated Entities are allocated among all the KMEP-Operated Entities using KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Thus, there are three sets of costs that are allocated to SFPP through three different Massachusetts Formulas: the costs assigned or allocated to KMEP, the costs directly assigned to the Products Pipeline Group, and the costs directly assigned to the Pacific Group.97

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95 Ex. SFP-38 at 10-12; Ex. SFP-129 at 8-9.
96 As discussed in more detail below, the three allocators of the Massachusetts Formula are (1) labor, (2) revenue, and (3) and property, plant, and equipment.
97 See Ex. SFP-40 at 1, 2, and 5. Line 13 of page 5 shows how the costs are allocated to SFPP under the Massachusetts Formula based on SFPP’s relative proportion (continued...
83. SFPP states that the KMI employees that work for the responsibility centers managing the individual KMI-Operated Entities and KMI-Owned Entities directly assign their expenses to those entities to the extent possible. SFPP also explains that certain of KMI’s corporate overhead costs (such as those of the Office of the Chairman, which provides executive guidance and oversight to the entire KMI organization) cannot be directly assigned to an individual operating subsidiary because such activities benefit multiple entities within the KMI business structure. SFPP asserts that there are three shared-services accounts KMI uses to capture those corporate overhead costs that cannot be directly assigned. It states that SFPP receives those costs from only one of these three shared services account, specifically Account 184601.98

84. SFPP states that the other two shared services accounts, 107001 and 184600, involve costs that are distributed only among the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities and have no impact on KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. It explains that the first shared services account, Account 107001, is used only to capture all of the overhead costs associated with the support of capital projects for the KMI-Operated and KMI-Owned Entities. SFPP states that both KMI-shared employees and KMI-dedicated employees may charge time to Account 107001. SFPP further explains that the expenses in Account 107001 are not charged to KMEP and are not included in the pool of costs allocated through KMI shared-cost allocations or KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Instead, SFPP asserts, the costs in Account 107001 are distributed among the KMI-Operated and KMI-Owned Entities through a separate allocation methodology based on each entity’s level of capital spending.99

85. SFPP further states that the second shared services account, Account 184600, is used to capture KMI’s corporate overhead costs incurred only for the benefit of the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities. It asserts that both KMI-shared employees and KMI-dedicated employees may charge time to Account 184600. SFPP also states that the expenses in Account 184600 are not charged to KMEP or allocated through KMEP’s shared cost distributions or its Massachusetts Formula. SFPP states that the total costs assigned to Account 184600 are first offset by the fixed fees that four of the KMI-Operated Entities pay to KMI. SFPP asserts that any difference between the amount in the account and the fees paid by those KMI-Operated Entities is allocated among the KMI-Owned Entities and the remaining KMI-Operated Entities through KMI’s own Massachusetts Formula allocation. Thus, if there is any shortfall in the recovery of the

of the residual (unassigned) costs for KMEP, the Products Pipeline Group (PPL General), and the PPL Pacific Group, with a total in the far right-hand column.

98 Ex. SFP-38 at 7-8, 11-12, 18-19, and 30-31.

99 Id. at 14-15.
costs through the fixed fees from the KMI-Operated Entities paying those fees, none of that shortfall or any other residual costs in Account 184600 flow to KMEP or to SFPP.100

86. SFPP explains that the third shared services account, Account 184601, is used only to capture the corporate overhead costs incurred by KMI-shared employees and the related responsibility centers for the benefit of the KMEP-Operated Entities, such as SFPP. SFPP states that the KMI-dedicated employees and their related responsibility centers are not allowed to budget expenses or charge time to Account 184601. SFPP states that unlike the other two shared services accounts which do not allocate costs to KMEP, the costs contained in Account 184601 are assigned to KMEP through a “KMI Cross-Charge,” and then allocated among the KMEP-Operated Entities through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula allocation.101 SFPP states that only the portion of KMI’s “shared costs” that are included in Account No. 184601 are assigned to KMEP, and then through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula to the KMEP-Operated Entities such as SFPP.102

87. SFPP states that expenses related to support services from KMI-shared employees that may be allocated to KMEP are subjected to a rigorous accounting review to ensure their accuracy. SFPP further states that KMI uses the Lawson Financials system for its enterprise-wide accounting system. This system uses a ledger and various customized reports to verify the accuracy of the overhead expenses charged to KMEP. The expenses are then subject to an approval process at the local and executive levels at KMI and GP Services. A supervisor or manager of the responsibility center is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of these numbers, and they are compared to the budgeted charges during monthly earnings review meetings. Wherever the expenses materially deviate from the budget, they are discussed and corrections are identified.103

88. In this case, the total overhead costs allocated to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge contained in Account 184601 were $63,312 million.104 The direct assignments to KMEP-Operated Entities were $89,243 million and the total allocated to those entities through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula was $234.6 million.105 After revisions, SFPP states that the total overhead costs allocated to SFPP by direct assignment from GP

100 Ex. SFP-39 at 2-3.
101 The KMI cross-charge to KMEP is reflected on page 9, line 16 of Ex. SFP-40 and was $63,312,015 in 2007.
102 Ex. SFP-38 at 11-12; Ex. SFP-129 at 12-13.
103 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 52; Ex. SFP-38 at 12; Ex. SFP-129 at 13-14.
104 Ex. SFP-40 at 9, line 16.
105 See Ex. SFP-342.
Services, and by the application of the KMEP's Massachusetts Formula (including the indirect costs from GP Services and the KMI cross-charge), were $41,240,000. Of this, the direct assignment of overhead costs to SFPP from KMEP cost centers was $9,802,000 and the allocation of overhead costs under KMEP's Massachusetts Formula was $31,438,000.\(^ {106} \)

In contrast, Mr. O'Loughlin would allocate $19,923,000 in overhead costs to the West Line based on an overhead cost allocation that apparently includes all of the entities owned by KMEP, which includes the KMI-Operated Entities, KMEP-Operated Entities and the Joint Ventures (together the KMEP-Owned Entities) and joint ventures in a single Massachusetts Formula.\(^ {107} \)

Daniel S. Arthur, Ph.D., lead witness for the ACV-Shippers, would allocate $20,366,534 to all of SFPP's operations (including the West Line) by using a single Massachusetts Formula that may include all of the KMI-Owned and KMEP-Owned Entities, although this is unclear.\(^ {108} \)

C. The Massachusetts Formula

89. The 2009 ID contains a detailed summary of KMI’s accounting system based on the testimony of SFPP’s witnesses\(^ {109} \) and the protesting shipper parties’ and the Trial Staff’s criticisms of that system.\(^ {110} \) The Commission concludes that the 2009 ID fairly

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106 See Ex.SPF-342

107 See Ex. ACV-3 at 5, line 6. While Mr. O'Loughlin states in his text that he used the same overhead cost allocation method as Dr. Arthur (Ex. ACV-1 at 32), Mr. O'Loughlin’s overhead costs for the West Line were almost the same as Dr. Arthur’s overhead costs for all of SFPP (n.109 infra). This suggests that of Dr. Arthur’s two methods, Mr. O’Loughlin may have used the KMEP-wide Massachusetts Formula and not the combined KMI-KMEP Massachusetts Formula Dr. Arthur advances.

108 Ex. ACV-86 at 1. Pages 3 through 6 thereof provide the detailed calculations for a single combined KMI-KMEP Massachusetts Formula. However, the Joint Initial Brief of the ACV Shipper’s states that Dr. Arthur’s use of KMEP-wide Massachusetts Formula allocates $17.6 million in costs to all of SFPP rather than attributing that number to the West Line only. See Joint Initial Brief of Continental Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Southwest Airlines Co., US Airways, Inc., Chevron Products Company, ConocoPhillips Company, and Valero Marketing and Supply Company dated September 30, 2009 at 45. This statement does not appear consistent with Ex. ACV-3 at 5, line 6, cited in the previous footnote, nor does the cited brief provide any analysis of the cost allocations to SFPP of Dr. Arthur’s proposed combined KMI-KMEP Massachusetts Formula.


110 Id. P 693-736, 745-747.
reviewed the testimony regarding KMI's method for applying the Massachusetts Formula to KMI's and GP Services's costs and for assigning and allocating those costs to KMEP and SFPP through that methodology. The Commission also concludes that the 2009 ID fairly summarizes the overall operations of KMI's accounting system. 111

90. The 2009 ID correctly summarized the Massachusetts Formula, 112 stating that the Massachusetts Formula allocates to subsidiary companies those corporate overhead costs (general and administrative, or G&A) that cannot legitimately be assigned on a direct basis to a specific subsidiary. 113 The Massachusetts Formula allocates corporate overhead costs to a regulated utility subsidiary using an average of three ratios: (1) the regulated utility subsidiary's gross operating revenues to total corporate gross operating revenues; (2) the regulated utility subsidiary's gross property, plant, and equipment to total corporate gross property, plant, and equipment; and (3) the regulated utility subsidiary's gross payroll (or direct labor costs) to total corporate gross payroll. 114 Overhead costs are allocated to the affiliate based upon the average of the three percentages of each of these three items times the total dollar figures for the three accounting items stated in the previous sentence. 115 The three averages are weighted equally. 116 In the instant case, the accuracy of KMI's direct assignments is the key issue concerning KMI's application of the Massachusetts Formula cost methodology to its accounting system.

91. The 2009 ID made seven main findings regarding KMI's accounting system. First, that KMI's accounting structure is consistent with the purpose of the Massachusetts Formula because it directly assigns overhead costs to specific subsidiaries where possible, and then allocates the residual costs through KMEP's Massachusetts Formula. 117 Second that the KMI-Operated Entities, certain Joint Ventures, and the KM

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111 Id. P 748-795.
112 Id. P 693-694.
113 Northwest Pipeline Corp., 71 FERC ¶ 61,253, at 61,984 (1995) (Northwest). The Commission has explained that "[d]irect costs are costs that the parent company can specifically identify and directly assign to the subsidiary that incurred the costs," and "[s]uch direct-billed corporate services are not considered in the allocation process." Michigan Gas Storage Co., 87 FERC ¶ 61,038, at 61,171-73 (1999).
115 Id. (citing Williams Natural Gas Co., 77 FERC ¶ 61,277, at 62,188).
Canada subsidiaries were properly excluded from the KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Third, KMI’s accounting system assigned or allocated costs with reasonable accuracy. Fourth, that year-end plant balances should be used to determine the rate base element used in SFPP’s Massachusetts Formula, and thereby rejected SFPP’s proposal to use a two-year (semi-annual) average. Fifth, that any purchase accounting adjustments (PAA) should be removed from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities. Sixth, that it is acceptable to use Tejas Consolidated’s net revenues in applying the Massachusetts Formula if the Tejas Consolidated were included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Seventh, the 2009 ID excluded KMI’s capitalized overhead costs from the Massachusetts Formula. The 2009 ID therefore rejected the ACC Shippers’ proposal that all entities included in the KMI business structure be consolidated in a single corporate-wide “all in” Massachusetts Formula that would include all of the overhead costs of all the KMI-Owned, KMI-Operated, KMEP-Operated, Joint Venture and KM Canada entities. The 2009 ID also rejected ACC Shipper’s alternative proposal, which is similar to Tesoro’s, that all KMEP-Owned Entities be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. The 2009 ID also rejected Trial Staff’s proposal to use a KMEP wide formula on an interim basis.

92. On exceptions, Valero asserts that the 2009 ID erred in permitting KMEP to use direct and shared-cost distributions in allocating overhead expenses to its subsidiaries and by excluding certain subsidiaries from a single-tier Massachusetts Formula. Valero agrees that the 2009 ID incorrectly omitted the subsidiary from that calculation. Trial Staff also asserts that the 2009 ID incorrectly excluded certain subsidiaries from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula, but in less categorical terms. In addition, Valero asserts that the 2009 ID did not apply the correct legal standards, should not have accepted the accuracy and reliability of KMI’s accounting methodology, incorrectly permitted the use certain of the cost of service components, and erred by not using gross revenues as the revenue component for all applications of that Formula. SFPP opposes the 2009 ID’s conclusion that KMI’s capitalized overhead costs should be excluded from the operation of its

118 Id. P 759-768.
119 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 775-778.
120 Id. P 779-780.
121 Id. P 781-785.
122 Id. P 786-790.
123 Id. P 791-796.
124 Id. P 769.
125 Id.
Massachusetts Formula. On reply, Trial Staff generally supports the 2009 ID but seeks on exceptions that the Commission require SFPP to include all KMEP-Owned Entities in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula, at least until SFPP can provide additional information supporting its proposed cost assignments and allocations. SFPP generally supported the 2009 ID’s conclusions regarding the exclusion of the KMI-Operated Entities and the Joint Ventures.

93. The Commission’s review is grouped by five topics: (1) the appropriateness of KMI’s accounting methodology; (2) the resolution of certain general legal issues; (3) the proposed exclusion of certain of KMEP-Owned Entities; (4) the reliability of KMI’s accounting system; and (5) the use of certain cost and revenue components in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula.

1. The Appropriateness of KMI’s Accounting Methodology

94. The 2009 ID concluded that KMI’s accounting methodology was appropriate and consistent with the requirements of the Massachusetts Formula because that methodology seeks to maximize the direct assignment of costs to the various operating entities in the KMI system including those owned by KMEP. The 2009 ID also found that the KMI methodology also assigns of costs directly to lowest level in the accounting structure where possible. As stated in Northwest, the Massachusetts Formula requires, to the extent is its reasonably possible, the direct assignment of costs to individual entities or operations, i.e., the lowest possible level, which in this case is SFPP. On review, the Commission concludes that the 2009 ID correctly held that KMI’s methodology is consistent with the purpose of the Massachusetts Formula. KMI’s methodology seeks to assign costs at the lowest possible level of KMI’s and KMEP’s business structures, and then allocates the residual costs through the Massachusetts Formula to each business entity that benefits from the costs incurred by KMI or GP Services. This means costs that are not directly assigned to SFPP are assigned either to the Pacific Group or to the Products Pipeline Group where possible, which is also consistent with assigning costs at the lowest possible level within KMEP business structure. Importantly, the Products Pipeline, CO₂, and Terminal Groups each consist of a group of operating entities or facilities having similar operating and commercial characteristics. That similarity is the

126 Id. P 750-758.

127 Northwest, 71 FERC at 61,984. The Commission has explained that “[d]irect costs are costs that the parent company can specifically identify and directly assign to the subsidiary that incurred the costs,” and “[s]uch direct-billed corporate services are not considered in the allocation process.” Michigan Gas Storage Co., 87 FERC ¶ 61,038, at 61,171-73 (1999).
basis for KMEP's direct assignment of costs to those Groups. However, when overhead costs cannot be directly assigned based on the costs records derived from those differing operating and commercial characteristics, overhead costs are allocated among the three Groups under KMEP's Massachusetts Formula, and there through the Products Pipeline Group and the Pacific Group to SFPP.  

95. Regarding this fundamental point, SFPP has presented sufficient evidence that KMI's accounting methodology provides an effective method for isolating the direct and indirect overhead costs that flow from KMI-dedicated employees or from KMI-shared employees to the KMI-Owned Entities. Because KMI's accounting structure rigidly separates KMI employees and GP Services employees, the costs of the KMI-dedicated employees are isolated from those of the GP Services employees providing the bulk of administrative and overhead services to KMEP. Accordingly, including the KMI-Owned Entities in KMEP's Massachusetts Formula would allocate costs to a large number of entities that do not benefit from the costs that flow to KMEP (and the KMEP-Operated Entities) from GP Services, as well as those that are allocated to KMEP from the KMI-shared employees through the KMI crosscharge. Similarly, the costs of the KMI-Owned Entities would flow to the KMEP-Operated Entities even though the latter do not benefit from the costs of the KMI-dedicated employees. Thus, the only purpose for such “all in” approach that combines all of the KMI and KMEP entities, and which would combine all of their overhead costs in a single Massachusetts Formula, is to spread all of KMI's and KMEP's overhead costs over the largest possible number of entities. The ACC Shippers propose doing so without regard to which entities received the benefit of specific cost centers or whether a specific entity had any involvement in the underlying business activity that generated those costs. As discussed below, Williams II requires the evaluation of individual cost centers wherever possible, not their commingling. 

96. Given Williams II, Trial Staff correctly states that ACC Shipper’s proposed “all in” method would be the antithesis of matching cost allocation to cost causation and would violate fundamental Commission cost allocation policies. For example, such an “all in” approach would allocate costs from KMEP’s CO₂ pipeline operations to the telecommunication units owned and operated by KMI on the assumption that KMI’s accounting system is so defective that it is impossible to directly assign overhead costs to KMEP’s CO₂ and KMI’s telecommunications units. Such an approach would include in

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128 See Ex. SFP-40 at 1-5, as corrected to exclude PAAs at 6.
129 Ex. SFP-38 at 7-8; Ex. SFP-39 at 2-3.
131 Staff Brief op. Ex. at 11, 19-21, 27.
a KMI wide Massachusetts Formula overhead costs that can be directly assigned to the operations of KMEP's CO₂ pipelines, such as the maintenance of the system's compressor and storage facilities, or their scheduling and pricing functions. This would occur even though the overhead costs of GP Services employees supporting the CO₂ pipelines cannot possibly benefit a KMI telecommunications entity whose overhead functions are provided solely by KMI-dedicated employees. Similarly, it is unreasonable to assert that KMI's accounting system is so deficient that KMI-dedicated employees who work only for KMI-Owned and operated interstate gas pipelines provide benefits to the CO₂ pipeline operations owned and operated KMEP, and for which overhead functions are provided solely by GP Services employees. Nothing in the record supports such an unreasonable position given the rigid separation of functions between the KMI and GP Services employees. Given that separation, the legitimate area of inquiry is the reasonableness of the assignment or allocation of costs to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge and the direct assignment of GP Services costs among the KMEP-Operated Entities.

Moreover, the Commission further concludes that nothing in this record supports a finding that all GP Services overhead costs must be allocated through KMEP-wide Massachusetts Formula to all of KMEP's operating entities without regard to what costs can be directly assigned to those entities. The organization of the KMEP-Owned Entities into the KMI-Operated gas pipelines, the Products Pipeline Group, the CO₂ Pipelines, and the Terminal Group is a rational structure that collects operations with similar economic and commercial functions into separate accounting centers. This is a sensible basis for directly assigning the overhead costs incurred by GP Services to the Products Pipeline, CO₂ Pipeline, and Terminal Groups. Because SFPP is the entity whose rates are before the Commission, the fundamental issue is whether overhead costs have been appropriately allocated to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge, or directly assigned by GP Services to the Pipeline Products Group, to the Pacific Group, or to SFPP. Thus the Commission will not examine whether costs assigned or allocated to CO₂ Pipeline and Terminal Groups are accurate as long as the costs flowing to the Pipeline Products Group, the Pacific Group, or to SFPP are reasonable.

That issue is examined in detail below. But as with the Commission's rejection of a combined KMI-KMEP "all in" Massachusetts Formula, the Commission rejects a theory that would allocate all of GP Services' costs to all of the KMEP-Owned Entities without the regard to whether those costs could be directly assigned to those entities based on their different structural, operating, commercial and staffing characteristics. The Commission will discuss below some limitations in cost data involving the Products Pipeline Group, and to a much lesser extent, the data for the initial operations of KMI Canada. Due to those limitations, the Commission is adopting Trial Staff's recommendation that those be addressed further in this proceeding. However, those limitations do not warrant rejection of a system designed to capture costs of three different groups that have different operating and commercial characteristics and to
whom GP Services has assigned distinct employee groups to support their operations. For example, a supervisory and commercial team for CO\textsubscript{2} pipelines would not in the normal course of business perform supervisory and commercial functions for Products Pipeline Group and the Terminal Facilities given the discreet grouping of the employees assigned to the CO\textsubscript{2} Group within GP Services.\textsuperscript{132} The record here does not support a finding that the overhead costs directly assigned to the Products Group, Pacific Group, or SFPP should have been assigned to the CO\textsubscript{2} Group or the Terminal Group. Conversely, the record does not support the allocation of costs assigned to the CO\textsubscript{2} Group or the Terminal Group to Products Group or SFPP, nor is it in the interest of the shippers for this to have occurred. Thus there is no basis here for requiring an “all in” KMEP Massachusetts Formula that negates the direct assignment of GP Services’ overhead costs among the different entities and facilities that KMEP owns and operates where this is reasonable.

99. The Commission thus concludes the appropriate methodological and legal issues to be decided here are: (1) certain generic legal issues; (2) the exclusion of some KMEP-Owned, but KMI or independently operated, entities from a more broadly defined KMEP Massachusetts Formula; (3) whether the supporting data SFPP has provided here is sufficiently accurate and reliable; (4) the definition and use of certain cost elements within the KMEP Massachusetts Formula; and (5) the nature of the revenue inputs to be used in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula calculations.

2. The Generic Legal Issues

100. Valero’s exceptions contain a number of general objections to KMI’s methodology which are addressed at this point. First, Valero argues that KMI’s methodology for assigning costs directly to certain specific operating groups and entities is invalid because KMEP stated in its 2007 Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K filing that the aggregated overhead costs are not attributable to specific KMI entities. Valero concludes that SFPP’s presentation in this proceeding is invalid and is at bottom a misrepresentation to the Commission given that SEC filings are made under oath.\textsuperscript{133} SFPP replies that overhead costs are aggregated in an SEC annual 10-K filing so the overhead administrative costs are distinguished from the earning power of the assets that determine the operating income and profit of its enterprises. SFPP states that the separation also allows investors to determine on a year to year basis how overhead costs change.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} Ex. SFP-38 at 24.
\textsuperscript{133} Valero Brief on Ex. at 29-26.
\textsuperscript{134} SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 61 (citing Ex. SFP-179 at 7-9; Ex. SFP-144).
101. The Commission accepts SFPP’s explanation of its use of a different presentation in its SEC 10-K filings from that required for cost justifications in a Commission rate proceeding. Different agencies have different regulatory requirements that reflect their different purposes. SFPP’s explanation of the SEC format is logical given the emphasis that investors place on the earning power of assets, and the related concern of whether administrative costs are reasonable, or excessive, given the revenue and profits of the underlying assets. It cannot be reasonably contested here that KMI’s accounting system is designed to assign and allocate costs for purposes of internal administration as well as for rate design. In contrast, with respect to matters subject to SEC regulation, KMI is incentivized to develop an accurate cost assignment process that enables it to judge the efficiency of its operations and its managers even if this involves a different accounting and reporting method than that used for the SEC.\textsuperscript{135} Such an separate effort was also appropriate given the large number of jurisdictional entities owned by both KMEP and KMI. It is also appropriate given KMI’s obligation to assure that costs are allocated with reasonable accuracy among those jurisdictional entities, and between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional functions.\textsuperscript{136} There is no discrepancy involved here that discredits KMI’s methodology.

102. Valero further asserts that the Commission should not rely on an accounting system that Valero alleges does not conform to the Massachusetts Formula, and that the 2009 ID did so.\textsuperscript{137} In reply, Trial Staff and SFPP assert that alternative accounting methods are acceptable if they credibly assign costs directly and fairly allocate any residual costs under the Massachusetts Formula.\textsuperscript{138} The Commission reiterates that while certain aspects of KMI’s methodology are examined in further detail below, the 2009 ID fairly reviewed KMI’s methodology and correctly concluded that it is designed to comply with the requirements of the Massachusetts Formula and that the structure of that system is based on sound accounting principles. As with the difference between the SEC and

\textsuperscript{135} One can reasonably assume that KMI would require the managers of various production and administrative functions to budget and operate in a manner consistent with its internal accounting procedures and that KMEP would desire a system that would provide increased accountability in order to maximize the firm’s efficiency.

\textsuperscript{136} Valero’s arguments in this regard inappropriately imply that KMEP’s and KMI’s officers would risk perjuring themselves through the use of inconsistent methodologies and terminology for the purpose of assigning an inordinate level of costs to SFPP.

\textsuperscript{137} Valero Brief on Ex. at 3-4, 17, 20.

\textsuperscript{138} Staff Brief op. Ex. at 14-15, 19, 23; \textit{Williams Natural Gas Company}, 85 FERC ¶ 61,285, at 62,132-33 (1998) (\textit{Williams II}).
business accounting functions, it is irrelevant that KMI's methodology may have been
developed in part for business rather than for regulatory purposes. Rather the issue is
whether the methodology is sufficiently reliable to be used for the Commission’s
regulatory purposes.

103. Valero also states that KMI’s methodology is self-serving, arbitrary, subjective,
and subject to manipulation compared to the objective and time-tested Massachusetts
Formula methodology.\footnote{See, e.g., Valero Brief on Ex. at 6, 8, 10, 13.} The Commission assumes that KMI’s methodology reflects the
desire of a profit driven entity to more effectively control its costs as well as increase the
accuracy of assignments and allocations for rate making purposes. The two are closely
related in that a more accurate business accounting system provides a sounder basis for
cost recovery in a regulatory context. Thus, reliance on an accounting system that also
has business functions has long been acceptable to the Commission if the methodology is
adequately supported.\footnote{Williams II, 85 FERC at 62,133, 62,138-139.} Moreover, to apply the Massachusetts Formula in a blanket way
to costs that can be directly assigned is itself arbitrary. Valero’s argument that KMI’s
methodology is arbitrary and subjective is grounded in certain errors in timesheet
classification and coding Valero found through discovery. However, such technical
errors alone do not make KMI’s methodology necessarily subjective. SFPP has
established that KMI has a logical methodology for assigning and allocating its costs and
instructs its employees to follow that methodology. SFPP has also established that there
are internal protocols for monitoring and correcting errors that may occur within the
system and that KMI’s system is designed to capture systematically all information
necessary to implement KMI’s accounting. The Commission finds that inevitable human
error involved in the use of any accounting methodology does not in itself render an
otherwise reasonable methodology arbitrary and subjective.

104. In a similar vein, Valero argues that KMI has no policies or directives that assure
that its employees will conform to the methodology KMI uses to allocate its costs.
Valero asserts that SFPP has provided no credible evidence of quality control
mechanisms designed to assure the accuracy of KMI’s accounting system and that KMI’s
personnel policy allows employees to be shifted from one function to another within the
KMI corporate structure.\footnote{Valero Brief on Ex. at 21-22 and 23-24.} SFPP replies that the document Valero cites provides KMI
with the legal right to move employees as needed throughout the organization, and that
there is specific documentation in the record stating that employees must fill out their
time sheets accurately. Moreover, SFPP's witness Mr. Brady testified in detail that KMI requires all employees to fill out time sheets and to provide an allocation of their time between the subsidiaries that benefit from their labor. He also explained that KMI has a budgeting and auditing function that is designed to assure the efficient operation of its accounting methodology and provided examples of such time sheets and time splits. The Commission finds that KMI has developed corporate policies and administrative protocols to effectively capture and to assign and allocate its costs; the issue here is the extent it actually does so.

105. Valero raises three additional interrelated legal and evidentiary points that merit greater consideration. All of these turn on relationships among the affiliates to which the overhead costs are to be assigned or allocated. The first involves the relevance of interlocking directors and officers in determining whether affiliates should be included in a Massachusetts Formula calculation, the second whether the receipt of any benefit from an overhead function requires inclusion of the affiliate receiving the benefit in the calculation, and the third whether to apply a minimal standard of benefit under some circumstances. These issues turn in large measure on the interpretation of Williams II.

106. Valero asserts that Williams II requires the inclusion of subsidiaries in the Massachusetts Formula when directors and officers of the parent company have any responsibility, however nominal, for the operations of the subsidiary. Valero relies heavily on the job descriptions of KMEP's officers and directors to support a conclusion that all of the KMEP-Owned and KMI-Owned Entities should be included in a single Massachusetts Formula calculation. Valero also asserts that the fiduciary obligations of officers and directors compel the conclusion that if such individuals are in a legal chain of control, they necessarily have operating responsibility for a given subsidiary. It asserts that this responsibility is reinforced by KMI's own internal ethics statements which emphasize that all employees must act responsibly and ethically. SFPP replies that Williams II applies only to the situations where the directors and officers have active responsibilities for operations and are directly involved in the management of the company. SFPP further states that in KMEP's structure, its officers are necessarily officers of subsidiary companies under basic principles of corporate law, but that it is

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142 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 61-62 (citing Ex. ACV-43 at 2-4 as demonstrating that KMI employees must correctly code their time and are instructed to do so).

143 Ex. SFP-38 at 9, 11-14, 15-17; Exs. SFP-41, 42, and 43; Ex. SFP-129 at 11, 13-14.

144 Valero Brief on Ex. at 28-30, 59-60, 66.

145 Id. at 29, n.31, 30.
unreasonable to presume that a requirement to act ethically extends to an affirmative obligation to be engaged in the day-to-day operations of a specific subsidiary.\footnote{146}

107. The Commission concludes that \textit{Williams II} is not as categorical as Valero asserts. In \textit{Williams II}, the pipeline applying for a rate increase was Williams Natural Gas Company (WNG), a subsidiary of \textit{The Williams Companies} (TWC).\footnote{147} TWC had numerous subsidiaries, many of which were unregulated. On exceptions, the Missouri Public Service Commission (MoPSC) asserted that the overhead functions performed by WNG were those of a stand-alone company and that the same administrative functions at the level of TWC only duplicated those of WNC. MoPSC therefore concluded that many of the overhead functions that TWC proposed to allocate to WNG under the Massachusetts Formula should be excluded from that calculation. MoPSC also argued that TWC did not directly assign as many costs as possible to subsidiaries other than WNG and that those should be excluded from the Massachusetts Formula calculation.\footnote{148} The result would have been to allocate costs away from the regulated gas entity, WNG, to unregulated entities thereby reducing the burden on WNG’s jurisdictional ratepayers.

108. In \textit{Williams II} the Commission conducted a detailed review of 11 of the 15 cost centers of TWC, the parent company, and held these should be included in WNG’s Massachusetts Formula.\footnote{149} While relying in part on the stated responsibilities of the directors and officers involved, the Commission was careful in each case to assure there was record evidence supporting the actual involvement of the directors and officers in WNG’s affairs.\footnote{150} The Commission also relied heavily on a WNG witness’s credible testimony that explained the assignment and allocation of responsibilities and costs among TWC’s various affiliates.\footnote{151} The Commission did reject certain adjustments WNC proposed to make to its total cost of service to reflect the minimal burden of subsidiaries in which TWC had minimal involvement or that were relatively inactive.\footnote{152} The Commission also stated that subsidiaries that received more than five or ten percent of their total administrative costs from the parent company should be included in WNG’s

\footnote{146}{SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 71-72, 73-74.}

\footnote{147}{\textit{Williams II}, 85 FERC at 62,132-33.}

\footnote{148}{\textit{Id.} at 62,135-36.}

\footnote{149}{\textit{Id.} at 62,139-151.}

\footnote{150}{\textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{Williams II}, 85 FERC at 62,141.}

\footnote{151}{\textit{Id.}}

\footnote{152}{\textit{Id.} at 62,137.
Massachusetts Formula. However the Commission also remanded the overhead cost issue for two reasons. First, to more accurately determine whether a benefit was actually received by a subsidiary. Second, to permit WNG to present more detailed evidence supporting cost-of-service adjustments that would mitigate the harshness of failing to include some of TWC's subsidiaries that received minimal benefit from its operations.

The Commission concludes that SFPP is correct that *Williams II* need not be construed to require that the presence of the same directors and officers at different levels in an organization chart and listed as such on the related corporate documents conclusively resolves whether an affiliate should be included in an allocation formula. Rather, when examining a TWC cost center the Commission relied on specific record evidence provided by TWC to conclude that there was a benefit to WNG from its parent company's involvement. While the Commission rejected the cost-of-service adjustment designed to address a *de minimis* argument, the Commission still offered WNG an opportunity to pursue the issue if this would result in a more equitable assignment or allocation of costs. This leads to two other points. First, *Williams II* leaves open that it may be reasonable to exclude a subsidiary receiving less than a five percent overlap of costs if inclusion of the affiliate would result in an irrational or excessive allocation to or from the regulated entity. The Commission therefore holds that application of such a standard may be appropriate under some circumstances. The Commission also concludes that the statement in *Williams II* that a subsidiary must be included if it receives any benefit from a cost center should not be applied when the result would be a serious misallocation of costs among related subsidiaries. That historical statement may serve as a bright-line rule with respect to a relatively simple hierarchical corporate structure, such as TWC and WNG. However, with respect to more complex business structures such as KMEP's where there are horizontal and vertical relationships, it is more appropriate to balance whether the benefits received from a cost warrant its attribution to a particular operating entity. Thus the Commission will analyze the benefits and their materiality to determine whether an entity or group of entities should be included in KMEP's Massachusetts Formula.

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153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 62,136-37; SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 69.
157 Id. at 62,137 n.31.
3. The Exclusion of Certain Subsidiaries

110. As noted, the 2009 ID excluded from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula the eight KMI-Operated Entities, the four joint ventures in which KMEP has ownership interests, and KM Canada.\textsuperscript{158} As discussed, on exceptions, Valero argues that the Commission should adopt a single KMI-wide Massachusetts Formula that combines all of the KMI-Owned, KMI-Operated, and KMEP-Operated Entities, as well as KM Canada and the Joint Ventures. Valero asserts that this preferred “all in” approach is necessary to assure an objective and accurate allocation of KMI’s and KMEP’s overhead costs given the errors in KMI’s and GP Services’ time sheets and time splits.\textsuperscript{159} As an alternative, Valero would include all of the KMEP-Owned Entities in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula.\textsuperscript{160} Tesoro also advances this more limited approach.\textsuperscript{161}

111. In contrast, Trial Staff argues that all KMEP-Owned Entities should be included in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula until KMI acts to assure that the costs in the KMI cross-charge were properly assigned or allocated to KMEP.\textsuperscript{162} As was previously discussed, Trial Staff argues that Valero’s “all in” approach would further distort the probable errors in KMI’s accounting methodology.\textsuperscript{163} Trial Staff therefore concludes that Valero is incorrect that KMI’s effort to maximize direct assignments is improper or necessarily ineffective. Rather, to correct the deficiencies in SFPP’s initial presentation at hearing, Trial Staff recommends the SFPP be required to provide information to support its cost assignment and allocations in its compliance filing to assure proper assignment or allocation of costs to SFPP. Alternatively, Trial Staff argues SFPP should be required to include all excluded KMEP-Owned Entities in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula on an interim basis and be required to keep more accurate records on a going-forward basis. This would be done by assuring that the costs of the KMI jointly-shared employees are consistently and accurately allocated or assigned to Account No. 186401, which governs the KMI cross-charge. At bottom, rather than adopting Valero’s

\textsuperscript{158} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 759-778. The eight KMI-Operated entities were Casper-Douglas, Tejas Consolidated, KMI GT, Trailblazer, TransColorado, KM North Texas, KM Mexico, and REX, plus the Marine Terminal, Red Cedar, Mountain Creek, the Heartland joint ventures, and KM Canada.

\textsuperscript{159} Valero Brief on Ex. at 12-13.

\textsuperscript{160} Id. at 10-11.

\textsuperscript{161} Tesoro Brief on Ex. at 3, 13-20. Tesoro’s more detailed exceptions on the accounting issues track those of Valero and are subsumed within that discussion.

\textsuperscript{162} Staff Brief on Ex. at 6-8; 12-13; Staff Brief op. Ex. at 12-13.

\textsuperscript{163} Staff Brief on Ex. at 8; Staff Brief op. Ex. at 12-13, 19-20.
unreasonable "all in" method, Trial Staff asserts that the Commission should deny SFPP’s rate increase unless SFPP meets its burden of proof with regard to direct assignments.164

112. The Commission has previously rejected Valero’s "all in" KMI-KMEP wide Massachusetts Formula as lacking any reasonable connection with economic or accounting realities. Turning to the narrower assertions relating to the KMEP owned gas pipeline subsidiaries and joint ventures, the Commission first notes that under KMI’s accounting methodology, residual costs from GP Services that cannot be directly assigned to KMEP-Operated Entities are allocated to those entities under KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. However, if affiliated entities are excluded from the application of the Massachusetts Formula, any residual overhead costs would be distributed over a smaller number of subsidiaries and the total overhead costs of those remaining entities would be increased. While recognizing that concern, the Commission first notes that under KMI’s accounting structure SFPP is disadvantaged if the costs of the KMI-shared employees are inaccurately allocated to KMEP, but is favored if the costs of such employees are allocated to the KMI-Owned Entities. Thus, in the instant case, the overhead cost allocation issues turn on two points that are discussed more fully below. These are (1) whether the costs of KMI-shared employees are properly assigned or allocated to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge, or (2) whether the GP Services costs are correctly assigned to KMEP’s sub-tiers or subsidiaries such as SFPP. As was previously discussed, the costs the KMI-Owned Entities incurred through the allocation of KMI-dedicated or KMI-shared employees through Account 184600 are not at issue given isolation of the KMI-dedicated employees.165 SFPP has established that even after a survey and an audit, Valero did not uncover a single situation where the employees of the audited RCs that directly assigned costs to SFPP included the costs of any of the KMI-Owned or the KMI-Operated Entities.166

113. Given the exclusion of the KMI-Owned Entities from a KMI-KMEP Massachusetts Formula, there are three categories of KMEP-Owned Entities that require further evaluation given their ownership by KMEP, but their exclusion from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. These are: (1) joint ventures for which the administrative and general functions SFPP states are provided by the joint venture partner; (2) two entities, Marine Terminal and KM Canada, which SFPP states provide their own administrative and general services; and (3) the eight KMI-Operated natural gas entities owned by KMEP. The determination of whether these entities are properly excluded from the

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164 Staff Brief on Ex. at 8-9; Staff Brief op. Ex. at 12, 15, 20.
165 See Ex. SFP-39 and Ex. SFP-38 at 9.
166 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 67-68.
KMEP Massachusetts Formula turns primarily on matters of corporate structure and the existence of some small cost overlaps that may provide benefits to a specific excluded entity.

114. Regarding the joint ventures, the 2009 ID excluded the Heartland, Red Cedar, and Mountain Creek joint ventures from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Trial Staff asserts on exceptions that all of KMEP’s joint ventures should be included in KMEP Massachusetts Formula, despite the fact that at hearing Trial Staff stated that the exclusion of the Heartland, Red Cedar, and Thunder Creek incur no costs through the KMI cross-charge. Valero argues that SFPP has not established that Heartland is operated exclusively by its 50 percent joint partner, Conoco Pipeline Company. It further asserts that the relevant partnership agreement states that KMEP is the operator of the partnership’s pipeline receipt and delivery services and that the management committee has at least one KMEP employee. Valero states that SFPP did not quantify any supervisory costs related to this employee. Valero also asserts that the Heartland employees for which KMEP is reimbursed generate direct costs in excess of $1 million a year and SFPP provides no quantification of such overhead costs such as human resources, IT and payroll for those employees. Valero further argues that some supervisory costs, such as the Chairman’s office and certain stock options, necessarily should be included in Red Cedar and Thunder Creek through the KMI cross-charge.

115. SFPP replies that in the case of all three joint ventures, all administrative and general costs are provided by the joint venture partner, including all human resources, IT and payroll costs, and that no costs from the joint ventures are included in the KMI cross-charge or those from GP Services. SFPP correctly states that its testimony to this effect is contested on brief, but not on the record. The 2009 ID is affirmed.

116. Regarding Marine Terminal, in his reply testimony SFPP’s witness Mr. Brady stated that one KMEP employee sits on the Marine Terminal board at an estimated cost of $7000, which is reflected in KMEP RC 1001 and is not part of the KMI cross-charge to KMEP. Mr. Brady further testified that while RC 1001 is a KMEP responsibility center, costs in RC 1001 are allocated only to subsidiaries in the MidCon geographic

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167 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 760-762.
168 Ex. S-12C at 24.
169 Valero Brief on Ex. at 68-70.
170 Id. at 71-73.
171 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 81-82.
172 Ex. SFP-129 at 35-36.
group, and thus are not allocated to SFPP, which is in the Pacific Group.\textsuperscript{173} Thus, in his opinion, because all other costs incurred for Marine Terminal are billed directly to the venture partner, there can be no cost allocation to SFPP because the costs incurred by KMEP are directly assigned to another KMEP subsidiary. On exceptions, Trial Staff argues that Marine Terminal should be included in KMEP's Massachusetts Formula, possibly because the source of the overhead costs is unclear.\textsuperscript{174} Valero asserts that Marine Terminal must be included in KMEP's Massachusetts Formula because Marine Terminal is shown as part of the terminal group in KMEP’s 2007 SEC 10-K Report. Valero also asserts that SFPP included any overhead costs required for billing activities or for the supervisory costs that would be involved in the billing functions related to Marine Terminal.\textsuperscript{175}

117. The Commission first concludes that Valero's argument regarding the statements about Marine Terminal in KMI's 10-K is inadequate. SFPP has adequately explained the difference between KMI's ownership structure, which is based primarily on tax considerations, and its operating and accounting structure. The latter structure is what at issue here. Given this, the Commission holds that SFPP's rationale and its analysis of the direct supervisory costs, and the amount, relevant to Marine Terminal is reasonable. The Commission thus affirms the exclusion of the Marine Terminal from KMEP's Massachusetts Formula.

118. The 2009 ID also excluded KM Canada from KMEP's Massachusetts Formula. KM Canada is the Canadian subsidiary of KMEP that operates the Canadian portion of Cochin Pipeline Company, Trans Mountain Pipeline Company, and the Vancouver Wharves Terminal.\textsuperscript{176} At hearing SFPP's initial testimony stated that almost all of KM Canada's employees were Canadians, as required by Canadian law, and that KM Canada has its own administrative structure and rates regulated by Canada's National Energy Board. SFPP’s witness Mr. Brady stated that in 2007, only a few of KM Canada's costs were incurred within GP Services or KMEP.\textsuperscript{177} In contrast, at hearing Trial Staff's witness testified that Cochin Pipeline would be included in the Products Pipeline tier and the Midcontinent sub-tier, Trans Mountain in the Pipeline Products and the Pacific sub-tier, and Vancouver Wharves Terminal in the Terminals tier, and called into question the

\textsuperscript{173}Id. at 40-41.
\textsuperscript{174}Ex. S-12C at 24.
\textsuperscript{175}Valero Brief on Ex. at 70-71.
\textsuperscript{176}2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at ¶ 63, 467-468, 478-480, 774.
\textsuperscript{177}Ex. SFP-38 at 35-37.
Valero asserts that the surveys and time sheets are inadequate to support the dollar figure advanced by SFPP and improperly exclude numerous costs that were incurred on behalf of KM Canada. These include organization and acquisition costs and supervision at the executive level of this acquisition. Valero asserts that SFPP failed to explain the references on various time sheets to services Valero argues were provided to KM Canada by GP Services (i.e. KMEP) employees. Valero concludes this supports its position that KMI did not accurately capture costs incurred by KMEP on behalf of KM Canada.

119. In its rebuttal testimony, SFPP asserted that some of the $477,000 limited costs incurred to support KM Canada were incurred by employees in responsibility centers that did not budget costs to the KMI cross-charge. Therefore SFPP excluded this entire amount from KMEP's cost structure to avoid any hint of cross subsidization. SFPP states that if KM Canada were allocated costs as Staff and Valero suggest, it will be allocated overhead costs twice. The first would be through the KM Canada responsibility centers for the costs incurred in KM Canada's stand-alone administrative functions. The second would be for the duplicated costs that are allocated to it from the same type of KMEP or KMI responsibility cost centers. It also states that the acquisition costs should be attributed to all of KMI's operations since those costs benefited all entities.

120. The Commission concludes that SFPP has established that KM Canada has its own administrative structure that incurs the bulk of its overhead costs, including human resources, payroll, accounting, and provides most of its own operations supervision. SFPP's Mr. Brady established by his direct testimony that GP Services (and hence KMEP) provides few services to KM Canada, and re-enforced this through his survey. However, Trial Staff's recommendation for inclusion of KM Canada in the KMEP Massachusetts (within the subdivisions previously stated) reflects statements in Mr. Brady's initial testimony that there may be some small amount of costs incurred by KMEP on behalf of KM Canada. It may also be consistent with some portions of footnote 34 of Valero's brief on exceptions asserting that some personnel and units of KMEP appear to have been involved in KM Canada commercial and regulatory matters

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178 Ex. S-12C at 16.
179 Valero Brief on Ex. at 50-51.
180 Id. at 52-55.
181 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 78-79; Ex. SFP-129 at 36-39 (Brady); Ex. SFP-133 for the KM Canada RCs.
182 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 79.
during 2007. Thus, while SFPP’s proposed $477,000 adjustment is less than 2 percent of the $25.5 million SFPP states were KM Canada’s incurred costs, the Commission concludes that SFPP must provide greater clarity for the record regarding the extent to which employees of GP Services, or KMI-shared employees, were involved in KM Canada operations in 2007. This must include a more detailed response to the criticisms contained in Valero’s Brief on Exceptions. In addition, the Commission questions whether the acquisition KM Canada, which SFPP argues is a stand-alone entity, will actually benefit SFPP, which operates in the southwestern United States. Therefore SFPP must revisit the issue of the KM Canada acquisition costs to assure that none of these costs flow down to SFPP.

121. The Commission thereby adopts Trial Staff’s suggestion that SFPP should provide fuller explanation and documentation of the relevant time sheets or time splits along with supporting work papers related to the KM Canada cost assignments and allocations. Consistent with Williams II, SFPP should structure any further analysis on a cost center by cost center basis, and assuming adequate documentation, remove the costs from KMEP’s total costs accordingly. For example, if all of KM Canada’s human resource activities were handled through its own administrative structure and none by GP Services or KMI, then that particular KM Canadian RC may be excluded from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Finally, if portions of KM Canada cost are included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula this does not mean all of KM Canada’s costs must be included. This is because, as Williams II requires, the review centers on individual KM Canada RCs, not the overhead costs of that entity in their entirety.

122. The 2009 ID also excluded eight KMI-Operated Entities from the KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula, all of which are involved in natural gas pipeline operations or sales. Under KMI’s management and accounting structure the KMI-Operated Entities are owned, but not operated by KMEP. Thus, under KMI’s accounting methodology they would not be allocated costs from GP Services. Rather they are managed by KMI-

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183 See Valero Brief on Ex. at 32-34, 33, n.34.
184 Id. at 52-55.
186 As discussed below, this would require two KMEP Massachusetts Formula calculations depending on whether particular RCs that benefited KMI Canada were in excess of any de minimis amount.
187 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 760, 775-778. As noted, the eight KMI-Operated Entities are Casper-Douglas, Tejas Consolidated, KMI GT, Trailblazer, TransColorado, KM North Texas, KM Mexico, and REX.
dedicated and KMI-shared employees. The costs of the employees responsible for the KMI-Operated Entities are captured in Account 184600. Four of those entities are billed fixed fees for these costs and any costs that are not recovered through the fees are allocated to the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities through KMI’s Massachusetts Formula.\(^\text{188}\) Under KMI’s accounting methodology, if the costs of KMI-shared employees are allocated to Account 184600, these cannot be allocated to KMEP or assigned to the Products Pipeline Group, the Pacific Group, or to SFPP. However the converse is true. Thus, the accuracy of the allocation of KMI-shared employee costs flowed to KMEP through the operation of KMI’s Massachusetts Formula, or the direct assignment to SFPP, controls the extent to which the KMI-Operated Entities may be excluded from KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula, as is discussed in the next section.

123. The Commission discusses here two more generic issues arising in the context of the excluded KMEP affiliates before turning to the accuracy of KMI’s accounting methodology. First, Valero argues that KMEP’s officers and directors have operating and legal responsibility for the KMI-Operated Entities, and therefore those entities should be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. After reviewing KMEP’s personnel structure and the ten RCs it selected during discovery,\(^\text{189}\) Valero presents the example of Ms. Armstrong, who serves as the Vice-President for Accounting for KMEP. Valero asserts that her job description includes responsibility for overseeing the accounting for KMEP’s subsidiaries.\(^\text{190}\) SFPP replies that Ms. Armstrong testified under oath that her day to day responsibilities involve only KMEP’s accounting issues, not the subsidiaries. SFPP’s Mr. Brady also testified that Ms. Armstrong reviews his role in developing capital investment decisions related to KMEP’s activities. Mr. Brady reiterated that as a shared KMI employee he performs accounting for the KMI-Owned Entities and the KMI-Operated Entities as well as the KMEP-Operated Entities, but that Ms. Armstrong only reviews the latter.\(^\text{191}\)

124. The Commission concludes that it appears reasonable that Ms. Armstrong does not have responsibility for the accounting functions of the KMI-Operated Entities. KMI and

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\(^{188}\) Thus, KMI’s Massachusetts Formula uses the standard three prong test to distribute the residual costs in Account 184600 to the KMI-Owned Entities.

\(^{189}\) See Ex. ACV-46 and Ex. ACV-238c at 3-8, 13 for the cost information on RCs that was provided to Dr. Arthur during discovery.

\(^{190}\) Valero Brief on Ex. at 30, 37-38, 56-60.

\(^{191}\) Ex. SFP-129 at 20-21. This example therefore presents two distinct issues: (1) how costs should be allocated among the entities that KMEP owns, and (2) how costs should be assigned to KMEP from a KMI shared employee or KMI cost center.
KMEP each have their own accounting group to perform these functions. In an age of specialization it is plausible that the KMI accounting group would be responsible for the accounting functions of the KMI-Operated Entities. The results for the individual KMI-Operated Entities, and the group as a whole, would then be flowed up to KMEP, but those financial results are not reviewed at the KMEP level. The transfer of financial data from a KMI-Operated entity to KMEP’s records would be done electronically and the KMEP accounting unit would be responsible for assuring that the numbers that were provided were correctly entered into KMEP’s books and ledgers for preparation of annual reports to KMEP’s shareholder and the SEC. Consistent with the record developed in Williams II, nothing in this record contradicts SFPP’s testimony in this regard concerning how KMI’s accounting structure actually works or the specifics of how the individuals involved actually function. Valero’s arguments to the contrary are based solely on the corporate documents, which are out of the context given this witness’s testimony. The Commission has previously concluded such evidence is inadequate given SFPP’s explicit witness testimony to the contrary, and therefore such documents do not support the inclusion of the KMI-Operated Entities in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula.

Second, Valero also asserts that the fees that are paid to KMI by four of the KMI-Operated Entities do not cover all the costs of those entities, and therefore there is a cross-subsidy of those four entities by SFPP. Valero states that the fees and costs at issue are inadequately documented and that SFPP’s analysis does not account for such overhead items as HR, IT and the KMI Chairman’s office. SFPP replies that this is not the case, but even if it is true, it is irrelevant. SFPP states that the fees from the four KMI-Operated Entities paying those fees are first charged to the total pool of KMI-Operated Entity costs, including those directly assigned to those entities. SFPP states that any residual costs are then allocated to the KMI-Owned Entities and the KMI-Operated Entities under KMI’s Massachusetts Formula. SFPP therefore concludes that any cost-recovery shortfall is contained with KMI’s Massachusetts Formula which allocates no costs to KMEP.

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192 See Ex. ACV-51 at 3-4, 9-10, 25-26, 28-29; see also Ex. SFP-129 at 20-21, 29.

193 In fact, Ex. ACV-65 at 16-19 contains testimony by a KMI officer that explains how the accounting system works in terms of the relative responsibility of the KMI and KMEP accounting and finance departments.

194 Williams II, 85 FERC at 62,141.

195 Valero Brief on Ex. at 60-63. The four entities paying fees to KMI are TransColorado, KM North Texas, KM Mexico, and REX.

196 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 75-77.
126. The Commission concludes that SFPP’s explanation is logical and Valero’s argument regarding the fees does not support the inclusion of the four fee-paying operating entities in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Valero’s argument that the costs of human resources, IT resources, and those of the Chairman’s office are inadequately accounted for in the case of the fee-paying entities, is irrelevant, as SFPP states, because those costs are allocated to other KMI-Owned or KMI-Operated Entities through the KMI Massachusetts Formula. Rather, this issue is a more generic one, namely whether the correct amount of KMI shared-employee costs is allocated or assigned to KMI-Owned, KMI-Operated Entities, and to KMEP in the first place. This has nothing to do with whether the fee paying entities cover those types of costs because they cannot be allocated to SFPP through the KMI cross-charge. Thus the 2009 ID was correct to conclude that the fact that four of the KMI-Operated Entities are fee paying entities does not require their inclusion in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula.

127. Finally, Valero does not address two minor issues identified at hearing where two employees in the account payable department worked for both the KMEP-Operated Entities and the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities. SFPP explained the reasons for the joint assignment and adjusted the costs based on a survey of the time involved. For these two narrow exceptions, the Commission concludes that the quality of the evidence is adequate under Williams II and does not support Valero’s position that all KMI and KMEP entities, or that all of the KMI-Operated Entities, must be included in a single KMI-KMEP wide Massachusetts Formula calculation. The next section discusses whether a different result is required based on the accuracy of cost assignment by GP Services to KMEP and of the costs assigned or allocated to KMEP and SFPP from the KMI-shared employees included the KMI cross-charge contained in Account 184601.

4. The Accuracy of the KMI’s Accounting System

128. The accuracy of KMI’s accounting is relevant here in two ways. The first is whether the costs of joint-employees allocated or assigned to the KMI cross-charge, and thereby to KMEP, were appropriately included in that cross charge. The second is whether the costs incurred by GP Services were correctly assigned to SFPP or to an

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197 As discussed, the KMI Massachusetts Formula does not allocate costs to KMEP. KMI costs that are appropriately assigned to KMEP are done so through the KMI cross-charge. This is in turn based on the cost assignment of the KMI shared personnel.

198 Ex. SFP-129 at 21-22; SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 74.

199 This would occur if costs that should have been allocated or assigned to one of the eight KMI-Operated pipelines were incorrectly included in the KMI cross-charge.
intermediate entity (such as the Pacific Tier) whose Massachusetts formula affects SFPP but not all of the KMEP-Operated Entities. The 2009 ID concluded that KMI’s accounting methodology provides sufficiently accurate cost assignments and allocations that rates based on that methodology will be just and reasonable. Trial Staff and Valero assert that there are two fundamental errors in the 2009 ID’s analysis supporting this holding. The first is that the 2009 ID unduly relied on the findings of another initial decision in reaching the 2009 ID’s conclusions, and as such failed to make the detailed analysis of benefits by cost center required in Williams II. The second error was to shift the burden of proof from SFPP to the opposing parties. They state that SFPP submitted a limited sample of time sheets and time splits to establish the costs assigned or allocated to KMEP are accurate and reliable. Trial Staff and Valero therefore conclude that the 2009 ID erred by holding that the opposing parties had not proved the inadequacy of SFPP’s system. They assert that it remains SFPP’s obligation to prove that its accounting system accurately and reliably assigns and allocates costs among the entities within the KMI/KMEP business structure.

129. However, Trial Staff also asserts that SFPP has demonstrated that KMI can correct its cost assignments and allocations in the instant proceeding to meet the ID’s finding, but that it has not done so to date. In contrast, Valero asserts that some 64 percent of time sheets taken from the RCs reviewed at hearing contained errors. Valero further asserts that in several cases employees stated on their timesheets that 100 percent of their time involved work on SFPP issues while their own supervisors had a different allocation, or other evidence indicates that employees were involved in working for other entities. It further states that the fact that a large number of other RCs were not examined in detail does not mean that they are sufficiently accurate; only that they were not examined. Valero posits that the RCs that were not examined are likely to have the same high error rate as SFPP reviewed. SFPP states that it reviewed the overhead cost assignments to SFPP contained in 5 RCs and corrected them as necessary to reduce the costs assigned to

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200 This would occur if GP Services costs were incorrectly assigned to SFPP instead of another KMEP-Operated Entity, or costs were incorrectly assigned to the Pipeline Tier or the Pacific Tier instead of another intermediate tier, for example the Terminal Tier.

201 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 751-756.

202 Staff Brief op. Ex. at 12-13.

203 Staff Brief on Ex. at 8-9 and Staff Brief op. Ex. at 12-13.

204 Staff Brief on Ex. at 4-5.

205 Id. at 6-8.

206 Valero Brief on Ex. at 26-27, 32-37, 39-40, 53-54.
SFPP. It asserts that the revised exhibits and information in its rebuttal testimony are reliable.\(^{207}\)

130. Regarding the burden of proof, the Commission has previously concluded in this order that the 2009 ID’s description of KMI’s accounting system was accurate and that the 2009 ID correctly supported an analysis based on the direct assignment of costs wherever possible. The 2009 ID appears to have concluded that SFPP provided adequate evidentiary support and that the opposing parties did not effectively discredit that presentation. This would reflect an appropriate allocation of the burden of proof if the evidentiary record supports the conclusion that SFPP made an adequate initial presentation. However, the Commission has reservations in this regard and believes that the opposing parties’ evidentiary objections should have been examined in greater detail. Therefore the Commission will conduct a more detailed review than that conducted by the 2009 ID. While the Commission concludes that the overall structure of KMI’s accounting methodology is adequate, the Commission concludes that further documentation of some of the details is required. To this extent the Commission reverses the 2009 ID.

131. In reaching its conclusion the Commission reiterates what is at issue here is the reasonableness of the rates in SFPP’s latest West Line rate filing. As previously stated, this turns on the reasonableness of the allocation or assignment of costs from a discrete set of cost centers that affect the costs ultimately allocated or assigned to SFPP. However, on exceptions Valero asserts that there may have been critical errors in the RCs that were not examined at hearing and therefore the 2009 ID erred by assuming that if an RC was not examined that it was adequate.\(^ {208}\) This is a logical statement, but it only goes so far. The only RCs that are relevant here are those that directly assign costs to SFPP or flow costs down to it through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Given the record before the Commission, the most relevant RCs which Valero criticizes appear to be those that directly assign costs to SFPP, some of which may also directly assign costs to entities that share the Pacific sub-tier or the Pipeline Products Tier with SFPP. Moreover, the questions raised by footnote 34 of Valero’s brief on exceptions likewise deal overwhelmingly with market issues which appear to be related to other members of the Pipeline Products Tier, such as Plantation, Cochin, OLP-A, and possibly Cochin Canada.\(^ {209}\) In this regard, many of Valero’s examples are from RC 1002 and involve

\(^{207}\) SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 64-66.

\(^{208}\) Valero Brief on Ex. at 20-22.

\(^{209}\) Id. at 33 n.34.
marketing or tariff matters related to the western products pipeline interests, and fall within the supervisory job description of the Vice President for that RC, Mr. Kehelet.\textsuperscript{210}

\textbf{132.} It therefore appears that to the extent the evidence is ambiguous, any errors may have been caused because those employees of the Pacific or Products Pipeline Group are performing the same or similar functions for several entities within those groups and may have shifted frequently back and forth among them. According to Valero, these limited examples are sufficient to destroy the integrity of the entire KMI cost accounting methodology. However, the fact there may have been errors in RC 1002 is not relevant to an RC that makes no direct or indirect cost allocations to SFPP, the Pacific Group, or the Pipeline Products since such an RC would have no impact of SFPP. In fact, if errors allocate costs away from KMEP or SFPP, this type of error helps rather than hurts SFPP’s rate payers.

\textbf{133.} Valero raises similar concerns about RC 1006 (Logistics KMP Pipelines), arguing that the RC assigns too many costs to SFPP based on the large number of KMEP pipeline and terminal facilities.\textsuperscript{211} Valero does not state in its analysis whether RC 1006 deals only with the KMEP-Operated pipelines, or includes the KMI-Operated Entities SFPP proposes to exclude. If RC 1006 is located within GP Services, then the costs would be assigned only to the KMEP-Operated Entities under KMI’s accounting methodology. This lack of supporting analysis reduces Valero’s argument to a general criticism. Valero makes a similar argument regarding the costs of RC 1040 (Environmental Compliance). Valero argues that the vast majority of environment compliance is allocated to SFPP, which it claims is improbable given the scope of KMEP’s operations.\textsuperscript{212} But this argument assumes that RC 1040 deals with all of KMEP’s operations. In fact it deals only with the costs allocated to certain KMEP-Operated pipelines and their related terminals.\textsuperscript{213} Since these are directly assigned costs, the directly assigned environmental costs for the KMEP pipelines that are operated by KMI would fall with a KMI responsibility center and would not fall within one of KMEP’s. Thus, a criticism of RC 1040 that is directed to all of KMEP’s operations (as Valero’s does here) is without analytical foundation. Moreover, the fact is that environmental remediation and compliance has been a hotly contested item in several SFPP cases, including arguments that SFPP’s management has been imprudent in dealing with leaks from an aging SFPP

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Id.} at 33.

\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Id.} at 33-34.

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Id.} at 34. Valero’s reference is clearly to all of KMEP’s operations and not just the KMEP-Operated Entities, thus using an improper base for the comparison.

\textsuperscript{213} See Ex. ACV- 238c at 13, line RC-1011 and RC-1040.
oil pipeline. Thus, within RC 1040, which deals only with KMEP operated pipelines, the assignment of the bulk of the costs to SFPP appears quite reasonable.215 Again Valero does not present the full context of the criticism or give a meaningful analysis of the materiality of its criticism. The goal of Valero’s broad criticisms appears to be the rejection of KMI’s accounting methodology as a whole.

134. By way of contrast, if one delves into the details, such a broad remedy may not be necessary or appropriate. For example, the KMI cross-charge to KMEP from the KMI-shared employees for Environmental is $375,694 recorded in Account No. 0245, and the charge for Remediation is $102,367 in Account 0246. According to SFPP, the grand total cross charge to KMEP in 2007 was $63,312,015 after an adjustment of $7,681,768 at hearing (an adjustment of 12.13 percent).216 Accounts Nos. 0245 and 0246 are .59 percent (0.0059) and .16 percent (0.0016) respectively of the revised KMI cross-charge. This indicates that while a large amount (unstated by Valero) of GP Services environmental and remediation services were allocated to SFPP, the amount flowing to SFPP from the KMI shared-employees was extraordinarily small even if SFPP is assigned 13.42 percent of all of the 2007 environment and remediation costs that would flow through the KMI cross-charge to KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula.217

135. This example demonstrates three points. First, it makes no sense to require inclusion of the KMI-Operated Entities in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula calculation as long as the portion of the KMI-shared costs allocated or assigned to KMEP or directly to SFPP from a particular RC is reasonable and is reasonably well documented. In the case of the previous example, inclusion of the KMI-Operated Entities in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula would simply shift a disproportionate amount of environmental costs to the KMI-Operated Entities even though environmental and remediation

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214 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 824-834, some $1.8 million per year, a sum the Commission accepted earlier in this order as an ongoing element of SFPP’s cost of service for the West Line rates alone; *Chevron Products Co., et al. v. SFPP, L.P.*, 127 FERC ¶ 63,023, at P 466-478 (2008); *SFPP, L.P.*, 116 FERC ¶ 63,059, at P 190-197 (2006) (some $1,080,000 per year for the North Lines only).

215 See Ex. ACV- 238c at 13:1011-1040.

216 Ex. SFP-134.

217 See Ex. SFP-130. For the two cost figures the result to SFPP would be .08 percent (.0008) and .02 percent (.0002) of the cross-charged environmental and remediation expenses respectively assuming a 13.42 percent Massachusetts Formula allocation to SFPP. Since there a several other KMEP-Operated Entities, both the percentage and dollar amount of the KIM environmental and remedial cross-charge actually allocated to SFPP through KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula is much smaller.
components of the 2007 KMI cross-charge to KMEP were miniscule and would have no impact to SFPP's costs. This would be true even if the 2007 KMI environmental and remediation cross-charge to KMEP had an error of 50 percent. Second, the bulk of the environmental costs included in SFPP rates flow from the activities of GP Services, which reflects just how the costs for the KMEP-Operated Entities are to be separated from those of the KMI-Owned or KMI-Operated Entities under KMI's accounting methodology. Third, the example emphasizes the need to examine the shared costs RCs individually: first by identifying those RCs that require the most critical examination; second, by documenting further the details of the costs allocated within the critical RCs.

136. The Commission concludes that there are five RCs that GP Services uses to directly assign costs to SFPP and an additional forty-one that are reflected in the 2007 KMI cross-charge, which could flow costs down to SFPP. Those RCs are the ones providing data to the 2007 KMI cross-charge to KMEP and assigning costs directly to SFPP, the Pipeline Products Tier, and the Pacific sub-tier. The statistical sample initially presented by SFPP was small and had a number of admitted errors, which SFPP claims to have corrected. However, the rationale and scope of those corrections are not clear to the Commission. Nor is it clear to the Commission how SFPP audited the 5 RCs it states provided direct assignments to SFPP, and the basis for any adjustments made, or how it reached the $7,681,768 in corrections to the 2007 KMI cross-charge reflected in Ex. No. SFP-134. However, the Commission also finds that the Valero's blanket criticisms on exceptions are not particularly helpful for the following reason. Even if one assumes that 100 percent of the time sheets in a particular RC need to be adjusted, it is unclear from Valero's brief or the exhibits it cites what percentage of the hours on each timesheet are in error, and the potential impact of the errors. Valero does assert that the total errors discovered were some $2 million of the RC's reviewed by Dr. Arthur which assigned away from SFPP. While this is a substantial sum, Valero then extends this beyond the RCs that directly assigned costs to SFPP to the entire KMI system, a second step that is

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218 KMEP operates the Pipeline Product, Terminals and CO₂ groups, and under KMEP's accounting methodology, environmental costs should be sufficiently site-specific such that the direct environmental costs for each group would be identifiable and supported by the audit required here. Valero's broadside approach does not adequately address the point but implies rather that the costs are willfully misallocated to SFPP. This is an insufficient ground for a wholesale rejection of KMI's accounting methodology without further examination.

219 See Ex. ACV-238c at 13.

220 See Ex. SFP-134.

221 Valero Brief on Ex. at 37 (citing Ex. SFP-134).
of questionable relevancy. Thus, while Valero has stated sufficient concerns that the Commission is requiring a further review of some portions of KMI’s accounting methodology, Valero’s arguments do not warrant rejection of that methodology in its entirety at this juncture, or the inclusion of the KMI-Operated Entities in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. This is in large part due to the scattered nature of its criticism rather than an integrated presentation that addresses the relevance and materiality of its criticism, some of which address RCs that appear to have no logical relationship to SFPP’s operations.\footnote{Cf. SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 62-64.}

137. Based on the foregoing the Commission adopts Trial Staff’s suggestion that SFPP provide a fuller analysis and explanation of its previous clarifications and adjustments in its compliance filing.\footnote{Staff Brief on Ex. at 8-9; Staff Brief op Ex. at 12-13, 18-19.} SFPP must also provide the source materials for such an audit and the supporting analysis. This approach is consistent with the limited remand adopted in Williams II and the importance Williams II placed on evaluating individual cost centers in determining how overhead costs should be assigned and allocated.\footnote{Williams II, 85 FERC at 62,139-51, 62,156. The Commission recognizes that SFPP believes it addressed all the issues on rebuttal, but concludes it is wisest to require a fuller explanation and package of supporting materials as was done in Williams II.} The total number of relevant RCs is limited and some of those displayed in Ex. No. SFP-134 appear to be quite small and of little materiality. Through this ruling the Commission seeks to assure that the costs flowing to KMEP and SFPP from GP Services and the KMI cross-charge are assigned and allocated with reasonable accuracy to KMEP and the KMEP-Operated Entities (including SFPP).\footnote{These are Casper-Douglas, Tejas Consolidated, KMIGT, and Trailblazer. See Ex. SFP-38 at 32-33.} The Commission also directs SFPP to make a more detailed response to Valero’s criticisms than is contained in its brief opposing exceptions, particularly for assignments and allocations to and within the Products Pipeline Group.

138. The documentation required here must be made available to all parties at the time SFPP makes its compliance filing. Moreover, in its compliance filing SFPP must clearly explain the basis for any deduction from KMEP’s cost of service for ambiguous situations based on its review of the time sheets or time split involves. If SFPP’s pending assignment and allocation of costs to SFPP involves ambiguous situations, SFPP must explain how these will be resolved. For example, SFPP might determine that the best resolution is to roll some of the costs now directly assigned to SFPP (about $9.3 million) up to a higher level in its accounting structure, such as the Pacific or the Products Pipeline Group. This would result in some reallocation of costs below the KMEP level,
but would not affect the allocation of costs to KMEP-Operated Entities that have nothing to due with product pipeline operations. Similarly, if some elements included in the cross-charge to KMEP are unclear, SFPP could provide documentation that supports eliminating some dollar amount of a specific cross-charge from KMEP’s total cost of service, or alternatively, assign or allocate those costs to those entities that are operated by KMI.

138. Thus, in the case of ambiguous situations involving the KMI cross-charge to KMEP, exclusion of such ambiguous costs from that cross-charge would allocate some portion of those costs through the KMI Massachusetts Formula to the eight KMI-Operating Entities SFPP excluded from the KMEP Massachusetts Formula calculation.226 This would be a more sensible resolution of any accounting ambiguities than the inclusion of eight large natural gas pipelines in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula because the operating costs of those gas pipelines are based on the operating characteristics of the gas pipeline mode. Given that, the costs of those gas pipelines are unlikely to provide any benefit to product pipeline, CO₂ pipeline, or terminal operations, or for that matter, it is unlikely that benefits would flow the other way. Once SFPP completes the analysis required here, it should provide a schematic showing the source of any changes and how those changes flow to the different levels of cost assignment and allocation among the KMEP-Operated Entities and between KMEP and KMI cost allocation functions. Moreover, in preparing its compliance filing SFPP must design its West Line rates based on the overhead analysis it believes is the one best supported by the additional materials required by this order. This will permit the protesting parties, Trial Staff and the Commission to evaluate the compliance filing as a whole and its impact on the rate design. The Commission will determine whether to require a further hearing on this matter after reviewing SFPP’s compliance filing.

5. The Appropriateness of Certain Cost and Revenue Components

139. There are also at issue on exceptions how SFPP applied four cost categories and one revenue factor in its calculation of KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. These cost issues include (1) the method for assigning certain employee related costs; (2) the proper method for removing PAAs from the rate base of KMEP-Operated and KMI-Operated Entities; (3) whether to include certain costs KMI incurred to buy out employee pensions when KMI became a privately held corporation; and (4), whether to capitalize or expense certain overhead costs related to capital investment. Regarding these, Valero asserts that the 2009 ID incorrectly adopted SFPP’s proposal to allocate ongoing pension and related

226 As noted, the eight KMI-Operated Entities are Casper-Douglas, Tejas Consolidated, KMIGT, Trailblazer, TransColorado, KM North Texas, KM Mexico, and REX.
employee benefits through its Massachusetts Formula rather than directly assigning those costs as function of its payroll wage costs. Valero also asserts that the 2009 ID incorrectly held that SFPP should remove PAAs from non-jurisdictional as well jurisdictional entities. Valero further asserts that SFPP incorrectly included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula the costs KMI incurred in buying out the employee pension costs.\(^{227}\) SFPP opposes the ID’s decision to require the capitalization of certain overhead costs incurred as a part of capital projects. Trial Staff and Valero support the 2009 ID’s conclusion in that regard.\(^{228}\) Regarding the revenue factor, the 2009 ID concluded that if Tejas were to be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula (which the 2009 ID held it should not), the Tejas contribution to revenue portion of the formula should be determined by the use of its net rather than gross revenues. Valero opposes this finding, which SFPP supports.\(^{229}\)

140. In this proceeding SFPP assigned wages directly to the entity incurring those wages based on timesheets and time splits to the extent possible. SFPP then allocated the related payroll taxes using only the payroll/labor cost factor in KMEP Massachusetts Formula, but allocated certain other employee related costs using all three elements of KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Those latter costs included Incentive Plans, Restricted Stock 401K Plans, Health and Welfare, and Pensions. The 2009 ID did not directly address the allocation of these costs. However, Valero asserts that those costs are similar to payroll taxes and that the distinction between payroll taxes and the other employee-related costs is an issue here. Valero states that under SFPP’s approach in this case SFPP is allocated 13.42 percent of those costs rather than 8.11 percent. Valero further states that KMEP’s Terminal Operations make up about 72.81 percent of KMEP over all payroll/labor inputs, but are allocated only 44.47 percent labor/payroll specific overhead costs. Valero argues that SFPP shifted its position in a subsequent case and now allocates those additional costs only on the payroll/labor factor.\(^{230}\) SFPP replies that payroll taxes are based solely on payroll costs, but that the other overhead employee costs, such as Health and Welfare costs, are not calculated solely by payroll costs. SFPP further asserts that allocating only by payroll costs would under-allocate costs to SFPP because the benefit costs include costs of the G&A employees as well as the employees of the operating entities.\(^{231}\)

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\(^{227}\) Valero Brief on Ex. at 8-9.

\(^{228}\) SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 45-48.

\(^{229}\) Staff Brief op. Ex. at 27-29.

\(^{230}\) Valero Brief on Ex. At 76 (citing Docket No. IS09-437, Ex. SPE-57 at 18).

\(^{231}\) SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 86 (citing Tr. 1480-81).
141. The Commission concludes that it cannot accept SFPP’s position on this issue. As SFPP’s own modification to its approach in its pending East Line rate case demonstrates, costs such as health and welfare costs, pension costs, and bonuses are driven primarily by direct payroll wage costs. Given the competitive relationship of the West Line and East Line shippers and the rates they pay, the Commission believes that both set of rates now in litigation before it should be designed on consistent principles as much as is possible. Since the calculation is relatively mechanical, SFPP should be able adjust these employee-related costs based on the information now available to it and which underpins the record. SFPP must prepare its compliance filing accordingly and provide a supporting analysis therewith. The ALJ is reversed on this matter.

142. The 2009 ID also concluded that SFPP properly removed all PAAs from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities in applying KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. Valero excepts, arguing that the PAAs should be removed only from the jurisdictional entities because this preserves an original cost methodology and precludes passing through to ratepayers the costs of any premiums above book value incurred in the purchase of jurisdictional entities. Valero asserts that this concern is not relevant to non-jurisdictional entities for which it is impossible to trace back any PAAs that may have been involved in prior purchases of regulated entities. SFPP replies that Valero’s position is inconsistent with a prior Commission order. SFPP further asserts that G&A costs will be over-allocated to the jurisdictional entities if the PAAs are not removed from the non-jurisdictional entities. The Commission holds that SFPP is correct. Failure to remove the PAAs from the non-jurisdictional entities will overstate their relative weight in the asset (rate base) component of KMEP’s and KMI’s Massachusetts Formulas. This is true regardless of what may have occurred in any earlier transactions involving the non-jurisdictional entities.

143. SFPP also proposed to include in its cost of service a portion of the $26.2 million that KMI incurred when that company went private and became Knight, Inc. $5.572 million was included in KMEP’s cost allocation methodology based on SFPP’s evaluation of the going-private costs that would have been incurred even if the going-private transaction has not occurred. Valero argues on exceptions that KMEP’s 236

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232 See Docket No. IS09-437-000, Ex. No. SPE-57 at 15.


234 Valero Br. on Ex. at 77-78.

235 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 87-88 (citing SFPP, L.P., 114 FERC ¶ 61,136, at P 17 (2006)).

236 The 2009 ID did not address the issue specifically and Valero’s exception is directed toward its failure to do so.
2007 SEC Form 10-K states that KMEP would have no obligation for these costs and that the costs were non-recurring. SFPP replies that the Form 10-K regulations require that this cost be allocated to KMEP and that KMEP is required to recognize it. SFPP asserts that Valero misinterpreted KMEP's 2007 Form 10-K and that the only representation is that KMEP would not have cash responsibility for this portion of the going-private costs. SFPP further asserts that the stock options that would have previously been granted to employees were replaced by a cash bonus of approximately the same level and that this evidence was not contradicted. It concludes that the $5.572 million at issue is a recurring cost because this represents the normal employee bonuses that will be incurred on a going forward basis, and as such are not related to the foregoing private transaction that Valero questions here. The Commission concludes that Valero's argument based on KMEP's 2007 Form 10-K is insufficient to rebut SFPP's specific evidence that the $5.572 million at issue should be considered a recurring cost. SFPP should not include any of the remaining $26.2 million buy-out cost in KMEP's service as it recognizes that those costs were non-recurring.

144. The fourth cost-of-service issue involves the capitalization of overhead costs related to capital investments. The 2009 ID adopted Trial Staff's position that SFPP should allocate indirect overhead costs involving capital investments through KMEP's Massachusetts Formula. SFPP excepts to this ruling, arguing that the Commission's oil pipeline regulations preclude the capitalizing of overhead costs and the industry practice is to the contrary. Trial Staff supports the 2009 ID, arguing that the Commission's accounting regulations are to the contrary, and that if industry practice contravenes the regulations, this proceeding should put the industry on notice that they are in violation.

145. The Commission concludes that this is a point that SFPP should address further in its compliance filing. No party disputes here that any direct costs related to capital investments should be allocated to the relevant operating entity, and sound principles of matching cost allocation with cost incurrence require that overhead management costs be allocated where this can be done. However, under KMI's accounting system, significant portions of the overhead costs related to capital expenditures are assigned or allocated

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237 Valero Brief on Ex. at 73-75.
238 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 85-86 (citing Ex. SFP-129 at 48-52; Ex. SFP-138c; and Ex. ACV-82).
240 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 46-47.
241 Staff Brief op. Ex. at 27-29.
based on the relevant responsibility centers (RCs) and time splits of the managers responsible for capital budgeting and construction. In this regard, Part 352, Instructions for Carrier Property Accounts, 3-3 contemplates this will be done as it requires charging the carrier property account for “direct and other costs.” The regulation states that the “[c]ost of labor includes the amount paid for labor performed by the carrier’s own employees and officers.” This includes payroll taxes, vacation pay, pensions, holiday pay and traveling, and other incidental expenses of employees. The regulation also states that “No charge shall be ... for the pay and expenses of officers and employees who merely render services incidentally in connection with extensions, additions, or replacements.”

SFPP states that it only included such incidental expenses in its Massachusetts Formula and therefore was correct in not capitalizing those expenses if those expenses met the standard in the regulation. However, SFPP has not clearly identified the source of those “incidental” costs, and thus whether they are actually separate from RCs that are dedicated to managing capital investments, or their magnitude. Because the Commission is testing the appropriateness of KMI’s RC based accounting system, SFPP must do more to establish the relevance and strength of its position in its compliance filing.

146. The last issue on exceptions regarding specific inputs to a Massachusetts Formula is whether to use Tejas Consolidated’s gross or net revenues in calculating KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula. The 2009 ID first concluded that Tejas should not be included in KMEP Massachusetts Formula since it is a KMI-Operated Entity, a position the Commission approved earlier in this order. The 2009 ID held in the alternative that if Tejas Consolidated is included in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula, SFPP should use the “Distrigas Formula” which uses net rather than gross revenues. The rationale for that formula is that gross revenues of an entity that buys and sells large amount of gas can distort the revenue proportion of the formula compared to entities that are involved primarily in transportation or storage. However, Valero asserts that the formula applies only to firms that have a gas cost recovery mechanism. Valero also argues that use of net revenues fails to reflect the higher risk of a gas sales business, and that if net revenues were negative, this would distort the Massachusetts Formula. SFPP asserts that the distinction of the gas cost recovery mechanism is not relevant and that the important factor is the disproportionate gross revenue resulting from a firm that is

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243 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 786-790.
245 Id.
246 Valero Brief on Ex. at 78-82.
primarily involved in gas sales. It argues that Tejas Consolidated's gross revenues would result in allocating $89 million in costs to Tejas Consolidated when the costs of the group responsible for managing risk of all gas transactions was only $4.2 million. SFPP also states that all of the costs of the related accounting and treasury groups were only $4.9 million even if it is assumed that Tejas Consolidated required all of their efforts. SFPP states that use of Tejas Consolidated's gross revenues would allocate to Tejas 25.8 percent of all overhead costs under Valero's "all in" approach.247

147. The issue of whether to use Tejas Consolidated's net or gross revenues is before the Commission as an alternative ruling, which the Commission will address as to resolve as many issues as possible. The Commission concludes that SFPP's analysis demonstrates that the 2009 ID correctly used Tejas Consolidated's net rather than gross revenue. Gas cost recovery mechanisms have long since been abolished, but this does not change the basic rationale for the use of net rather than gross revenues when an entity's gross revenues are predominately from gas sales. Valero presents nothing that suggests that resources needed to evaluate risk of gas sales is proportionately related to the total sales involved, and in fact, common sense suggests that the resources required would relate more to the number of sales or the customers to be evaluated than to the size of sales. Valero's argument regarding the possibility that a gas sales entity may have no net revenues is appropriately addressed when, and if, that situation occurs. SFPP's analysis demonstrates that there would be a gross over-allocation of overhead costs to Tejas Consolidated if the Commission accepted Valero's arguments.248

D. The KN Method

148. The KN Method is used to allocate a jurisdictional entity's administrative and general (A&G) costs between its jurisdictional and non-jurisdiction functions, and if the

247 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 82-86.

248 Valero challenges SFPP's allocation of liability insurance among KMI's affiliates, but does not appear to make it an exception as such. Rather, the argument is intended as an example of an unsupported or arbitrary assignment of costs. See Valero Brief on Ex. at 14-15. SFPP stated that the allocation was based on the relative replacement cost of each asset under KMI's blanket insurance policy. Rather, Valero simply prepared a mileage ratio analysis for the various pipelines and did nothing to analyze whether SFPP's allocation, which is based on its general liability insurance practices, was irrational or imprudent, given the differences in the operating and physical configurations of its pipeline operations. If Valero wanted to pursue the matter on the grounds that SFPP's standing business practice was arbitrary or that the calculation was improper, it should have done so at hearing.
entity has more than one jurisdictional function, among those functions. In this proceeding there is agreement that the KN Method applies, but there is disagreement about how it is to be applied. SFPP asserts that in its prior rate proceedings the Commission accepted a KN analysis based on a simple average of its total Carrier Direct Original Cost Property and its Carrier Direct Labor percentage. Thus, in the instant case SFPP’s Direct Original Cost Property to Total Original Cost Property was 77.67 percent and its Carrier Direct Labor was 84.07 percent of total carrier labor. The simple average of those two percentages results in a KN factor of 80.87 percent which is used to functionalize indirect overhead costs (called A&G) costs to SFPP’s various jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional functions by multiplying the ratio times the dollar amount in each A&G category. 249 The 2009 ID concluded that SFPP’s KN Method does not comply with the KN Method required by Opinion No. 731, but adopted SFPP’s method on the ground that method had been accepted in compliance filings involved in prior SFPP rate cases. 250

149. Trail Staff asserts the 2009 ID correctly found that SFPP’s KN Method did not conform to Opinion No. 731, but erred in not requiring SFPP to conform to the Opinion. 251 Trial Staff states that the correct KN Method is as follows. First, all A&G costs are divided into three categories: labor, plant, and other costs. The labor, plant, and other costs are each summed and the “other costs” are then allocated between the indirect labor and plant costs based on the ratio of those two costs. This gives a separate total dollar amount for A&G labor and plant costs. These two separate total A&G costs are assigned to each division or function using direct labor and direct plant ratios. Those ratios are defined as the ratio of the function’s direct labor to total labor costs and the ratio of the function’s direct plant to total plant. The total labor-related A&G is multiplied by each function’s direct labor ratio and the total plant-related A&G is multiplied by each function’s direct plant ratio. Each of these last two calculations results in the dollar figure of the labor and plant A&G costs of each function. The next step is to sum those two dollar cost figures and develop a ratio of those two dollar cost totals for each function. The resulting ratio is the KN ratio for each division or function. The KN ratio for each function is then applied to each category of A&G expense and that resulting dollar amount is allocated to that function. The sum of those allocations to each function becomes the total A&G expense for that function. 252 Trial Staff argues that the 2009 ID incorrectly accepted SFPP’s argument that the traditional KN method is too

249 See Ex. S-12C at 29-30 for a concise description of SFPP’s method.


251 Staff Brief on Ex. at 9-11.

252 See Ex. S-12C at 28-29.
complicated, as it is the Commission’s method.\textsuperscript{253} Trial Staff further argues that the Commission expressly stated in two of the most recent SFPP orders that SFPP was not using the correct KN Method.\textsuperscript{254} SFPP supports the 2009 ID’s ruling and rationale.

150. Trial Staff is correct that SFPP’s proposed KN Method does not conform to Opinion No. 731 and SFPP should be required to do so. Trial Staff correctly argues that the method has been consistently affirmed in other proceedings,\textsuperscript{255} and that it is the Commission’s method regardless of its complexity. While the parties have various theories why the Commission accepted SFPP’s proposed method in a number of past compliance filings,\textsuperscript{256} those theories are simply beside the point. None of the compliance filings are final as of this date because those filings were interim filings in three interrelated proceedings, Docket Nos. OR92-8-000 and OR96-2-000 involving SFPP’s East and West Line rates,\textsuperscript{257} and in Docket No. OR96-2-012 involving SFPP Sepulveda Line rates.\textsuperscript{258} Trial Staff is also correct that the most recent orders in both instances explicitly found that SFPP’s methodology did not follow the proper KN Method.\textsuperscript{259} Trial Staff also correctly asserted at hearing that the simple averaging approach used by SFPP will unduly allocate costs to a jurisdictional function that has unusually large capital costs as the averaging approach dilutes the impact of the capital ratio by combining it with the labor ratio.\textsuperscript{260} The 2009 ID is reversed and SFPP is directed to apply the KN Method set forth in Opinion No. 731.

V. \textbf{Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital}

\textsuperscript{253} Staff Brief on Ex. at 9.

\textsuperscript{254} Staff Brief on Ex. at 16-17 (citing SFPP, L.P., 113 FERC ¶ 61,277, at P 87-89 (2005) and SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ¶ 61,204, at P 137 (2007)).


\textsuperscript{256} Staff Brief on Ex. at 11-16; SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 89, n.14.

\textsuperscript{257} 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 88, and Ordering Paragraph (C) (requiring a compliance filing).

\textsuperscript{258} SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ¶ 61,240, at P 150 (December 2007 Order), and Ordering Paragraph (C) (requiring a compliance filing).

\textsuperscript{259} See SFPP, L.P., 113 FERC ¶ 61,277, at P 87-89 (2005) (December 2005 Order); December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 137.

\textsuperscript{260} Ex. S-12C at 30-31.
151. This part of the order addresses issues related to capital structure and the cost of capital. The issues raised include the role of purchase accounting adjustments (PAA) and goodwill in determining SFPP’s capital structure, the treatment of debt in the capital structure, whether cost of certain types of debt should be included in SFPP’s debt cost, and matters related to the equity cost of capital. As discussed below, the Commission finds that the cost of capital must be calculated as of September 30, 2008. To be consistent with this determination, the Commission determines that September 30, 2008, is also the appropriate date for determining capital structure.

A. PAA and Goodwill

152. All parties agree that the capital structure of KMEP, SFPP’s parent company, should be used to determine SFPP’s cost-of-service. However, the parties dispute whether KMEP’s capital structure must be adjusted due to PAAs and goodwill related to acquisitions made by KMEP. The 2009 ID required the removal of all PAAs from the equity component of KMEP’s capital structure. However, the 2009 ID did not require any adjustments to remove the effects of goodwill.261 The briefs on exceptions raise objections to the 2009 ID’s treatment of both PAAs and goodwill.

153. By way of background, when an asset is acquired, two adjustments are made to reflect the difference between (a) the acquisition price of an asset and (b) the book value of the asset on the prior owner’s balance sheet preceding the sale. First, the asset’s value is adjusted for a PAA, an accounting adjustment that writes-up the book value of the acquired asset so that the book value (original cost minus accumulated depreciation) reflects the asset’s market price.262 Commission policy generally requires removal of the effects of PAAs from the rate base component of a pipeline’s cost-of-service because inclusion of PAAs would be inconsistent with original cost ratemaking. This restricts a utility’s recovery to no more or less than a rate of return and depreciation based upon an asset’s original cost.263

154. At the time of an acquisition, a second accounting adjustment is often made to the books of the acquiring company for goodwill. Goodwill is based upon the difference

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261 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 629, 642.

262 Ex. BPW-1 at 12-13; Ex. SFP-171 at 6; SFPP, L.P., 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 65 (2005) (December 2005 Order). If the PAA is negative, then it also will decrease the pipeline’s rates below the levels consistent with the Commission’s original cost ratemaking policy.

263 See, e.g., Longhorn Partners Pipeline, 82 FERC ¶ 61,146, at 61,543 (1998).
between acquisition price and the market value (the book value plus the PAA). Goodwill is defined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as “an asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually identified and separately recognized.” As discussed below, the Commission finds that it is inappropriate to adjust KMEP’s capital structure for either goodwill or the PAAs at issue in this proceeding.

1. PAA

155. The 2009 ID adjusted KMEP’s capital structure to remove PAAs from the equity component because the PAAs at issue in this proceeding did not relate to a “new service or substantial benefit” to ratepayers. Moreover, the 2009 ID determined that the evidence failed to support SFPP’s claim that PAAs do not distort rates.

156. The 2009 ID added that if the Commission determined that it was inappropriate to remove the PAAs entirely from equity, the Commission could consider removing the PAA only from the debt component of capital structure for acquisitions that were financed initially with short term debt and, where both debt and equity were used, to remove PAAs from the debt and equity component in accordance with the debt and equity used to fund the acquisitions. Alternatively, the 2009 ID suggested the Commission could deduct the PAA from both the equity and debt components of capital structure using the ratio ultimately used to finance the original acquisition.

157. On exceptions, SFPP asserts that the 2009 ID misapplied Commission precedent by requiring the removal of PAAs from the equity component of capital structure based upon the substantial benefits test. SFPP contends that the Commission’s 2006 Sepulveda Order established a two-part analysis providing that (1) regarding the presence of PAAs in rate base, the effect of the PAA must be removed absent a showing of substantial benefits or new service to ratepayers (substantial benefits standard), and (2) regarding the possible influence of PAAs upon capital structure, the PAA must be removed from the carrier’s capital structure to the extent that the PAA has distorted capital structure.

265 Ex. SFP-174 at 4.
267 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 641.
158. SFPP states that it did not include any PAAs in rate base, and, thus, the first part of the analysis is inapplicable. SFPP further claims that KMEP’s capital structure was not distorted by the PAAs or the financing of the acquisition that generated the PAAs. SFPP avers that any increase in equity on the balance sheet of an acquired (or target) company resulting from a PAA does not flow through to the acquiring (or parent) company’s consolidated balance sheet. SFPP explains that this is because the equity balances of the acquiring company’s subsidiaries are eliminated in consolidation.

159. Moreover, SFPP asserts that any impact on an acquiring company’s capital structure resulting from an acquisition involving PAA (or goodwill) comes from the type of financing used to fund the acquisition. SFPP states that it has used roughly a 50-50 combination of debt and equity to finance the acquisitions that generated the PAAs. Thus, SFPP avers that the 2009 ID’s elimination of the PAAs solely from KMEP’s equity balance actually distorts the capital structure. SFPP argues that to the extent the Commission adjusts KMEP’s capital structure for PAAs, such an adjustment must be made to both debt and equity in accord with the acquisitions that generated the financing of those PAAs.

160. In contrast, SFPP argues that the methodologies advocated by the shippers yield inconsistent and unreasonable results, and otherwise fail to apply generally accepted accounting principles to determine the impact of PAAs on capital structure. SFPP further emphasizes that the June 2005, December 2005, and February 2006 Orders in Docket No. OR96-2-000 addressed the impact of PAAs on SFPP’s capital structure, as opposed to KMEP’s capital structure.

161. Opposing exceptions, ExxonMobil/BP, Tesoro, and the ACC Shippers assert that Commission precedent supports the exclusion of PAAs when calculating the debt to equity ratio in capital structure. ExxonMobil/BP and the ACC Shippers argue that Commission precedent provides that PAAs must be removed from all cost of service calculations, including capital structure, absent a showing that the acquisition provides to ratepayers a new service or substantial benefits. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP contend that the decision to eschew a PAA adjustment to capital structure in the 2006 Sepulveda Order relied upon a unique factual scenario in which the Commission concluded that a 1988 PAA did not distort the debt to equity ratio. They emphasize that the 1988 PAA discussed in that decision is not at issue here. The ACC Shippers elaborate that this was because the 1988 PAA adjustment to equity was made prior to the creation of SFPP’s initial capital structure and could have no impact on the amounts of debt and equity that were sold at the initial public offering.

268 117 FERC ¶ 61,285.
162. ExxonMobil/BP, Tesoro, and the ACC Shippers further argue that the PAA in this proceeding distorted KMEP’s capital structure. Those parties allege that SFPP ignores the distinction between the retention of PAAs for GAAP accounting purposes and the removal of PAAs for ratemaking purposes. Those parties claim that SFPP’s position that PAAs are not reflected on KMEP’s consolidated balance sheet is incorrect because the asset values carried forward onto the consolidated balance sheet of the parent company retain the increases attributable to PAAs. The shippers conclude that the Commission has explicitly recognized that PAAs distort the parent company KMEP’s regulatory capital structure, not just SFPP’s capital structure.\textsuperscript{269}

163. ExxonMobil/BP also asserts that the hypotheticals advanced by SFPP witness Peterson involving acquisitions funded entirely by cash or entirely with newly issued debt lack relevance because the three largest KMEP acquisitions (the acquisition of SFPP, Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission Co., and Kinder Morgan Wink Pipeline, L.P.) all involved significant issuances of equity by KMEP. ExxonMobil/BP emphasize that none of KMEP’s acquisitions of jurisdictional properties included the issuance of new debt, and SFPP only absorbed the pre-existing debt of the acquired entity. ExxonMobil emphasizes that none of SFPP witness Peterson’s hypotheticals addressed this precise scenario.

164. Moreover, ExxonMobil/BP argues that there is no basis for reducing the level of debt below the actual level of debt. ExxonMobil/BP states that the debt level held by a pipeline is a set amount, which does not change with the valuation of assets; thus, they claim that the financing purportedly used in the acquisition of an asset is separate from the PAA level. Further, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil assert that the level of a PAA is independent from the financing used in the transaction and that SFPP erroneously attributes changes in financing to the impact of a PAA.

165. The ACC Shippers further aver that SFPP’s witnesses provide contradictory testimony, with Dr. Williamson arguing that PAAs should be removed from the balance sheet in proportion to the percentage of debt and equity used to finance the transaction. In contrast, the ACC Shippers state that Mr. Petersen repeatedly stresses that the amount of a PAA is not impacted by the type of financing used to acquire a target company. ExxonMobil and the ACC Shippers further note that to the extent the Commission adjusts capital structure for computing return, the same capital structure should be used to compute the net trended original cost rate base and the deferred return.

\textsuperscript{269} The shippers cite the February 2006 Order, 114 FERC ¶ 61,136 at P 14-15 and the December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 64-66, n.92.
166. The Commission finds that it is unnecessary to adjust KMEP's capital structure for the presence of PAAs, and, thus, the Commission reverses the 2009 ID. As explained previously, a PAA is an accounting adjustment that occurs when a purchaser pays more than book value (original cost minus accumulated depreciation) for an asset with a resulting increase in the rate base of the regulated entity. Permitting a PAA to distort the cost-of-service and to increase customer rates is inconsistent with original cost ratemaking, which restricts a utility's recovery to no more or less than a rate of return and depreciation based upon an asset's original cost.\textsuperscript{270} Therefore the Commission has determined that it is inconsistent with ratemaking principles to allow a PAA to increase a company's recovery either by inflating the rate base or by distorting the equity component of capital structure.\textsuperscript{271} Commission policy thus requires adjustments to remove the effects of a PAA from cost-of-service unless the acquisition either provides a new service or a "substantial benefit to ratepayers."\textsuperscript{272}

167. If a PAA does not satisfy the substantial benefits test, the Commission must next determine the appropriate adjustments to remove the effects of the PAA from cost-of-service. The purpose of any such adjustment is to remove the distorting effects of the PAA from the utilities' cost-of-service calculations, and such an adjustment must address an actual distortion caused by the PAA.\textsuperscript{273} Regarding rate base, the distortions of a PAA are readily apparent. When a PAA is added to rate base, the PAA increases the rate base above book value. If the PAA is not excluded from rate base for ratemaking purposes, the presence of the PAA in rate base would allow the utility to recover depreciation and a return on more than the original investment in the asset.\textsuperscript{274}

168. However, the effect of a PAA on capital structure is less straightforward and the mere presence of a PAA does not always establish that a distortion to capital structure has actually occurred. Whereas rate base consists of a sum of asset values, capital structure consists of a ratio of equity and debt in the regulated entity's financing. As the Commission observed in the 2006 Sepulveda Order, a PAA merely increases the size of the asset base of a utility, not necessarily the ratio of debt and equity used to finance the

\textsuperscript{270} See, e.g., December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 65.
\textsuperscript{271} Id.; February 2006 Order, 114 FERC ¶ 61,136 at P 15.
\textsuperscript{272} Longhorn Partners Pipeline, 82 FERC ¶ 61,146 at 61,543.
\textsuperscript{273} 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 31-32.
\textsuperscript{274} For the purposes of the discussion here, we assume that the PAA is positive. If the PAA is negative, then it also will decrease the rate base (and consequently the pipeline's rates) below the levels consistent with the Commission's original cost ratemaking policy.
Thus the mere presence of a PAA does not demonstrate that the PAA has in fact distorted capital structure by rendering the debt to equity ratio any different than it would have been absent the PAA. The 2009 ID and the briefs on exception rely upon the Commissions orders in Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al. However, the Commission's orders in Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al., were premised on the finding that inclusion of the PAA had, in fact, distorted the capital structure by increasing the equity component of the capital structure (without appreciably increasing debt) and, because equity is typically more expensive than debt, the Commission concluded that the PAA imposed an unreasonable cost on ratepayers. As was the case in the 2006 Sepulveda Order, if it is not clear that the debt to equity ratio is materially altered as a result of a PAA increasing the asset base, then the capital structure has not been distorted and there is no need for an adjustment.

Applying such reasoning to the record presented here, no party claims that the PAAs at issue satisfy the substantial benefits test. Thus, SFPP correctly removed the PAAs for the purpose of establishing its rate base. Because the PAAs do not satisfy the substantial benefits test, the Commission must also consider possible adjustments to capital structure, and, in assessing these possible adjustments, perform an additional analysis to determine whether the PAAs actually caused a distortion to capital structure. The Commission finds that the PAAs at issue in this proceeding did not distort KMEP's capital structure.

275 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32. In the 2006 Sepulveda Order, the Commission considered a PAA resulting from the 1988 sale of assets from the predecessor pipeline to SFPP. The 1988 sale thus increased the size of the asset base when the assets were transferred to the new owner, SFPP. The new owner proceeded to raise financing, resulting in a capital structure of approximately 60 percent debt and 40 percent equity. Under these circumstances, the Commission determined that there was no basis to conclude the PAA had been added entirely to the equity component or that any distortion of capital structure had occurred as a result of the PAA. The Commission explained there is no reason "to believe that this market established debt-equity ratio would have changed if the 1988 asset base resulting from the 1988 sale was the same, smaller, or larger." Id. Thus, the Commission rejected arguments that the capital structure should be adjusted for PAAs.

276 See n.266, supra.

277 December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 64-65. In Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al. the Commission addressed the treatment of KMEP's 1998 purchase of SFPP and the related PAAs in SFPP's capital structure, which was being used as the capital structure in that proceeding. Based upon the record present there, it was clear that the PAAs had been added entirely to the equity component of capital structure, skewing the capital structure toward equity.
debt to equity ratio, and thus no adjustment to capital structure for the PAAs is warranted. In assessing the existence of distortions to capital structure, the primary question to consider is not the financing of any particular transaction, but whether the increased asset base resulting from the presence of the PAAs is distorting capital structure. This is because capital is fungible. For this reason the financing related to a particular purchase must be considered as a part of the overall pool of funds used to finance the assets of the company. Moreover, over time, financial strategies shift, debt retires, and new issuances of debt and equity are made even as the asset base continues to include the residual effects of PAAs. Thus, for KMEP, an MLP with multiple subsidiaries that regularly makes new issuances of debt and equity, it is not possible to isolate and distinguish the ongoing impact of a PAA on the capital structure’s debt to equity ratio. Moreover, without making any adjustment for PAA, KMEP’s capital structure remains within industry norms. As a result, the evidence does not support a finding that the increase to KMEP’s asset base resulting from the PAAs has distorted capital structure. Rather, the most accurate description of the ratio of debt to equity that KMEP uses to define its regulatory rate base is the debt to equity ratio reported in KMEP’s financial statements.

170. Consideration of the possible adjustments to remove the purported effects of PAAs on capital structure only further supports the decision to use KMEP’s actual debt to equity ratio. The record provides inadequate justification for the 2009 ID’s deduction of the PAAs entirely from equity. As an initial matter, the PAAs involving KMEP related to acquisitions financed by both debt and equity. Thus, even if the Commission accepted the proposition that the ongoing effect of a PAA can be linked to the financing of a particular transaction years previously, there is no support for removing the PAAs entirely from equity. ExxonMobil claims that for transactions involving most of the PAAs, KMEP merely assumed the debt of the acquiring companies and did not issue any new debt. Because no new debt was issued, ExxonMobil contends that the PAA cannot be viewed as increasing debt levels and should be removed entirely from equity. This argument is not persuasive. Even assuming that the ongoing effect of a PAA can be

278 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32.
279 However, the Commission notes that as value of the asset depreciates, it would be inconsistent to view the effect of the PAA on asset base as not also declining over the life of the asset.
280 Without removing PAAs, KMEP’s capital structure is 56.18 percent debt and 43.82 percent equity as of September 30, 2008. See Ex. TES-3 at 9.
281 Together, the PAA and goodwill represent the additional cost to KMEP of the acquisition above the asset’s book value. There is no evidence that capital markets required KMEP to raise the additional cost represented by the PAA solely from equity.
traced to the financing of the original acquisition, whether or not KMEP assumed debt or issued debt is not relevant. KMEP's debt level increased as a result of the acquisition. From the perspective of KMEP, the increase in the level of debt was part of the financing for the entire acquisition, including the portion of the asset base involving the PAAs. Had KMEP not assumed the debt, then it likely would have needed to obtain additional financing in order to compensate parties that remained responsible for the debt of the acquired company.

171. For these reasons prior Commission decisions do not necessarily support deducting the PAAs entirely from the equity component. In deciding to remove the PAAs solely from the equity component, the 2009 ID relied upon Commission orders in Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al. However, unlike the facts considered in Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al., the PAAs at issue in this proceeding cannot entirely be attributed to equity. In Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al., the Commission was using the subsidiary SFPP's capital structure rather than the parent KMEP's capital structure, which is the capital structure at issue here. Those orders addressed PAAs resulting from "push down" accounting on the books of SFPP following its acquisition by KMEP. Under "push down" accounting, the difference between the purchase price and the book value of the company acquired was "pushed down" to the books of the acquired company, SFPP. In this case there was a dramatic increase in equity on the SFPP balance sheet because the debt component of its existing capital structure was unchanged. This "push down" therefore raised concerns that such an increase in equity component of the capital structure was unrelated to any issuance of any "new" equity, debt, or other financing by SFPP. Thus, the resulting capital structure was not reflective of SFPP's actual cost of capital. Therefore, under the circumstances presented in Docket No. OR96-2-000, et al., it was appropriate to remove the PAA entirely from the equity component because the PAA had distorted that capital structure by increasing the equity component without increasing the debt component.

172. As the parties note, as part of its rationale for adopting SFPP's capital structure in Docket No. OR92-8-000, et al., the Commission expressed concern that KMEP's capital structure could also be distorted by PAAs. However, neither the December 2005 nor the February 2006 Orders concluded that the marginal increase in acquisition cost related to the PAA should be attributed solely to equity regarding KMEP.

283 Id. at P 15.
284 Id. at P 14.
173. In supporting the removal of PAAs solely from equity, ExxonMobil/BP further argue that debt levels are "fixed" and that any fluctuations in asset values must thereby be removed from equity. As a matter of accounting, it is true that if an asset is revalued, this revaluation does not reduce a utility's debt level. However, the Commission's adjustments to exclude the effect of a PAA from capital structure are not analogous to an actual write down of an asset's value. Rather, as was made clear by the 2006 Sepulveda Order, the Commission's evaluation concerns how the increase of the asset base associated with the PAA ultimately altered the debt to equity ratio in KMEP's capital structure.\footnote{2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32. Although in a sense it is true that the PAA is separate from the financing of a transaction, the financing of the transaction ultimately reflects the total cost of the acquisition, which includes the "cost" attributed to a PAA for accounting purposes.}

174. Therefore, removing the PAA solely from the equity component does not reflect the actual impact of the PAA on capital structure. Neither the 2009 ID nor the briefs opposing exception provide justification for removing the PAAs entirely from equity. Rather than removing the PAAs entirely from equity, the 2009 ID presented an alternative that the PAAs could be removed from debt and equity in the same ratios that were used to finance the various acquisitions involving the PAAs. However, as explained above, this approach is flawed because capital at the parent company level is essentially fungible and the debt to equity ratio in a particular transaction may be offset by other financial issuances. Moreover, the particular adjustment in this proceeding is difficult to determine. SFPP funds many of its purchases with short term debt, and then eventually issues longer term debt and equity to replace this short term debt. Thus, the financing transactions are not easily traceable back to the original acquisition.

175. The Commission notes that KMEP's capital structure without any modification for the PAA is consistent with the capital structure of other pipelines and does not indicate any excess in the equity component.\footnote{See n.280, supra.} This is another distinction with the facts in Docket No. OR96-2, where inclusion of the PAA created a capital structure of 25 percent debt and 75 percent equity for SFPP.\footnote{In deducting the PAA solely from equity, the Commission noted that once the PAA was removed, "SFPP's capital structure [is] well within the norms of the oil and products pipeline industry, and results in more appropriate debt and equity ratios." December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 64.} As noted previously, the proceedings in Docket No. OR96-2, et al., the Commission stated that PAAs may have distorted KMEP's capital structure because "the write-up of the equity component would likely modify the debt to...

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equity ratio in KMEP's capital structure by increasing the equity component. However, based upon the factors considered in this decision and the more extensive evidence presented by the parties in this proceeding, the Commission concludes that KMEP's capital structure is not distorted by PAAs.

2. Goodwill

176. The 2009 ID found that goodwill should not be removed for purposes of determining capital structure. The 2009 ID emphasized that goodwill is not a write-up of assets. Rather, the 2009 ID concluded that goodwill represents the acquisition of an additional intangible asset which has real value and future economic benefit to ratepayers. Thus, the 2009 ID concluded that goodwill is appropriately included in the determination of capital structure.

177. On exceptions, ExxonMobil/BP assert that the 2009 ID erred by failing to remove goodwill from KMEP's capital structure. ExxonMobil/BP argue that the effect of an acquired company's goodwill on the consolidated balance sheet is reflected in a higher equity amount than would exist if there had been no goodwill. As a result, they argue that goodwill, like a PAA, artificially inflates the equity component of capital structure and will result in higher rates. To justify the increased costs, ExxonMobil/BP contend that Commission precedent requiring the removal of PAAs unless they provide "new service or substantial benefits" to ratepayers should also be applied to goodwill. ExxonMobil/BP claim the 2009 ID simply found that goodwill provides "future economic benefit" but made no showing that such benefit will accrue to ratepayers.

178. Opposing exceptions, SFPP asserts that contrary to ExxonMobil/BP's claim, goodwill does not affect either debt or equity balances. Rather, the impact on an acquiring company's capital structure results solely from the type of financing used to fund the acquisition. SFPP argues the evidence in this proceeding shows that the amount of debt of an acquiring company is not fixed and in fact increases to the extent the acquiring company issues debt to finance its acquisition. SFPP contends, therefore, that the notion that goodwill inflates a company's equity balance is unsupported.

289 December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 66.

290 In its definition of goodwill, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) explains that goodwill is an "asset representing the future economic benefits arising from other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually indentified and separately recognized." Ex. SFP-174 at 4.

179. The Commission finds that there is no justification for adjusting capital structure for goodwill. Although the Commission arrives at the same conclusion as the 2009 ID, the Commission does so on a different basis. Much like a PAA, goodwill is unrelated to the original cost of the assets used to provide jurisdictional service and emerges when more is paid than the book value (original cost minus depreciation) of an asset. These types of accounting adjustments that depart from original cost cannot be permitted to distort rates by being included in the pipeline’s asset base. However, because the Commission found that capital structure need not be adjusted for PAAs, the Commission also determines that it is not necessary to alter the capital structure to remove goodwill. However, for the same reasons that a PAA does not necessarily alter the debt to equity ratio in capital structure, it is not clear that the additional cost above the book value that is attributed to goodwill distorts capital structure in a company with the characteristics of KMEP. If the debt to equity ratio is not distorted by the goodwill, there is no justification for adjusting capital structure.

B. **Appropriate Debt to be Included in the Capital Structure**

180. On exceptions, SFPP and ExxonMobil/BP agree that the 2009 ID did not make a clear ruling on whether KMEP’s Current Portion of Long-Term Debt\(^{292}\) should be included in calculating the appropriate capital structure. They note that this issue was included in the joint statement of issues.\(^{293}\) Moreover, on exceptions, SFPP notes the 2009 ID addressed only the issue of how commercial paper should be treated for purposes of calculating the cost of long-term debt, not how such debt should be treated for determining the appropriate capital structure, and that in this the 2009 ID erred.

181. SFPP asserts that both the commercial paper and the long-term debt set to expire within one year should be excluded from capital structure. SFPP states that KMEP neither intends nor has the ability to refinance either of these near-expiring types of debt on a long-term basis. SFPP thus concludes that the use of commercial paper to finance KMEP’s acquisitions is temporary and that the permanent financing of its acquisitions is through a combination of long-term debt and equity. SFPP therefore seeks to distinguish the December 2005 Order, which had included long-term debt due in less than one year in the debt component of capital structure because “SFPP was borrowing so called short-term funds from KMEP but treating those funds like long-term debt by continuing to

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\(^{292}\) Commercial paper and long-term debt expiring within one year are collectively referred to as “Current Portion of Long-Term Debt.”

\(^{293}\) Issue II(e) of the Joint Statement of Issues provides “What, if any, are the appropriate adjustments to capital structure for the current portion of long term debt.”
carry them as sums due affiliates for several years on SFPP's balance sheet. SFPP states that the facts in this proceeding are different in that KMEP had no outstanding commercial paper at the end of 2008, and the issuance of new long-term debt cannot be categorized simply as a replacement of maturing debt.

182. ExxonMobil/BP argue on exceptions that the 2009 ID correctly held that commercial paper should be included in the determination of capital structure, but failed to address the issue of how long-term debt expiring within one year should be treated for calculating capital structure. ExxonMobil/BP contend that since KMEP routinely rolls-over its Current Portion of Long-Term Debt into new issuances of long-term debt there is no rational basis to treat commercial paper and long-term debt expiring within one year differently. In opposing SFPP's exceptions, ExxonMobil/BP again argue that there is no basis to treat the Current Portion of Long-Term Debt, both commercial paper and long-term debt expiring within one year, differently for cost of debt and capital structure purposes. It argues that KMEP's commercial paper was supported by a five-year credit facility which credit facility assures the holders of the commercial paper that KMEP would be able to rollover that debt. ExxonMobil/BP further argue that KMEP has acknowledged that it uses commercial paper to fund long-term acquisitions and intends to refinance its short-term commercial paper. Further, ExxonMobil/BP state the lower cost of the commercial paper versus SFPP's other long-term debt is not a reason to exclude commercial paper from the calculation of the cost of long-term debt.

183. The Commission finds that commercial paper should be incorporated as debt into KMEP's capital structure for the years in which that debt existed. The Commission generally does not use short term debt to determine capital structure because short term debt typically does not support the pipeline's rate base. However, in this order, the Commission has emphasized the fungible character of the capital for an entity such as KMEP and the infeasibility of tracing particular forms of capital to particular expenditures. More fundamentally, KMEP has maintained significant levels of commercial paper for several years, such that the commercial paper became a continual presence in KMEP's financial portfolio. Thus, given that it was a basic component of KMEP's financing, KMEP's commercial paper must be reflected as debt in capital

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294 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 36 (citing December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 69).
296 See P 165, supra.
297 The Commission notes that after the end of the adjustment period on
structure. KMEP had no outstanding commercial paper recorded as of September 30, 2008, the date the Commission has adopted for determining capital structure. However, KMEP’s previous use of commercial paper must be included in historic capital structure for purposes such as determining the deferred return.

As with commercial paper, the Commission finds that KMEP’s long-term debt due within one year should be included in capital structure. Although due to mature during the test period, this expiring long-term debt has been used as a permanent aspect of KMEP’s ongoing funding of capital structure, not as temporary financing. Moreover, despite the debt’s approaching expiration, as SFPP states, “Large, publicly traded companies, including KMEP, consistently issue long-term debt and equity to finance their acquisitions and their infrastructure investments.” Thus, given the continuous issuance of new debt and equity, it is not clear that the expiration of particular long-term debt necessarily represents a change in the ratio of long-term debt to equity in KMEP’s capital structure. For a company with KMEP’s financing practices, the most reasonable estimate of ongoing long-term debt levels includes all long-term debt, even the long-term debt due to expire within one year.

C. The Cost of Debt

September 30, 2008, KMEP reported that it had no outstanding commercial paper due to a revision to its short-term credit rating and the conditions in the market at the time. KMEP SEC Form 10-Q for Third Quarter of 2008 at p. 34. However, this contrasts to the sustained levels of commercial paper maintained by SFPP in the years preceding the financial crises, including $591 million in 2001, $220 million in 2002, $426 million in 2003, $417 million in 2004, $566 million in 2005, $1098 million in 2006, and $589 million in 2007. SFPP Brief on Ex. at 31. These amounts are relevant because they affect the capital structure that is used for those years in making the calculations required by the Commission’s Opinion No. 154-B methodology. These large amounts of short term debt would materially affect the debt to equity ratio used to determine the weighted cost of capital if they were excluded from the capital structure.

The magnitude of KMEP’s maturing debt is such that excluding that debt from KMEP’s capital structure could materially affect the debt-equity ratio used to compute the weighted cost of capital. This was not the case for companies that have modest or nominal amounts of long term debt maturing in single year.
185. All parties agree that the cost of debt for SFPP’s parent, KMEP, should be used.\textsuperscript{300} However, as has been discussed, there are exceptions regarding the components to be incorporated into the calculation of KMEP’s cost of debt. These include the role of commercial paper in determining debt costs and whether to include certain industrial bonds in KMEP’s debt cost structure.

1. The Cost of Commercial Paper

186. The 2009 ID adjusted KMEP’s cost of debt to incorporate the lower interest levels of KMEP’s outstanding commercial paper.\textsuperscript{301} The 2009 ID noted that while the Commission has previously held that only debt with a maturity date of more than one year is typically classified as long-term debt, there have been exceptions when the pipeline utilizes short-term debt as long-term debt.\textsuperscript{302} In this proceeding, the 2009 ID found that the testimony of Mr. O’Loughlin supports the conclusion that KMEP treats commercial paper as long-term debt.\textsuperscript{303} This position was supported by Tesoro and ExxonMobil while SFPP excepts from that decision. The Commission has determined here that the most appropriate date for determining SFPP’s cost of capital is September 30, 2008. As KMEP had no outstanding commercial paper on that date, the cost of such debt is moot in this proceeding.

2. Industrial Revenue Bonds

187. The 2009 ID determined that SFPP properly excluded Economic Development Revenue Refunding Bonds, Industrial Revenue Bonds, and OLP-B specific bonds (special purpose and tax exempt bonds) from the calculation of the cost of SFPP’s long-term debt. The 2009 ID also determined, referencing Professor Williamson’s testimony, that the special purpose and tax exempt bonds, were not available to finance the West

\textsuperscript{300} When a subsidiary uses its parent company’s capital structure, as all parties agree SFPP should do here, the use of the parent company’s cost of debt necessarily follows. This issue here is what portion of that debt to use.

\textsuperscript{301} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 646.

\textsuperscript{302} Id. (citing December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 69 (noting “SFPP was borrowing so called short term funds from KMEP but treated those funds like long term debt by continuing to carry them as sums due affiliates for several years on SFPP’s balance sheet.”)).

\textsuperscript{303} Id. P 647.
Line rate base and are therefore, appropriately excluded from the calculation of the cost of long-term debt. 304

188. On exceptions, the ACC Shippers assert that the 2009 ID erred by excluding the special purpose and tax exempt bonds. The ACC Shippers argue that it is inconsistent for SFPP to treat the special purpose and tax exempt bonds as long-term debt for purposes of determining KMEP's capital structure while excluding this debt from its determination of the cost of debt. According to the ACC Shippers, exclusion of the special purpose and tax exempt bonds will create an artificially high cost of debt, inflating the cost of service. Moreover, the ACC Shippers state that KMEP funds its operations in a consolidated manner and treats the special purpose and tax exempt bonds as long-term debt for purposes of capital structure.

189. The ACC Shippers also assert that SFPP witness Professor Williamson excluded the special purpose and tax exempt bonds on the basis of an arbitrary and inconsistent "dollar tracing test." According to the ACC Shippers, the "dollar tracing test" would exclude the cost of debt if that debt was used to pay for a company other than SFPP, but if the debt was issued by KMEP to pay distributions, then that debt would be included. The ACC Shippers contend that such dollar tracing has been previously rejected by the Commission for ratemaking purposes. 305

190. Opposing exceptions, SFPP states that its cost of debt should only reflect the actual cost of KMEP's debt financing available to fund its pipeline operations and any debt not used for such purposes should be excluded. First, SFPP asserts the evidence shows that these special purpose and tax exempt bonds were issued to finance other projects and were not otherwise available to finance SFPP's West Line rate base. 306 Second, SFPP asserts that it is appropriate to exclude the special purpose bonds from the determination of debt costs while including them in the debt component of capital structure. SFPP claims that whereas investors look at the balance sheet capital structure to ascertain financial risk, the cost of debt is an after-the-fact calculation made for purposes of Commission proceedings. SFPP further argues that, to determine the cost of debt, the Commission relies on actual debt cost and that investor decisions are not considered. Finally, SFPP argues that there is no record evidence to support the ACC Shippers' position that excluding special purpose and tax exempt bonds will require

304 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 647.
305 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 14 (citing Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 117 FERC ¶ 61,077, at P 193, 195 (2006)).
306 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 41 (citing Ex. SFP-75 at 39).
“dollar tracing.” SFPP argues that Professor Williamson only excluded debt that was clearly unavailable to finance the rate base of KMEP’s jurisdictional activities.

191. The Commission finds that the 2009 ID incorrectly permitted the removal of industrial revenue bonds from KMEP’s cost of debt. Although SFPP avers that certain issuances of debt by KMEP or its subsidiaries were used for particular purposes, such issuances of debt and equity are interchangeable aspects of the overall financing of KMEP. As the Commission explained in Kern River:

[A]fter a company engages in a financing, whether debt or equity, the proceeds from the financing are commingled with other liquid assets, derived from other financings and/or internally generated funds, which are then used to pay the company's operating and non-operating expenses. Thus, there is no way to tell which dollars are used to pay which expenses.\(^\text{307}\)

192. The Commission concludes that “dollar tracing” of debt to particular expenses is impossible.\(^\text{308}\) The Commission notes that the fungible nature of KMEP’s financing provided support to the Commission’s determination not to adjust KMEP’s capital structure to account for PAAs. Thus, even if the issuance of a particular bond was rendered tax exempt because KMEP (or a subsidiary) was expending money for a particular purpose at a given time,\(^\text{309}\) that bond ultimately formed a component of the overall pool of capital available to KMEP to finance its operations and lowered the overall costs of KMEP’s indebtedness. Therefore the so-called special purpose and tax exempt bonds should be reflected in debt costs.

D. The Cost of Equity Capital

193. This section addresses issues raised on exceptions related to the derivation of a rate of return on equity. On the issue of the appropriate rate of return on equity, the 2009 ID rejected the use of equity component data beyond the test period and, with respect to the proxy group, excluded one company, Enterprise Products Partners, and included one company, Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P. The 2009 ID also found that the position

\(^\text{307}\) Opinion No. 486, 117 FERC ¶ 61,077 at P 195.

\(^\text{308}\) Id.

\(^\text{309}\) Moreover, SFPP failed to establish that all of the debt that Professor Williamson excluded was tax exempt (see Tr. 449), further discrediting SFPP’s unpersuasive contention that legal obligations segregated this debt from KMEP’s overall pool of capital.
advocated by ExxonMobil which resulted in an approximate median rate of return for the proxy group (before adjusting for the inflation component) at or about 12.53 percent, as compared to SFPP’s proposed 13.01 percent rate of return, to be appropriate, subject to re-calculation based upon the other related findings in the 2009 ID. The parties raise exceptions regarding the following two determinations in the 2009 ID: (1) with respect to the proxy groups, that Enterprise Products Partners, L.P. (Enterprise) should be excluded and Sunoco Logistics Partners, L.P. (Sunoco Logistics) should have been included as a proxy group member and (2) SFPP may not use post-test period equity component data.

1. Composition of the Proxy Group

194. SFPP argues on exceptions that the ID erroneously adopted for the base and test period a non-representative oil pipeline proxy group that excluded Enterprise but included Sunoco Logistics.

a. Exclusion of Enterprise

195. The 2009 ID found that “Enterprise should not be included in the proxy group used to determine SFPP’s appropriate rate of return on equity because it does not have an investment grade bond rating and because it was involved in a merger.”310 In reaching this decision, the Presiding Judge relied on the Commission’s decision in Kern River311 to exclude Enterprise from Kern River’s proxy group.

196. SFPP proposes to include Enterprise as a member of the proxy group for 2007 and the six-month period ending September 20, 2008.312 SFPP argues that the 2009 ID’s basis for excluding Enterprise from the proxy group, its non-investment grade bond rating and involvement in a merger, are incorrect. According to SFPP, Enterprise regained its investment-grade bond rating in December 2006313 and the merger referenced in the 2009 ID was completed in September 2004. Thus, SFPP argues that these issues were removed prior to the base and test period, and therefore, are not legitimate reasons for excluding Enterprise.

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311 Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034.

312 Ex. SFP-75 at 3, 7-10.

313 SFPP acknowledges that Enterprise’s bond rating was non-investment grade during 2004 (the period at issue in the Kern River proceeding) but that in 2007 and 2008 (the period at issue in this case) Enterprise had an investment grade rating.
197. ExxonMobil/BP assert that SFPP’s justification for including Enterprise is misplaced. According to ExxonMobil/BP, the principle reason for excluding Enterprise is that Enterprise is subject to substantial commodity risk, which significantly differs from SFPP’s commodity risk level. ExxonMobil/BP argue that Enterprise’s September 2004 merger with Gulf Terra did not reduce Enterprise’s commodity risk or change its commercial characteristics.

198. Because the significant role Kern River plays in the 2009 ID as well as the parties’ reliance on it in their exceptions, the Commission provides the following summary of the relevant part of that order. In Kern River, the Commission excluded Enterprise from Kern River’s proxy group for two reasons. First, Enterprise’s merger with Gulf Terra Energy Partners, L.P. was completed near the end of Kern River’s 2004 test year (the 12 month period ending in October 2004), which merger effected Enterprise’s financial profile. Second, prior to the merger, and thus for much of the 2004 test year, Enterprise was predominately a gas liquids pipeline with only 10 percent of its revenues were generated by its gas transmission business while 73 percent were from its natural gas liquids pipelines, which led the Commission to conclude that Enterprise had differing commercial characteristics than Kern River.

199. Despite the fact that Enterprise has held an investment grade rating since 2006 and that its merger activity ended in 2004, one of the more significant reasons that the Commission excluded Enterprise from Kern River’s proxy group appears to be unchanged. Specifically, its commodity risk. In Kern River, the Commission noted that prior to the September 2004 merger, Enterprise was dominated by gas liquids and that the record showed that Enterprise’s natural gas liquids transmission business is particularly vulnerable to commodity risk due to the pricing mechanism it utilizes to transport natural gas liquids and related interest risks. This appears to continue to be the case. Enterprises’ 2007 10-K indicates that approximately 77 percent of its revenues were from natural gas liquids pipelines. Moreover, Enterprise’s Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2007 states that Enterprise continues to have a material level of commodity price risk. SFPP fails to disprove this as its only witness on the issue.

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314 ExxonMobil/BP Brief op. Ex. at 11 (citing Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 78).

315 Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 78-81.

316 Id. at P 78 (noting that Enterprise’s SEC Form 10-K indicates that during 2004 only 10 percent of its revenues were from the natural gas business, while 73 percent were from its natural gas liquids pipelines).

317 Ex. SFP-15 at 71.

318 Ex. XOM-29.
Dr. Williamson, testified that he did not "know" whether Enterprise’s "vulnerability to commodity risk" is the same today as it was during 2004. Proxy group members must be representative and have reasonably comparable risks. Based on Enterprise’s continuing and significant commodity risk, the Commission affirms the 2009 ID’s conclusion that Enterprise should not be included in the proxy group.

b. Inclusion of Sunoco Logistics

200. The 2009 ID found that Sunoco Logistics should be included in the proxy group based on the testimony of ExxonMobil’s witness, Dr. Horst. Specifically, the 2009 ID found compelling Dr. Horst’s testimony that Sunoco Logistics derives 96 percent of its revenues and 64.7 percent of its assets from its Western Pipeline System, which owns and operates 3,200 miles of crude oil trunk pipelines, and approximately 500 miles of crude oil gathering pipelines in Texas and Oklahoma. SFPP argues on exceptions that inclusion of Sunoco Logistics in the proxy group is inconsistent with the Proxy Group Policy Statement as Sunoco Logistics was not covered by Value Line during the time period relevant to SFPP’s rate case. SFPP states that no party has justified including in the proxy group a company that was not covered by Value Line during the relevant time period.

201. While ExxonMobil/BP agree that there is no evidence in this record that Sunoco is included in the Value Line reports, ExxonMobil/BP state that under the Proxy Group Policy Statement coverage by Value Line is a relevant consideration, but not an absolute requirement. ExxonMobil/BP support inclusion of Sunoco Logistics stating that 96 percent of Sunoco’s revenues are derived from crude oil trunk and gathering pipelines and that it has been in operation as an MLP for over five years. ExxonMobil/BP therefore conclude that Sunoco’s inclusion in the proxy group is consistent with the Commission’s inclusion of TC Pipelines in Kern River’s proxy group even though TC Pipelines also was not covered by Value Line.

319 See Ex. SFP-75 at 9, 10-12.


322 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 17 (citing Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 79).

323 ExxonMobil/BP Brief op. Ex. at 13 (citing Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC (continued...))
202. In the Proxy Group Policy Statement, the Commission declined to determine which particular corporations and/or MLPs should be included in the gas or oil proxy groups, and instead left that determination to each individual rate case. The Commission provided further guidance stating that “when developing its proxy group, a pipeline should select MLPs that are well established and have assets that are predominantly gas and oil pipelines,” because such pipelines are most likely to have risk comparable to the pipeline at issue. The Proxy Group Policy Statement further notes that there may be particular MLPs that do not satisfy these criteria, but are still appropriate for inclusion in the proxy group. In such a case, the pipeline must justify including such MLP in its proxy group. The Commission also agreed in principle with a commenter that with respect to the Commission’s practice of using the five-year growth forecasts reported by IBES to determine the short-term growth rates for each proxy company, IBES forecasts should only be used for an MLP that is tracked by Value Line. However, the Commission made clear that these are guidelines, not necessary conditions, for including a particular MLP in the proxy group.

203. The Commission finds that SFPP has already identified a sufficiently large proxy group for the base and test period that it is not necessary to include Sunoco Logistics. Notwithstanding ExxonMobil/BP’s argument regarding TC Pipelines, the inclusion of a company in another proxy group in an unrelated proceeding is not a compelling reason to move beyond the guidelines in the Proxy Group Policy Statement where no evidence was presented in this record that Sunoco Logistic is followed by Value Line, particularly because an adequately sized proxy group has already been identified. The Commission has previously concluded that a proxy group should consist of at least four, and preferably at least five members, if representative members can be found. In Kern River, the Commission noted that while “adding more members to the proxy group results in greater statistical accuracy, this is true only if the additional members are appropriately included in the proxy group as representative firms.” In Kern River, TC Pipelines was included to achieve a five member proxy group. However, in this case, adequacy of the size of SFPP’s proxy group is not an issue as SFPP’s proxy group is comprised of seven

¶ 61,034 at P 66).

324 Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 51.
325 Id. P 79.
326 Id.
327 Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 104 (finding that a five firm proxy group, including three MLPs, is sufficient to avoid concerns about too small a proxy group resulting in a distorted sample).
members after excluding both Enterprise and Sunoco. Given that an adequately sized proxy group has been identified, the Commission does not find that it is necessary to include an entity such as Sunoco Logistics, for which there is no evidence in the record that it meets the preferred guidance criteria set forth in the Proxy Group Policy Statement, namely that the entity be covered by Value Line.

2. Use of Post-Test Period Data for DCF Analysis

204. The 2009 ID rejected SFPP’s proposed use of post-test period equity component data. The 2009 ID determined that the April 2009 post-test period data is anomalous in that it reflects a period in American economic history that has not existed since the Great Depression and is unlikely to exist for the foreseeable future. The 2009 ID thus concluded it would be serious error to design SFPP’s prospective rates, and specifically to calculate the discounted cash flow (DCF), using such anomalous data.

205. SFPP argues on exceptions that the 2009 ID erroneously adopted the September 2008 return on equity data, which SFPP states is obsolete. SFPP urges the Commission to instead adopt more recent return on equity data in the record: either the April 30, 2009 data, or alternatively the January 31, 2009 data. SFPP states that the use of the most recent return on equity data in the record is required by Hope, the market-based cost of capital model, and long-standing Commission policy. SFPP further states that the 2009 ID’s conclusion that “the Commission uses post-test period data only when that data demonstrates that the test period data will be seriously in error” is incorrect. According to SFPP, the Commission instead prefers to use the most recent six months of data in the record to derive the current dividend yield because updated data more accurately reflects current investor needs. SFPP argues in the alternative that, if the Commission rejects the updated January or April 2009 DCFs, then the Commission must also reject the September 2008 DCF and instead designate a real rate of return that reflects the Commission’s best judgment regarding the future based on data from past DCF periods.

328 In this case, after excluding Enterprise and not including Sunoco Logistics, SFPP’s proxy group is comprised of five companies in 2004 and 2005, six entities in 2006, and seven entities in 2007 and 2008.


330 SFPP Brief on Ex. at 12-13 (citing Trunkline Gas Co., 90 FERC ¶ 61,017, at 61,117 (2000); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 104 FERC ¶ 61,036, at P 17-18, 20 (2003); and Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,084, at 61,427 (1998)).
206. ExxonMobil/BP, the ACC Shippers, and Tesoro disagree with SFPP and urge the Commission to uphold the ID’s determination that it is inappropriate to use post-test period data to calculate SFPP’s return on equity (ROE). These Shippers state that the Commission’s regulations and precedent require that the carrier’s rate filing be based on 12 months of costs reflecting actual experience (the base period) which can be adjusted for certain changes that are known and measurable within the following nine months (together, the test period). Further, data beyond the end of the test period can only be used if the test period data would reflect a substantial error or would produce unreasonable results. Moreover, Shippers argue that the Commission has found that modification of test period data should only reflect “a change that is a significant, lasting change, not a cyclical change.”

207. The ACC Shippers argue that looking beyond the test period in this case would be contrary to Commission precedent, noting that the Commission will only look to post-test period data when it is more reliable and representative than test period data for setting prospective rates. Shippers note that the January and April 2009 data is anomalous as it reflects a negative or flat inflation rate, is indicative of a temporary low point in the American economy, and would allow SFPP to achieve windfall profits as the economy recovers. Last, the ACC Shippers argue that the Commission should reject SFPP’s argument that if the Commission rejects using the updated 2009 data, then it should also reject using the test period data and instead develop a composite ROE based on historical data. The ACC Shippers state that this argument must be rejected as it was first raised on exceptions and SFPP failed to develop a supporting record in this case.

208. The Commission upholds the 2009 ID’s determination on this issue and rejects SFPP’s proposed use of post-test period data for purposes of the DCF analysis, but on somewhat different grounds. As the Commission has stated previously, the Commission uses the most recent data, even if such data is from outside the test period, “because the market is always changing and later figures more accurately reflect current investor needs.” Unlike cost of service and capital structure data, the Commission prefers the most recent financial data in the record for calculating a pipeline’s ROE, recognizing

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331 ACC Brief on Ex. at 5 (citing Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. SFPP, L.P., 117 FERC ¶ 61,285, at P 69 (2006)).


333 See Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 104 FERC ¶ 61,036 at P 20 (2003) (Williston II) (permitting updated cost of equity figures over Trial Staff’s objections); (continued...
that updates are not permitted once the record has been closed and the hearing has concluded. However, any updating of the record is subject to the more fundamental principle of ratemaking that that cost of service adopted in rate proceeding be a reasonable forecast of the pipeline’s future cost of service; this is that the costs are representative of the costs that the pipeline is likely to incur over period that the rates at issue are in effect.

209. Financial information SFPP has included in this docket and other ongoing SFPP proceedings before the Commission establishes that the updated cost of equity data SFPP included in this proceeding is not representative of its long term equity cost of capital. That cost applies to the entire firm regardless of what facilities and rates are at issue. SFPP’s October 16, 2008 rate filing in the instant docket contained an equity cost of capital of 7.20 percent for 2007, as updated to 7.64 percent for September 2008, the figure adopted by the 2009 ID, SFPP updated those ROEs in January 2009 and April 2009. The ROE for January 2009 was 14.30 percent and the figure for April 2009 was 14.83 percent. The 6.66 point increase in the cost of capital for the four months October through January and of 7.79 percent for the seven months October through April reflects the collapse of the stock market in late 2008 and early 2009 and the use of a negative inflation rate in calculating SFPP’s ROE. SFPP’s proposed West Line rates in this proceeding will be in effect indefinitely into the future. Neither the collapse of the stock prices (which increased the dividend yield used in the DCF calculation) nor the minimal or negative inflation rate (which establishes the real rather than the nominal cost of capital) would have so continued. SFPP’s proposed ROE based on data for the six months ended February 2010 was 9.09 percent and for the six months ended March 2010.

Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 84 FERC ¶ 61,081 I at 61,382 (1998) (“It is true that the Commission prefers to use dividend yield data from the most recent six-month period available”).

334 See Enbridge Pipelines (KPC), 100 FERC ¶ 61,260 at PP 379-86 (2002), reh’g denied, 102 FERC ¶ 61,310 (2003), denying the pipeline’s motion to reopen the record after the hearing had concluded to consider the effects of Enron’s bankruptcy on pipeline capital costs. See also Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“In relying on ex parte submissions appearing in a post-hearing brief, the Commission violated fundamental canons of due process.”).

335 Ex. SFP-5 at 8.

336 Id. 9

337 Ex. SFP-76.

338 Ex. SFP-323 at 1.
was 8.72 percent. Therefore, the ROEs resulting from a DCF analysis based on data for the six months ending January 2009 or April 2009 are not representative of SFPP’s cost of capital during the future periods the rates proposed in this case may be in effect. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable to design a long term rate for the West Lines using an ROE based on financial data from those six month periods. For the foregoing reasons, the Commission affirms the 2009 ID’s use of record data for the six months ended September 30, 2008 in the instant docket.

E. Rate Base Issues

210. This section addresses issues raised on exceptions related to the rate base determinations. With respect to the rate base, the 2009 ID held that the appropriate test year rate base depends upon the calculation of deferred return, the calculation of KMEP’s capital structure, and whether SFPP’s depreciation expense rate needs to be adjusted. The 2009 ID found that while arguments raised by ExxonMobil/BP regarding potential error in SFPP’s 1984 calculation of deferred return have merit, the Commission has previously accepted SFPP’s deferred return calculation. Thus the 2009 ID determined that SFPP appropriately calculated the rate base and inflation-adjusted deferred return in its filing. However, the 2009 ID rejected SFPP’s proposed changes to the inflation-adjusted deferred return using post-test period data.

1. Determination of Deferred Return

211. The 2009 ID notes that, according to ExxonMobil’s testimony, it appears that SFPP’s calculation of deferred return deviates from the standard deferred return calculation methodology. The 2009 ID states the deferred return is calculated each year by multiplying the inflation factor from the applicable year by the equity portion of the pipeline’s rate base from that same year. The pipeline is permitted to add a starting rate base (SRB) write-up to its rate base. According to ExxonMobil, SFPP did not apply the equity ratio to the starting rate base write-up before adding it to the equity portion of SFPP’s trending rate base. Notwithstanding this deviation, the 2009 ID concludes:

[T]he Commission seems to have approved SFPP’s deferred return methodology when it accepted SFPP’s compliance filings in the proceeding underlying Opinion No. 435. The

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339 See Docket No. IS09-437-000, Ex. SPE-108 at 2, 3 respectively. The materials cited in this and the preceding footnote are incorporated into the instant record.


341 Id. P 619–621.
Commission is free to permit deviations from its own established methodology as long as the resulting rate is just and reasonable, and that appears to be the case here, as determined previously by the Commission. Therefore, since the Commission previously approved the deferred return methodology employed by SFPP in this case, and since Staff takes no position adverse to SFPP on this issue, and because the Shippers have not produced a study demonstrating the rate-impact of SFPP’s deferred return methodology, the undersigned finds that SFPP’s deferred return methodology was appropriately calculated in this proceeding. If the Commission believes it inadvertently allowed the aforementioned deviations to take place, it may adopt Exxon’s position and should require SFPP to recalculate in accordance with its directives.\textsuperscript{342}

212. On exceptions, ExxonMobil/BP, joined by Valero, argue that the 2009 ID erred by permitting SFPP to depart from Commission precedent by improperly calculating the deferred return on its SRB write-up. ExxonMobil/BP urge that the Opinion No. 154-B methodology, which provides that deferred return should be computed on the basis of only the equity portion of the net SRB write-up, is the only lawful way to calculate deferred return and should be followed in this case. ExxonMobil/BP note that in the prior SFPP case cited by the 2009 ID, nothing in the order reflects an intent by the Commission to approve a departure from the previously established method for computing deferred return under Opinion No. 154-B; rather, SFPP’s calculation error in that proceeding simply went undetected.

213. SFPP states that it correctly calculated its deferred return under the Opinion No. 154-B. SFPP claims that ExxonMobil/BP have misread SFPP’s statements showing the deferred return calculation. Specifically, SFPP states that it only included the equity portion of the SRB write-up in rate base and its deferred return calculation. SFPP stated that it derived the equity portion of SRB write-up by multiplying the full SRB write-up amount ($31,004,000 from line 13) by the equity ratio (39.26% from line 14) which results in an equity portion of SRB write-up in the amount of $12,173,000. Moreover, SFPP notes that its SRB write-up has been fully amortized and is no longer a factor in SFPP’s rate base.\textsuperscript{343}

\textsuperscript{342} \textit{Id.} P 621.

\textsuperscript{343} See Ex. SFP-57 at 16 (Statement E4) (showing that the starting rate base write-up was fully amortized as of 2004).
214. A review of SFPP’s supporting work papers, specifically, Ex. SFP-57, at 15-16 (Statement E4 – West Line Starting Rate Base and Amortization Calculation) confirms that SFPP correctly calculated deferred return consistent with the Opinion No. 154-B methodology. There is no evidence to support ExxonMobil/BP’s assertion that SFPP has perpetuated a prior error in performing its calculation. Specifically, the Commission finds that SFPP calculated its deferred return using only the equity portion of its SRB write-up rather than the entire SRB write-up. ExxonMobil/BP’s sole witness on this issue, Dr. Horst, states that “I have no objections to the calculations shown in SFPP’s Statement E-4.” Dr. Horst’s concern is that 100 percent of the net SRB write-up is included on Line 9 of SFPP’s Statement E2. Dr. Horst argues that “for consistency, SFPP should have included only the equity portion of its SRB write-up rather than the entire Net Starting Rate Base Write-Up, but rather the product of the equity ratio shown on Line 3 of Statement E-2 multiplied by the net SRB write-up.” The Commission finds that the amount SFPP included on Line 9 of Statement E-2, $12,173,000 is the product of the equity ratio shown on Line 3 of Statement E-2 multiplied by the net SRB write-up ($31,004,000) as shown on Lines 13-15 of SFPP’s Statement E4. ExxonMobil/BP’s additional arguments on exceptions regarding this issue, specifically the arguments that SFPP failed to properly calculate the SRB, appear at a minimum to conflict with its expert witnesses’ testimony, and at best are conjecture on ExxonMobil/BP’s part.

2. Calculation of the Inflation Adjustments

215. SFPP sought to substitute inflation rates for the first four months of 2009 in place of the actual inflation rate during the test year ending September 30, 2008, for purposes of computing its deferred return. Specifically, SFPP sought to update the inflation factor

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344 ExxonMobil/BP’s confusion may lie with the description used in the statements showing the calculation of deferred return refers to “net starting rate base write-up.” ExxonMobil/BP state that “The SRB Write-Up, net of amortization, is referred to as the Net SRB Write-Up” and further state that “only the equity portion of the Net SRB Write-Up that is added to the equity portion of the rate base.” Exxon/BP Brief on Ex. at 41-42. A review of SFPP’s Statement E4 – Starting Rate Base and Amortization Calculation, shows that “Net Starting Rate Base Write-Up” as used in Statement E4 refer to the equity portion of the SRB Write-Up minus the amortized amount of the SRB Write-Up.

345 Ex. XOM-1 at 27:13.

346 Ex. XOM-1 at 30:13-16.

347 Id.

348 ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 44.
it uses to calculate its deferred return with the inflation rate it provides in Exhibit No. SFP-323, the April 2009 DCF. The 2009 ID rejected SFPP’s proposed changes to the inflation-adjusted deferred return beyond the test period ending September 30, 2008.\textsuperscript{349} The Presiding Judge found that SFPP is not permitted to rely on the April 2009 DCF. Rather, SFPP must use the inflation factor from the end of the test period, as it is neither necessary nor useful to look beyond the test period and apply an anomalous inflation factor to SFPP’s prospective rates.\textsuperscript{350} Simply put, the 2009 ID rejected the use of post-test period data for the same reasons discussed in the Equity Cost of Capital section above.

216. SFPP argues that the 2009 ID erred by refusing to calculate the deferred return using the updated, post-test period inflation factor offered by Dr. Williamson. The ACC Shippers support the Presiding Judge’s conclusion that SFPP’s rate base and inflation-adjusted net deferred earnings should use the test period inflation factor. ExxonMobil/BP note that SFPP’s argument in support of using a post-test period inflation factor relies on the Commission’s acceptance of SFPP’s argument regarding the use of a post-test period equity component data to calculate SFPP’s return on equity. ExxonMobil/BP urge the Commission to reject the use of post-test period inflation data for two reasons. First, Commission precedent rejects the use of post-test period data unless SFPP demonstrates that the test period data will be in serious error\textsuperscript{351} and ExxonMobil/BP note that SFPP has not proffered any evidence that the September 2008 data are seriously in error. Second, ExxonMobil/BP state there is no precedent for permitting a pipeline to employ a negative inflation rate to compute its deferred return, which would be the case if SFPP used the April 2009 inflation rate. ExxonMobil/BP correctly note that the effect of calculating a pipeline’s deferred return using a negative rate of inflation would be to increase its ROW. Thus ExxonMobil/BP assert that if there is zero or negative inflation in a given year then there should be no deferred return for that year, otherwise the result would yield to the pipeline an ROE in excess of that required to attract capital in the market.\textsuperscript{352}

217. For the reasons discussed the Commission upholds the 2009 ID’s ruling that SFPP may not use post-test period inflation rate for the same reasons the Commission rejected SFPP’s request to use post-test period equity component data.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{349} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 614.
\item \textsuperscript{350} Id. P 622.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Exxon/BP Brief op. Ex. at 28 (citing 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 650; \textit{Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co.}, 87 FERC ¶ 61,265, at 62,022 (1999)).
\item \textsuperscript{352} Exxon/BP Brief op. Ex. at 29.
\end{itemize}
VI. Income Tax Allowance Issues

218. This part addresses income tax allowance issues raised on exceptions in the instant docket. The 2009 ID held: (1) that SFPP was legally entitled to an income tax allowance;\(^{353}\) (2) that SFPP properly calculated the income tax allowance following the guidance in prior Commission orders;\(^{354}\) (3) that SFPP properly calculated the taxable income of SFPP and its partners;\(^{355}\) (4) that SFPP used the correct marginal tax rate for those partners;\(^{356}\) (5) that there should be no adjustments to reflect the benefits of tax deferrals occasioned by a master limited partnership (MLP);\(^{357}\) (6) that there was no income tax allowance for future capital gains included in SFPP’s cost of service;\(^{358}\) (7) that there were no unintended consequences from the application of the Commission’s Income Tax Policy Statement to SFPP;\(^{359}\) and (8) that no adjustment should be made to SFPP’s rate of return on equity to reflect any benefits that may flow to SFPP’s limited partners from SFPP’s income tax allowance.\(^{360}\)

219. All of the 2009 ID’s conclusions regarding SFPP’s income tax allowance are opposed by the ACC Shippers and by ExxonMobil/BP. SFPP supports the 2009 ID’s conclusions in all regards. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert on exceptions in this case the same arguments they have raised in numerous prior SFPP rate proceedings, but are presented here in their most complete form to date. Accordingly, this review relies on certain aspects of the Commission’s prior SFPP orders where appropriate, but will address any refinements or modifications to the ACC Shippers’ and ExxonMobil/BP’s arguments advanced in this proceeding. The exceptions fall into five broad categories: (1) the legality of an income tax allowance, (2) whether SFPP complied with the Commission’s protocols for implementing an income tax allowance, (3) certain proposed adjustments to the rate of return on equity to prevent an alleged double recovery of the income tax allowance, (4) whether the allowance was properly

\(^{353}\) 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 670.


\(^{355}\) Id. P 684.

\(^{356}\) Id. P 685.

\(^{357}\) Id. P 688.

\(^{358}\) Id. P 689.

\(^{359}\) Id. P 692.

\(^{360}\) Id. P 669.
calculated, and (5) related accumulated deferred income tax (ADIT) issues. The parties’ arguments are addressed in turn below.

A. Legality of an Income Tax Allowance

220. Both the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that SFPP is not entitled to an income tax allowance as a matter of law.\(^{361}\) All arguments regarding the fundamental legality of the income tax allowance for master limited partnerships (MLP) are addressed here. To summarize, with regard to the legality of applying an income tax allowance to SFPP, a limited partnership, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that the 2009 ID erred by: (1) failing to recognize that BP West Coast,\(^{362}\) as clarified by ExxonMobil,\(^{363}\) is controlling authority; (2) failing to consider whether the Commission had violated its statutory authority and the intent of Congress; and (3) failing to examine whether the income tax policy could be appropriately applied to SFPP. The following background section provides context for the Commission’s review of the legality of an income tax allowance under the Income Tax Policy Statement.\(^{364}\)

1. Legal Background

221. The Commission’s current income tax allowance policy for partnerships in general, and MLPs specifically, was occasioned by the court’s rejection in BP West Coast of the so-called Lakehead policy.\(^{365}\) The Lakehead policy provided that a limited partnership would be permitted to include an income tax allowance in its rates equal to the proportion of its limited partnership interests owned by corporate partners, but could not include a tax allowance for its partnership interests that were not owned by corporations. On review of four Commission orders addressing various rate issues

\(^{361}\) ExxonMobil/BP present this argument as an alternative argument if the Commission declines to adjust SFPP’s rate of return to correct an alleged double recovery of the income tax allowance in SFPP’s equity return.

\(^{362}\) BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (BP West Coast).

\(^{363}\) ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ExxonMobil).


\(^{365}\) BP West Coast, 374 F.3d 1263, 1285-1293 (analyzing and reversing the Commission’s income tax allowance conclusions in Lakehead Pipeline Company, L.P., 71 FERC ¶ 61,338 (1995), reh’g denied, 75 FERC ¶ 61,181 (1998) (Lakehead)).
pertaining to SFPP, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the Commission’s application of the Lakehead policy to SFPP in BP West Coast.

222. The court held that the Commission had not justified two central aspects of the Lakehead policy. First, the Commission failed to explain adequately why a partnership should be afforded an income tax allowance on the partnership interests owned by corporations but not on those owned by individuals. Second, the Commission could not grant a regulated entity organized as a partnership an allowance for income taxes when the Commission itself had concluded that partnerships incur no income tax costs. Holding that the Commission could not grant an income tax allowance for a phantom tax cost, the court reversed the Commission’s decision to rely on Lakehead in awarding SFPP a partial tax allowance and remanded the proceeding to the Commission.

223. In light of the potentially broad implications of the court’s determination in BP West Coast regarding income tax allowances, the Commission opened a generic proceeding seeking industry comment on income tax allowances. After the receipt of numerous comments, the Commission issued the Income Tax Policy Statement. In formulating the Income Tax Policy Statement, the Commission determined that the Lakehead policy “mistakenly focused on who pays the taxes rather than on the more fundamental cost allocation principle of what costs, including tax costs, are attributed to regulated service, and therefore properly included in a regulated cost of service.” The Commission found the realities of partnership law is such that:

[J]ust as a corporation has an actual or potential income tax liability on income from the first tier public utility assets it controls, so do the

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367 BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1289-90.

368 Id. at 1291-92.

369 Id. at 1288, 1291.

370 Id. at 1312.

371 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139.

372 Id. P 33.
owners of a partnership or LLC on the first tier assets and income that they control by means of the pass-through entity.\textsuperscript{373}

Thus, the Commission found that while a partnership entity does not pay taxes on its income from its public utility operations, that income is distributed to its partners who are liable for income taxes on that income, just as a corporate entity must pay taxes on its public utility income.\textsuperscript{374} The Commission further concluded that the responsibility of a regulated utility's partners for payment of taxes on partnership income is the payment of taxes on first tier income, just as a corporation's income tax obligations represent taxes on first tier income.\textsuperscript{375} The Commission ultimately adopted an income tax policy permitting "an income tax allowance for all entities or individuals owning public utility assets, provided that an entity or individual has an actual or potential income tax liability to be paid on that income from those assets."\textsuperscript{376}

224. Regarding the SFPP orders remanded by \textit{BP West Coast}, on remand the Commission applied the newly formulated Income Tax Policy Statement and held that SFPP was entitled to an income tax allowance to the extent the owners of its partnership interests had actual or potential income tax liability during the periods at issue.\textsuperscript{377} The June 2005 Remand Order was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by the shipper parties — a group that comprises most of the protesting shipper parties in this proceeding.

225. On appeal, the court noted that in reviewing the June 2005 Remand Order, it necessarily must also review the Income Tax Policy Statement because the June 2005 Remand Order explicitly relied on the Policy Statement.\textsuperscript{378} Addressing the shipper parties' arguments that \textit{BP West Coast} precludes a partnership, including MLPs, from

\textsuperscript{373} \textit{Id.} P 34.

\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Id.} P 33.

\textsuperscript{375} \textit{Id.} P 22, 33-36, 38.

\textsuperscript{376} \textit{Id.} P 32.


\textsuperscript{378} \textit{ExxonMobil}, 487 F.3d at 951.
obtaining an income tax allowance, the court stated that "at the outset, we note that BP West Coast did not categorically prohibit the Commission from granting income tax allowances to pipelines that operate as limited partnerships."\(^{379}\) In upholding the Commission’s Policy Statement and the June 2005 Order that implemented that policy, the court noted that income tax liability for partnership income occurs at the partner level, and that it is the partner that is responsible for any tax liability that may accrue on distributive income derived from the partnership.\(^{380}\) The court stated:

In the Policy Statement and the Remand Order, the Commission resolved the principal defect of the Lakehead policy, which was the unexplained differential treatment of individual and corporate partners. FERC then determined that it would be "just and reasonable" to grant regulated pipelines an income tax allowance to the extent that all of the pipeline’s partners—whether individual or corporate—incur actual or potential tax liability. The Commission reasonably determined that such taxes are "attributable" to the regulated entity, given that partners must pay tax on their share of the partnership income regardless of whether they actually receive a cash distribution. Additionally, the Commission reasonably relied upon evidence that a full income tax allowance is necessary to ensure that corporations and partnerships of like risk will earn comparable after-tax returns.\(^{381}\)

226. In reaching its conclusion, the court reviewed a comparison of the pre- and after-tax returns of a corporation and the partners of a limited partnership absent an income tax allowance, stating:

In the Policy Statement, FERC concluded that it would be inequitable to grant a full income tax allowance to corporations while denying a similar allowance to limited partnerships. For example, if the corporate tax rate is 35%, then a pipeline that operates as a corporation is permitted to charge a rate of $154 in order to earn after-tax income of $100. As several commenters pointed out, "if an income tax allowance is not allowed the

\(^{379}\) Id. at 953.

\(^{380}\) Id. at 951-52, 954 (finding that under the principles of partnership law "investors in a limited partnership are required to pay tax on their distributive shares of the partnership income, even if they do not receive a cash distribution").

\(^{381}\) Id. at 955.
partnership, then the partners must pay a $35 income tax on $100 of utility income, leaving them with only an after-tax return of $65. 382

The court continued:

Based on these comments, the Commission has determined that pipelines operating as limited partnerships should receive a full income tax allowance in order to maintain parity with pipelines that operate as corporations. This conclusion was not unreasonable and we defer to FERC's expert judgment about the best way to equalize after-tax returns for partnerships and corporations. 383

227. In response to the argument that limited partnerships do not pay entity-level income taxes, the court stated that this argument was not without force, but held that it could not prevail.

[A]s FERC explained in the Policy Statement and the Remand Order, the income taxes for which SFPP will receive an income tax are real, albeit indirect. SFPP will be eligible for a tax allowance only to the extent it can demonstrate – in a rate proceeding – that its partners incur 'actual or potential' income tax liability on their respective shares of the partnership income. 384

Having thus again concluded that partnerships have the equivalent of an entity level tax, albeit indirect, on public utility income, the court continued:

And there is at least one aspect of partnership law that supports FERC's conclusion but was not advanced by the Commission in BP West Coast – investors in a limited partnership are required to pay tax on their distributive shares of the partnership income, even if they do not receive a cash distribution. As explained above, this supports FERC's determination that taxes on the income received from a limited partnership should be allocated to the pipeline and included in the regulated entity's cost-of-service. In this sense, petitioners' likening of partnership tax to shareholder dividend tax is

382 Id. at 953 (interior citations omitted). See also Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 10-15.
383 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953.
384 Id. at 954.
inapposite because a shareholder of a corporation is generally taxed on the amount of the cash dividend actually received.\textsuperscript{385}

The court thereby rejected the argument that an allowance for income taxes should not be included in an MLP's cost-of-service and held that the income taxes to be paid by the partners were properly attributed to the MLP as an entity-level regulatory cost.\textsuperscript{386} The court thus upheld the Income Tax Policy Statement's two fundamental conclusions regarding income tax allowances for partnerships. First, that the income taxes paid on partnership income are real costs of acquiring and operating the pipeline assets, and therefore the income tax allowance does not recover a phantom cost.\textsuperscript{387} Second, that the income tax allowance is appropriate and lawful if the partners incur an actual or potential income tax liability on the distributive income they receive.\textsuperscript{388}

228. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the Income Tax Policy Statement, as upheld by the court in ExxonMobil, compares the after-tax returns of the regulated entity that incurs the taxable net income, and thus is attributed, either directly or indirectly, liability for taxes on the income from its jurisdictional operations. As such, the relevant comparison when examining the policy rationale for an income tax allowance is between a jurisdictional partnership together with its partners, which are jointly treated as the public utility entity, and a jurisdictional corporation. As the numerical example cited in ExxonMobil indicates, the appropriate analysis is for first tier income that occurs at the level of the operating entity. For that reason, the tax rate used is that of the corporation, not the tax rate on dividends, which may be lower. The correct comparison of after-tax income and cash returns is not between the after-tax return of a partnership’s partners and a corporation’s shareholders because corporate shareholders have second tier dividend income on which they pay taxes as a function of the double taxation of corporate income. As the above-quoted text establishes, ExxonMobil recognized this fact.\textsuperscript{389}

229. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP’ exceptions advanced here on the legality of the income tax allowance occur in this legal framework. In addressing the arguments raised on exceptions, the Commission will address here those that go to the central holdings of ExxonMobil and the Income Tax Policy Statement, specifically: (1) whether BP West Coast remains controlling legal authority, (2) whether the application of the

\textsuperscript{385} Id. (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{386} Id. at 954.
\textsuperscript{387} Id. at 952, 954.
\textsuperscript{388} Id. at 951-52, 955.
\textsuperscript{389} Id. at 954. See also Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 27.
Income Tax Policy Statement results in a double recovery of a partner’s actual or potential income tax liability, and (3) whether the 2009 ID should have re-examined whether to apply certain elements of the Commission’s implementing methodology. This order also discusses the implementing protocols adopted in the Commission’s December 2005, 2006 Sepulveda, and December 2007 Orders in section B below. This includes the issue of whether SFPP has complied with the relevant regulatory standards and the various proposals to adjust the rate of return if SFPP is afforded an income tax allowance.

2. Whether BP West Coast Remains Controlling Authority

230. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that the 2009 ID erred in failing to recognize BP West Coast as the controlling authority on income tax allowances. They further assert that ExxonMobil only clarified the basic holding of BP West Coast, but did not overrule it. The Commission concludes that BP West Coast is not the controlling authority on the issue of whether SFPP is entitled by law to an income tax allowance. Rather, ExxonMobil, which upheld the Income Tax Policy Statement, is the prevailing authority on this issue. Addressing the same argument shippers present here, whether BP West Coast is the law of the case, the court in ExxonMobil distinguished its ruling in BP West Coast stating:

At the outset, we note that BP West Coast did not categorically prohibit the Commission from granting income tax allowances to pipelines that operate as limited partnerships.

... Shipper petitioners also emphasize that in BP West Coast we rejected SFPP’s argument that the Commission should have adopted a full income tax allowance for limited partnerships. Petitioners argue that this holding is now the ‘law of the case,’ because the instant case involves the same issue that was litigated – and resolved in the shippers’ favor – in the earlier proceeding. Again, we disagree. In BP West Coast, SFPP cross-petitioned for review of the Lakehead policy. ... SFPP argued that FERC should have granted a full ITA to pipelines operating as limited partnerships. We rejected SFPP’s argument in BP West Coast, but petitioners now read too much into our holding with respect to this issue. All we held in BP West Coast is that the Commission was not required to grant a full income tax allowance to pipelines that operate as limited partnerships. Petitioners’ argument
assumes that ‘not required’ is synonymous with ‘prohibited.’ To the contrary, when an agency has broad discretion to choose among different policy options, the fact that any one option is not required certainly does not mean that it is prohibited.\(^{390}\)

In short, the court in ExxonMobil addressed and rejected the precise argument that the shippers again advance in this case.

231. The ACC Shippers further assert that the analysis presented by Judge Peter Young in a 2006 Initial Decision in an SFPP rate complaint proceeding is the correct analysis regarding income tax allowances for MLPs and should have been followed in the 2009 ID. In 2006, Judge Young concluded that the Income Tax Policy Statement failed the standards of BP West Coast because SFPP, the utility, would never pay any income taxes.\(^{391}\) The ACC Shippers assert that the 2009 ID erred by not addressing these arguments or attempting to distinguish Judge Young’s 2006 Initial Decision. The Commission notes that Judge Young’s Initial Decision is of no precedential value for the purposes of this case.\(^{392}\) Moreover, the basis of Judge Young’s conclusion was subsequently addressed and rejected in ExxonMobil. The court in ExxonMobil distinguished its ruling in BP West Coast and upheld the Commission’s determinations that (1) the income tax liability of the partners for the partnership income is properly attributed to a regulated partnership,\(^{393}\) and (2) attributing that tax liability to the partnership does not result in phantom taxes if the partners have an actual or potential income tax liability.\(^{394}\) Given this, the 2009 ID was correct to summarily reject the ACC Shipper’s argument.\(^{395}\)

\(^{390}\) ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953, 955.


\(^{392}\) See, e.g., Illinois Power Co., 62 FERC ¶ 61,147, at n.17 (1993); and Southern Company Services, Inc., 61 FERC ¶ 61,339, at n.56 (1992) (noting that a case subsequently settled prior to Commission review does not constitute binding precedent).

\(^{393}\) ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-54.

\(^{394}\) Id. at 954-55.

\(^{395}\) Presiding Administrative Law Judge Cianci specifically noted in the 2009 ID that “[t]he omission from this initial decision of any argument raised by the Parties at the hearing or in their briefs does not mean that it has not been considered; rather, it has been evaluated and found to either lack merit or significance such that inclusion would only tend to lengthen this initial decision without altering its substance or effect.” 2009 ID, (continued...)
3. Issues Resolved by ExxonMobil

232. Continuing their attack on the legality of the Income Tax Policy Statement, the ACC Shippers further assert that (1) the Income Tax Policy Statement does not have the force of law, and (2) the 2009 ID erred by ruling that SFPP was entitled to an income tax allowance by law. SFPP counters that these issues were resolved by ExxonMobil and that the ID properly relied on ExxonMobil and subsequent Commission decisions as binding precedent.

233. Regarding whether the Commission’s income tax allowance policy, as articulated in the 2005 Income Tax Policy Statement, has the force of law, the answer lies in the ACC Shippers’ own discussion of this issue in its Brief on Exceptions. The ACC Shippers quote extensively from the Commission’s decision in Marathon. Specifically, in Marathon, the Commission in addressing the effect of its Alternative Rate Policy Statement, quoted extensively from the seminal court decision on agency policy statements:

In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. FPC, the Court stated that:

An administrative agency has available two methods for formulating policy that will have the force of law. An agency may establish binding policy through rulemaking procedures by which it promulgates substantive rules, or through adjudications which constitute binding precedents. A general statement of policy is the outcome of neither a rulemaking nor adjudication; it is neither a rule nor a precedent but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which the agency hopes to implement in future rulemakings or adjudications. A general statement of policy, like a press release, presages an upcoming rulemaking or announces the course which the agency intends to follow in future adjudications.

In Marathon, the Commission affirmed that a policy first articulated through a policy statement does not become binding precedent; i.e., carry the force of law, until the

129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 867.

396 ACC Brief on Ex. at 21.

Commission addresses the issue in an adjudicated proceeding. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has recognized that many agencies choose to adopt interpretations through adjudications rather than through rulemaking, and that this process has been widely approved by the courts. 399

234. After issuance of the Income Tax Policy Statement on May 4, 2005, 400 the Commission applied the newly articulated policy in an adjudicated proceeding -- the June 2005 Remand Order in the complaint proceedings against SFPP in Docket No. OR92-8-024 et al. 401 The Commission concluded in the June 2005 Remand Order that “[g]iven


399 Int’l Union, UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The court in Int’l Union, UAW held: “When an agency uses an adjudication as a vehicle for announcement of a new rule, therefore, the effect of the adjudication can go far beyond its immediate effect on the parties involved in the specific adjudication.” Id. at 248.


401 The SFPP proceedings in Docket No. OR92-8-024 et al. constitute “adjudicated proceedings.” As it applies here, an adjudication means an adjudication under section 554 of the APA in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. On the issue of what is an adjudication, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held:

APA section 554 “applies . . . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” with some enumerated exceptions not applicable here. 5 U.S.C. § 554. If an adjudication is governed by section 554, it must feature the following procedural components: an impartial and unbiased presiding officer, id. § 556(b); notice and an opportunity to participate in the hearing, id. § 554(c); the right of the parties to appear with counsel, id. § 553(b); the right to present oral and written evidence (including rebuttal evidence) and to conduct such cross-examination as is required for a full and true disclosure of the facts, id. § 556(d); the right to submit proposed findings, conclusions and exceptions, id. § 557(c); the compilation of an exclusive record upon which the agency must base its decision, id.

(continued...)
the Commission's [Income Tax] Policy Statement and the application of its policy in this opinion, the Commission concludes that SFPP, L.P. should be afforded an income tax allowance on all of its partnership interests to the extent that the owners of those interests had an actual or potential income tax liability during the periods at issue.\(^{402}\) As articulated in Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. FPC, as a result of the June 2005 Remand Order, a final order in an adjudicated proceeding, the Income Tax Allowance Policy became binding precedent giving that policy the "force of law." Moreover, in ExxonMobil, the U.S. Court of Appeals reviewed the June 2005 Remand Order along with the Income Tax Policy Statement.\(^{403}\) The court in ExxonMobil clearly upheld the Income Tax Policy Statement as reasonable and affirmed its application to SFPP.\(^{404}\)

235. It is well settled that "an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it."\(^{405}\) As discussed supra, the applicable precedent on the issue of income tax allowances for regulated utilities organized as partnerships is ExxonMobil and the June 2005 Remand Order. This precedent establishes the legality of allowing an income tax allowance for pipelines organized as general partnerships, limited partnerships, MLPs, or other pass-through entities. The 2009 ID therefore correctly concluded that SFPP, a limited partnership owned by KMEP, is entitled to an income tax allowance based upon established legal precedent.

236. In addition to the ACC Shippers' failed argument that BP West Coast remains controlling authority, the ACC Shippers also assert the more basic proposition that the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil are simply incorrect. The ACC Shippers put forth two arguments to support this position. First, that the funds for any income-tax payments are included in the distributions that the Commission's discounted cash flow (DCF) model uses to calculate a pipeline's return on equity. They assert that this results in a double recovery of any income taxes that an MLP's partners may pay on distributive income. Second, the ACC Shippers assert that Congress did not authorize the Commission to create an income allowance for MLPs and that providing an income tax allowance does not equalize the cash and income returns of the limited partner owners.

\[\text{§ 556(e); and limitations on ex parte communications and on the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, id. § 554(d).}\]

\[\text{St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989).}\]

\(^{402}\) June 2005 Remand Order, 111 FERC ¶ 61,334 at P 27.

\(^{403}\) ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951.

\(^{404}\) Id. at 951, 953, 955.

\(^{405}\) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
and of corporate shareholders. The ACC Shippers therefore conclude that the 2009 ID erred by relying on prior Commission and other initial decisions involving SFPP and thereby failing to address those arguments in detail.

237. As discussed supra, the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil compared the cash and income returns of the corporation and MLP as regulated utilities and as taxable entities after imputing the partner’s income tax liability to the latter. Thus, the ACC Shippers’ argument that the comparison should be between the MLP partner and the corporate shareholder, is clearly inconsistent with the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil. Accordingly, the Presiding Judge properly rejected this position in the 2009 ID given the controlling precedent. Only the Commission may determine whether to revise the Income Tax Policy Statement given the arguments presented in the ACC Shippers’ and ExxonMobil/BP’s exceptions. The Commission does so below.

4. Should the Income Tax Policy Statement be Revised?

238. This section addresses the arguments that underlie the ExxonMobil/BP’s attack on the fundamental income tax allowance policy as articulated in the Income Tax Policy Statement. ExxonMobil/BP make the following arguments in support of their conclusion that the Commission’s Income Tax Policy Statement is incorrect and therefore should be revised to eliminate the income tax allowance for public utilities organized as partnerships. ExxonMobil/BP’s overarching contention is that providing an income tax allowance to an MLP over-recovers any income taxes that the partners may actually pay and gives MLPs a competitive advantage over corporations at undue cost to the ratepayers. For this reason, ExxonMobil/BP assert that the Income Tax Policy Statement should be revised.

239. ExxonMobil/BP’s characterization of the issue is incorrect. The issue presented is whether the Income Tax Policy Statement should be revised to deny MLPs an income tax allowance because the MLP unit holder will have higher after-tax distributed income and after-tax cash return than a corporate shareholder if both an MLP and a corporation obtain an income tax allowance. This after-tax difference is the result of the double taxation of corporate income. Accordingly, if neither the MLP nor the corporation obtains an income tax allowance, the MLP unit holder will still have greater after-tax income and after-tax cash return than the corporate shareholder. In both cases the MLP will have a competitive advantage over the corporation in the equity market. Thus, all other things being equal, the imputed MLP unit and corporate share prices and the after-tax income and cash returns on the equity component of the respective rate bases will be the same only if the MLP does not obtain an income tax allowance but the corporation

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406 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-53.
does. Put another way, the competitive advantage that a MLP enjoys over a corporation can be eliminated only if the Commission accords the MLP different treatment than the corporation.

240. As discussed in the previous section, ExxonMobil/BP’s argument fails as a matter of law. ExxonMobil/BP’s argument relies on the erroneous assumption that the taxes that the MLP partner pays on the pipeline income are “investor level” taxes. This assumption is contrary to the Commission’s determination, as upheld by the court in ExxonMobil, that taxes on the income received from a regulated pipeline organized as a partnership should be attributed to the pipeline and included in the regulated entity’s cost-of-service.\(^{407}\) The court thus held that “petitioners’ likening of partnership tax to shareholder dividend tax is inapposite because a shareholder of a corporation is generally taxed on the amount of the cash dividend actually received.”\(^{408}\) Notwithstanding the foregoing, ExxonMobil/BP’s argument raises the policy issue of whether an income tax allowance is needed to ensure that an MLP will obtain a level of equity return necessary to attract capital to the pipeline industry. In examining this, the Commission explains below the mechanics of the DCF model, the Congressional purpose in allowing energy-based MLPs, the capital attraction standard, and the regulatory structure of an income tax allowance.

### a. The DCF Model

241. The issue as framed by ExxonMobil/BP and the ACC Shippers is that the rate of return on equity for MLPs, as established using the Commission’s DCF model, includes a “built-in” tax allowance. According to ExxonMobil/BP, this “built-in” tax allowance is a reflection of the fact that the DCF model yields a rate of return that will be high enough for investors to net their required rate of return even after they pay income taxes.\(^{409}\) ExxonMobil/BP conclude that if an MLP pipeline receives an “[income tax allowance] that is intended to cover investor level taxes (since there are no pipeline level taxes) and receives an ROE derived from the DCF methodology utilizing an MLP-only proxy group, there is a double recovery of investor level income taxes.”\(^{410}\) Or put another way, an income tax allowance is not needed to ensure that a MLP will receive a level of return necessary to attract capital. As the following description of the DCF model shows, this assertion is a collateral attack on the conclusions in the Income Tax Policy Statement, Proxy Group Policy Statement, and Opinion No. 486-B that tax factors are assumed to be

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\(^{407}\) *Id.* at 954.

\(^{408}\) *Id.*

\(^{409}\) ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 6-8.

\(^{410}\) *Id.* at 6-7.

242. The objective of the Commission’s DCF model is to determine the return that must be earned by the regulated entity for the entity to obtain equity capital from investors. The DCF finds that return by examining the percentage returns on equity the market requires for members of a proxy group. The members of the proxy group must fall within a reasonable range of comparable risks and have publicly traded securities. The Commission’s DCF model uses three fundamental variables. The first is the stock or unit price and the second is the distribution or dividend yield on the security. These two variables are used to determine a current return measured both in dollars and the percentage yield. The third variable is the projected dividend or distribution growth to a terminal point in time using two different time frames—short-term and long-term. The first is the projected short term growth rate of five years. The second is the long term growth rate which is equal to the projected long term growth for gross domestic product in the case of corporations, and one half of that for an MLP. The short-term and long-term growth rates are combined with the short-term component weighted at two thirds and the long term component weighted at one third.\footnote{See Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 35.} Since the dividend or distribution growth is based on the dollar value in the first year and the estimated growth to the end of the investment time frame, the result is the estimated total cash flows that will be returned to the investor over the time frame of the analysis. The model discounts the cash flows back to the first year using the percentage yield for each security during that first year. Because of the growth factor, the resulting percentage return on equity is higher than the percentage yield in the first year. In most cases, the median percentage return on equity of the sample is what is deemed necessary to attract investors.\footnote{The sample must normally consist of at least five members. See Opinion No. 486-B, 126 FERC ¶ 61,034 at P 102-105.} The DCF model is the same for MLPs and corporations except for a different long term growth rate.\footnote{\textit{Id.} P 45-50 (dividends and distributions), P 119-124 (short term growth), and P 125-130 (long term growth).}  

243. Significantly with respect to the issue raised by ExxonMobil/BP, the Commission’s DCF model starts with the stock price of the securities in the proxy group, observes the distribution or dividend, and then calculates the yield (the percentage return) by dividing the dollar amount of the distribution by the stock price. The dollar amount of
the distribution in the first year, as increased by the growth rate, is applied over the long-
term growth horizon and is discounted back at the first year’s percentage yield to obtain
the return on equity required to attract capital to the firm. However, an investor uses the
opposite approach in applying a DCF model. Rather than solving for the required return
on equity, an investor first determines the required return on equity of securities of
comparable risk. The investor then looks at the current dollar yield and estimates growth
of that yield, which, as with the Commission’s DCF model, determines the total cash
flows to be generated over the life of the investment. The investor’s DCF model then
determines the stock price that will yield the required percentage return given the current
and projected cash flows of the security involved. Thus, the Commission’s DCF model
and that of the investor are reciprocal applications of the same methodology. Both are
driven by the level of distributions anticipated by the investor. Under the Commission’s
model, a greater cash flow will be reflected in a higher dollar yield, but the return of
equity will be the same. For the investor, a higher distribution means a higher stock
price, but again the return on equity will remain the same. This is because the percentage
return on equity for securities of similar risk is established by the market whether viewed
from the investor’s or the Commission’s perspective.

244. The central role of the distributions or dividends is reflected in the following
example. The investor desires a 6 percent after-tax return and has a 25 percent marginal
tax rate. Thus, the security must have an ROE of 8 percent to achieve an after-tax
yield of 6 percent. Assume that the distribution or dividend is $8. The investor will price
the security at $100. Conversely, if the security price is $100 and the yield is $8, the
Commission determines that the required return is 8 percent. If the dollar distribution
increases to $10, the investor will price the security at $125 because $10 is 8 percent of
$125. The Commission would note that the security price is $125 and that the yield is
$10, or a return of 8 percent. If the distribution is $6, the security price will drop to
$75, a return of 8 percent. The Commission would observe a $75 dollar security price, a
$6 yield, and a return of 8 percent. In all cases the ROE is 8 percent and the after-tax
return is 6 percent based on the market-established return.

245. Following on the previous example, the Commission now recapitulates and
expands the example by comparing the after-tax returns of an MLP and a corporation
presented in the Income Tax Policy Statement and repeated in ExxonMobil. That
example compares the after-tax returns of a jurisdictional MLP and a jurisdictional
corporation that owned the same assets with the assumption that the MLP is imputed the

415 The examples used here omit the growth factor to simplify the math. This does
not change the fundamental mechanics of the DCF model.

416 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953.
income tax liability of its owning partners. Thus, if the MLP partners and the corporation both have a marginal tax rate of 35 percent and the entity has net income of $100, without a tax allowance, the MLP partners would have an after-tax income of $65 and the corporation would have an after-tax income of $100. If the MLP is given an income tax allowance, then the MLP (and its partners) and the corporation would both have an after-tax income of $100. If both entities distribute the entire income as a cash distribution, the after-tax cash to the individual unit holders is $100 and the after-tax cash and income to the corporate shareholders is $90 to $65 depending on what assumptions are made regarding the corporate shareholders’ marginal tax rates. Since the securities trade on the after-tax value of the distribution and income, in the last example the MLP unit will have a higher imputed price under a DFC analysis. Similarly, if neither entity has an income tax allowance (an option suggested by ExxonMobil), the after-tax income and cash distribution are as follows: the MLP partners after-tax income and cash distribution is $65 per unit at the 35 percent bracket; the corporate shareholder realizes after-tax income and cash distribution of $58.50 to $44.25 per share depending on the marginal tax rate of the corporate shareholder. Note that the prices of both securities will drop, but the corporate share will still have lower imputed price than the MLP unit.

246. The implications of the proceeding example for after-tax income and cash returns, and the imputed security price, are examined in more detail in Exhibits SFP-98 and SFP-99, which have been adopted by both sides in this proceeding. These exhibits analyze a pipeline with the same operating and financial data except for the presence or absence of the MLP income tax allowance. The same rate base, capital structure, debt and equity cost of capital, operating revenues and operating expenses are used for the analysis in both exhibits. The analysis uses a 32 percent marginal tax rate for the MLP unit holder and the corporate shareholder.

247. Given the foregoing, Ex. SFP-98 assumes that the MLP is given an income tax allowance. The pre-tax income available to the MLP unit holder is $13.5397 and $9.2070 for the corporate shareholder after the payment of entity-level taxes by the corporation, but with no entity-level taxes paid by the MLP. The after-tax income to the marginal investor is $9.2070 for the MLP unit holder and $6.2608 for the corporate

417 Id. at 955.
418 Cf. Ex. SFP-75 at 21-23.
419 Cf. ACC Shipper Brief on Ex. at 39, 45 (citing for the respectively, Ex. SFP-98 “Oil Pipeline Under Corporate and MLP Organizational Structures (32% MLP Tax Allowance; 32% Marginal Investor Tax Rate)” and Ex. SFP-98 “First Alternative Hypothetical Example of an Oil Pipeline Under Corporate and MLP Organizational Structures (0% MLP Tax Allowance; 32% Marginal Investor Tax Rate)”).
shareholder after both pay the 32 percent marginal tax rate resulting in an implied MLP unit price of $100 and an implied corporate share price of $68. In both cases the after-tax return on equity is 9.207 percent and the regulatory ROE is the 13.540 percent posited as part of the exhibit’s cost-of-service assumptions. The only difference is the business format. As the risk is the same for both business models, the higher MLP unit price reflects its higher after-tax dollar income and cash returns as compared to the corporation.

248. Ex. SFP-99 presents the same example as Ex. SFP-98, but assumes there is no MLP tax allowance. In Ex. SFP-99, the pre-tax income available to both the MLP unit holder and the corporate shareholder is $9,207 after the corporation pays entity-level taxes but the MLP does not. The after-tax income to the marginal investor for both the MLP unit holder and the corporate shareholder is $6,260 after both pay a 32 percent marginal tax rate. This results in an implied MLP unit price of $68.00 and an implied corporate share price also of $68.00. For both ownership formats the after-tax return on equity is 9.207 percent and the regulatory ROE is the 13.540 percent posited as part of the exhibit’s cost-of-service assumptions. The unit and share prices are the same as the after-tax dollar income and cash returns are the same for both business models given the assumption of their identical risk.

249. As shown by Exs. SFP-98 and SFP-99, the after-tax dollar income and cash returns of the unit holder and the shareholder on the equity component of the rate base will be the same only if the MLP is denied an income-allowance and the corporation is granted one. Thus, as SFPP argues, the ACC Shippers seek a return to the Lakehead regulatory protocol which provides an income tax allowance only on those partnership interests owned by a corporation, a position repudiated by BP West Coast. Moreover, the analysis in Exs. SFP-98 and SFP-99 demonstrates that it is simply not true that the income taxes of the MLP partnership are recovered twice because in fact they are paid only once and compensated only once. Rather, in all cases there is cash from the distributions (which may be reflected in income) that is available to pay the taxes, which is in turn reflected in the capitalized value of the security price. This is the fundamental objection the ACC Shippers present here. At bottom, it is the resulting drop in the relative MLP unit price from the denial of an income tax allowance that led the Commission to conclude, as summarized in ExxonMobil, that “termination of the allowance would clearly act as a disincentive for the use of the partnership format, because it would lower the returns of partnerships vis-à-vis corporations, and because it would prevent certain investors from realizing the benefits of a consolidated income tax return.” In fact, as SFPP establishes, a drop in the prices of partnership interests

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420 See Ex. SFP-98; Ex. SFP-99, reproduced as Appendix B and Appendix C.
421 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-53 (affirming the Commission’s rationale).
occurred immediately after the announcement of the *Lakehead* doctrine.\footnote{422}{See Ex. SFP-75 at 30.} The practical consequence of the *Lakehead* doctrine for the price of the Lakehead units was completely consistent with the basic financial theory under discussion here.

250. As discussed, ExxonMobil/BP’s argument ultimately fails because (1) it erroneously considers the taxes that the MLP partner pays on the MLP pipeline income to be “investor level” taxes rather than taxes that are imputed to the entity under *ExxonMobil*, and (2) it seeks to reinstall the *Lakehead* policy through the door of the DCF model. The ExxonMobil/BP’s and the ACC Shippers’ entire double-recovery argument, and its implications for the Commission’s DCF model, hinges on these erroneous assumptions. Since the argument of a double recovery is mathematically incorrect, their position that there is double payment or over-recovery from ratepayers of an MLP partner’s income taxes can be sustained only if the court’s analysis in *ExxonMobil* upholding the validity of the Income Tax Policy Statement was incorrect. This order next turns to the Congressional purpose in authorizing energy firms to use the MLP business format and whether Congress placed any limits on the Commission’s authority to implement that purpose.

b. Congressional Purpose Regarding Energy MLPs

251. ExxonMobil/BP’s and the ACC Shippers’ next argument is that the Commission’s income tax allowance policy exceeds the Commission’s statutory authority and is contrary to Congressional intent. ExxonMobil/BP and the ACC Shippers assert that the Commission’s historic analysis in *Lakehead* properly reflected Congressional purpose on the taxation status of public utility partnerships by not providing a partnership’s individual partners with an income tax allowance.\footnote{423}{ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 23. The ACC Shippers cite to *Lakehead*, 75 FERC at 61,596, in which the Commission stated:}

\begin{quote}
[FERC] is denying Lakehead this particular tax allowance because that tax expense does not exist. Congress did not endorse phantom taxes in enacting section 7704 of the I.R.C. It simply endorsed this particular form (partnership) in connection with taxing an enterprise. That form should be advantageous on its own merits without the addition of phantom taxes in a cost-of-service just as it is advantageous for companies without a cost of service that are covered by section 7704’s exception.
\end{quote}

The Commission notes that this language was itself an earlier interpretation of section 7704 by the Commission because, as the ACC Shippers correctly state, Congress did not
BP West Coast that in exempting pipeline limited partnerships from taxation Congress “did not empower FERC to do any thing, let alone to create an allowance for fictional income taxes.” The ACC Shippers further argue that the Commission does not have the statutory authority to modify Congress’ tax legislation, specifically section 7704 of the I.R.C. through which Congress exempted oil and gas pipelines organized as partnerships from being treated as corporations for income tax purposes.

252. ExxonMobil/BP and the ACC Shippers also assert that the 2009 ID erred by failing to address their contention that when Congress enacted Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code, it intended to provide all energy companies – both regulated and non-regulated, incentives to invest by allowing them to organize as partnerships. ExxonMobil/BP assert that Congress could have authorized an income tax allowance for regulated entities but did not do so. They also argue that in one prior instance when Congress created investment incentives for certain energy companies that it specifically prohibited the Commission from including those benefits in a regulated entity’s rates. The ACC Shippers further argue that certain purported legislative history presented at hearing and on initial briefs below consists of materials created long after the relevant address the matter explicitly. The Commission was therefore exercising its discretion in interpreting the meaning of section 7704. As discussed, BP West Coast rejected the Commission’s Lakehead analysis, and thus implicitly rejected the language that the ACC Shippers rely on here. See BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1289-91. ExxonMobil in turn rejected the argument that providing an income tax allowance results in a “phantom cost.” See ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 949, 951, 953, 955. The quote from Lakehead shows that the ACC Shippers’ citation is inapposite to the issue at hand.

ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 17-18 (quoting BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1293).

Section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code treats certain publicly traded partnerships as corporations for income tax purpose, but exempts from taxation income from certain energy-related activities, including “income and gains derived from transportation (including pipelines transporting gas, oil, or products thereof) ... of any mineral or natural resource ...” See Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).

MLPs were thus permitted to pass their tax liability through to the member partners and therefore, are referred to as “pass-through” entities.


ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 11.
statutes were passed and as such it has little, if any, weight. They also argue that the December 2007 Order provided no legislative history to support an allowance.

253. In light of this debate the Commission has revisited the legislative history of section 7704. In doing so, the Commission concludes that MLPs were specifically designed as a tax advantaged form of investment compared to a corporation and have two important distinctions. The first is the avoidance of the tax on dividend distributions (double taxation of income) and the second is the ability to defer the recognition of ordinary income at the partner level. Regarding both points, Congress specifically designed the MLP business model to have certain advantages to facilitate the investment of equity capital. As noted in the prior orders, the legislative history is limited and hard to find. However there are three sources of legislative history for section 7704 that support the conclusions of the December 2007 Order.

254. First, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation produced a pamphlet report for a hearing held by the Senate Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management. The pamphlet report provides that an MLP is a creative new technique for investment. It states that the driving force behind the use of an MLP is the appeal of the tax savings that can be effected by conducting a business in partnership form (with one level of tax) rather than in corporate form (with two levels of tax). Use of an MLP gives the investor an opportunity to realize a better after-tax yield on current cash return[s] than corporate stock because of tax savings. Then as now, the MLP was a type of partnership rather than a corporation. The issue before the Subcommittee was whether the MLP should

429 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 26-28.
430 Id. at 26 n.11.
432 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29.
434 Id. at 3.
435 Id. at 16.
continue to enjoy partnership status or be considered a corporate entity. Congress answered this question when it passed House Bill 3545 and affirmed the partnership status of an MLP.

255. Second, the report from the July 21, 1987 Senate Subcommittee hearing provides insight into information provided the Senate prior to going to Conference on the bill. The Subcommittee hearing included testimony from one administration witness and seven public witnesses. The administration witness and one public witness supported corporate tax treatment of MLPs. The balance of the witnesses, consisting of business executives and attorneys, supported the continuation of partnership treatment of MLPs for tax purposes. The witnesses who supported partnership treatment of MLPs cited the financial benefits enjoyed by investors as the main force behind their use and stated that those benefits encourage potential investors to invest. Thus, Mr. John P. Neafsey, who was the chief financial officer for an energy company, testified that the need for capital from investors was best met through the use of an MLP. Mr. Neafsey cited the use of an MLP as the best way to attract investors when compared to the alternatives of selling shares of stock or issuing a debt instrument. The advantages of a MLP were also repeated by the other five witnesses who supported partnership treatment of a MLP.

256. Third, a House Committee Report shows the Congressional intent behind section 7704 through the benefits provided to MLPs at that time. While the Committee Report does not expressly state Congress' intent behind its support of MLPs, the Report does implicitly demonstrate Congress' support of MLPs. The first evidence of support is the fact that the MLP provision, which became section 7704, survived the Conference agreement between the House and the Senate. The second evidence of support is that the Conference agreement afforded MLP investors a greater tax benefit by allowing a loss deduction that could be used to offset income generated from sources other than the

436 Id. at 21.
437 Id. at 21.
438 Id. at 58, 180.
439 Id. at 84-86.
440 Id. at 93, 145, 169.
442 Id. at 419-22.
MLP. Previously the loss deduction from an MLP could only be used to offset income from the same MLP, but this did not invalidate the general purpose for creating MLPs.

257. The ACC Shippers' further argue that while Congress created an incentive for energy companies to develop energy infrastructure by changing the tax laws, Congress did not change the Commission's statutory authority to allow regulated companies to recover investment incentives in their rates, but this is inapposite. Congress does not need to grant such affirmative permission through legislation. Rather, silence more likely implies that all the partnership entities involved could be accorded the same status. The legislative history discussed above emphasizes that the tax incentives Congress provided MLPs have important practical financial consequences. The MLP limited partners enjoy certain tax advantages particularly due to the avoidance of the double taxation of corporate earnings and the tax deferrals derived from allocation of income and losses among the partners. For this reason they will pay a relatively higher price to purchase the limited partnership interests, which gives the partnership a cost of capital advantage and implements the purpose for Congress' endorsing the MLP business model.

258. As Exs. SFP-98 and SFP-99 indicate, eliminating the income tax allowance for MLPs would reduce the incentive to invest in such partnerships because there is no material financial incentive to do so from the viewpoint of an individual investor. While the incentives to use partnerships within corporate structures, with the resulting administrative efficiencies, would remain, the Income Tax Policy Statement rejected this more limited purpose and was affirmed by ExxonMobil. In this regard, the ACC Shippers are simply incorrect in citing BP West Coast for the proposition that the Commission cannot create an income tax allowance to implement the investment goals of section 7704. The relevant holding in BP West Coast was premised on the court's conclusion that the Commission had not justified partnership income taxes as an element of the partnership's regulatory cost-of-service, and therefore investment incentives could not create a cost if one did not exist independently of the incentive. That ruling no longer applies because ExxonMobil explicitly held that income taxes were a legitimate, albeit indirect, part of a jurisdictional cost-of-service. The Commission therefore concludes that Congress did not preclude granting MLPs an income tax allowance and in fact intended the contrary. The Commission's prior interpretation of section 7704 in Lakehead was incorrect because it improperly distinguished the partnership from the

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443 Id. at 951-52. As discussed supra, at this time the previous limitation applies.

444 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 22-23.


446 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952.
corporate model. Thus the Commission over-ruled its holding in *Lakehead* that section 7704 does not authorize granting jurisdictional partnerships an income tax allowance.

c. **The Capital Attraction Standard**

259. The ACC Shippers also assert that the providing SFPP an income tax allowance fails the capital attraction standard set forth in *Hope Natural Gas*. As discussed in both *BP West Coast* and *ExxonMobil*, the Commission has an obligation to provide a regulated entity an opportunity to earn an equity return that will attract capital to the firm. *BP West Coast* held that the Commission had erroneously concluded that allowing any income tax allowance was necessary to meet the capital attraction standard because under the Commission’s own cost accounting theory partnerships did not pay income taxes, and therefore had no cost in that regard. Addressing the same point in *ExxonMobil*, the court concluded that the Commission had adequately explained that income taxes were a cost to a partnership, albeit indirect, and therefore an income tax allowance was necessary. The court specifically described the capital attraction standard and concluded that the Commission’s adoption of an income tax allowance for partnerships was reasonable under that standard. The ACC Shippers’ argument in this regard is flatly inconsistent with the holding of *ExxonMobil*. At bottom, their argument approaches the issue of the difference in the after-tax cash and income return of an MLP unit holder and a corporate shareholder from a different angle. The Commission has previously explained why the higher after-tax cash and income return received by the MLP unit holder is reasonable under the Interstate Commerce Act and consistent with the purpose of section 7704. The 2009 ID was correct to reject this argument.

d. **Regulatory Purpose for an Income Tax Allowance**

260. The remaining question regarding the legality of granting an income tax allowance to a MLP is whether the Commission should deny the allowance for regulatory reasons, i.e., to create a “fairer” result for the ratepayers. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP further assert that the equity advantage enjoyed by MLPs comes from the inclusion of an unnecessary “phantom” cost in the pipeline’s rates, which results in unjust and unreasonable rates. They assert that in *Lakehead* the Commission correctly concluded

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447 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 50-53 (citing *FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)).

448 *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d at 1290-91.

449 *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 951 (stating that just and reasonable rates are “rates yielding sufficient revenue to cover all proper costs, including federal income taxes, plus a specified return on invested capital”).
that the investment incentives created by section 7704 should not include a cost that is not actually incurred by a regulatory utility partnership – the "phantom" tax cost issue. SFPP replies that the Income Tax Policy Statement rejected the phantom tax issue and expressly repudiated by Lakehead. SFPP concludes that because there is no phantom income tax liability, the income tax allowance policy does not result in improper subsidization by ratepayers of the investor tax benefits Congress granted MLPs.

261. The Lakehead policy has been rejected by both the Commission and the court. The Commission, in overruling Lakehead, specifically concluded that income taxes are a cost of raising a partnership’s capital because the partners have a liability for the income generated by the partnership’s public utility operations. Under both the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil, the comparison of relative returns was between the MLP as a regulated entity, including the imputed income tax liability, and the corporation as a regulated entity, with its explicit income tax liability. The comparison was not between the individual unit holder and the corporate shareholder as the ACC Shippers urge here. The Income Tax Policy Statement recognizes that unlike corporate income, MLP income is not subject to double taxation. Thus granting an income tax allowance to MLPs results in an adjustment in the relative investment price of an MLP’s and a corporation’s securities to the former’s advantage. ExxonMobil accepted the Commission’s determination that elimination of the allowance would create a disincentive for using partnerships because it would lower the relative returns for partnerships as compared to corporations. Thus the difference in dollar returns resulting from an income tax allowance was addressed in the examples provided in the Income Tax Allowance Statement and was affirmed by ExxonMobil. Further, the price advantage MLPs hold over corporations was recognized in the Income Tax Policy Statement and was upheld by the court. This precedent forecloses the ACC Shippers’ and ExxonMobil/BP’s arguments.

450 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 22-23; ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 8-10.
451 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 7-10.
452 See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 33. This conclusion was affirmed in ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-54.
453 Id. P 6 n.6. The footnote states that the investor equalizes prices to reflect the pre-tax return. The more correct statement would be that the investor adjusts the price for the same after-tax return because not all investors have the same marginal tax rate.
454 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-53.
262. Notwithstanding the foregoing, given that the ACC Shippers questioning the equity of the Income Tax Policy Statement, the Commission will revisit the policy rationale that underlies the Policy Statement. The Commission’s Income Tax Policy Statement is consistent with Congress’ decision to give MLPs an equity price advantage through section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code. As Ex. SFP-99 shows, a MLPs’ equity price advantage is lost if MLPs are denied an income tax allowance and causes the MLPs to lose the additional cash flow supporting the investment incentives Congress created by authorizing the MLP format. In short, as discussed above, if the income tax allowance is eliminated for MLPs, the impact of the MLP tax incentive granted by Congress would be voided. It is true that the ratepayers will pay a higher rate if an MLP has an income tax allowance. However, shippers’ rates will be no higher than if the pipelines that are MLPs shift to the corporate form and thereby obtain an income tax allowance, and might actually be lower.

263. Moreover, denying MLPs an income tax allowance would apply different regulatory accounting and policy standards to regulated MLPs than to regulated corporations. This becomes apparent by examining the role an income tax allowance performs in the Commission’s cost-of-service methodology. Under the cost-of-service methodology, the pre-tax operating and capital costs of the regulated entity are calculated to establish the revenue required to cover those costs, including the equity return. The income taxes on the return are then grossed-up and added to the revenue requirement to assure an adequate after-tax return. The point is that a regulated firm’s pre-tax gross revenue is capped based on its capital and operating costs. This differs from an unregulated entity, which must earn enough revenue and return from sales to cover all operating and capital costs and to pay the related income taxes in order to obtain the same after-tax return on equity as a regulated entity. In short, an unregulated entity does not gross up its revenue through a regulatory markup in order to earn the after-tax return. Rather, an unregulated entity earns the equivalent income through its sales. The purpose of regulation is to replicate a competitive market. Accordingly, with respect to income taxes, the Commission replicates the competitive market by using an income tax allowance as a gross-up mechanism in lieu of the additional sales volume that an entity in a competitive market would need to generate the required after-tax equity return.

264. Without an income tax allowance, a jurisdictional MLP would not be able to replicate an unregulated MLP’s after-tax return because the jurisdictional MLP does not make sufficient sales to cover the imputed income taxes of its unit holders. Thus, under the scenario advocated by the ACC Shippers, a jurisdictional corporation may obtain an

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456 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 961.
income tax allowance that replicates the sales and revenues of a non-jurisdictional corporation, but a jurisdictional MLP would not be permitted to replicate the sales and revenues of a non-jurisdictional MLP. This would restore the irrational distinction between partnerships and corporations that the court rejected in *BP West Coast* and which the Commission rectified in the Income Tax Policy Statement. The ACC Shippers' position that MLPs should be denied an income tax allowance discriminates against MLPs vis-a-vis corporations and would undercut the incentives embedded in the MLP business format.

265. Finally, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP both again argue that the December 2007 Order creates a tax benefit or cost where none exists in the regulatory structure established by the ICA. They assert that this violates the holding in *BP West Coast* that Congress cannot create a tax liability where none otherwise exists simply to create an investment incentive. But this argument misconstrues the issue at hand. Here, the Commission is not creating a tax liability where none otherwise exists. An MLP pipeline does incur a tax cost, albeit indirectly. Thus, the issue here is whether the benefits of Congress’ elimination of double taxation should accrue to the MLP pipeline, or should be passed back to the ratepayers by denying MLPs an income tax allowance. The Commission again concludes that Congress intended to encourage pipeline investment by authorizing tax incentives for MLPs. To achieve this, it is appropriate to grant regulated MLPs an income tax allowance and equalize the return of the MLP and the corporation at the entity level. The Commission therefore affirms its previous conclusions in the Income Tax Policy Statement as affirmed in *ExxonMobil*.

5. Did the ID Err by not Addressing Certain Implementing Regulatory Protocols?

266. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP both assert that the 2009 ID erred in failing to address whether SFPP established that its partners had an actual or potential income tax liability. More specifically, they assert that the 2009 ID: (1) incorrectly concluded that SFPP met the standard simply by establishing that its limited partners had an obligation to report either positive or negative taxable income on their returns; (2) erroneously accepted the presumed 28 percent marginal tax rate without critical

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457 The ACC Shippers essentially state this in their Brief on Ex. at 23, 28.
458 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139; and *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d at 1292.
459 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 18, 49 (citing *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d at 1292-93); ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 9-10.
460 *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 954.
analysis; and (3) failed to consider evidence that effectively rebutted the application of the 28 percent marginal tax rate to mutual funds and the 35 percent marginal tax rate to unrelated business income. At bottom, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that the 2009 ID incorrectly relied on the precedent established by the December 2007 Order in which the Commission granted SFPP an income tax allowance holding that if a partner receives a K-1 and must report distributive ordinary income or loss on the partners’ annual income tax return, that partner has an actual or potential income tax liability. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP argue that the 2009 ID should have independently analyzed the evidence on whether SFPP met its obligation to demonstrate that its partners have an actual or potential income tax allowance.461

267. In response to the ACC Shippers’ and ExxonMobil/BP’s challenge, SFPP asserts that the 2009 ID correctly held that SFPP established that its partners incurred actual or potential income tax liability and properly calculated the income tax allowance.462 SFPP replies that the Commission’s prior decisions are binding on the Presiding ALJ. SFPP further asserts that the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP do not have the right to repeatedly litigate the same issues.463 While a Presiding ALJ may revisit a Commission decision if the facts warrant it, in the instant case, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP mainly challenge well-established regulatory standards set by the Commission in decisions involving the same litigants, e.g., the December 2007 Order. The Commission concludes that based on the precedent established by the December 2007 Order, the 2009 ID correctly held that SFPP met the Commission’s standards and protocols for determining whether an MLP partner has an actual or potential income tax liability. However, as the December 2007 Order has not been judicially reviewed, the Commission will revisit those standards and protocols below.

B. The Implementing Regulatory Protocols

268. The ACC Shippers challenge the 2009 ID’s application of the regulatory protocols that the Commission adopted in its December 2005, 2006 Sepulveda, and December 2007 Orders464 to implement the Income Tax Policy Statement. The 2009 ID concluded that SFPP established that its partners had an actual or potential income tax liability based on the standards and protocols established in the December 2005, 2006 Sepulveda, and

461 ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 31-36; ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 22-26.
462 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 24.
463 Id. at 22.
December 2007 Orders.\textsuperscript{465} This part of the order addresses the doubt cast by the ACC Shippers on SFPP's fulfillment of its obligation under the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil to establish that its partners have an “actual or potential” income tax obligation for the pipeline’s public utility income attributable to them. The specific issues raised include (1) whether SFPP must establish that there is taxable income in the base or a subsequent year; (2) whether the Commission’s protocols incorrectly permit recovery of taxes on downstream gains through the income tax allowance; (3) the role and character of incentive distributions; (4) the 28 percent marginal rate for mutual funds and unrelated business taxable income (UBTI); and (5) the use of presumptions to establish the partners’ marginal tax rates.

1. **Must Income be Recognized in the Base Year or by a Known Period?**

On exceptions the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that SFPP does not qualify for an income tax allowance because the individual limited partners of KMEP\textsuperscript{466} collectively have negative distributive income in all the relevant years of this proceeding. Moreover, the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP assert that KMEP’s partners are likely to have negative income for many years.\textsuperscript{467} Thus, they assert, SFPP has not established that KMEP’s individual limited partners have actual or potential income tax liability. In sum, both the ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP contest the Commission’s prior conclusion that the deferral of ordinary income is central to the concept of a potential income tax liability under the standard approved by ExxonMobil.\textsuperscript{468} SFPP responds that the Commission has previously recognized that deferral of income tax recognition is an intrinsic and acceptable feature of MLPs. SFPP further asserts that as a matter of basic tax law, the limited partners’ deferred ordinary income will be recognized when the limited partnership interest is sold and that the Commission has accepted this type of income recognition delay.\textsuperscript{469}

\textsuperscript{465} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 683-694.
\textsuperscript{466} KMEP is the MLP that indirectly owns the majority of the partner interests in SFPP.
\textsuperscript{467} ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 22-23; ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 31-32.
\textsuperscript{468} See December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 23-28; December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 28-32; ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 954-955.
\textsuperscript{469} SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 26.
270. The Commission has consistently recognized that an MLP’s limited partners may have negative distributive income in any particular year.\textsuperscript{470} Moreover, even before the issue of whether negative or deferred income qualifies as potential income tax liability arose in the context of partnerships, the deferral of income tax liability was a well recognized under FERC regulation and was expressly discussed and affirmed in City of Charlottesville.\textsuperscript{471} Notwithstanding the court’s holding in City of Charlottesville, the ACC Shippers again question whether taxable income must be recognized in the test year or in a known period, or if income recognition is deferred, whether the possibility of a long deferral period is reasonable. The Commission addresses these questions below.

\textbf{a. Must there be Known Income Recognition?}

271. ExxonMobil/BP argue that the 2009 ID erred in granting SFPP an income tax allowance where the distributive income of SFPP’s limited partners is negative in all the known years at issue here.\textsuperscript{472} They conclude that because there is no known date by which income recognition will occur, SFPP has not established as a matter of fact that there is an actual or potential income tax liability. Essentially, ExxonMobil/BP assert that the actual income tax liability must occur in the base year, or the timing of the potential income tax in future years must be known with some degree of certainty to satisfy the actual or potential income tax liability standard under the Income Tax Policy Statement. SFPP replies that this issue was resolved by the Commission’s prior orders that accepted a more open-ended time frame for the recognition of limited partners’ actual income tax liability.\textsuperscript{473} To date, no reviewable order has addressed this issue; therefore the Commission once again addresses these arguments.

272. ExxonMobil/BP’s argument that there must be actual taxable income distributed to the partners in the base year, or in a known future year, ignores the conclusion to the contrary in the long standing “actual taxes paid” analysis in City of Charlottesville.\textsuperscript{474}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{470} Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at 35; December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 24, 49-51.
\item \textsuperscript{471} City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 774 F.2d 1205, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (City of Charlottesville). The court also explained how Commission policy has allowed or denied the deferral of income tax liabilities based on its view of the importance of actual tax recognition. \textit{Id.} at 1213-14, 1216.
\item \textsuperscript{472} ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 22.
\item \textsuperscript{473} It is unchallenged that KMPG’s, the corporate partner’s, actual income tax liability can be determined since its returns are available in a specific rate proceeding. What is contested and discussed further below is how KMPG’s income is determined.
\item \textsuperscript{474} City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d 1205.
\end{itemize}
The court in *City of Charlottesville* reviewed, with respect to a jurisdictional entity that was part of a consolidated group of companies, the Commission’s decision to use a “stand-alone” methodology to determine the entity’s pipeline’s tax allowance rather than the “flow-through” methodology.\(^{475}\) Under the flow-through method, the effective tax rate paid by the consolidated group of companies\(^{476}\) is applied to the affiliate jurisdictional entity at issue. Conversely, under the stand-alone method, the Commission, for tax purposes, segregates the affiliated entity from the rest of the consolidated group; i.e., the utility’s tax base is determined using only the taxable income and deductions that is attributable to the entity’s jurisdictional activities.\(^{477}\) At issue in *City of Charlottesville* was whether the stand-alone methodology is unlawful under the “actual taxes paid” principle. In *City of Charlottesville*, the court rejected the “actual taxes paid” limitation stating:

> We conclude . . . that the imprecision of the “actual taxes paid” formulation is exceeded only by the name of the Holy Roman Empire: two out of the three words are wrong. Taxes, yes. But not necessarily *actual* taxes, since inexact estimations are often allowed, *e.g.*, a nationwide tax allowance applied to all individual utilities, see *Tenneco Oil*, 571 F.2d at 844. . . . And not necessarily *taxes paid*, since tax liability incurred by current activities but in fact not paid currently can be charged to present rate payers, *e.g.*, taxes deferred by reason of accelerated depreciation but passed to current ratepayers through normalization, see *Public Systems*, 709 F.2d at 81-82. So the principle should be expressed “actual or estimated taxes paid or incurred” -- whereupon it ceases to constrain the Commission with regard to taxes any more than the Commission is constrained with regard to its treatment of other expenses. Which is as it should be.\(^{478}\)

273. The December 2007 Order built on the court’s holding by concluding that the “actual or potential income tax liability” requirement recognizes that a potential income tax liability may be incurred, but not recognized, when there is a distribution of cash to the partner that is in excess of ordinary income distributed to that partner. There will

\(^{475}\) Id. at 1206.
\(^{476}\) When a jurisdictional entity is part of a consolidated group, the group files a single tax return and pays taxes computed on the consolidated revenues and deductions of all the affiliates and the parent.

\(^{477}\) *City of Charlottesville*, 774 F.2d at 1207.
\(^{478}\) Id. at 1215 (emphasis in the original; footnotes omitted).
normally follow from this a reduction in basis that reflects the partnership’s depreciation or amortization expense. The Income Tax Policy Statement adopted the phrase “actual or potential income tax liability” precisely because the actual payment of income taxes on distributed partnership income may be deferred for some time, as was explicitly recognized in the Policy Statement. The December 2007 Order thus concluded that requiring positive income on a partner’s Form K-1, or the recognition of distributed income in the base year is inconsistent with the phrase “actual or potential income tax liability.” Income recognition is a matter of timing. The key issue in determining whether there is “potential income tax liability” is the relative certainty of whether, not when, ordinary income will be recognized upon the sale of the partner’s interest.

Thus there is no need for taxable income in the base year and no requirement that the MLP establish a known time for income recognition under the potential income tax liability standard.

274. ExxonMobil/BP also argue that the partner may sell the partnership interest at a price that is less than the original basis, and that under such scenario, the deferred income will never be recaptured. There are two answers to this argument. As the materials submitted by a shipper party in an earlier SFPP proceeding, the Sepulveda Line case, and previously cited in this order, make clear, deferred ordinary income must be recognized at the time of sale. The investor must always recognize the income that would be recaptured before recognizing any long term capital gains, although the recognition may only serve in some cases to reduce the loss involved. Second, the possibility that

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479 See December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 28, 34. There are two significant discussions of MLPs that were entered by a Shipper Party in the Sepulveda Line rate proceeding, Docket No. OR96-2-012. These are SEP ARCO-22, captioned “Wachovia Securities, Master Limited Partnerships: A Primer” (Primer) dated November 18, 2003, at 4-5; and SEP ARCO-21, Publically Traded Partnerships, PTP FAQs (FAQs) at 2. Both were also filed as Ex. BP-19 in Docket No. RP04-274-000. These exhibits, which will be included in the record here, are also discussed in the December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 30 and n.68.

480 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 37 n.35 (emphasis added).

481 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 27 (emphasis added).

482 Id. at 27-29, 34. City of Charlottesville recognized that deferrals could be for as long as 15 years. See City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1215.

483 Primer at 4-5. The numerical example, which is quoted in full at n.522, supra, contains positive long term capital gains, but applies equally well to a situation where the investor recognizes deferred ordinary income, but has a capital loss. See also FAQs at 2.
recapture may not occur appears to be within the scope of the risks analyzed in *City of Charlottesville*. In *City of Charlottesville*, the court recognized, and accepted, that there could be a sale of assets by a corporate parent before the tax deferrals were exhausted, and that such a sale would maximize the tax benefits to the selling party and avoid the potential recapture of the parent corporation's deferred income. While the Commission is addressing partnership's here, the same principle applies to the partner's that have the obligation to pay the taxes on income generated by a partnership.

b. The Delay of Income Recognition

275. ExxonMobil/BP further assert that the 2009 ID erred by holding that a partner has an actual or potential income tax liability so long as the partner files an income tax return reflecting distributive income, either positive or negative. ExxonMobil/BP argue that cash distributions to limited partner unitholders, while not taxed at the time of distribution, increase the potential gain on a future sale by reducing the unitholders' basis in their units, thus creating a deferred income tax liability. ExxonMobil/BP argue that unlike current income, which is always likely to have some actual or potential tax liability, there is no guarantee that some or all of a partner's gain will be taxed, thus actual taxes may never be paid.

276. The issue is whether a substantial or indefinite delay in recognition of income or an actual tax payment is unreasonable. In the December 2007 Order, the Commission recognized that MLP partnership interests often are held for long periods of time precisely because distributions in excess of distributed income reduce the partner's capital account. The reduced capital account, combined with the allocation of distributive income away from the limited partners, defers ordinary income recognition. The Commission thus has acknowledged that the partner has tax incentives to delay the sale of its partnership interest and defer tax liability on the deferred income. In this instance the answer turns on the combined effect of the court's decisions in *ExxonMobil* and *City of Charlottesville*.

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484 *City of Charlottesville*, 774 F.2d at 1216.


486 In *ExxonMobil* the court stated "that [while] the orders under review and the policy statement upon which they are based incorporate some of the troubling elements of the phantom tax we disallowed in *BP West Coast*, FERC has justified its new policy with sufficient reasoning to survive our review." *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 948. The Commission recognizes the possibility of an extended period before deferred income is recognized and taxes are paid may have been one of the elements that troubled the court.
277. *City of Charlottesville* affirmed the Commission's use of the stand-alone methodology for determining tax allowances, which method explicitly recognizes delays in the recognition and payment of deferred income tax liability, perhaps for as much as fifteen years. The court recognized how tax deferrals contain the possibility that taxes may never be paid:

This speculation whether consumption of the tax losses represents a real economic detriment is reminiscent of the dispute, in the context of normalization, of whether taxes deferred by reason of accelerated depreciation will in fact *ever* be paid, or will as a practical matter be *postponed forever*. Just as the courts have left that call to the Commission, permitting it to conclude either way – first allowing normalization and later disallowing it because of indefinite postponement of tax liability – so also we think this matter is one for the Commission’s judgment.

Under the MLP ownership format it may also be uncertain when, or if, recognition of the deferred income will occur. However, the fact that recognition may be deferred at the level of the limited partner rather than the regulated entity does not change the fact that any deferred taxes on ordinary income are a real, if indirect, cost to the partnership of raising capital. Thus, as income recognition will almost always occur when the partnership interest is sold, the filing of an income tax return declaring negative or positive income from the partnership is sufficient to establish that there is either (1) an actual tax liability because the return reflects positive partnership income in the current year, or (2) a potential income tax liability that will be recognized when the partnership unit is sold and

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487 *City of Charlottesville*, 774 F.2d at 1216. Of note, Dr. Horst, ExxonMobil/BP's expert witness, estimated that the average holding period for a KMEP limited partnership interest was 8 years, considerably less than the 15 year tax loss carry forward period noted in *City of Charlottesville*. See Ex. XOM-10.

488 *City of Charlottesville*, 774 F.2d at 1216 (italicized emphasis in the original; underlining emphasis added; citations omitted). The analysis in *City of Charlottesville* involved income tax deferrals generated by accelerated depreciation or amortization in excess of the straight line depreciation method required under the Commission’s rate making protocols. *Id.* at 1215-16.

489 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 950-52, 955.

490 While there is some potential of infinite deferral, for example by charitable contribution or the step up in basis of an estate, this is no different than the avoidance of recognition that may occur for other types of depreciated assets under IRS regulation.
the deferrals are recognized. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the 2009 ID correctly applied Commission precedent on the issue of potential income tax liability.

2. The Possible Recovery of Taxes on Downstream Gains

278. On exceptions, ExxonMobil/BP argue that the 2009 ID incorrectly assumes that all income from the sale of a partnership interest will be ordinary income. ExxonMobil/BP state that some income from the sale of a partner’s units may be taxed as capital gains which tax should not be recovered in an income tax allowance. They further assert that ordinary income may be offset by accumulated losses from the same partnership or from other such interests. Last, they assert that at the time of the sale of a partnership interest, the income being taxed is not income from the partnership, but rather is income from the purchase price paid by the new purchaser. SFPP replies that its income tax allowance does not include any taxes that may be due on the sale of an investment by a partner.

279. The Commission’s rate making methodology does not allow recovery through a public utility’s rates of capital gains that may occur from that sale of corporate assets, nor does it do so here. The Commission has long since recognized that there are different types of income that will be recognized on the sale of an MLP partnership interest. As summarized in the Wachovia Primer, to the extent the sale results in income in excess of partner’s original basis, this income is taxed as a capital gain except for those items of depreciation and amortization that are recaptured as ordinary income. The Commission’s income tax allowance is applied only to the equity return component of a pipeline’s

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491 The court noted that the sale of assets that generated a deferred income tax liability might be structured to benefit the parent company, the point at which the tax losses were accrued, rather than the ratepayers. The possibility of tax loss carry forwards sheltering income from recognition is explicitly discussed, noting that asset sales may occur to maximize the benefits to the regulated entity, not the ratepayers. Moreover, the fact that the tax losses might be carried forward as much as fifteen years was not objectionable. City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1215-16.

492 ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 27.

493 Id. at 28.

494 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 13.

495 See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 37 n.35, which states that on sale of the interest any gain in excess of basis may have differing characteristics.

496 Primer at 5; FAQs at 2.
regulatory costs; i.e., its net operating income calculated by applying the equity rate of return against the equity component of the pipeline’s rate base. The dollar amount of that income is derived using the Commission’s DCF model. Thus a pipeline’s cost-of-service does not recover capital gains tax from the disposition of either the pipeline’s assets or an MLP partnership interest.

280. If, at the time a partner’s interest is sold, there is recognition of deferred income, this income reflects the recapture of deferred ordinary income. As discussed above, income deferral is caused by a reduction in basis (i.e. the partners’ capital account) from distributions in excess of distributed ordinary income to the extent the reduction reflects prior depreciation of the partnership’s depreciation or amortization accounts. A limited partnership’s capital gain derived from depreciation that is not subject to recapture, or gain above the initial purchase price, is no different than the capital gain resulting from reduction in a corporation’s basis due ordinary depreciation or the appreciation a corporation may recognize on the sale of the asset.

281. Further, ExxonMobil/BP’s argument that ordinary incomes from the sale of a partnership interest comes from the purchaser and does not reflect the seller’s deferred income is incorrect. Any capital gain income from the sale of the partnership interest in excess of its original basis, or in excess of basis as reduced by amortization of that interest under a section 743(b) election, is profit recognized upon sale to the purchasing party and may be taxed at capital gain rates. Income recognition from the recapture of deferred income reflects ordinary income generated in prior years by the partnership that was not distributed to the partner in the year it was earned. Thus, if the sale triggers income recapture, the purchaser provides the cash for the sale and triggers the taxable event, but is not the “source” of the income recognized by the selling party.

282. Finally, it is true that ordinary income from the recapture of deferred income may be set off against accrued losses in ordinary income that are not subject to the recapture provisions. Like a corporation, it is quite possible for a partner to have some accrued ordinary losses that reflect accrued negative distributed income. Such accrued ordinary losses are similar to the tax loss carry forwards accruing by a corporation that might have otherwise had profitable book operations. Thus, in practice, there is no assurance that any pipeline will earn its cost-of-service in any given year and, as such, tax loss carry-forwards may occur even for a jurisdictional corporation. If such a corporation is sold, gains from its sale may be offset against such tax loss carry-forwards without recapture of the income tax allowance provided the corporation. This is consistent with the principle that there is no assurance that that recognition will immediately occur, or that the cash

497 There may also be a recapture at ordinary income rates of the amortization of the section 743 interest if that amortization method exceeded straight-line depreciation.
generated by the income tax allowance will be paid in actual taxes. In this regard, the sale of an MLP partnership interest is no different from the sale of an interest in a corporation. The Commission agrees with the holding in the 2009 ID that the receipt of a K-1 that reports income or loss for income tax purposes sufficiently establishes a partner’s actual or potential income tax liability.

3. The Role of Incentive Distributions

283. The ACC Shippers assert the 2009 ID erroneously permitted incentive distributions to be used in determining SFPP’s income tax allowance. They assert the inclusion of incentive distributions in the general partner’s income violates the stand-alone doctrine. SFPP replies that including incentive distributions in the general partner’s income reflects how the tax burden is distributed and is consistent with Commission precedent.

284. To answer this exception it is necessary to reprise some basic features of the MLP business model. MLPs make distributions based on available cash, which is normally defined as cash from operations less maintenance and capital expenditures, plus residual cash from the sale of assets and external financing. Available cash includes the cash generated by depreciation and amortization, and in the case of a Commission regulated entity, the income tax allowance. Thus, a basic MLP model defines available cash as net cash from operations after all operating expenses and debt payments plus cash flow from depreciation and the income tax allowance. Most incentive distribution

498 City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1215-16.

499 These are capital expenditures necessary to maintain the asset at the same level of utility, but which may not be expensed under normal accounting rules. Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 11-12; Primer at 8.

500 While MLPs usually distribute more of their available cash than corporations, this is not necessarily objectionable. See Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 11-13; Primer at 6. In City of Charlottesville, the appellant City argued that pipelines should not be permitted to use internally generated funds to finance non-jurisdictional activities. The court affirmed the Commission’s contrary holding, noting:

The Commission disagreed because the use of the funds (consisting of profits, depreciation, and deferred taxes) did not in its view burden the ratepayers, i.e. did not affect their rates. “[W]hat the pipelines’ shareholders do with this cash is largely their own business,” the Commission said. “They may reinvest it in the pipelines or they may invest it in other business ventures.” Id. Assuming that to be true (which petitioner has not contested) the Commission’s conclusion represents a reasonable application of the benefits/burdens test.

(continued….)
provisions provide for the general partner to obtain an increasing proportion of available cash as the organization’s cash flow grows. Incentive payments usually begin as a relatively low percentage of available cash, but can reach as much as 50 percent of distributions as the organization’s available cash increases.\(^{501}\) That growth can come from numerous sources including revenue from increased sales, more efficient operations, and additional capital investment, or acquisitions. However, as indicated by the MLP annual reports included in the record in this case, the increase in available cash is most likely a function of improved revenues and margins from ongoing operations.\(^{502}\)

285. Of particular importance here, when the general partner receives an incentive distribution, the general partner is allocated partnership income in the same dollar amount as the incentive distribution. Put another way, a general partner receiving an incentive distribution is not allocated partnership income based on the general partner’s nominal partnership interests. This, in turn, shifts income away from the limited partners as they will receive less income than would be allocated to them based on their nominal interests. If the allocation to the limited partners of items of expense and deductions is unchanged, this may be one factor that causes an income tax loss and deferred income recognition.

286. The ACC Shippers therefore assert that SFPP’s income tax allowance is artificially inflated because SFPP allocates income to the general partner through incentive distributions. In support of this argument, the ACC Shippers first assert that the incentive distributions are based on KMEP’s total cash flow from all its subsidiaries and affiliates -- not just SFPP. They claim this violates the stand-alone method for establishing a subsidiary’s rates. The ACC Shippers further argue that the allocation of income to KMPG inflates the proportion of total income that is distributed to the corporate general partner KMPG, Inc., and unfairly burdens SFPP’s ratepayers by substantially increasing the marginal rates used to determine the income tax allowance.\(^ {503}\) They thus conclude (1) that only SFPP’s income may be used in allocating income to the partners, and (2) that the income tax allowance should be calculated as if partnership income were allocated among the partners on nominal partnership interests. SFPP asserts that the first conclusion is faulty because it does not include all of KMEP’s income in the calculation as it excludes some of the partner’s income from the calculation. SFPP asserts that the second conclusion has been rejected by the Commission.

\(\text{City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1218 (emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted).}\)

\(^{501}\) See Primer at 7-8; MLPs II at 4, 14.

\(^{502}\) See Primer at 6; MLPs II at 4-5.

\(^{503}\) ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 56-61.
287. The first issue is whether the effect of incentive distributions vis-a-vis the Commission’s income tax allowance policy violates the stand-alone method approved in *City of Charlottesville.*\(^{504}\) The ACC Shippers’ argument turns on the fact that with regard to corporations, the marginal rate is determined only on the jurisdictional entity’s net income, which includes only the regulated entity’s public utility income and deductions. In turn, the statutory tax rate is applied only to the corporation’s net jurisdictional income.\(^ {505}\) Therefore, an essential element of the traditional stand-alone method is that only jurisdictional income and expenses are used in determining the operating income to which the income tax allowance applies. In past, this bright line approach was applied to partnerships at the partnership level based on an assumption that most pipeline partnerships were owned by corporations, which meant the 35 percent maximum statutory tax rate applied to the partnership’s jurisdictional income.\(^ {506}\) The ACC Shippers’ argument is that the stand-alone test is violated because SFPP’s incentive distributions are based on cash flows, and thus includes a general partner’s income from sources other than the regulated utility SFPP.

288. As discussed in *ExxonMobil,*\(^ {507}\) a partner’s income tax liability may be attributed to the partnership for regulatory purposes and the statutory (marginal) tax rate is to be used under *City of Charlottesville.*\(^ {508}\) Under basic tax law, the marginal tax rate can only be determined once partner’s income for all sources is included and the related deductions and exclusions applied.\(^ {509}\) Incentive distributions are derived from all sources of available cash, which are commingled at the KMEP level, as is the income that must be allocated among the partners based on the distribution of the available cash. Both

\(^{504}\) *City of Charlottesville,* 774 F.2d at 1207.

\(^{505}\) Id.


\(^{507}\) *ExxonMobil,* 487 F.3d at 952-53.

\(^{508}\) *City of Charlottesville,* 744 F.2d at 1207.

\(^{509}\) Moreover, the June 2005 Order stated that income taxes are paid by the partner on partnership income. It did not say that such taxes paid are only on the distributed partnership income or that only such income should be used to determine a partnership’s income tax allowance. *See June 2005 Remand Order,* 111 FERC ¶ 61,334 at P 22-23. The Income Tax Policy Statement also contains no such limitations. *See Income Tax Policy Statement,* 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 32-33, 40. That all of a partnership’s and the partners’ income, items of deduction and expense must be included in adjusted gross income is a basic point of federal income tax law.
SFPP and KMEP are pass-through entities and KMEP prepares its individual partners’ K-1s based on the level of KMEP’s distributive income. For this reason, the historical stand-alone approach, which assumed that partnerships are equivalent to corporations for tax purposes, is no longer appropriate as MLPs have both corporate and non-corporate partners. This is the central point addressed in *BP West Coast* and which the Commission resolved through the Income Tax Policy Statement. 510 Under the Policy Statement, although the marginal tax rate may vary among partners, the marginal tax rate of the various partners is derived from their total income, and thus includes that income derived from the general partner’s incentive distributions. Therefore, the marginal tax rate reflects the actual tax cost of raising capital for the partnership. Assuming, as here, that the income tax allowance is appropriate, the weighted marginal tax rate is still less than thirty five percent which is the rate that would apply if the corporate form was applicable to all of KMEP’s distributed income.

289. Thus, the stand-alone method described in *City of Charlottesville* is not exactly reflected here because of the difference between first and second tier ownership that exists under the corporate business model does not apply to partnerships. Under the regulated corporate model there is always a clear distinction between a corporate subsidiary’s net income and the parent corporation’s income because the parent files a consolidated return with its own items of deduction that may serve to offset the regulated corporate subsidiary’s net income and income tax liability. Conversely, the Commission develops the marginal tax rate for regulated utilities that are pass-through entities by determining all of the income and items of deduction at the partner level, which results in the inclusion of items of income and deduction that are not generated by the regulated entity. Further, it is a fundamental principle of income tax law that a partner must include income from whatever source derived (and all the related deductions) in preparing a return. At bottom, the fact that SFPP, and its parent partner KMEP, are pass-through entities requires modification of the stand-alone doctrine. Since KMEP is the source of the net income available for distribution to the partners, the ID correctly included all of KMEP’s income in determining SFPP’s income tax allowance.

290. The ACC Shippers also argue allocating partnership income based on incentive distributions distorts the weighted marginal cost calculation because partnership income is allocated to the general partner in a dollar amount equal to the cash distribution to the general partner. More specifically, they claim that allocating some 50 percent of the income to KMPG, Inc. means that some 50 percent of SFPP income flowed through KMEP’s income will be attributed a 35 percent marginal tax rate compared to the 2.0202 percent that would bear that rate if nominal partnership interests are used to determine the

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510 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 32-33; *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 952, 955.
weighted marginal tax rate. They conclude distribution of income based on the nominal partnership interests more fairly reflects the interests of the ratepayers. They further argue that the Commission has improperly delegated its rate making responsibilities to private parties by accepting the incentive distribution agreement embedded in the KMEP limited partnership agreement.

291. ExxonMobil unequivocally affirmed the Commission’s prior finding that the amount of the marginal tax rate is determined by the partner’s taxable income, not that of the partnership.\textsuperscript{511} This allocation of income is a function of the incentive distribution provision of the KMEP partnership agreements, which provide for a different allocation of distributions, and thus the allocation of partnership income based on the partnership agreement.\textsuperscript{512} There is nothing illegal about such an agreement among an MLP’s limited and general partners as a matter of IRS regulation or partnership law. As such, the agreements are controlling for the purpose of income allocation and reflect how the actual or potential income tax burden is allocated among KMEP’s partners. A different protocol would not reflect that the actual or potential income tax cost is incurred by those who buy the partnership interests or contribute assets to the partnership and the conditions under which they did so. Moreover, as previously discussed, if the partnership income tax allowance itself is valid, then the weighted marginal rate will be lower due to the lower rate attributed to the partnership interests that are not owned by corporations. Thus, the Commission upholds the inclusion of incentive distributions in determining the allocation of distributive income and in calculating SFPP’s income tax allowance.

4. **Marginal Rate for Mutual Funds and UBTI**

292. The ACC Shippers assert that the 2009 ID did not adopt the proper marginal tax rates for mutual funds or the unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). The ACC Shippers further argue that the 2009 ID erroneously attributed a 28 percent marginal tax rate to distributions received by mutual fund unit holders since most mutual funds distribute more than 90 percent of income to their shareholders and therefore pay no taxes. The ACC Shippers conclude that because mutual funds are pass-through entities

\textsuperscript{511} ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-55.

\textsuperscript{512} See Primer at 6-7; Comments of BP West Coast Products LLC and ExxonMobil Corporation dated January 25, 2005 in Docket No. PL05-5-000 (Inquiry Regarding Income Tax Allowances), Ex. A thereto, Wachovia Securities – MLPs – Recognizing the Value of the General Partner (MLPs II) at 2-10 (providing a description of incentive distribution mechanics and the relative risks of the limited and general partners). The cited materials have been added to the record based on the previous use by all the parties in earlier SFPP rate proceedings involving income tax allowance issues.
that rarely pay income taxes, the correct marginal rate is the marginal tax rate that the mutual funds’ shareholders pay on the dividends they receive. Thus, the ACC Shippers assert the correct marginal tax rate for SFPP’s mutual fund unit holders is 15 percent. In support of the 15 percent rate, the ACC Shippers state that by 2004 there was a distinction between dividends that qualify for a 15 percent rate rather than the higher rate previously in effect for the 1999 base year addressed by the December 2007 Order.

293. SFPP replies that the distributions KMEP makes as an MLP do not lose their character simply because the unit holder, a mutual fund, passes the distributions through to its shareholders, citing 26 U.S.C. § 854(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2009). Thus, the distributions reduce the basis of the mutual fund, or its shareholder, and are not necessarily qualifying dividends with the lower 15 percent marginal tax rate. The Commission first notes that to the extent KMEP does not have access to the ownership categories of a mutual fund’s shareholders,\(^{513}\) SFPP shall treat all distributive income to mutual funds as if the beneficiaries were individuals. SFPP must also determine for each year at issue whether its distributions to mutual funds would be treated as qualifying or ordinary dividends, if at all, when the mutual fund distributes KMEP’s distributions to the mutual fund shareholders. SFPP should then apply the proper marginal rate to those distributions. If the distributions are not treated as qualified dividends, the proper marginal tax rate for calculating SFPP’s income tax allowance is 28 percent.

294. The ACC Shippers also assert that SFPP improperly imputed a 35 percent marginal tax rate to UBTI that might be incurred by a mutual fund or other pass-through entity with restrictions on the type of income it can distribute. In support of their argument, the ACC Shippers assert that the 35 percent rate only applies if the UBTI is more than $1000 for such pass-through entities. The ACC Shippers state that there is no indication on the 1994 or 1999 K-1s issued by SFPP that any recipient had more than $1000 in UBTI. In response, SFPP states that the ACC Shippers misstate the law with respect to UBTI. SFPP notes that an exempt organization must report all its UBTI on a single tax form and it is the cumulative amount of reported UBTI that must meet the $1,000 threshold.\(^{514}\)

295. The issue is whether the UBTI threshold applies to the amount reported on individual K-1s or to the total UBTI of the recipient mutual fund that must be reported on

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\(^{513}\) This data may be available from the mutual fund’s reports on the character of its shareholders.

\(^{514}\) SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 32.
a different form, Form 990-T.\textsuperscript{515} The correct answer is the latter. However, to justify applying a 35 percent marginal tax rate to the UBTI, SFPP must establish that a unit holder that received UBTI from KMEP was subject to the 35 percent rate because the Form 990-T reported more than $1,000. If SFPP cannot provide this supporting documentation then the prudent result is to apply a 28 percent marginal tax rate to any unit holder with UBTI because any UBTI income would be included in ordinary income without a tax penalty at that rate and would fall within the presumptions governing non-corporate ordinary income. SFPP must adjust its cost-of-service accordingly.

5. The Role of Presumptions

296. Last, the ACC Shippers argue that the 2009 ID erred by not addressing their rebuttal of the 28 percent presumption used to establish the marginal tax rate for individuals. The ACC Shippers argue that their testimony establishes that there is a double recovery of the income tax allowance through the equity rate of return generated by the Commission’s DCF model. Therefore, they conclude that the marginal tax rate for individual unit holders should be zero when calculating a partnership’s income tax allowance. The Commission has previously reviewed and rejected this argument. The ACC Shippers’ “rebuttal” of the 28 percent tax rate has nothing to do with the underlying rationale for the 28 percent presumption. The ACC Shippers would advance the same argument if the marginal tax rate presumption were 10 percent, 20 percent, or 35 percent. Moreover, they say nothing about the statistical foundation for the 28 percent presumption, and in fact accept it. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the ACC Shippers’ argument that the 28 percent presumption has been rebutted is without logical or analytical foundation. Rather, the underlying issue raised by the ACC Shippers’ “rebuttal” argument is whether an MLP unit holder may lawfully have a higher after-tax dollar income and cash return than a corporate shareholder of a pipeline firm of the same risk. The Commission previously concluded that Congress contemplated this in creating the MLP business format. The 2009 ID is affirmed on this issue.

C. Proposed Adjustments to SFPP’s Equity Rate of Return

297. This part of the order discusses the ACC Shippers’ three proposed adjustments to SFPP’s equity rate of return to compensate ratepayers for the benefits that may flow to SFPP individual unit holders as a result of the income tax allowance. First, the ACC Shippers propose adjusting SFPP’s return on equity to eliminate the alleged over-recovery of the income tax allowance. Second, the ACC Shippers propose an adjustment to compensate for the time value of income tax deferrals that may flow to KMEP’s

\textsuperscript{515} The Commission notes that the amount of KMEP income at issue is less than 1 percent, and as such, a proportionate amount of the tax allowance is at issue here.
limited partners from any delayed income recognition. Third, the ACC Shippers propose adjusting SFPP’s equity rate of return to reflect the amortization that may be taken under section 743(b) of the Internal Revenue Code that KMEP’s limited partners are required to take under the governing partnership documents.

1. Adjustment of the Return for any Alleged Income Tax Over-Recovery

298. ExxonMobil/BP urge the Commission to reduce SFPP’s equity rate of return so that the after-tax return to an MLP unit holder is no greater than the after-tax return to a corporate shareholder. \footnote{ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 12-14.} ExxonMobil/BP assert that Dr. Horst’s testimony supports decreasing SFPP’s return on equity to mitigate the alleged double recovery of income taxes. Dr. Horst developed a gas corporate pipeline sample and a gas MLP pipeline sample and compared their returns on equity. After adjusting for what he concluded was the relative risk of the two samples, Dr. Horst calculated that the average return on equity of the MLP sample was 3.41 percent (341 basis points) higher than the return of the corporate sample. Assuming that the two samples were properly adjusted for risk, Dr. Horst concludes that the difference in the two samples’ percentage return on equity is due to the ownership format, and that the controlling factor was that the MLP partnership was given an income tax allowance “as if it were a corporation.” \footnote{ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 14 (quoting Ex. XOM-12 at 5:12-19).}

299. SFPP argues that there are fatal errors in Dr. Horst’s analysis. SFPP asserts that Dr. Horst’s analysis ignores the basic premise of corporate finance that securities of companies of like risk will yield the same percentage equity returns under a DCF analysis that solves for the stock price -- a point SFPP states Dr. Horst conceded. \footnote{SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 17 (citing Ex. SFP-322 at 119-20, 143).} SFPP further attacks Dr. Horst’s risk analysis as seriously flawed for two reasons. First, the analysis did not allow for stock volatility and other factors that would cause the returns to fluctuate within his proposed statistical range. Second, SFPP asserts that both the gas pipeline and the MLP sample included entities that do not fall within the acceptable risk profile for a properly structured Commission proxy group sample. SFPP asserts this error involves companies of unusual risk or anomalously low returns or stock prices indicating that the firms are unrepresentative (such as El Paso Natural Gas), or including firms having significantly different business profiles (such as extensive local gas distribution operations) from the more pipeline-oriented firms included in the sample. SFPP argues these errors undercut the 3.41 percent differential found by Dr. Horst.
300. SFPP also asserts that Dr. Horst used the wrong marginal tax rate to determine the after-tax return of a corporate shareholder he used to compare the MLP unit holder’s and corporate shareholder’s after-tax returns. SFPP’s witness Dr. Schink modified Dr. Horst’s analysis to suggest that even under the latter’s assumptions of an average 10 percent marginal tax rate on dividends, all things being equal, the relative after tax price of the corporate share would be $90 and of the MLP unit $100. However, what is of greater importance here is that Dr. Horst testified, and ExxonMobil/BP argue on exceptions, that the most efficient way to equalize the after-tax return on equity of MLP unit holders and corporate shareholders is to remove the double recovery of the income tax cost they assert is embedded in the equity return of the MLP unit holders. ExxonMobil/BP would resolve the difference in the cash and dollar income returns (and thereby equalize the MLP unit and corporate share prices) by eliminating the income tax allowance for partnerships.\footnote{519} SFPP asserts that Dr. Horst would agree that if the percentage returns on equity equalize, this is a function of market forces and not the cash flow that is generated by an income tax allowance.\footnote{520}

301. The Commission previously addressed the purported double recovery of the taxes through the equity return, which essentially resolves ExxonMobil/BP’s issue. However, the Commission will analyze the further nuances of ExxonMobil/BP’s argument. While the Commission agrees that granting an income tax allowance results in the MLP unit having a higher price than a corporate share of the same risk, the Commission has concluded that there is no double recovery of the income tax cost by providing an income tax allowance to the MLP unit holders. Rather, eliminating the corporate double-taxation burden by organizing as an MLP means that more additional after-tax cash flow (and income if it is recognized) flows to the MLP unit holder. As discussed supra, that results in an increase in the relative price of the MLP units compared to corporate shares because the equity returns equalize due to competitive market forces. While this is a function of the tax benefits Congress gave MLPs, it is also wholly consistent with the emphasis that the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil place on the comparing the after-tax returns of a partnership (and its partners) to a corporation’s when both are assumed to be paying first-tier income taxes.\footnote{521} Since the Commission resolves the issue of whether an income tax allowance is appropriate based on policy considerations, the Commission

\footnote{519 This point was discussed in the earlier analysis the relationship between the income tax allowance and the DCF model, as exemplified by Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, which are reproduced in Appendices B and C.}

\footnote{520 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 21.}

\footnote{521 See ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953-54; Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 22-23, 36-38.}
need not address SFPP’s criticisms of Dr. Horst’s methodology. Thus the Commission will not adjust the MLP equity returns as advanced by ExxonMobil/BP and Dr. Horst.

2. Whether to Adjust for the Benefits on Deferred Income Recognition

The ACC Shippers also seek to adjust SFPP’s return on equity to reflect the tax deferral aspects of the MLP business model. By way of background, the Commission notes that no one disagrees that the MLP business model results in the deferral of income tax recognition which potentially benefits the MLP unit holder. The example in footnote 521 explains the income tax consequences of the sale of a MLP equity unit after a three year holding period, which results in the recognition of capital gains of $2.05, and the recapture in the year of sale of $4.00 in ordinary income. The conventional approach of evaluating those savings is to discount the principal amount of the tax deferral savings through a present value calculation that reflects the taxpayer’s required rate of return. Thus, this value is reflected in the price the investor will pay for the MLP equity unit. In other words, the investor bids up the price of the unit to reflect the present value of the additional after-tax cash flow resulting from the ability to reinvest the deferred payment of the taxes. As with the income tax allowance, if the only difference is the ownership format, the after-tax returns generated by the MLP unit interest and the corporation’s shareholder interest will equalize. However, the price of the MLP unit will be higher as a result.

The mechanics of these deferrals were clearly explained as early as February 28, 2005 in a shipper party exhibit introduced in the Sepulveda Line proceeding, Docket No. OR96-2-012. Primer at 1, 4-5. The latter two pages have a clear example of when and how there is deferred income recognition:

Therefore, when the investor sells the security for $22.05 per unit at the end of year 3, he/she would realize a total gain of approximately $8.00 per unit in addition to having received $4.41 per unit in cash distributions over the three year period. This includes a capital gain of $2.05 (the difference between the selling price of $22.05 and the purchase price of $20.00 per unit) and ordinary income of about $4.00 per unit (the difference between the purchase price of $20.00 per unit and the adjusted cost basis of $16.03 per unit) which is the recapture of depreciation and amortization deductions. (emphasis added).

The description here is exactly what the Commission described would occur in the Income Tax Policy Statement. See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 37 n.35.
At bottom, the ACC Shippers assert that the benefits of the deferral should accrue to the ratepayer by adjusting SFPP’s rate of return to reflect the present value of the deferrals. They cite the Commission’s 2006 Sepulveda Order for the proposition that this adjustment should be made for the benefit of the ratepayers. The ACC Shippers further assert that the Commission’s December 2007 Order improperly reached the opposite conclusion and held that the present value benefit of the deferrals should accrue to the pipeline. They again argue that BP West Coast held that the Commission cannot invent a tax cost savings to encourage investment where no tax cost actually exists. On the mechanics, the ACC Shippers would adjust SFPP’s return by determining the estimated average holding period of SFPP’s limited partnership common interests. Under ExxonMobil’s analysis the average holding period was 8 years.

As the Commission understands it, the present value of those deferrals would be determined by calculating the total amount of deferrals during an average holding period, determining the tax savings at the marginal tax rate used under the Commission’s income tax allowance methodology, and then discounting the value of the deferrals by the amount of SFPP’s equity rate of return. This results in a present dollar amount of the savings in the base year. It is not clear from the testimony what would happen at this point, but it appears that the dollar savings are deducted from allowed equity dollar return in the base year. This in turn reduces the percentage return on the equity rate base and leads to a lower dollar equity cost embedded in the pipeline’s cost-of-service. Alternatively, the discounted tax savings could be deducted from the income tax allowance, thus reducing that component of the pipeline’s cost-of-service and the after-tax cash flow generated by the allowance. This alternative approach would have the added effect of adjusting the percentage after-tax return on equity since less after-tax

524 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29, 32-33.
525 BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1292-93.
526 See Prepared Answering Testimony of Thomas Horst on Behalf of ExxonMobil Oil Corporate dated January 26, 2009, Ex. XOM-1 at 35-36 and Ex. EOX-10. BP West Coast’s witness calculated that the average holding period was longer, some 13.8 years. See 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 175.
527 Thus, if the equity rate base is $100 and the allowed percentage return is 8 percent, the allowed dollar return is $8. If the present value of the deferred tax benefits is $1, then the allowed dollar return becomes $7, or an equity return of 7 percent. In the initial year the dollar return and the percentage return are the same, but in theory as the equity rate base changes, the percentage equity return could remain at 7 percent, but the dollar return reflected in, or returned by, the cost-of-service would change accordingly.
income and cash flow would be measured against the equity rate base embedded in the base year cost-of-service. SFPP answers that the Commission correctly determined in the December 2007 Order that any tax savings should accrue to the pipeline.\footnote{SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 7.}

The Commission again notes that the income and tax payment deferrals generated at the partnership level through the allocation of losses among the partners are purposefully distinct from the tax advantages generated by accelerated depreciation at the level of an operating partnership.\footnote{See City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1205-06, 1215-16.} Thus, normalization at the partner level would undercut the deliberate distinction Congress created between corporate and MLP pipeline ownership formats by increasing the cash and income after-tax return for the limited partners. This effect results from normalizing an MLP’s tax advantages, which reduces the cash available for distributions, and thereby the dollar return on an MLP’s equity rate base. This in turn would reduce the price advantage for an MLP’s equity units that Congress created when it authorized tax advantages for the MLP pipeline ownership format. As such, the ACC Shippers’ argument that the equity return must be adjusted to reflect the tax deferrals is essentially subsumed under the prior analysis of (1) whether there is a double recovery of the income tax allowance, and (2) whether there must be some clearly identifiable time frame in which any deferred income taxes must be actually recognized.

On the first point, the Commission previously concluded that the legislative history reflects Congressional intent that any benefits from the elimination of corporate double-taxation accrue to the MLP pipeline as an investment incentive. On the second point, the Commission concluded that the possible indefinite postponement of income recognition was within the general bounds of City of Charlottesville v. FERC. However, this scenario is unlikely given the average holding periods advanced by the ACC Shippers. Pursuing the same analysis here, the Commission concludes that the tax savings that occur from tax deferral are also investment incentives embedded in the MLP model. This means that the present value of any tax benefits would be reflected in relative price of the MLP equity units as compared to the price of corporate shares issued with the same after-tax dollar value at the operating level of a jurisdictional utility.

The 2006 Sepulveda Order erred by not recognizing Congress’ purpose in permitting energy partnerships to have an income tax allowance. The 2006 Sepulveda Order acknowledged that an MLP’s higher unit price permits the pipeline to raise the same amount of capital as a pipeline organized as a corporation while issuing fewer...
shares. However, the 2006 Sepulveda Order incorrectly held for the ratepayers finding that the higher stock price comes at ratepayers’ expense. Subsequently, in the December 2007 Order, the Commission reached the correct conclusion on this issue. However, because the issue was not discussed in detail in that Order a fuller analysis was called for here. At bottom, neither order fully addressed the fundamental point that an investor will equalize the after-tax returns. As a result, the benefits of any income tax deferrals that may flow to the MLP’s limited partners are incorporated in the price of the MLP’s equity units, which lowers the equity cost of capital used for investments. The analysis in this order corrects these oversights and affirms the December 2007 Order.

Finally, the ACC Shippers again argue that the earlier December 2007 Order creates a tax benefit or cost where none exists in the regulatory structure established by the ICA. They assert that this violates the holding in BP West Coast that the Commission cannot create a tax liability where none otherwise exists simply to create an investment incentive. The ACC Shippers’ argument misconstrues the current situation. As was previously discussed, the Commission is not creating a “phantom” tax liability. As is explicitly stated in ExxonMobil, “the income taxes for which SFPP will receive an income tax allowance are real, albeit indirect.” Thus, the issue is not whether SFPP incurs an actual tax liability. Rather, the issue is whether benefits from the deferral of the income tax cost should be allocated to the partners or the ratepayers. The Commission again concludes the Commission’s policy decisions should support Congress’ intent to encourage pipeline investment. Thus there should be no normalization of tax benefits that accrue to a limited partner under a MLP partnership agreement. The 2009 ID is affirmed on this issue.

530 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 45.
531 Id. P 45-46.
532 Again, the Income Tax Policy Statement did so, although it incorrectly used the phrase pre-tax rather than after-tax return. See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 4 n.6. Thus the issue was raised to the court when it decided ExxonMobil.
533 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29, 32-33.
534 Shippers also raised this argument in the CCV Group January Request for Rehearing and Clarification at 16-17; Navajo January 2008 Request for Rehearing at 13.
535 Citing BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1292 n.9.
536 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 954.
3. The Role of Section 743(b) Depreciation

309. On exceptions ExxonMobil/BP assert that the 2009 ID erred by not adjusting SFPP’s equity rate of return for the amortization that may be taken on a partnership interest under section 743(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. They assert that this form of amortization by a partner is similar to amortization in excess of straight line depreciation, and therefore SFPP’s equity rate of return should adjusted through a mechanism similar to the Commission’s accumulated deferred income tax methodology (ADIT). They argue that there is no merit to SFPP’s argument at hearing that section 743(b) depreciation is not related to SFPP’s operations and therefore cannot be attributed to SFPP without violating the stand-alone doctrine. ExxonMobil/BP further assert that SFPP itself states that the additional depreciation is determined by the difference between the purchase price on a limited partner interest and the pro rata book value of SFPP’s rate base. SFPP replies that it admitted no such thing, that ExxonMobil/BP has distorted the record, and that the section 743(b) depreciation component is not related to the amortization of SFPP’s rate base.

310. Section 743(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a partner of any partnership (not just an MLP) may elect to amortize the portion of a partnership interest for which the price paid was greater than the per unit book basis of that partnership interest, i.e., when the unit is purchased at a premium. This essentially “writes up” the partner’s basis and creates an asset that may be amortized in addition to the depreciation of the assets that are amortized on the partnership’s books when the interest is purchased. Since partnerships are pass-through entities, the partnership items of depreciation are allocated to and separately stated for each partner as part of the items of partnership income and deduction that are reported on their K-1s. With regard to the section 743(b) depreciation item, KMEP (SFPP’s owner MLP) requires its unit holders to take this

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537 26 C.F.R. § 743(b) (2010) (section 743(b) provides for an optional basis adjustment that typically affects incoming partners).

538 ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 33-34.

539 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 26-27.

540 The book value of the depreciable assets per unit is gross investment less accrued depreciation and amortization (i.e. net assets) divided by the units outstanding at the time of purchase. The nature of the firm’s capital structure is not relevant to the calculation as depreciation is allocated to the partners as an annual expense from operations. This is different from the equity each unit has in a venture which is a function of net assets, less debt and other more senior claims, divided by the number of units outstanding.
elevation, which thereby generates an additional depreciation component. The resulting dollar value is unique to each unit holder because it reflects the price paid by each limited partner on the date of the purchase of the KMEP interest and reflects the difference between the purchase price (the partner's basis) and the partner's depreciation basis in all the assets owned directly or indirectly by KMEP. Thus this differential is not a function of the depreciation factors derived from SFPP's rate base and embedded in its rates.

311. ExxonMobil/BP appear to agree that the additional depreciation afforded a limited partner under section 743(b) may be the cause of much of the tax loss leading to deferred income recognition. Thus, the assertion that there should be adjustment to SFPP's return to reflect the section 743(b) depreciation is unrelated to SFPP's rate base, and does not give rise to an ADIT issue since the dollar depreciation rate is unique to each KMEP unit holder.\(^{541}\) Aside from the sheer technical impossibility of tracing such an ADIT type calculation back to SFPP's rate base, ExxonMobil/BP's analysis has no legal foundation and would violate the stand-alone doctrine as it would attribute the unit holder's amortization to SFPP as an operating expense. If an adjustment were required, it would be an adjustment to the unit holder's return on equity to reflect the present value of the tax savings from the limited partner's deferral of income recognition through the partner's ownership of its KMEP units. The Commission rejected any such adjustments earlier in this order.

D. Is the Income Tax Allowance Properly Calculated?

312. This section addresses the ACC Shippers' and ExxonMobil/BP's various arguments regarding whether the proposed income allowance was properly calculated. One such argument is that SFPP's income tax allowance must be adjusted to account for the alleged double recovery of the income tax cost in the equity rate of return and for the deferral of the income recognition.\(^{542}\) The Commission previously rejected these assertions earlier in this order and therefore the 2009 ID is affirmed in this regard. ExxonMobil/BP also assert the portion of the income tax allowance that reflects state taxes should be adjusted to reflect an alleged overstatement of weighted state tax rates.\(^{543}\) Specifically, ExxonMobil/BP argue that the weighted state income tax rates for KMEP's

\(^{541}\) The Commission assumes that the depreciation rate is controlled by IRS regulation and is constant for all the partners to which it applies. However, the dollar amount would depend on the spread between per unit book value and purchase price of the individual units. Even if the rate varies, this would not change the result here.

\(^{542}\) ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 29-32.

\(^{543}\) ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 37.
unit holders should be reduced to eliminate any source-state taxation; i.e., the income tax allowance should only reflect state income tax from the unit holder's state of residence.

313. ExxonMobil/BP’s argument is inconsistent with actual tax practice. A standard K-1 includes disclosure of the portion of ordinary income attributable to the each state, when required, not just tax from the resident state.\textsuperscript{544} The income is typically declared with an offset against the state of residence as the Commission discussed in the December 2007 Order.\textsuperscript{545} The exception is denied.

E. Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes

314. The ACC Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP challenge the determination in the 2009 ID that SFPP properly calculated the accumulated deferred income taxes (ADIT). They assert that SFPP used an overstated marginal tax rate resulting in an artificially high ADIT.\textsuperscript{546} Specifically, ExxonMobil/BP argue that the ADIT adjustment is too high because the blended federal and state tax rate is too high as a result of (1) use of source-state taxation and (2) the retention of the time value of the tax deferral.\textsuperscript{547} Both of these arguments have been addressed and rejected above. ExxonMobil/BP also assert that SFPP erred by not including the state income tax component of its cost-of-service in its ADIT calculation.

315. The ACC Shippers assert that SFPP’s time frame for applying the ADIT adjustment is incorrect. At bottom, they assert that SFPP incorrectly applies the lower marginal tax rate of an MLP beginning in 1992. They assert that between 1992 and 1996, SFPP collected ADIT using the top marginal corporate income tax rate (35 percent) in its existing West Line rates at the statutory 35 percent rate and that the going-forward ADIT calculation here should reflect this fact. ACC Shippers conclude that the correct date for applying the lower tax rate is the base and test year used to define the rates at issue here, i.e., the adjusted 2007 base year. They argue their position is consistent with the Commission practice of applying its current policy and rulings at the time the decision is made.\textsuperscript{548} SFPP replies that the Commission held in the Opinion No. 435 Orders that

\textsuperscript{544} See Ex. BPW-9 at 3 of 4; Ex. BPW-12 at 4 of 6.
\textsuperscript{545} December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at 61.
\textsuperscript{546} See ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 61-64; ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 37.
\textsuperscript{547} ExxonMobil/BP Brief on Ex. at 37.
\textsuperscript{548} ACC Shippers Brief on Ex. at 63 (arguing against “SFPP’s retroactive application of the Income Tax Policy Statement in the development of ADIT balances”).
SFPP became a partnership in 1992, and therefore the current partnership rate should be applied beginning with that year. SFPP asserts that there is no such thing as a fund that reflects the over- or under-recovery of ADIT and that only issue is the proper calculation of the necessary adjustment to the rate base for the years at issue.

316. These arguments require a brief summary of the how the ADIT adjustment works. The Commission’s cost-of-service methodology assumes the straight-line depreciation of the pipeline’s assets. Thus the depreciation rate is a constant rate embedded in the pipeline’s cost-of-service reflecting a composite rate based on the useful life of all the assets. This depreciation rate is a non-cash expense that reduces the taxable income of the pipeline, and hence its income tax allowance. However, in practice, most pipelines depreciate their assets more rapidly (i.e., accelerated depreciation) than would be the case under straight-line depreciation. In such a case, the pipeline has less taxable income than would be the case if it were using straight-line depreciation. Accordingly, the income tax allowance will generate more cash in such a year than the taxes that are actually paid. This effectively increases the pipeline’s after-tax return. To mitigate this result, the Commission requires the pipeline to determine the amount of unpaid income taxes that accrues and then to adjust the pipeline’s rate base so eliminate the additional return that the pipeline can earn on the deferred payments. This is done by reducing the equity component of the pipeline’s rate base by the amount of the accumulated deferred income taxes. Because the equity portion of the rate base is reduced, there is less cash flow from the allowed equity rate of return, which offsets the additional cash flow generated if the tax allowance is in excess of the actual taxes paid.

317. Over time, as the pipeline’s accelerated depreciation declines, the pipeline generates more taxable income than is included in its cost-of-service and begins to pay more taxes than the income tax allowance covers. As this occurs, the rate base adjustment declines and the return on equity increases over the remaining useful life of the assets involved. This is called the “turn around” of the ADIT account. If the pipeline’s equity rate of return or marginal tax rate changes in a subsequent rate case, the original schedule for calculating the “turn around” may become inaccurate. To correct any inaccuracies, the Commission requires the pipeline to adjust the ADIT schedule to correct for the over- or under-recovery of the ADIT adjustment. This adjustment is the issue raised here.

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549 SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 33-35.
550 For a fuller analysis of ADIT, see Opinion No. 486, 117 FERC ¶ 61,077 at P 224-233; Opinion No. 486-A, 123 FERC ¶ 61,056 at P 269-276.
318. SFPP is technically correct that there is no “overfunding” at issue here. Rather, the issue is the amount of the ADIT adjustment going forward for the rates established in this case and the impact of the ADIT on the adjusted rate base. On a going forward basis, the ADIT adjustment is properly based on the marginal tax rate established here. SFPP’s rate base should be adjusted to reflect the difference between the taxable income to which that rate would apply under straight-line depreciation and the taxable income earning under other types of depreciation rates. The ACC Shippers’ dispute is with the rate to be applied for the period beginning 1992 through 1996.\(^{551}\) The ACC Shippers advocate using the maximum “corporate” statutory rate. Applying a higher marginal rate for the period 1992 through 1996 would further reduce the rate base for that time frame resulting in a lower rate base going forward than would otherwise be the case. Applying a lower marginal tax rate means a higher rate base going forward and a higher cash equity return. This is a function of how accrued depreciation works in the context of the ADIT adjustment.

319. The ACC Shippers argue that if SFPP designs its going-forward rates using the partnership marginal tax rate beginning in 1992, its rates will be higher than if the higher marginal tax rate is applied to period beginning 1992. They therefore conclude that the Opinion No. 435 Orders, including the December 2007 Order, incorrectly endorsed using a “retroactive approach” to ADIT\(^{552}\) and further, the December 2007 Order’s holding was of limited precedential value because it involved a small number of shippers in a reparation case. SFPP asserts that the Commission correctly rejected ACC’s retroactivity argument in the December 2007 Order because the policy in place at the time Opinion No. 435 was decided was overturned by BP West Coast.\(^{553}\)

320. The Commission first concludes that the Opinion No. 435 Orders erred in applying the partnership marginal tax rate to a reparations year in which the marginal tax rate was actually the 35 percent corporate rate. In the proceeding underlying the Opinion No. 435 Orders, the base and test year at issue was 1994 and SFPP’s rates were established based on the cost of service in that year. Those rates were properly applied

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\(^{551}\) The period before 1992 is not at issue because all parties agree that prior to 1992 SFPP paid the maximum statutory rate and that this was the proper rate for the ADIT calculations.

\(^{552}\) The ACC Shippers’ reference to “retroactive approach” refers to SFPP’s retroactive application of the 2005 Income Tax Policy Statement in the development of ADIT balances. The application of the Income Tax Policy Statement resulted in SFPP using the partnership tax rate in lieu of the higher corporate tax rate in the ADIT calculations.

\(^{553}\) SFPP Brief op. Ex. at 34.
retrospectively to 1992 under the reparation provisions of the ICA. However, it was incorrect to apply to the 1992 year a retroactive application of only one of the cost of service elements embedded in the 1994 cost-of-service. The ACC Shippers are correct that the ADIT adjustment is modified under a special convention554 to assure that the ADIT account going forward accurately reflects the amount of the future “turn around” to be achieved. Since the rate of the “turn around” is based on the cost of equity capital and the marginal tax rate, the adjustment must reflect the amount of the ADIT adjustment that has occurred to date. Therefore, in calculating the rate base to be used to design the new rates at issue here, the rate base must reflect how the ADIT account actually functioned in the prior years. Thus, the ACC Shippers are correct that SFPP must use the actual marginal tax rate in effect from 1992 to the current test year in designing the rates at issue here. The Commission will not revisit the Opinion No. 435 Orders because the ADIT portion of those orders is final. However, with respect to ADIT, the Opinion No. 435 Orders should not be followed in the future.

321. Finally, ExxonMobil/BP is correct that the state income tax component of SFPP’s cost-of-service is to be included in its ADIT calculation. This simply reflects the full amount of the marginal tax rate involved in making the ADIT adjustment and reflects the Commission’s practice in all rate making proceedings regardless of the ownership format.

VII. Substantial Under-recovery

322. This section addresses whether SFPP has established that it was substantially under-recovering its West Coast line rates at the time it made its June 30, 2008 filing pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 342.4(a). As an interstate oil pipeline SFPP is subject to the Commission’s oil pipeline indexing regulations contained at 18 C.F.R. Part 342 – Oil Pipeline Rate Methodologies and Procedures.555 While oil pipelines must normally recover cost increases by using the indexing procedure contained in section 342.3,556 an oil pipeline may file to increase its existing rates under section 342.4. However, to do so the pipeline must establish that “there is a substantial divergence between the actual costs experienced by the carrier and that rate resulting from the application of the index such that the rate at the ceiling level would preclude the carrier from being able to charge a  

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554 The “South Georgia” convention.
556 Id. § 342.3.
just and reasonable rate within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. 557 This means that before filing under section 342.4 a carrier must first determine whether it can recover its current costs by raising its rates to the maximum level permitted by the Commission’s indexing methodology. If the carrier cannot recover its costs by maximizing the increase permitted by the indexing methodology, it may then file a rate case under provided it shows that the divergence between the maximum permitted rate under the indexing mechanisms and its actual costs is such that application of the indexing mechanism does not produce a rate that is just and reasonable.

323. When SFPP made its June 30, 2008 tariff filing, several intervenors asserted that SFPP had not established that it met the standard in section 342.4. 558 However, the Commission concluded that SFPP had made an adequate initial showing that its filing met the requirements of a cost of service filing under 18 C.F.R. § 346.1 of the Commission’s regulations, but also stated that there was insufficient data to resolve the disputes. 559 This is still the case at the time of this order because to make a final finding under section 342.1 requires two pieces of information. The first is the ceiling rate for the West Line at the time SFPP made its June 30, 2008 filing. The second is the rate calculated pursuant to this order, which will not be known until SFPP completes its compliance filing. Therefore, if any of the protesting shipper parties wish to pursue this issue further, they may do so in their comments on SFPP’s compliance filing. The Commission will make its ruling on whether SFPP has met the standard in section 342.2 as part of its review of SFPP’s compliance filing when all the required information is available.

The Commission orders:

(A) The exceptions to the 2009 ID are resolved as stated in the body of this order. Any exception not specifically discussed should be considered denied.

(B) SFPP shall file revised rates consistent with this order within 45 days after this order issues, including the supporting explanatory statements and documentation for the overhead cost allocations required in the body of this order, and an estimate of refunds.

(C) Comments on the compliance filing are due 75 days after this order issues and reply comments 90 days after this order issues.

557 Id. § 342.4.
559 Id. P 11.
Docket No. IS08-390-002

By the Commission.

(SEAL)

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
## Appendix B

### Hypothetical Example of an Oil Pipeline

**Under Corporations and MLP Organizational Structures: Scenario 1**

(32% MLP Tax Allowance; 32% Marginal Investor Tax Rate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gas pipeline structure</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>MLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gas pipeline structure</td>
<td>Ln 11/(1 - Ln 1)</td>
<td>C-Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Marginal tax rate for calculation of income tax allowance</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Other pipeline costs and share units outstanding</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Operating costs</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rate base</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Equity in capital structure</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rate in capital structure</td>
<td>1 - Ln 8</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cost of debt</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Shares outstanding</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>75.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Income tax rate of pipeline asset</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Calculations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Equity return on rate base</td>
<td>Ln 3 * Ln 8 – Ln 7</td>
<td>$6,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Income tax allowance</td>
<td>Ln 14 * (1 + Ln 4)</td>
<td>$3,247,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Interest expense</td>
<td>Ln 15</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Income taxes paid by pipeline asset</td>
<td>Ln 17 - Ln 19 - Ln 21</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Income available to share units</td>
<td>Ln 17 - Ln 18 - Ln 19 - Ln 20</td>
<td>$10,147,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>After entity taxes and before investor taxes</td>
<td>Ln 22</td>
<td>$13,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Income per share unit</td>
<td>Ln 21/Ln 11</td>
<td>$3,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rate base for the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 22</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>After tax income per share unit for the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 22 - Ln 23</td>
<td>$7,230,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Impaired market price DCF share unit</td>
<td>Ln 24</td>
<td>$0,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Remate after tax equity return of the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 24 - Ln 25</td>
<td>$9,230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>DCF Method estimate of the ROE for the pipeline</td>
<td>Ln 22/Ln 25</td>
<td>13.600%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Income taxes paid by pipeline asset</td>
<td>Ln 20</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Taxes paid by the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 21/Ln 23</td>
<td>$3,247,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Income taxes paid by entity and investor</td>
<td>Ln 20 + Ln 29</td>
<td>$3,247,058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### First Alternative Hypothetical Example of an Oil Pipeline Under Corporate and MLP Organizational Structures: Scenario 2 (0% MLP Tax Allowance, 32% Marginal Investor Tax Rate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<th>Alternative Organizational Structures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>Assumptions</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Pipeline Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tax rate for marginal investor and return on equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Required after tax equity return of the marginal investor</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.384%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Tax rate for the marginal investor</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Required return on equity (ROE)</td>
<td>Ln 1 / (1 - Ln 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.600%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Marginal tax rate for calculation of income tax allowance</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Other pipeline costs and shareholdings outstanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Operating costs</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Rate base</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Equity in capital structure</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Debt in capital structure</td>
<td>Ln 1 / Ln 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Cost of debt</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) Shareholdings outstanding</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>725,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) In-service tax rate of parent entity</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Equity return on rate base</td>
<td>Ln 3 * Ln 8 * Ln 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Income tax allowance</td>
<td>Ln 5 * Ln 4 * (1 - Ln 4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Interest expense</td>
<td>Ln 10 * Ln 9 * Ln 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Operating costs</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Revenue requirements</td>
<td>Ln (Ln 13 to Ln 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$13,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Operating costs</td>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Interest expense</td>
<td>Ln 15</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Income taxes paid by parent entity</td>
<td>Ln 17 + Ln 18 + Ln 19 + Ln 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Income available to shareholders/holders</td>
<td>Ln 17 - Ln 18 - Ln 19 + Ln 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after entity taxes and before investor taxes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Income per share/unit</td>
<td>Ln 21 / Ln 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Tax rate for the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 After tax income per share/unit for the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 22 * Ln 21 - Ln 23</td>
<td></td>
<td>$6,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Implied market price per share/unit</td>
<td>Ln 24 / Ln 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>$68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Resulting after tax equity return of the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 24 + Ln 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.600%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 DCF method estimate of the ROE for the pipeline</td>
<td>Ln 22 / Ln 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>$13,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Anneaux
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Alternative Organizational Structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Income taxes paid by pipeline entity</td>
<td>Ln 19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Taxes paid by the marginal investor</td>
<td>Ln 20 + Ln 22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Income taxes paid by equity and investor</td>
<td>Ln 28 + Ln 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
137 FERC ¶ 61,220
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

SFPP, L.P.                          Docket Nos. IS08-390-004
                                           IS08-390-006

OPINION NO. 511-A

ORDER ON REHEARING AND COMPLIANCE FILING

(Issued December 16, 2011)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

SFPP, L.P. 

Docket Nos. IS08-390-004
IS08-390-006

OPINION NO. 511-A

APPEARANCES

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George L. Weber, Esq., on behalf of Chevron Products Company.

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Melvin Goldstein, Esq., Matthew Corcoran, Esq., and Barron W. Dowling, Esq., on behalf of Tesoro Marketing and Refining.

Steven A. Adducci, Esq., on behalf of Valero Marketing and Supply Company.


Derek L. Anderson, Esq., and Debora E. Lyon, Esq., on behalf of the FERC Trial Staff.
OPINION NO. 511-A

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137 FERC ¶ 61,220
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman;
Philip D. Moeller, John R. Norris,
and Cheryl A. LaFleur.

SFPP, L.P. Docket Nos. IS08-390-004

IS08-390-006

OPINION NO. 511-A
ORDER ON REHEARING AND COMPLIANCE FILING
(Issued December 16, 2011)

1. This order addresses requests for rehearing of Opinion No. 511 issued
February 17, 2011 in Docket No. IS08-390-002. 1 Opinion No. 511 addressed briefs on
and opposing exceptions to an Initial Decision issued on December 2, 2009 concerning a
cost of service rate case filed by SFPP, L.P. (SFPP) for its West Line rates. 2 This order
also addresses SFPP’s April 25, 2011 compliance filing submitted in compliance with
Opinion No. 511. 3


3 SFPP, L.P. April 25, 2011 Compliance Filing in Docket No. IS08-390-006
(Compliance Filing). On April 25, 2011, as replaced on May 16, 2011, SFPP filed tariffs
for its West Line that reflect the revisions required by Opinion No. 511 and other
corrections SFPP identified in its Compliance Filing. See SFPP, May 16, 2011, Tariff
Filing, Docket No. IS11-338-000. On June 15, 2011, the Commission issued an order
accepting the tariffs to be effective June 1, 2011, subject to refund and to the outcome of
SFPP’s cost of service Compliance Filing in Docket No. IS08-390-006. See SFPP, L.P.
135 FERC ¶ 61,235 (2011). The Commission noted that its conditional acceptance of the
tariffs in Docket No. IS11-338-000 is subject to further order, and any additional process
that may subsequently be required upon review of the Compliance Filing in Docket
No. IS08-390-006. Id. P 8.
2. The Commission affirms its prior findings regarding throughput, litigation costs, capital structure and the cost of capital (both debt and equity), and all income tax allowance issues except those related to the calculation of allowance for deferred income taxes (ADIT). As discussed below, the Commission generally denies the requests for rehearing regarding overhead cost allocation except regarding the assignment of certain costs to SFPP and the exclusion of the KM Canada Entities. The Commission also grants rehearing to require SFPP to recalculate its starting rate base write-up. The Commission grants rehearing on the issue of substantial divergence and requires SFPP to modify its indexing calculations. The Commission therefore directs SFPP to make a revised compliance filing consistent with these rulings and to recalculate the refunds due its shippers.

I. Background

3. On June 30, 2008, SFPP submitted, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 342.4(a), revised FERC Tariff Nos. 171 and 172 to reflect proposed cost of service rates which would result in a rate increase for all shipments on SFPP’s West Line between Watson Station, Los Angeles County, California and Phoenix, Arizona. The proposed rates were protested by BP West Coast Products LLC and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (together “ExxonMobil/BP”), Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company (Tesoro), ConocoPhillips Company, Continental Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines Inc., Southwest Airlines Co., US Airways, Inc., Chevron Products Company (Chevron), and Valero Marketing and Supply Company (together, the ACV Shippers). The protesting shippers alleged that SFPP failed to demonstrate a substantial divergence between SFPP’s actual costs and its current ceiling rates such that the ceiling rates would preclude SFPP from being able to charge just and reasonable rates. The protesting parties raised numerous issues of material fact regarding SFPP’s claimed actual costs and proposed rate levels.

4. SFPP supported its proposed rate increase arguing that the rate increase responds to a decline in volumes on SFPP’s West Line that are a result of a corresponding increase in throughput to Phoenix from SFPP’s East Line. SFPP calculated its West Line cost of service for the test period at $47,162,000. SFPP’s test period revenue under its then-existing rates would have been $41,988,000, resulting in an under-recovery of approximately $5,174,000 or 12.3 percent. SFPP projected that the test period revenue under the proposed rates would be approximately $47,157,000. SFPP used calendar year 2007 as the base period for actual costs, revenue, and throughput data. SFPP used the first nine months of 2008 (January through September) for the test period to adjust the base period for known and measurable changes.
5. By order issued July 29, 2008, the Commission accepted and suspended SFPP's proposed rates for the West Line to become effective August 1, 2008 subject to refund. The issues surrounding the proposed West Line rates were set for hearing and settlement judge procedures. After settlement discussions reached a stalemate, a hearing was held in June 2009. The Presiding Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued the Initial Decision on December 2, 2009 (2009 ID). The principal sections of the 2009 ID address (1) the base and test periods, (2) allowed return, (3) income tax allowance, (4) the level and allocation of operating and maintenance expenses, (5) the throughput volume level for determining rates, and (6) classification of costs for Account No. 590. The 2009 ID concluded that the just and reasonable going-forward rates for the West Line are those rates calculated after all of the adjustments ordered by the ALJ are implemented. Subsequently, the parties filed briefs on exceptions and briefs opposing exceptions.

6. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission generally affirmed the ALJ's determinations. However, the Commission determined that several issues required revisions. Specifically, the Commission modified the ALJ's findings regarding throughput, purchase accounting adjustments, the allocation of litigation costs, and some rate base and secondary cost of service issues. The Commission ordered SFPP to file an enhanced overhead cost recovery analysis, revised tariffs, and an estimated refund report consistent with the conclusions in Opinion No. 511. The Commission affirmed most of the other rulings by the ALJ, including his holdings regarding goodwill, the allocation of costs among SFPP's affiliates, and between SFPP's jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional services, and most capital structure and income tax allowance issues.

7. On April 25, 2011, SFPP submitted its Compliance Filing in response to Opinion No. 511 in Docket No. IS08-390-006. The Compliance Filing contains the cost of service information SFPP filed to support the revised West Line rates, including the further justification of SFPP's overhead cost allocations required by the Opinion No. 511.

8. SFPP, Tesoro, ExxonMobil/BP, and the ACV Shippers request rehearing of Opinion No. 511. These rehearing requests are summarized below and then addressed by topic. Each section of this order also contains a discussion of issues that were properly raised in the parties' comments and reply comments on the SFPP Compliance Filing. The Commission does not address any comments raising matters that should have been addressed in the parties' rehearing requests or which only repeat the arguments in those rehearing requests. It is well established that the only matter to be addressed in a

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5 This order uses "Shipper Parties" to reference more than one of the shipper litigants in this proceeding.
II. Test Year Definition and Throughput

A. Opinion No. 511

9. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission determined that throughput and related cost of service items should be derived based upon a test period using annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008.\(^9\) Opinion No. 511 concluded that this data was the most representative of likely future volumes on the West Line. The Commission explained that the expansion on SFPP’s East Line into Phoenix created an alternative for West Line shippers into the Phoenix market. As a result, SFPP’s shippers began to transfer some of their volumes from the West Line to the East Line beginning in January 2008.\(^10\) Opinion No. 511 also rejected as speculative arguments advanced by

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\(^7\) SFPP, L.P., 134 FERC ¶ 63,013 (2011) (East Line ID).


\(^10\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 27.
Tesoro and ACC Shippers that the January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008 throughput was not representative due to an economic downturn.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{B. Rehearing}

1. \textbf{Rehearing Arguments}

10. ACV Shippers and Tesoro seek rehearing of the throughput levels adopted by Opinion No. 511. The ACV Shippers contend that Opinion No. 511 disregarded Commission regulations that set forth a 12-month base period followed by a 9-month adjustment period.\textsuperscript{12} ACV Shippers assert that if the Commission always relies on actual data from the adjustment period, the base period would become meaningless. Instead, both ACV Shippers and Tesoro contend that the prevailing policy has been to consider whether changes in the adjustment period are lasting changes and to make changes to the base period data accordingly.\textsuperscript{13}

11. The ACV Shippers seek to distinguish the cases cited by Opinion No. 511 for using actual data from the adjustment period because those cases involved natural gas pipelines as opposed to oil pipelines. The ACV Shippers state that the Commission subjects a rate filing pursuant to section 4 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA)\textsuperscript{14} to a nearly automatic five-month suspension before the new rate takes effect. Thus, in these natural gas pipeline proceedings, the ACV Shippers assert the end of the adjustment period coincides with the time when the revised rate becomes effective subject to refund. In contrast, the ACV Shippers state that oil pipeline rates often take effect subject to refund on one day's notice. Thus, ACV Shippers assert that in oil pipeline rate cases, the most recent actual data prior to the effectiveness of the new rate is the base period data—not the adjustment period data.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Id.} P 29.

\textsuperscript{12} 18 C.F.R. § 346.2 (2011).


12. ACV Shippers and Tesoro also assert that the January 1, 2008, through September 30, 2008, adjustment period throughput is not representative of the conditions likely to prevail while the West Line rates remain in effect. Both parties argue that adjustment period throughput levels were temporarily decreased due to the effects of an economic recession. The ACV Shippers argue that the effects of the recession on throughput are not speculative. Rather, they contend that the Commission should not assume a lasting recession, noting that historically recessions have not resulted in lasting changes in Arizona gasoline use and that recessions have not lasted longer than one year and four months. Similarly, Tesoro argues that the January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 period represents a temporary downturn in throughput on the West Line. In support, Tesoro states that prior to 2008 petroleum product demand to Phoenix had been growing rapidly. Tesoro asserts that projections prepared by SFPP and other analysts prior to and after the onset of the recession forecasted annual increases in demand. Tesoro further cites population growth in the Western region between 2008 and 2010.

13. Tesoro disputes Opinion No. 511’s discussion of the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s (EIA) “Annual Energy Outlook 2010” that was published on May 11, 2010. Tesoro notes that the EIA published new estimates in December 2010 and revised its projections upward, showing motor gasoline consumption in the Mountain Region surpassing 2008 levels in 2010. Tesoro states that the more recent December 2010 projection showed motor gasoline consumption levels surpassing 2007 levels in 2014. Similarly, Tesoro argues that the December 2010 Report showed a more rapid recovery in liquid fuel consumption, projecting 2008 levels to be surpassed in 2011 and 2007 levels to be surpassed in 2015. Tesoro further references a report from the California Energy Commission published in May 2010 after the record in this proceeding closed. Tesoro states the report shows Arizona fuel demand rebounding back to 2008 (and in some cases 2007) levels.

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15 ACV Rehearing at 80 (citing Ex. ACV-297; Ex. ACV-304).


14. ACV Shippers also object that Opinion No. 511 improperly relied upon complaint procedures as a remedy for shippers should West Line volumes increase in the future. ACV Shippers contend that only shippers that filed complaints are able to obtain compensation other than a prospective reduction in rates. ACV Shippers also argue that it can take years for complaint proceedings to be processed.

15. Finally, ACV Shippers allege that West Line volumes established in Opinion No. 511 combine with the Administrative Law Judge’s Initial Decision in Docket No. IS09-437-000, et al., regarding the East Line to establish a total throughput to Phoenix that is far lower than recent actual levels of Phoenix demand as reflected in combined East and West Line volumes.

16. Tesoro further contends that the Commission acknowledged that the January 2008 to September 2008 throughput volumes are not the most accurate depiction of actual throughput changes on the West Line because the Commission ordered SFPP to reflect changes in 2008 volumes to the Yuma Marine Corp Air Station and the Calnev interconnect at Colton, California.

17. ACV Shippers and Tesoro propose alternative throughput levels. ACV Shippers contend that West Line rates should be based on throughput levels as proposed by witness Matthew O’Loughlin. Mr. O’Loughlin adjusted Phoenix 2007 base period volumes on the West Line downward by the adjustment period increase in East Line volumes. ACV Shippers state that this approach avoids incorporating any effects related to the recession. Similarly, Tesoro advocates using the throughput levels proposed by its witness, Phillip Ashton, consisting of the first 11-months of data from 2008 adjusted for volumes that Tesoro claims resulted from the temporary affects of the recession.

2. Commission Determination

18. The Commission denies rehearing and upholds the adoption in Opinion No. 511 of test period volumes consisting of annualized, actual January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 throughput.

19. Opinion No. 511 correctly relied upon precedent involving natural gas pipelines for the principle that the Commission sometimes uses actual adjustment period data.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{18}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at n.34 (citing Kern River Gas Co. Opinion No. 486, 117 FERC ¶ 61,077, at P 263 (2006); High Island Offshore System, L.L.C., 110 FERC ¶ 61,043, at P 49 (2005); Enbridge Pipelines (KPC), 100 FERC ¶ 61,260, at P 315 (2002); Trunkline Gas Co., 90 FERC ¶ 61,017, at 61,048-49 (2000); (continued...)
The Commission’s oil pipeline and natural gas pipeline cost of service regulations relating to the base and test period are nearly identical.19 As such, the text of the regulations supports the application of a similar regulatory scheme. The distinction that ACV Shippers seek to create based upon the Commission’s suspension policies is not persuasive. As ACV Shippers note, the Commission typically suspends for five months a contested rate increase proposed by a natural gas pipeline. In contrast, the Commission typically allows oil pipeline rate increases to be effective with a minimal suspension.20 However, even without the imposition of a longer suspension in this proceeding, the actual throughput levels during the adjustment period (between January 1, 2008 and September 30, 2008) coincide with the throughput levels in effect when the rate increase in this proceeding was filed (June 30, 2008) and its effective date (August 1, 2008). Thus, Opinion No. 511’s reliance upon the natural gas pipeline cases was appropriate, and to the extent that actual data during the adjustment period provides more accurate throughput projections, the Commission is justified in using the more recent information.

20. Similarly, the ACV Shippers’ and Tesoro’s reliance upon the 2006 Sepulveda Order is also misplaced. In the 2006 Sepulveda Order, the Commission stated that test period adjustments to data must reflect “a significant lasting change, not a cyclical change.”21 In that decision, the Commission declined to make certain modifications to base period throughput based upon the 9-month adjustment period because it was unclear whether the proposed modifications constituted a significant lasting change.22 In making

Northwest Pipeline Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 62,027, 62,030 (1999); Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 72 FERC ¶ 61,074, at 61,360 (1995)).


20 The different practices result from the Commission’s light-handed regulation of oil pipeline rates under the Interstate Commerce Act and a different regulatory scheme under the Natural Gas Act.

21 December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 69. The December 2006 Sepulveda Order involved a calendar year 2006 base period followed by a nine-month adjustment period in 2007. The Commission accepted adjustments to the base period data due to the drop in volumes experienced by one shipper (Ultramar). However, it did not accept an adjustment based upon a drop in volumes by another shipper (GATX), finding that the drop in volumes was not a significant lasting change.

22 December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 69-70.
this factual determination, the 2006 Sepulveda Order did not preclude the Commission from using actual adjustment period data to the extent this data reflected future conditions.\(^{23}\) In Opinion No. 511, the Commission assessed a different set of facts and concluded that the actual adjustment period volumes provided an appropriate projection of likely future throughput levels. The ACV Shippers' contention that Opinion No. 511 departed from Commission oil pipeline base and test period regulations lacks foundation.\(^{24}\)

21. Within this regulatory framework, the Commission also re-affirms its position that the annualized actual data from the nine-month adjustment period of January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 are the most representative of future throughput. The volume data after January 1, 2008, reflects the effects of the East Line expansion on West Line throughput and other throughput level changes.\(^{25}\) Opinion No. 511 correctly rejected ACC Shippers' and Tesoro's proposed throughput levels because these projections did not provide a realistic estimate of future volumes. As stated in Opinion No. 511 and uncontested on rehearing, on a per barrel per day basis, the West Line to Phoenix volume levels proposed by ACV Shippers and Tesoro exceed the actual volume

\(^{23}\) Rather, the December 2006 Sepulveda Order gave consideration to using 12-month actual data that overlapped with much of the adjustment period. December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 69-70.

\(^{24}\) Furthermore, Opinion No. 511's decision to use the last 12-months of the 21-month test period is not inconsistent with the requirement that pipelines provide initial base period data. As the Commission has explained:

The Commission also does not agree that using the updated data for the last twelve months of the test period means that the pipeline's evidence supporting the initial filing is a waste of time. The evidence ensures that the pipeline may not file for a rate change without justification, aids the discovery process, and establishes a base period for the parties to work with.

*Northwest Pipeline, Corp.*, 87 FERC, at 62,029.

\(^{25}\) Opinion No. 511 recognized that the decline in the West Line volumes in 2008 was not entirely due to the additional capacity on the East Line. Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at n.33 (citing Ex. ACV-1 at 8).
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

level for every single month in the adjustment period from January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008.26

22. ACV Shippers and Tesoro rely upon various economic projections to justify their departure from the actual adjustment period data, but as Opinion No. 511 determined, such projections and estimates are inherently speculative. Tesoro notes that between May 2010 and December 2010, the EIA increased its projections for consumption of motor gasoline and liquid fuels in future years. However, this change simply reflects the uncertainty and contingent nature of such future projections.27 Given these uncertainties, Opinion No. 511 appropriately used actual annualized data from January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008. These are the conditions characterizing the actual conditions when the rates were filed and entered into effect on July 1, 2008. Consistent with the Commission’s regulations, to the extent that events in the post-test period alter cost of service components for future years, Commission regulations permit shippers to file complaints.28

23. The Commission also rejects Tesoro’s suggestion that the Commission should utilize post-test period data. Whereas the Commission has often used post-base period

26 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 29 n.35 (citing Ex. SFP-187).


28 ACV Shippers’ objection to the Commission’s complaint proceedings as a remedy is without merit. Under section 13(1) of the ICA and Commission regulations, a complaint has been the longstanding remedy for shippers raising objections to rates they no longer believe are just and reasonable.
data, the Commission only uses data outside the combined 21-months consisting of the 12-month base period and the 9-month adjustment period for good cause shown.\(^{29}\)

Opinion No. 511 specifically considered actual post-adjustment period data from October 2008-September 2009 and found no good cause for departure from the general regulatory practice of limiting consideration to the base and adjustment period.\(^{30}\) Tesoro’s rehearing request fails to explain why it believes the Opinion No. 511’s analysis of this actual post-adjustment period data was incorrect. The perpetual consideration and incorporation into cost of service data from outside the 21-month period would create a forever moving target. Tesoro has not presented good cause for departing from the general regulatory practice of limiting consideration to the base period and adjustment period data.

24. Likewise, the Commission will not reconsider, as requested by ACV Shippers, the West Line volumes adopted by Opinion No. 511 based upon an Administrative Law Judge’s decision in Docket No. IS09-437-000 involving the East Line volumes. As an initial matter, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision is not Commission precedent. More fundamentally, Docket Nos. IS08-390 and IS09-437 are two separate proceedings, filed one year apart and with effective dates one year apart.\(^{31}\) The base and adjustment periods in the two proceedings are also different and have been developed in separate records.\(^{32}\) Consequently, it is not necessary for the cost of service calculations in one case to correspond to the cost of service calculations in the other proceeding.

\(^{29}\) 18 C.F.R. § 346.2(a)(ii) (2011). Tesoro’s discussion of this issue relies heavily upon Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company, 52 FERC ¶ 61,170 (1990) and Northwest Pipeline Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,266. However, the referenced discussions in both Williston and Northwest used data from within the 21-month period consisting of the base period and the subsequent nine-month adjustment period. Williston, 52 FERC at 61,646-49; Northwest Pipeline Corp., 87 FERC at 62,028. Neither case used actual data from outside the 21-month test period.

\(^{30}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 29 & n.38.

\(^{31}\) Docket No. IS08-390-000 involves a proposed a rate increase for the West Line to be effective August 1, 2008. Docket No. IS09-437-000 involves a proposed rate increase for the East Line to be effective September 1, 2009.

\(^{32}\) Under Rule 716 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Commission has discretion to reopen the record when good cause is shown. 18 C.F.R. § 385.716 (2011). As discussed below, on its own motion the Commission provided for additional materials to be provided on the issue of SFPP’s overhead cost allocations. The Shipper Parties assert on rehearing that the Commission failed to meet the standard of its own regulation and therefore should not have provided SFPP an opportunity to provide

(continued...)
25. Contrary to Tesoro’s suggestions, the Commission’s requirement that SFPP use the actual annualized January 1, 2008, to September 30, 2008 volumes, for the Yuma Marine Corp. Air Station and the Calnevi Interconnect at Colton are consistent with the Phoenix throughput levels adopted by Opinion No. 511. Rather than undermining the test and base period adopted by the Commission, this directive merely assured that all volumes being used to determine West Line throughput were from the same January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008 period.

C. Compliance Filing

1. SFPP’s Compliance Filing

26. In Schedule 21 of its Compliance Filing, SFPP calculated its annualized January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 West Line throughput to be 72,389,800 barrels. As directed by Opinion No. 511, SFPP states that it adjusted throughput to all West Line destinations in order to synchronize volumetric data across the entire cost of service. SFPP also states that it adjusted throughput-related costs as directed by Opinion No. 511.

2. Shipper Protests

27. Trial Staff states that the annualized throughput levels contained within SFPP’s Compliance Filing conflict with the throughput levels over the same period in Trial Staff witness Bonnie Pride’s testimony of 72,453,200 barrels33 as well as SFPP witness James Kehlet’s testimony. In protesting SFPP’s Compliance Filing, Tesoro and ACV Shippers challenge the findings of Opinion No. 511, reiterating many of the arguments they raised on rehearing.

28. In SFPP’s answer, it responds to Trial Staff that the annualized volumes reflected on Schedule 21 used the same monthly volume data as utilized by Mr. Kehlet in his Exhibit No. SF-64. SFPP urges the rejection of Trial Staff’s methodology because,

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additional evidence regarding the allocation of its overhead costs. Despite that objection to the Commission’s action involving overhead cost allocation, the ACV Shippers fail to request on rehearing that Rule 716 be applied here nor do they discuss the applicable standard as it would relate to the additional record evidence from Docket No. IS09-437-000. They fail to do so even though the additional material they seek to submit would fall outside the base and adjustment period of this proceeding.

33 Trial Staff June 15, 2011 Protest of SFPP Compliance Filing at 4 (citing Ex. S-22) (Trial Staff Protest).
according to SFPP, Staff annualized the January to September 2008 volumes using an approach that assumed each month had the same number of days. In contrast, SFPP states that it used a more accurate approach which converted the January to September 2008 volumes to annual volumes on a daily basis. SFPP further notes that the difference between Staff’s and SFPP’s calculation is a mere 0.09 percent of the total barrels.

29. SFPP argues that the protests filed by ACV Shippers and Tesoro argue that Opinion No. 511 reached the wrong result, not that SFPP failed to comply with Opinion No. 511. SFPP also alleges that ACV Shippers and Tesoro improperly rely on documents not in the record.

3. **Commission Determination**

30. In the next compliance filing, the Commission will require SFPP to file additional explanation to support the throughput level of 72,389,800 barrels contained in its Compliance Filing. Specifically, SFPP has not provided work papers in its Compliance Filing or its answer demonstrating how the proposed throughput level of 72,389,800 barrels was derived from Exhibit No. SFP-64 as claimed in its answer. This information is necessary to address the objections and concerns raised by Trial Staff regarding the accuracy of SFPP’s calculations.

31. The Commission rejects the concerns raised by Tesoro and ACV in their protests to SFPP’s Compliance Filing. Tesoro and ACV Shippers challenge the findings of Opinion No. 511 itself. To the extent ACV Shippers and Tesoro raised these arguments on rehearing, the Commission has addressed them. However, as posed in a protest to a compliance filing, such objections to Opinion No. 511 are untimely.

III. **Volumetric Allocation of Costs**

32. Opinion No. 511 held that consistent with the Commission’s discussion of West Line throughput, the volumes used in the route directory to allocate expenses between interstate and intrastate costs and at the Phoenix Terminal should use the annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008, for all destinations.34

33. SFPP states that its Compliance Filing reflects these volume adjustments.35 SFPP explains that because the adjustments to the separation factors of the route directory

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34 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 57.

35 SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab A, Schedule 13.
affect both the direct investment and expense attributable to West Line interstate service, these changes ripple through virtually every aspect of the cost of service calculations.\textsuperscript{36}

34. No party protests this aspect of SFPP’s filing, and the Commission finds that SFPP has complied with the directives of Opinion No. 511 in this regard.

IV. Operating Expenses and Rate Design

A. Litigation Costs

1. Opinion No. 511

35. Opinion No. 511 determined that SFPP may recover its regulatory litigation expenses attributable to this proceeding through a three-year surcharge developed to reflect the costs incurred in this proceeding during the hearing, rehearing, and compliance phases. Opinion No. 511 noted that a similar litigation recovery surcharge has been previously adopted in complaint proceedings involving SFPP and stated that a surcharge based upon actual litigation costs recoverable over a limited period provides an appropriate means to avoid both over-recovery and under-recovery. Opinion No. 511 further noted the protracted litigation historically involving SFPP and stated that under these circumstances, there is little assurance that base period data, test period data, or any other normalization would provide sufficiently representative estimates of future expense levels.

2. Rehearing

a. Rehearing Arguments

36. ACV Shippers contend that the Commission erred by not limiting SFPP’s recovery for litigation costs to those incurred during the base period. ACV Shippers argue that under Commission regulations,\textsuperscript{37} cost of service must be defined based upon a historical base period and non-recurring costs are to be eliminated or normalized from the cost of service included in rates. The ACV shippers state that the Commission provided no justification for treating litigation costs differently from SFPP’s other operations and maintenance expenses. ACV Shippers also state that Opinion No. 511’s treatment of litigation costs is inconsistent with Commission policy prohibiting recovery of costs incurred outside of the test period.

\textsuperscript{36} Id. at Affidavit of Thomas A. Turner at P 4.

\textsuperscript{37} ACV Rehearing at 65-66 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 346.2(a) (2011)).
37. ACV Shippers acknowledge that the Commission has allowed similar treatment of SFPP's litigation costs in the past, but the ACV Shippers dispute that a similar approach is appropriate here. ACV Shippers seek to distinguish these prior cases, stating that the Commission only allowed recovery of such non-recurring, post-test period litigation costs because it was a complaint proceeding and SFPP did not control the timing of the underlying complaint that caused the costs. ACV Shippers dispute that the treatment of litigation costs in Opinion No. 511 will avoid a risk of substantial over-recovery in the future. ACV Shippers also argue that the Commission's holding will create perverse litigation incentives if SFPP knows in advance that it will recover all of its litigation costs.

38. Tesoro argues that the Commission inappropriately dismissed its argument in favor of a five-year surcharge because Tesoro failed to raise this objection on exceptions and waited until its brief opposing exceptions. Tesoro avers that the Commission is overlooking a substantive argument on the basis of a technicality.

b. Commission Determination

39. The Commission denies rehearing. Pipelines are entitled to recover their reasonably incurred rate litigation costs. The Commission has permitted SFPP in prior complaint proceedings to recover its litigation costs based upon a surcharge. Although this proceeding relates to a filing initiated by the pipeline, Opinion No. 511 explained that such a surcharge was also appropriate in this instance:

Where significant litigation costs have been incurred and it is uncertain whether those litigation costs will continue into future years, a surcharge based upon actual litigation costs provides an appropriate means to avoid both over-recovery and under-recovery. The protracted litigation that has historically involved SFPP creates unique circumstances rendering it very difficult to determine a


39 SFPP, L.P., Opinion No. 435-A, 91 FERC ¶ 61,135, at 61,512 (2000) (stating "Litigation related to the pipeline's cost of service and the structure of its tariff are part of its normal, ongoing operations, and such costs are recoverable as part of the pipeline's cost of service").

40 See supra note 39.
representative level for SFPP's future regulatory litigation costs. Under these circumstances, there is little assurance that base period data, test period data, or any other normalization would provide sufficiently representative estimates of future expense levels. The surcharge allows recovery of actual costs without creating a risk of substantial over-recovery in the future.\textsuperscript{41}

40. The Commission rejects ACV Shippers' argument that such a surcharge is limited to complaints. The principle that pipelines may recover their prudently incurred FERC litigation costs applies whether a pipeline is filing a rate increase or responding to a complaint. Given this principle, practical considerations undermine the rigid application of the Commission's test period regulations to litigation costs as urged by ACV Shippers. As Opinion No. 511 emphasized, it is difficult to develop a reasonable level of litigation costs based upon historical costs given the complicated and protracted litigation between SFPP and its shippers over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, most of SFPP's litigation costs related to this proceeding are not reflected in the base or adjustment periods.\textsuperscript{43} Thus, if the Commission rigidly applied its test period principles to SFPP's litigation costs, the pipeline would be deprived of its ability to recover litigation costs that are representative of the costs incurred to support this rate filing unless it filed a second rate case. Such an approach is neither administratively efficient nor consistent with SFPP's right to recover its reasonably incurred litigation costs.

41. The ACV Shippers' other objections are without merit. Although SFPP made the decision to file the rate increase, it does not control the degree to which shippers have litigated the issues raised in this proceeding. Regarding ACV Shippers' concern that the litigation surcharge will create perverse incentives, pipelines are limited to their prudently incurred litigation costs.

42. The Commission also affirms its adoption of a three year period to collect the surcharge as opposed to a five-year period. As Opinion No. 511 concluded, Tesoro did

\textsuperscript{41} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 35 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{42} Id.

\textsuperscript{43} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 36; see also Ex. SFP-188 at 26-27. For example, ACV Shippers' reliance on the 2007 base period produced an annual West Line litigation charge of $429,492, which is not representative of the $6.7 million that SFPP reports in its Compliance Filing as the total cost to litigate this case over roughly the past three years. See SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab A, Statement B.
not raise this issue in a timely manner on exceptions and waited until its brief opposing exceptions. Moreover, as Opinion No. 511 explained, although prior SFPP decisions have applied a five-year surcharge, the Commission determined that a three-year surcharge is an appropriate time period for recovery of litigation costs in this proceeding because the costs have been incurred over approximately three years of litigation.

3. Compliance Filing

43. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP has filed to recover accumulated litigation costs of $6.7 million. These litigation costs are for expenses associated with this proceeding as billed to SFPP through the date of the Compliance Filing, generally representing litigation services through March 2011. SFPP explains that this results in a litigation expense surcharge per barrel of $0.0310, and that Page 2 of Schedule 24 provides the total litigation expenses implicitly recovered by SFPP through the surcharge during the refund period (August 1, 2008 through May 31, 2011) of $6.2 million.

44. Trial Staff and ExxonMobil/BP argue that SFPP’s tariff should separately state the litigation surcharge and explicitly state that the surcharge will be removed after a three-year period. ExxonMobil/BP explains that separately stating the surcharge will ensure compliance with Opinion No. 511.

45. In a related argument, Trial Staff notes that SFPP’s Compliance Filing cost of service includes an annual litigation surcharge amount of $2,242,831 in Account 520 of Schedule 15, which is described in a related footnote as “[a]ctual IS08-390 litigation expense amortized over three years” for regulatory litigation expense. They note that Schedule 15 does not mention the elimination of the surcharge in three years. Trial Staff contends that this expense must be removed from the cost of service because it will be

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44 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 34 n.41. Tesoro’s reliance upon the Mid-America case is misplaced. Tesoro Rehearing at 51 (citing Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,123, at P 84 (2010)). In that proceeding, the Commission considered a brief opposing exceptions by a party supporting an administrative law judge’s initial decision. Mid-America Pipeline Company, LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,123 at P 77-84. In this case, Tesoro advocated a modification to the 2009 ID in its brief opposing exceptions.

45 SFPP Compliance Filing, Affidavit of Thomas A. Turner at P 5; see also SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab A, Schedule 24.

46 SFPP Compliance Filing, Affidavit of Thomas A. Turner at P 5.
collected from a surcharge rather than as part of the tariff rate and to prevent this expense from being included in the cost of service upon which a future index filing will be based.

46. Trial Staff and ACV Shippers also argue that if SFPP is permitted to recover this expense through a separate surcharge, such costs should be treated separately on SFPP’s Form No. 6 (including on page 700) and should not be included in determining the level of the Commission’s oil pipeline index. Tesoro argues that the legal costs in SFPP’s Compliance Filing appear to be inflated and may not be justified. Tesoro asserts that SFPP should be required to explain in further detail what exactly is contained in this cost category before the rates that it is requesting are approved. Finally, Tesoro asserts that SFPP’s rates should be appropriately reduced by August 2011 to reflect the end of the amortization period. ACV Shippers also challenge the holdings of Opinion No. 511 itself, reiterating many of the arguments previously raised on rehearing.

47. In its answer, SFPP responds that the Shipper Parties’ challenges to the holding of Opinion No. 511 are procedurally flawed. SFPP also argues that there is no merit to Trial Staff’s and ACV Shippers’ request that SFPP state its litigation surcharge separately in its FERC Form No. 6 or its tariff sheets. SFPP states that page 700 of the FERC Form No. 6 does not contain a specific line item requiring that the litigation surcharge be separately stated. SFPP states that there is no basis for showing its litigation charge as a separate item on the Form No. 6.

48. SFPP also states that it did not list a separate rate to recover its litigation costs in its tariff sheets and does not believe that establishing a separate charge is necessary. SFPP states that the litigation surcharge is clearly set forth in its Compliance Filing and that it will track its costs and revenues to ensure that it recovers no more than its actual costs.

49. The Commission accepts the litigation costs of $6.7 million contained within SFPP’s Compliance Filing. Tesoro states that it requires more information to assess the litigation costs in SFPP’s Compliance Filing, but Tesoro does not provide a sufficient basis for believing that the monthly figures provided by SFPP in schedule 24 are not credible. Although some protests raised concerns that SFPP had not identified the surcharge separately on its tariff sheets, this issue is moot because collection of the three year surcharge began August 1, 2008 and stopped August, 1, 2011. With respect to the rates calculated based upon Opinion No. 511, SFPP did not apply an index increase to the

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litigation component of its costs.48 This is appropriate because SFPP is recovering its litigation costs via a surcharge for accumulated litigation costs that already incorporate inflationary changes over the August 1, 2008 through August 1, 2011, period in which they have been collected.

50. The Commission will not address in this proceeding the treatment of the litigation surcharge in the calculation of the Commission’s oil pipeline index. This question is more appropriately addressed at the time of the next five-year index review.49 However, in its Compliance Filing and as a note in its next annual Form No. 6 filing, SFPP must provide information (a) identifying its litigation costs for each year related to this case, (b) explaining how much it recovered in the surcharge, and (c) explaining how these litigation costs have been reported on the Form No. 6, including page 700. This information will help the Commission and interested parties monitor SFPP’s compliance with Opinion No. 511 and will facilitate further evaluation during the next five-year review.

51. The Commission rejects the arguments raised by ACV Shippers in their protest against SFPP’s Compliance Filing that challenge the determination of Opinion No. 511. ACV Shippers should have raised these arguments on rehearing, and to the extent these arguments were properly raised on rehearing, the Commission addressed them above. However, when raised in a protest to a compliance filing, such objections are untimely.

B. Environmental Costs

52. Opinion No. 511 upheld the 2009 ID and adopted an environmental remediation cost of $1,877,610. The Commission denied arguments made by Trial Staff on exceptions that the 2009 ID improperly included non-jurisdictional costs.50 No party sought rehearing on this issue.

53. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP states that it included $1,877,610 of environmental remediation expenses in its West Line cost of service reflected in adjustments from SFPP’s Exhibit SFP-57C to costs at the Colton Terminal, Liberty and Watson Station sites. SFPP states that it applied volumetric separation factors attributable to the

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48 SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab A, Schedules 20 and 22.
49 The Commission reviews the index level every five years and completed its most recent review in 2010-2011.
50 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 70.
remaining costs, reducing the total amount included in SFPP’s Compliance Filing to $1,836,482.

54. Tesoro asserts that SFPP improperly calculated its environmental remediation expenses in its Compliance Filing. Tesoro explains that Opinion No. 511 adopted the 2009 ID’s adjustments regarding environmental expenses.\(^{51}\) Tesoro explains that although SFPP removed costs associated with the Liberty and Watson sites as required by the 2009 ID, SFPP did not make further adjustments required by the 2009 ID based upon 2008 costs rather than the 2007 costs used by SFPP.\(^{52}\) Tesoro states that the testimony of SFPP witness Michael A. Hanak\(^{53}\) provides 2008 environmental costs as required by the 2009 ID and upheld in Opinion No. 511. Based upon this data, Tesoro claims that the 2008 actual environmental costs should be $1.6 million rather than $1.8 million.

55. In its reply comments, SFPP states that Tesoro’s argument rests upon a mistaken description of the 2009 ID. SFPP states that the 2009 ID adopted $1,877,610 as the appropriate amount for environmental remediation costs and did not order SFPP to make any additional reductions to that figure.\(^{54}\) SFPP notes that if Tesoro disagreed with the 2009 ID’s findings, it should have raised the issue on exceptions. SFPP adds that Opinion No. 511 also expressly determined that $1,877,610 to be the appropriate amount for environmental remediation costs,\(^{55}\) and SFPP notes that Tesoro never raised the issue on rehearing. Finally, SFPP concludes that Tesoro provided no support for its position other than a misreading of the 2009 ID. SFPP states that Tesoro does not cite any evidence supporting the claim that 2008 environmental remediation costs should be used or supporting the amount of environmental remediation costs that Tesoro now advances.

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\(^{51}\) Tesoro June 15, 2011 Comments on SFPP Compliance Filing at 30 (Tesoro Protest) (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 70).

\(^{52}\) Id.

\(^{53}\) Id. at 30-31 (citing Ex. SFP-120 at 4; Ex. SFP-123 at 4).


\(^{55}\) Id. at 70 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 67-70).
56. Also in reply comments, Trial Staff supports Tesoro’s position, asserting that the 2009 ID, as upheld by Opinion No. 511, directed SFPP to use 2008 data in calculating remediation expenses.

57. The Commission accepts SFPP’s inclusion of $1,836,482\(^{56}\) of environmental remediation expenses in its cost of service. Opinion No. 511 authorized SFPP to include this sum in its cost of service.\(^{57}\) No party challenged Opinion No. 511’s findings regarding environmental costs on rehearing or sought clarification of the relationship between Opinion No. 511 and the 2009 ID. Thus, the objections raised in comments on SFPP’s Compliance Filing are untimely. It is not appropriate to revisit different interpretations of the 2009 ID at this stage in the proceeding.

C. Fuel and Power Costs

58. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission determined that throughput and related cost of service items should be derived from a test period using annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008.\(^{58}\) In its Compliance Filing, SFPP included fuel and power costs of $6,608,495.\(^{59}\)

59. In its protest to SFPP’s Compliance Filing, Tesoro argues that fuel and power levels in SFPP’s Compliance Filing are incorrect because SFPP determined the fuel and power costs based upon too low a throughput level, as opposed to the throughput level favored by Tesoro. Tesoro also objects to SFPP’s adjustment for a power increase at Yuma. Trial Staff states that SFPP failed to comply with the directives of Opinion No. 511 which required that throughput-related cost of service items should be derived from a test period using annualized actual data for January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008.

60. In reply comments, SFPP states that its Compliance Filing used fuel and power costs for 2007 whereas Opinion No. 511 provides that fuel and power costs were to be based on data for the first nine months of 2008 annualized. SFPP states that it will

\(^{56}\) Opinion No. 511 authorized SFPP to include environmental costs of $1,877,610. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP adjusted this number solely to account for Opinion No. 511’s decision altering the volumetric separation factors.

\(^{57}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 70.

\(^{58}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 27.

\(^{59}\) SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab A, Schedule 15, Page 1.
correct this item in the revised compliance filing following the Commission’s order on rehearing of Opinion No. 511. SFPP states that this change will render moot Tesoro’s objection to the power increase at Yuma Station because using the first nine months of data from 2008 will reflect the actual costs at Yuma Station.

61. SFPP also states that Tesoro’s objection to throughput levels improperly challenges the merits of Opinion No. 511. In its reply comments, Trial Staff also states that Tesoro’s adjustment to fuel and power costs is improper.

62. The Commission directs SFPP to modify its fuel and power costs as proposed in its reply comments. Fuel and power costs vary depending upon throughput levels. To the extent that SFPP is using the throughput for the January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 period, it must also use the annualized fuel and power costs incurred for the same period. However, Opinion No. 511 rejected the volume levels advocated by Tesoro, and thus the Commission must also reject the fuel and power costs that are based upon Tesoro’s proposed volume levels.

V. Overhead Cost Allocation

A. General

1. Summary of 2009 ID Determinations

63. Allocation of overhead costs is a significant issue in this rate proceeding as approximately 11 percent of SFPP’s West Line cost of service is attributable to the allocation of corporate overhead expenses. Neither SFPP nor KMEP, the master limited partnership that wholly owns SFPP, have any employees. Rather, all operating and administrative services and related overhead functions are provided by either Kinder Morgan, Inc. (KMI) or KinderMorgan General Partner Services (GP Services). Both KMI and GP Services provided overhead services to both SFPP and multiple other companies operated by KMEP.

64. The 2009 ID made seven main findings regarding the KMI/KMEP cost allocation methodology and accounting structure. First, that the accounting structure is consistent with the purpose of the Massachusetts formula because it directly assigns overhead costs to specific subsidiaries where possible, and then allocates the residual costs through KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Second, that the KMI-Operated Entities, certain Joint Ventures, and the KM Canada Entities were properly excluded from the KMEP’s

60 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 750-758.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

Massachusetts formula. Third, that KMI’s accounting system assigned or allocated costs with reasonable accuracy. Fourth, that year-end plant balances should be used to determine the rate base element used in SFPP’s Massachusetts formula, and thereby rejected SFPP’s proposal to use a two-year (semi-annual) average. Fifth, that any purchase accounting adjustments should be removed from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities. Sixth, that it is acceptable to use Tejas Consolidated’s net revenues in applying the Massachusetts formula if Tejas Consolidated were included in KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Seventh, that KMI’s capitalized overhead costs must be excluded from the Massachusetts formula. The 2009 ID therefore rejected the ACC Shippers’ proposal that all entities included in the KMI business structure be consolidated in a single corporate-wide “all in” Massachusetts formula that would include all of the overhead costs of all the KMI-Owned, KMI-Operated, KMEP-Operated, Joint Venture and KM Canada entities. The 2009 ID also rejected ACC Shippers’ alternative proposal, which is similar to Tesoro’s, that all KMEP-Owned Entities be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. The 2009 ID also rejected Trial Staff’s proposal to use a KMEP-wide formula on an interim basis.

2. Opinion No. 511

In Opinion No. 511, the Commission generally affirmed the ALJ’s findings regarding the allocation of overhead costs among SFPP’s affiliates and between SFPP’s

61 Id. P 759-768.
62 Id. P 775-778.
63 Id. P 779-780.
64 Id. P 781-785.
65 Id. P 786-790.
66 Id. P 791-796.
67 The ACC Shippers includes the Airlines, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips. At the hearing phase, Valero had not yet joined with the ACC Shippers.
68 Id. P 769.
69 Id.
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional services. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission, concurring with the ALJ, determined that the KMI/KMEP cost allocation methodology is generally appropriate in that it assigns costs at the lowest possible level of KMEP's business structure, and then allocates the residual costs through the Massachusetts formula to each business entity that benefits, by more than a de minimis amount, from the KMI-shared or GP Services costs. Thus, KMI's accounting methodology complies with the requirements of the Massachusetts formula. However, the Commission concluded that further documentation of some of the accounting details was required to ensure accurate assignment of costs. However, the Commission required SFPP to provide a fuller analysis and explanation of the relevant responsibility centers (RCs) including the audit material and supporting analysis to allow the Commission to determine whether the costs flowing to KMEP and SFPP from GP Services and KMI are assigned and allocated with reasonable accuracy to KMEP, and ultimately to the KMEP-Operated Entities, which includes SFPP.

66. The Commission further concluded that nothing in the record supports a finding that all GP Services' overhead costs must be allocated through KMEP-wide Massachusetts formula to all of KMEP-Operated Entities without regard to what costs can be directly assigned to those entities. The Commission found acceptable that KMEP accounts for overhead costs differently in its SEC annual 10-K filing versus the regulatory accounting used in this rate case. Further, the Commission found that inevitable human error involved in using any accounting structure did not itself render the accounting arbitrary and subjective.

67. Regarding the ALJ's exclusion of certain KMEP-Owned Entities from KMEP's Massachusetts formula (certain Joint Ventures, Marine Terminal and the KM Canada Entities, and eight KMI-Operated natural gas entities), the Commission found that all but

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70 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 73-150.

71 Id. P 94.

72 Id. P 130.

73 Id. P 130-138.

74 Id. P 97.

75 Id. P 101.

76 Id. P 103, 128-138.
the KM Canada Entities were correctly excluded. With respect to KM Canada, the Commission held that SFPP must provide additional information and documentation to support their exclusion.

68. Finally, the Commission ruled on challenges to SFPP’s application of four cost categories and one revenue factor in its calculation of KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Specifically, the Commission ruled that SFPP’s method of assigning certain employee related costs (i.e., allocating ongoing pension and related employee benefits through its Massachusetts formula rather than directly assigning those costs) was in error, and ordered SFPP to adjust these employee-related costs in its Compliance Filing. Next, on the issue of the proper method for removing purchase accounting adjustments (PAA) from the rate base of KMEP-Operated and KMI-Operated Entities, the Commission held that SFPP correctly removed all PAAAs from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities in applying KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. With regard to KMI’s so-called “going-private” costs, the Commission upheld SFPP’s treatment of $5.572 million of the going-private costs as a recurring costs, but noted that SFPP may not include any of the remaining $262.2 million buy-out cost in KMEP’s cost allocation pool because they were non-recurring costs. Next, with respect to the capitalization of overhead costs related to capital investments, where SFPP disputed the determination in the 2009 ID that SFPP should allocate indirect overhead costs involving capital investments through KMEP’s Massachusetts formula, the Commission directed SFPP to address this issue in its Compliance Filing. Last, on the issue of whether to use Tejas Consolidated’s gross or net revenues in calculating KMEP’s Massachusetts formula, the Commission concluded that it was correct to use net rather than gross revenues.

77 Id. P 110-127.
78 Id. P 120.
79 Id. P 139-147.
80 Id. P 140-141.
81 Id. P 142.
82 Id. P 143.
83 Id. P 145.
84 Id. P 146-147.
69. Regarding SFPP’s KN Method, which is used to allocate overhead costs between SFPP’s jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facilities, and among SFPP’s different jurisdictional activities, the Commission reversed the ALJ and directed SFPP to apply the KN Method set forth in Opinion No. 731. 85

B. Rehearing Requests

70. SFPP, Tesoro, and the ACV Shippers sought rehearing of most overhead cost allocation issues. SFPP seeks rehearing of the Commission’s determination regarding the KN Method. Tesoro and ACV Shippers sought rehearing of virtually every determination regarding SFPP’s application of the Massachusetts formula. As noted above, both the ACV Shippers and Tesoro rely on the East Line Rate Proceeding record to date, i.e., the presiding ALJ’s initial decision in Docket No. IS09-437-000 (East Line ID) to support their rehearing requests. An initial decision pending before the Commission on exceptions is not a final Commission decision, and as such does not create binding precedent. 86 The Commission again reiterates that the East Line ID, now pending on exceptions, is of no precedential value for purposes of this case. Accordingly, the Commission will not acknowledge or address any arguments that rely on the East Line ID to support their position.

71. In addition, both Tesoro and ACV Shippers repeat a significant portion of their rehearing requests in their June 15, 2011 comments on SFPP’s Compliance Filing. These arguments do not pertain to the specific matters that are the subject of SFPP’s Compliance Filing. Rather, ACV Shippers and Tesoro use their comments to challenge Commission findings, conclusions and directives in Opinion No. 511. SFPP also falls victim to this by responding in its July 11, 2011 Reply Comments to Shipper Parties’ recitation of their rehearing arguments in their comments on the Compliance Filing. The Commission will not consider arguments raised in pleadings in the compliance phase of this proceeding that are not focused on whether the specific Commission directives are being correctly implemented in the Compliance Filing. 87

85 Id. P 150.


87 Delmarva Power & Light Co., 63 FERC ¶ 61,321, at 63,160 (1993) (Commission will not consider arguments raised in a compliance proceeding that are not

(continued...)
1. Appropriateness of SFPP's Cost Allocation Methodology

a. Rehearing Requests

72. Tesoro challenges the Commission’s general determination that the KMI accounting methodology for allocating overhead costs employed by KMEP is a valid, accurate method in contrast to the approaches presented by shipper witnesses Daniel Arthur and Peter Ashton. Tesoro argues on rehearing that SFPP’s multi-tiered approach to the allocation of general and administrative costs is inherently unreliable and likely leads to cross-subsidization and unjustifiably inflates SFPP’s rates. Tesoro further argues that SFPP has the burden of proof to validate the reliability of the accounting system as well as the methods employed to allocate corporate overhead expenses. Tesoro argues that the Commission erroneously concluded that KMI’s accounting methodology is consistent with the purpose of the Massachusetts formula. Tesoro states that evidence shows KMI’s accounting structure and allocation methodology are not transparent and notes that neither the Commission nor any of the shippers can audit the individual direct assignments to ensure consistency with the objective of the Massachusetts formula. Tesoro concludes that the KMI accounting system is inconsistent with cost causation because it cannot be audited and cannot be matched with cost causation. Tesoro states that the issue is whether the application of KMI’s accounting structure and methodology produces accurate, reliable results, which can be verified by the Commission and shippers.

73. Similarly, ACV Shippers argue that the Commission’s approval of SFPP’s general and administrative (G&A) overhead cost allocation methodology is arbitrary and not well founded. ACV Shippers take issue with the Commission’s acceptance of the “arbitrary and subjective predilection of individual pipeline’s or their parent’s unique accounting method,” notwithstanding that the accounting methodology is nowhere publicly identified or recognized such as in the audited financial reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In sum, ACV Shippers argue that SFPP failed at hearing responsive to the complying party’s response to the explicit directives of the Commission’s earlier order).

88 ACV Shippers’ witness Dr. Arthur advocates the “all in” approach. Specifically, Dr. Arthur proposes a combined KMEP/KMI Massachusetts formula which allocates $340.1 million of overhead expenses to all KMI and KMEP subsidiaries without any direct assignments of overhead expenses. See 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 263. Likewise, shipper witness Mr. Ashton rejects SFPP’s proposed multi-tired Massachusetts formula. See id. P 298-299.
to provide adequate data to demonstrate transparency, consistency, reliability, and credibility regarding its G&A overhead cost allocation scheme.

74. ACV Shippers argue that the Commission erred in allowing SFPP to file additional data to support its G&A overhead cost allocation methodology rather than rejecting it for failure to carry its burden of proof. ACV Shippers argue that this unfairly gave SFPP a second bite at the apple. They further argue that although shippers will be able to comment on SFPP’s Compliance Filing, it is not a meaningful opportunity to test the credibility and probative value of SFPP’s claims through discovery, testimony, and cross-examination. ACV Shippers assert that the Commission’s rules provide that evidence may not be added to the evidentiary record after the record is closed, unless reopened under Rule 716 which rule allows the Commission to reopen a record if it has reason to believe that reopening is warranted by changes in conditions of fact or of law or by the public interest. Finally, ACV Shippers note that requiring a compliance filing is unnecessary because the Commission already has before it updated analyses, clarifications, and evidence regarding SFPP’s alleged accounting methodology and related overhead scheme, including its direct assignments all of which have been tested through discovery and cross-examination in SFPP’s East Line rate case. The ACV Shippers advocate, on the issue of the appropriateness of SFPP’s cost allocation methodology, relying on the record G&A overhead data in the East Line proceeding instead of the supplemental overhead data provided in SFPP’s Compliance Filing.

75. The ACV Shippers further argue that the Commission, in reviewing SFPP’s overhead cost allocation methodology, failed to apply the level of scrutiny required in past proceedings based on concerns for cross-subsidies between affiliates and jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional facilities. The ACV Shippers point out that Kinder Morgan has a strong incentive to allocate and/or assign as high a level of overhead expenses to SFPP as possible in order to increase SFPP’s rates and revenues. To support this argument, ACV Shippers cite two cases for the proposition that Commission will scrutinize transactions between affiliates. 89

76. ACV Shippers further seek rehearing of the Commission’s rejection of their proposed “all in” KMI/KMEP combined Massachusetts formula for allocating G&A overhead costs. ACV Shippers state that the sole reason the Commission gave for rejecting ACV Shippers’ proposal is the Commission’s belief that SFPP’s proposed G&A overhead accounting methodology provides a credible, reliable, and accurate assignment

89 See ACV Rehearing at 99 (citing Northeast Utility Service Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,332, at 62,089-90 (1994); Missouri River Energy Servs., et al., 130 FERC ¶ 63,014, at P 433-437 (2010)).
or allocation of overhead costs. ACV Shippers state that the Commission also erred in accepting the Trial Staff’s assertion that the ACV Shipper’s “all in” method was the antithesis of matching cost allocation with causation. ACV Shippers assert that its proposed “all in” method is consistent with the single-tier, three-factor Massachusetts formula, and reasonably matches G&A overhead costs with causation where direct assignment of such costs cannot be reliability or accurately made or lack justification. ACV Shippers assert that the Commission’s rejection of the “all in” method is based on the erroneous conclusion that Kinder Morgan’s accounting methodology can reasonably and credibly isolate costs within entities or groups of entities.

77. ACV Shippers claim that the Commission, in rejecting the “all-in” method, ignores the fact that SFPP witness Bradley (i) testified that the use of the Commission’s single-tier Massachusetts formula methodology for all subsidiaries of a parent company is reasonable, (ii) agreed that there is a causal connection between the three Massachusetts formula factors and the incurrence of KMEP’s G&A overhead costs, and (iii) agreed that the Commission’s single-tier Massachusetts formula model reasonably matches residual corporate overhead costs with causation. ACV Shippers reiterate that the Commission fails to make any attempt to reconcile its own precedent established in Williston Basin, where the direct assignment of G&A overhead costs cannot be made on a reliable and accurate basis or justified, such G&A overhead costs are to be allocated pursuant to the Commission’s established three-factor, single-tier Massachusetts formula.

78. ACV Shippers assert that their witness, Dr. Arthur, proposed “all in” or combined KMI/KMEP Massachusetts formula allocation of unallocated G&A overhead costs is clearly required in order to develop a just and reasonable level of G&A overhead costs for designing rates. ACV Shippers note that Dr. Arthur explained that given (i) the fact

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90 ACV Rehearing at 203 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 96).


92 Id. at 205 (citing ACV-287 at 49-50).

93 Id. (citing ACV-287 at 57-58).


95 ACV Rehearing at 210 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 46-47).
that neither KMEP nor SFPP have any employees and all overhead expenses that are allocated or assigned to KMEP originate at KMI, (ii) the complexity associated with the KMI and KMEP organizational structure, (iii) the lack of any transparency, objectivity, and accuracy associated with Kinder Morgan’s allocation of G&A overhead costs between KMI and KMEP, (iv) the fact that Kinder Morgan policy allows, at any moment, for KMI or GP Services employees to perform work for any Kinder Morgan entity, (v) the blatant inaccuracies, potential for unfettered and subjective manipulation, and (vi) the improper cross-subsidies created between the subsidiaries of KMI and KMEP, there is no credible, reliable, or reasonable foundation for believing or even ascertaining that a KMEP-only Massachusetts formula allocation reasonable represents the amount of overhead expense incurred for the benefit of KMEP’s subsidiaries.

b. Commission Determination

79. The Commission denies the shippers’ overarching challenge on rehearing of the Commission’s approval of SFPP’s cost allocation methodology. This case presents the Commission with two cost allocation approaches from which to choose. The first option is SFPP’s “multi-tiered” costing methodology. The second alternative, supported by the Tesoro and the ACV Shippers, is the single, corporate-wide (or single-tiered) Massachusetts formula, the “all in” approach. The Commission must determine which of these two cost allocation approaches to use. In addressing this issue, the central holding that controls is that “[c]ost allocation is not an exact science and no one method may be said to fit all situations.” 96 In deciding which cost allocation methodology to apply, the Commission must choose from the cost allocation alternatives available on the record. 97 Thus, the Commission “must sometimes conclude which is the more reasonable of the several [cost allocation] alternatives.” 98 To make the decision, the Commission considers which methodology most closely conforms to the Commission’s long standing practice of trying to align cost allocation with cost causation. 99


97 See id. (stating that where the record presents the Commission with three flawed approaches from which to choose, it must choose from the alternatives available on the record).

98 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 106 FERC ¶ 61,299, at P 190 (2004); see also Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 589 (1945) (noting “[a]llocation of costs is not a matter for the slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad of facts. It has no claim to an exact science.”).

80. Both SFPP’s and the shippers’ cost allocation methodologies apply the Commission-approved Massachusetts formula for allocating indirect costs. Thus, the major difference between the two methodologies is the use of direct assignments for certain costs. Under SFPP’s multi-tiered cost allocation methodology, costs are assigned to different operating levels (tiers) within the KMEP structure and then are allocated via the Massachusetts formula. Under this method, there are four tiers. Tier 1 encompasses all KMEP-Operated Entities. The overhead costs included in Tier 1 are those applicable to all of the KMEP-Operated Entities that cannot be assigned to any other tier. These Tier 1 costs are allocated via the Massachusetts formula to all the entities within Tiers 2, 3, and 4. Tier 2 is comprised of KMEP’s products pipeline subsidiaries, which includes SFPP. The overhead costs included in Tier 2 are those that are incurred on behalf of any of KMEP’s products pipelines and related facilities and can be directly assigned to this tier. Tier 2 is further subdivided into four regional groups, and all costs that can be directly assigned to a specific regional group are assigned to that group and then allocated via the Massachusetts formula among the subsidiaries in that specific regional group. The Tier 2 overhead costs that cannot be attributed to any one of the regional groups are allocated, via the Massachusetts formula, to all of the entities within Tier 2. Tier 3 assigns and allocates costs to KMEP’s CO₂ pipeline entities. Tier 4 assigns and allocates costs to bulk terminals and the terminals that are not associated with the products pipelines contained in Tier 2.

81. The cost allocation approach presented by Shipper Parties is the “all-in” approach. Under the “all-in” approach, all of the overhead costs for the entire corporate family (including all KMI and KMEP subsidiaries) would be allocated via the Massachusetts formula to all KMI and KMEP subsidiaries, without any direct assignment of overhead expenses. Shipper Parties advocate for the “all-in” method because they believe that it is impossible under KMI’s accounting structure to make reasonably accurate direct assignments of overhead costs among the entities in the KMI-KMEP corporate structure.

82. The Commission affirms on rehearing that of the two cost allocation methodologies presented in this proceeding, SFPP’s multi-tiered allocation approach more closely gives effect to the Commission policy that costs be directly assigned when it is possible to do so. As the Commission explained in Williams Natural Gas Co., 100 “the [Massachusetts] formula is intended to allocate corporate costs to the subsidiaries to the extent that each subsidiary uses or benefits from the services provided by the corporate cost centers. A direct charge is the most accurate way to match the benefit with the cost, and it should be used as the first step where a direct charge can be assessed.” 101


101 Williams, 85 FERC at 62,138.
Commission further explained in *Williams*, “only after costs are directly charged where appropriate is the general allocator used.”

83. The Commission policy requiring direct charges arises from the principle of cost causation. Under the principle of cost causation, the Commission must ensure that the costs allocated to a beneficiary are at least roughly commensurate with the benefits that are expected to accrue to that entity. The Commission, in reviewing SFPP’s proposed multi-tiered cost allocation methodology, considered whether SFPP’s methodology is consistent with this cost causation principle. However, both the Commission and the U.S. Court of Appeals have made clear that cost allocation is not an exact science. The D.C. Circuit has long recognized that agency ratemaking is “far from an exact science” and involves policy decisions. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has explained that cost causation “does not require exacting precision in a ratemaking agency’s allocation decisions.”

84. SFPP’s multi-tiered approach seeks to maximize the direct assignment of costs to the lowest levels in the operating and accounting structure. The record includes substantial testimony supporting the multi-tiered approach as adhering to the Commission’s principles of cost causation. KMEP directly allocated costs to the

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102 Id. (explaining that direct charges are those charges that have a clearly identifiable beneficial or casual relationship to the product or service provided, but that does not mean the pipeline must engage in an administratively burdensome and expensive process of attempting to allocate directly costs that are not susceptible to direct allocation. Rather practicality may be considered in determining which costs to allocate directly).


104 Id.


107 See e.g., 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 46-59 (describing Bradley direct testimony), P 68-74 (describing Dr. Webb direct testimony), P 451-460 (describing Bradley rebuttal testimony), and P 497 (describing Dr. Webb rebuttal testimony).
incuring entity wherever possible. Further, the multiple tiers of cost allocation imposed by KMEP further helps to directly assign costs to the specific entity or groups of entities that incurred the cost, avoiding a general assignment of KMEP overhead costs to all subsidiaries. Specifically, through the use of a system of separate employees (i.e., GP Services, KMI-dedicated and KMI-shared), RCs, salary splits, time sheets and shared services accounts, the overhead costs associated with the KMI-operated and KMI-owned entities are reasonably separated from the overhead costs associated with the KMEP-operated entities. Thus, the pool of costs allocated through KMEP’s Massachusetts formula includes only those costs associated with the subsidiaries that benefit from the activities that generated the costs, the KMEP-operated entities. SFPP states that KMEP’s allocation of residual overhead costs that cannot be directly assigned to an individual subsidiary or group of subsidiaries is allocated through a traditional, “one-tier” Massachusetts formula.\textsuperscript{108} It would be contrary to the principle of cost causation for an entity outside the KMEP-operated entities to be allocated any KMEP costs through a Massachusetts formula because there is no credible evidence here that those entities benefit from any GP Services costs or from the portion of the KMI costs included in the KMI cross-charge to KMEP.

85. Conversely, under the shippers’ “all in” approach there is no attempt to directly assign any of KMI’s overhead costs. Rather, under the “all in” approach all of KMI’s and KMEP’s overhead costs would be allocated using the Massachusetts formula to all of the Kinder Morgan entities without any regard to which entities benefited from the costs. Under the “all in” approach, all of GP Services’ costs would be allocated via the Massachusetts formula to KMEP-Operated Entities (including SFPP) without regard to whether a portion of GP Services’ overhead costs were occurred on behalf of and therefore, directly assigned to specific entities or regional groups other than SFPP. This would result in SFPP being assigned a portion of costs from which SFPP did not benefit. Thus, the “all-in” approach is fundamentally flawed for failing to directly assign costs to the extent practicable. The Commission therefore finds that the “all-in” method would result in unjust and unreasonable rates because KMEP’s and KMI’s overhead costs would be inappropriately allocated among a wide range of jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities, including several natural gas pipelines that are subject to the Commission’s authority under the Natural Gas Act.\textsuperscript{109} The Commission therefore affirms that of the two

\textsuperscript{108} See SFPP Initial Brief at 83 (Sept. 30, 2009) (citing Staff witness Mr. Sosnick, Ex. S-12 at 14-20).

\textsuperscript{109} See 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. Several of the eight KMI-Operated natural gas pipelines are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction including: Trailblazer Pipeline Company, TransColorado Gas Transmission Company, and Rockies Express Pipeline.
cost allocation approaches presented in this case, SFPP’s multi-tiered cost allocation method is the most consistent with the Commission’s principle of cost causation and the purpose of the Massachusetts formula.

86. Further, the Commission remains unconvinced by Tesoro’s and the ACV Shippers’ objections to the multi-tiered approach. Shippers’ challenges to SFPP’s multi-tier cost allocation methodology generally fall into one of two categories: (1) concern with the complexity associated with the KMI and KMEP organizational structure, and (2) concern regarding the accuracy of the assignments. With respect with the arguments regarding the complexity of the Kinder Morgan accounting structure, SFPP should not be penalized because it is a subsidiary within a complex corporate structure. The concerns regarding the accuracy of the assignments are addressed in the section on the quality of the direct assignments below as are arguments related to the cost allocations among various KMEP subsidiaries.

87. The Commission next addresses the ACV Shippers’ arguments that SFPP witness Bradley acknowledged that a single-tier or “traditional” Massachusetts formula cost allocation is a reasonable form of cost allocation for indirect costs. The Commission agrees that a single-tier Massachusetts formula can be a reasonable and appropriate overhead cost allocation methodology. This acknowledgement is not a concession that the KMEP multi-tiered overhead cost allocation methodology is unreasonable or that the Shipper Parties’ “all-in” method is appropriate here. Thus, the past acceptance of a single-tier Massachusetts formula cost allocation methodology does not prevent a regulated pipeline from seeking approval of a multi-tier cost allocation methodology as SFPP does in this case. Commission approval of the use of a single-tier Massachusetts formula does not make it the only appropriate cost allocation methodology. Rather, if a regulated pipeline seeks to modify the application of the Massachusetts formula, the Commission will review the proposed methodology, in this case the multi-tiered methodology, to ensure it does not result in unjust and unreasonable rates.

88. Finally, with respect to ACV Shippers’ due process arguments, the Commission denies rehearing. The ACV Shippers’ concern is that the Commission, by requiring SFPP to submit additional record evidence in its Compliance Filing, did not allow other parties an adequate opportunity to respond. First, under Rule 716, it is fully within the Commission’s discretion to reopen the record in a proceeding if the Commission has “reason to believe that reopening of a proceeding is warranted by . . . the public interest.” In Opinion No. 511, the Commission required SFPP, as part of its

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110 Further, the shippers did not cite any precedent to the contrary.

Compliance Filing, to provide additional justification and verification regarding the overhead cost assignments and allocations from certain RCs. The Commission found this approach was consistent with the approach taken in Williams, and is necessary; i.e., is in the public interest, to assure that the costs flowing to KMEP and SFPP from GP Services and the KMI cross-charge are assigned and allocated with reasonable accuracy to the KMEP-Operated Entities, including SFPP.

In directing SFPP to provide the additional record evidence in its compliance filing, the Commission further noted that protesting parties, Trial Staff, and the Commission would be able to evaluate the compliance filing and its impact on the rate design. The Commission further stated that it would then determine whether to require a further hearing on this matter after reviewing SFPP’s compliance filing. Thus, the ACV Shippers and the other shipper litigants have had an opportunity to rebut SFPP’s evidence presented in SFPP’s Compliance Filing as demonstrated by the hundreds of pages of comments on the Compliance Filing and supporting affidavits and documents filed by the shipper litigants. The ACV Shippers alone filed a 52-page protest and comments on SFPP’s Compliance Filing supported by a 57-page affidavit of its witness Dr. Daniel Arthur, which was accompanied by multiple exhibits. The Commission finds that shipper litigants have had the same opportunity to rebut and respond to the supplemental evidence submitted in the SFPP Compliance Filing as if the Commission had remanded the issue for further briefing on the issue. Notably, none of the shipper litigants that protested SFPP’s Compliance Filing requested that the Commission set the issue of the quality of the direct assignments for further hearing or discovery.

While the ACV Shippers argue that the Commission erred in providing SFPP with a so-called second bite at the apple, the paper hearing that was afforded in the context of this Compliance Filing was an opportunity for the Shipper Parties to address the statement in Opinion No. 511 that their critique of SFPP’s testimony and cost allocation

112 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 137.

113 In Williams, the Commission directed additional information to be obtained through a formal hearing. Williams, 85 FERC at 62,137. However, a full hearing is not obligatory in these matters if an opportunity for comment is provided.

114 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 137.

115 See e.g., Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 123 FERC ¶ 61,056, at P 188-190 (2008) (order on rehearing in which the Commission reopened the record to give all parties an opportunity to submit additional evidence).
methodology lacked sufficient analytical rigor. As part of its Compliance Filing, SFPP provided all the accounting information that lay behind its cost allocation methodology for the 2007 test year. However, the Commission finds that the Shipper Parties’ protests of SFPP’s Compliance Filing contain several fundamental limitations. First, much of their evidence consists of testimony from the East Line rate proceeding, Docket No. IS09-437-000. This is inappropriate because it has no legal relevance here and reflects the Shipper Parties’ failure to effectively address the additional material submitted by SFPP in this proceeding. Second, the Shipper Parties have not modified the litigation strategy they used at hearing, which was (1) to make arguments based on a literal interpretation of parts of Williams, and (2) to challenge SFPP’s multi-tier cost allocation methodology based on errors found in a relatively narrow portion of that methodology. By relying on their prior arguments and material inappropriately excised from the Docket No. IS09-437-000 record Shipper Parties did not avail themselves of the opportunity to make a more refined statistical and analytical critique of SFPP’s direct assignments and accounting structure.

Next, the Commission addresses more specific issues raised on rehearing regarding Opinion No. 511’s determinations on SFPP’s overhead cost allocation. In two specific instances, we grant rehearing where we conclude that SFPP’s evidentiary presentation is inadequate.

2. **Relevance of Using Different Accounting Methods for Different Regulatory Bodies**

   a. **Rehearing Requests**

   Tesoro challenges on rehearing the Commission’s acceptance of the fact that SFPP uses different accounting systems for different purposes, i.e., uses a different accounting or reporting system for purposes of filings made with the SEC versus the allocation methodology used in rate proceedings before the Commission. Tesoro states that in KMEP’s SEC Form 10-K filing, Kinder Morgan officers submitted sworn statements representing that certain overhead expenses are not attributable to any particular SFPP entity business segment. Tesoro, therefore, asserts that KMEP has represented that a completely different overhead allocation methodology correctly represents its overhead costs. The ACV Shippers echo this argument on rehearing and in its Compliance Filing protest, stating that SFPP’s allocation methodology has no purpose other than for ratemaking, thus there can be no presumption of reasonableness or accuracy associated

   \[116\] See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 136.
with Kinder Morgan’s purported methodology used for assigning and allocating G&A overhead costs.

93. The ACV Shippers also argue that the fact that Kinder Morgan presents differing overhead cost allocation methodologies to the SEC and the Commission is conclusive evidence that SFPP’s G&A overhead cost accounting and allocation methodology was developed solely for ratemaking purposes and was not used for internal business purposes by Kinder Morgan’s management. ACV Shippers thus conclude that SFPP’s overhead cost accounting and allocation methodology is not an objective business practice. As an example, the ACV Shippers note that KMEP’s SEC 10-K states that $278.7 million of G&A overhead costs were items not attributable to any segment. Yet in this proceeding, SFPP claims that KMEP can directly assign $111.9 million of these same G&A overhead costs to individual KMEP subsidiaries and groups of subsidiaries. Moreover, the ACV Shippers note that KMEP’s SEC Form 10-K is prepared in accordance with the SEC regulations and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting standards, which require reporting by business segments in the manner used internally to evaluate subsidiary performance. Thus, the ACV Shippers conclude that because Kinder Morgan does not and has not incorporated SFPP’s proposed G&A overhead accounting and allocation methodology in its SEC Form 10-K reporting, SFPP’s proposed G&A overhead methodology is not relied upon internally by senior management within Kinder Morgan to evaluate subsidiary performance or for making operating decisions. Thus, ACV Shippers conclude SFPP’s proposed G&A overhead ratemaking methodology cannot be considered an objective Kinder Morgan business practice. In short, the ACV Shippers complain that Kinder Morgan pays no meaningful recognition to SFPP’s purported G&A overhead methodology outside SFPP’s rate proceeding. Accordingly, the ACV Shippers argue that the Commission erred in stating in Opinion No. 511 that “[i]t cannot be reasonabl[y] contested here that KMI’s accounting system is designed to assign and allocate[] for purposes of internal administration as well as for rate design.”

  b. Commission Determination

94. The Commission again rejects this argument that both Tesoro and the ACV Shippers have pursued through this proceeding. The argument, at its core, is that the accounting methodologies that SFPP used to allocate overhead costs must be rejected because they are not identical to the accounting used for its corporate SEC filings. This argument is without merit. The SEC and the Commission serve different regulatory purposes and as such, have different accounting and financial reporting requirements for

  117 ACV Rehearing at 109-110 (quoting Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 101).
jurisdictional entities. While the Commission does not normally comment on the regulatory practices of other agencies, the record here indicates that the SEC reporting method precludes the assignment of costs to business segments that are not directly incurred by those segments and precludes the allocation of the costs that may be incurred by several different functions or subsidiaries.\(^{118}\) In contrast, the Commission's Uniform System of Accounts, 18 C.F.R. Part 352, is to be used by oil carriers to comply with the Commission's accounting and financial reporting regulations and is specifically designed to distinguish situations where the direct or indirect allocation of costs is appropriate.\(^{119}\) This reflects the fact that, in a ratemaking context, the Commission requires direct assignment of costs where possible and the formulaic allocation of the remaining indirect costs to relevant subsidiaries.

95. This difference in purpose is consistent with the Commission's prior recognition that "jurisdictional entities are routinely required to report financial information to the Commission in a manner that is not entirely consistent with the methodology used for external reporting purposes."\(^{120}\) The Commission also requires reported financial information to be based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) standards, which are promulgated by FASB.\(^{121}\) The Shipper Parties provide no evidence that Kinder Morgan's direct cost assignment methodology at issue here is inconsistent with GAAP. For example, the Shipper Parties have provided no evidence that KMI/KMEP maintains a parallel set of ledger entries, time sheets, or other documents that are designed to capture operating and financial costs in a manner that is inconsistent with the direct cost assignment methodology SFPP has advanced here. More is required

\(^{118}\) SFPP Brief Opposing Exceptions at 60-61 (citing SFP-139 at 14-15 (Webb testimony)). In other words, unless the costs can be directly assigned, then they are deemed not to be capable of allocation under the SEC reporting standards. An example is that pension costs or financing costs incurred at the level of a corporate parent are not to be assigned to a subsidiary or function that does not directly incur those costs.

\(^{119}\) A specific example in this case is whether certain capital expenditures should be directly assigned or included in a broader cost category and allocated by formula. See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC \(\text{¶} 61,121\) at P 145.


\(^{121}\) Id.
here than the facial inconsistency of different regulatory regimes and an inference that the difference is intended to deceive.\textsuperscript{122}

96. As it pertains to this case, the Commission has regulatory oversight over SFPP’s rates and rate design. The issue here is cost allocation. Cost allocation is a ratemaking issue, not an accounting issue. The Commission has long recognized that accounting rules do not dictate ratemaking, noting: “Despite the obvious relevance of accounting precepts for some regulatory policies, they cannot supply an independent basis for action when they may conflict with established ratemaking principles.”\textsuperscript{123} The standard of review here is whether the direct assignment methodology SFPP advances here is reasonably designed to meet the ratemaking principle of maximizing the direct assignment of costs in a specific regulatory proceeding. What the SEC requires for financial reporting purposes is not controlling any more than the Commission’s past recognition that some accounting treatments are not necessarily related to operational realities or other components of ratemaking. For these reasons, the Commission denies rehearing on this issue.

3. Quality of Direct Assignments

a. Rehearing Requests

97. Next, the Commission addresses the Shipper Parties’ arguments that errors in a small sample of RCs invalidate KMI/KMEP’s direct assignment and multi-tiered cost allocation methodology in their entirety. Tesoro states on rehearing that the Commission erred in dismissing evidence of rampant and significant errors inherent in the timekeeping

\textsuperscript{122} The Shipper Parties’ argument that there is no connection between the allocation method at issue here and KMI/KMEP’s business accounting concerns is inconsistent with the assertion that it is readily used to manipulate regulatory costs. To use this type of manipulation in a skilled manner assumes the effort has some grounding in the realities of the company’s operations. Otherwise, it would collapse under any type of rigorous scrutiny. In fact, where the costs at issue here do not seem to be adequately tied back to specific operations and geographic locations, the Commission is rejecting the assignment.

\textsuperscript{123} See Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir 1966) (stating “[Accounting] for tax purposes and even the Commission’s present Uniform System of Accounts may be valuable tools, but they cannot dictate ratemaking policies.”).
process that serves as the foundation for KMEP’s assignments. Tesoro states that evidence in the record of that proceeding indicates that 64 percent of the employee time and cost assignments of overhead expenses purportedly reflected on KMEP’s general ledger were incorrect. Tesoro argues that a methodology that produces erroneous results 64 percent of the time is not reasonable. Tesoro states that this error rate undercuts any claim that SFPP’s accounting structure has strong internal protocols for ensuring accuracy, and instead shows that the errors are pervasive and reflect a fundamentally flawed system.

98. The ACV Shippers also contest the Commission’s findings regarding the quality of SFPP’s direct assignments. ACV Shippers argue that Kinder Morgan’s purported G&A overhead accounting methodology fails to reliably or credibly isolate KMI overhead costs and does not rigidly separate KMI and GP Services employees and related costs. ACV Shippers argue that Opinion No. 511 ignores the fact that SFPP presented no data or evidence regarding KMI-dedicated employee costs in order to verify, test, or audit how those costs have been assigned or allocated, i.e., that there is no record evidence to demonstrate that KMI-dedicated employees’ G&A overhead costs are directly assigned on a consistent and accurate basis. ACV Shippers support this allegation with citations to the East Line rate proceeding (Docket No. IS09-437-000). Thus, ACV Shippers state that because SFPP’s G&A cost allocation has not been shown to be a credible mechanism for isolating overhead costs or to be a reasonable or accurate methodology for assigning or allocating costs between KMI and KMEP, the only reasonable methodology is the proposed “all-in” cost allocation methodology presented by ACV Shippers’ witness Dr. Arthur.

99. ACV Shippers also challenge the Commission’s acceptance that KMI and GP Services employees are “rigidly” separated for cost accounting purposes. ACV Shippers argue that the record clearly demonstrates that there is no rigid separation of these employees. To support their claim, ACV Shippers state that employees of GP Services directly oversee employees of KMI, and therefore, these GP Services employees are indirectly performing overhead services for the KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated

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124 Tesoro Rehearing at 30-32.

125 Id. at 32.

126 ACV Rehearing at 110-121.

127 Id. at 111.
ACV Shippers assert that certain KMI employees are overseen by the management group overseeing KMEP's products pipelines, which includes GP Services employee Tom Bannigan, President of KMEP's Products Pipeline divisions. ACV Shippers thus conclude that if employees of GP Services are overseen by employees of KMI and GP Services are overseeing KMI employees, there is no rigid separation. Specifically, ACV Shippers argue that the employees of KMI and GP Services are functionally operating as one integrated unit as there are no bright lines or firm boundaries that separate the two entities or the overhead services they perform.

100. ACV Shippers again argue that the Commission erred in affirming the ALJ's determination that SFPP's G&A overhead assignment and allocation methodology is "based on sound accounting principles." They assert that this claim is undermined by the fact that Kinder Morgan's accounting structure and cost allocation methodology may have been developed, in part, for business rather than for regulatory purposes. ACV Shippers argue that SFPP's G&A accounting methodology has no recognized business purpose, as SFPP's G&A accounting methodology is the antithesis of Kinder Morgan's representations in its SEC Form 10-Ks and related audited financial statements. They state that the fact that Kinder Morgan does not recognize or use SFPP's proposed methodology in its SEC Form 10-K reports establishes that Kinder Morgan does not rely on or recognize SFPP's proposed G&A overhead methodology to evaluate the performance of its subsidiaries; i.e., has no meaningful business purpose. The ACV Shippers assert that this undermines the Commission's conclusion in Opinion No. 511 that "the reliance on an accounting system that also has business functions has long been acceptable to the Commission if the methodology is adequately supported." 129

101. The ACV Shippers further argue that the Commission arbitrarily trivialized the deficiencies and inaccuracies in SFPP's G&A overhead assignment as "technical errors." 130 The ACV Shippers then give a detailed discussion of the record evidence on this issue. For example, the ACV Shippers note that SFPP's direct assignment of overhead costs for RC 1002 (Commercial Management Team Orange) demonstrated that SFPP's primary company witness in this proceeding, James Kehlet, assigned 100 percent of his time to SFPP. 131 However, Mr. Kehlet testifies that as Vice President, Marketing

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128 Id. at 119 (citing Ex. ACV-50C at 4; Ex. ACV-51C at 25, 29, 30).
129 Id. at 122 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 103).
130 Id. at 124.
131 Id. at 125 (citing Ex. ACV-279HC at 1). RC 1002 is one of the five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP.
West for KMEP, he was directly responsible for marketing for the Pacific Region of Kinder Morgan, including West Coast, Terminals, SFPP, and Calnev Pipe Line LLC (Calnev). Next, ACV Shippers point to its witness Dr. Arthur's analysis of the time and labor cost assignments reflected on KMEP's books and records for RC 1006 (Logistics KMP Pipelines) showed the vast majority of the employees in this RC as having 100 percent of their time and expenses assigned to SFPP notwithstanding the numerous other KMEP pipeline and terminal subsidiaries which would necessarily require logistical services from RC 1006.\(^{132}\) ACV Shippers state that Dr. Arthur's analysis demonstrated the inconsistency of having supervisors assigning 100 percent of their time to SFPP while at the same time the employees they supervise were assigning their time to KMEP subsidiaries other than SFPP. ACV Shippers note that at hearing SFPP's witness Mr. Bradley included a revised G&A overhead model during the hearing that corrected the cost allocation to correct inaccuracies. They assert that SFPP's revised overhead allocation model did nothing to mitigate the basic flaws in SFPP's proposed methodology and there is no basis to believe that SFPP's self-survey captured all of the time/cost assignment errors. Thus, the purported "correction" lacked credibility and was incomplete.\(^{133}\)

102. In sum, the ACV Shippers make the overarching assertion that Kinder Morgan proposes a G&A overhead accounting structure for assigning overhead expenses to SFPP that allocates as much G&A overhead expenses to SFPP as possible. They assert this is done to support an excessive rate level and benefit non-regulated affiliates. ACV Shippers assert that Kinder Morgan uses a completely different accounting methodology or no accounting methodology at all, for internal evaluation of the performance of its subsidiaries and making decisions on how to allocate capital among the subsidiaries. They further argue that if different accounting methods are used by Kinder Morgan for ratemaking versus internal business decision-making, then there are serious concerns and questions regarding the ratemaking accounting methodology.\(^{134}\) ACV Shippers' argument implies that the direct assignment methodology at issue here is designed specifically to manipulate cost allocations for purposes of regulatory ratemaking.

103. ACV Shippers argue that the Commission must investigate the accuracy and reasonableness of the G&A overhead cost assignments and allocations associated with all

\(^{132}\) Id. (citing Ex. ACV-279HC at 2-4). RC 1006 is one of the five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP.

\(^{133}\) Id. at 127-129.

\(^{134}\) Id. at 207.
of GP Services’ and KMI’s RCs. ACV Shippers further argue there is no basis or foundation to claim that Kinder Morgan’s G&A overhead accounting methodology effectively captures and/or isolates overhead costs with individual or groups of Kinder Morgan subsidiaries or that it is based on “sound accounting principles.” ACV Shippers next argue that the Commission erred in claiming that G&A overhead RCs that do not directly or indirectly assign costs to SFPP are irrelevant.\(^{135}\) The ACV Shippers argue that even though an RC may not assign costs to SFPP, the entity or entities that these RCs assign costs to is critical to the verification of whether SFPP’s proposed methodology is accurate and reliable and whether SFPP has included in the Massachusetts formula all of the applicable and relevant entities that are causing and benefiting from Kinder Morgan’s G&A overhead services. Thus, the ACV Shippers conclude that where SFPP has only provided data on five RCs and this same data conclusively demonstrated that assignments of G&A overhead time and costs were inaccurate 64 percent of the time, there is no rational basis to simply assume that all of the other RCs do not reflect errors of similar magnitude or would identify other anomalies, such as the improper exclusion of entities which would further demonstrate the lack of credibility and reliability to be attributed to SFPP’s proposed G&A overhead accounting methodology.

104. The ACV Shippers state that the Commission erred in asserting that SFPP has established that Kinder Morgan has developed effective policies and protocols to capture and isolate G&A overhead costs for the Kinder Morgan subsidiaries without any evidentiary foundation for this assertion. The ACV Shippers note that SFPP’s only support in the record for SFPP’s claims about Kinder Morgan’s ability to track and isolate G&A overhead costs with individual or groups of subsidiaries were sample salary splits and time sheets for a small set of employees.\(^{136}\) ACV Shippers state SFPP presented no evidence of any internal protocols for monitoring the reasonableness or accuracy of G&A overhead time and costs assignments existed or had been performed. To support its argument that Kinder Morgan has not developed uniform or specific protocols or policies for assigning G&A overhead costs, the ACV Shipper cite to SFPP witness Knudsen, a Kinder Morgan employee in RC 1006, who testified that he was unaware as to who was responsible for establishing the allocation of his time and that he had not received any written or verbal guidelines on how he should allocate his time, although Mr. Knudsen stated that “years back” he was provided instructions on coding his time to Kinder Morgan capital projects.\(^{137}\)

\(^{135}\) *Id.* at 145 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 131-132).

\(^{136}\) *Id.* at 153 (citing Ex. SFP-41; Ex. SFP-43).

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at 154 (citing Tr. 974).
b. **Commission Determination**

105. The Commission denies rehearing with respect to Tesoro and the ACV Shippers' general challenge to the quality of the direct assignment of costs to KMEP-Operated Entities either via the KMI cross-charge or GP Services charges. The core of their argument is that errors in the RCs examined at hearing are evidence that all of KMI/KMEP's direct cost allocations are unreliable and unacceptable for use in this proceeding. Their central point is that the RCs assigning costs directly to SFPP had a 64 percent error rate. From this observation ACV Shippers and Tesoro extrapolate that a similar error rate is likely to apply to all aspects of KMEP's overhead cost allocation and therefore it should be rejected.\(^{138}\) As discussed in detail below, the Commission rejects the argument that the 64 percent error rate reflects a systemic problem with the overhead cost allocation because (i) the error rate reflects the Location Code 0002 error which is limited to five RCs, and (ii) Shipper Parties fail to justify attributing a 64 percent error in five RCs to the hundreds of unexamined RCs.

106. First, the record, including SFPP's Compliance Filing, demonstrates that the 64 percent error rate in the RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP is not representative of a possible error rate in other RCs. As discussed in detail below in section V.C.1 of this order,\(^{139}\) the five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP were subject to an error, the Location Code 0002 error, that was limited to those five RCs.\(^{140}\) The Location Code

\[^{138}\] Costs are assigned or allocated to SFPP from five sources. The first source is costs directly assigned from five RCs to SFPP. The second source is costs directly assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group, a subgroup within Tier 2, which costs are allocated among the members of the Pacific Pipeline Group (i.e., SFPP, Calnev and West Coast Terminals) using the Massachusetts formula. The third source of costs are those directly assigned to the Tier 2 Products Pipeline Group, which group includes the Pacific Pipeline Group, Mid-Continent Pipeline Group, Eastern Pipeline Group and Southeast Pipeline Group, and are then allocated to all members of the Products Pipeline Group using the Massachusetts formula. The fourth source is costs generated by GP Services on behalf of KMEP-Operated Entities, which costs could not be directly assigned, to all of the KMEP-Operated Entities using the Massachusetts formula. The fifth source is costs generated by the KMI-shared employees or RCs for the benefit of KMEP-Operated Entities, which costs are assigned to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge and then allocated to all of the KMEP-Operated Entities using the Massachusetts formula.

\[^{139}\] See *infra* at P 181-200.

\[^{140}\] The five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP are: RC 1002, RC 1006, RC 1009, RC 1011, and RC 1040.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

0002 error is the result of the accounting department misapplying the Location Code 0002 tag used by the G&A employees in those five RCs. SFPP states that the G&A employees intended for their labor costs coded to Location Code 0002 to be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier. Instead, the accounting department directly assigned costs in the five RCs at issue coded to Location Code 0002 to SFPP. The Location Code 0002 error affects a large percentage of the $9.3 million in costs directly assigned to SFPP and appears to account for the Shipper Parties’ claimed 64 percent error rate. The Commission finds that the Location Code 0002 error is isolated and contained in nature and is not evidence of “rampant” errors inherent in the timekeeping process such that KMEP’s entire cost allocation methodology is irretrievably undermined.

107. Second, Shipper Parties fail to substantiate their claim that a large number of errors within the five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP reflect a systemic problem in the KMI/KMEP cost allocation methodology. The Shipper Parties’ argument assumes that the impact on SFPP of errors at the KMI level, i.e., the KMI-shared employees or KMI-shared RCs, reflects the same probability of error and impact as those of a much smaller sample. The Commission agrees that human error, or in the case of costs directly assigned to SFPP, the incentive for error is greatest at the lowest level at which the costs are captured. In contrast, at the KMI level, shared costs are aggregated with all of the shared costs assigned to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge. The KMI cross-charge is then allocated to all KMEP-Operated Entities, including SFPP, using the Massachusetts formula. Thus, the impact of any errors in the KMI-shared costs is diluted as the costs flow down through KMEP Massachusetts formula. Thus any implication that a 64 percent error rate in the five RCs directly assigning costs to SFPP is relevant here has two incorrect assumptions: (1) that the same error rate occurs elsewhere and (2) that it is material. In that regard, as Opinion No. 511 points out, it makes a considerable difference whether the erroneous timesheets in the sample have an error rate of 30 out of 40 hours or 2 out of 40 hours.141

108. Shipper Parties also incorrectly assume that the incentives for distortion are the same at the KMI level as at the operating level of the Pacific Pipeline Group. In short, the incentive for distortion as well as the ability to implement it declines as a cost center becomes more removed from SFPP’s operations, its costs, and its return on the KMEP’s income statement. Absent some evidence of systemic manipulation, which there is none in the record, this broad brush argument fails.

109. There is also a practical limitation to the Shipper Parties’ general argument concerning KMI/KMEP’s accounting structure. First, despite the hearing record and the

141 See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 131-135.
opportunity for further analysis, the Shipper Parties present no factual evidence that any costs have been shifted to SFPP from separate groups such as the CO₂ pipeline group (Tier 3), within the KMEP structure or between the KMI-Owned Entities that are served only by KMI employees. Given this, they make no practical showing beyond their broad brush attack that any limitations within those other groups have any impact on SFPP’s costs whatsoever. Moreover, Opinion No. 511 recognized that there was a possibility that KMI-shared costs could be over assigned (not allocated) to KMEP for distribution through its Massachusetts formula. Opinion No. 511 directed SFPP to review those assignments with the recognition that some of KMI-shared RCs were more relevant to SFPP’s operations and more likely to have an impact than others. SFPP performed the analysis and adjusted the figures using sources from the 2007 test year.

110. Shipper Parties did not appear to review the more important KMI-shared RCs, perform a sensitivity analysis of their possible impact, or draw a basic statistical sample from the underlying work papers to challenge SFPP’s analysis. Instead, Shipper Parties rely primarily on an argument that extrapolates a 64 percent error rate for all of KMI-shared and GP Services RCs from the 64 percent error rate in five RCs studied by the Shipper Parties. This argument is insufficient to substantiate their proposed “all in” Massachusetts formula approach given the Commission’s strong preference for direct assignment and the lack of any meaningful correlation between cost incurrence and cost allocation that would occur if a KMI/KMEP wide Massachusetts formula were used in this proceeding. The Commission therefore finds that the record reflects that Tesoro’s and ACV Shippers’ blanket objection that SFPP’s direct assignment of corporate overhead costs is fundamentally flawed and failed to satisfy the burden of persuasion the shippers bear in this case of providing sufficient record evidence on the matter they sought to establish.

111. The Commission is not blindly accepting all of SFPP’s conclusions regarding overhead cost allocation. The Commission recognizes that direct cost assignments to SFPP, to the Tier 2 Pipeline Products group and to the Pacific Pipeline Group are the

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142 Opinion No. 511 provides a specific example of this point and provides guidance on how one might approach the issue of the assignment of jointly-shared costs from KMI to KMEP. See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 134-35.


144 See e.g., Complex Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing City of Winnfield, La. v. FERC, 744 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
areas where accounting errors can have the most direct impact on SFPP. They are also the areas where managers may have the greatest incentives to shift costs among closely related affiliates. As such, in this case the Commission required SFPP to present in its Compliance Filing a detailed presentation supporting the direct assignment of costs. The Commission applies this standard when examining the exclusion of certain affiliates and reviewing relevant RCs in the next sections of this order. As a result, the Commission rejects certain direct cost allocations to SFPP and rejects the exclusion of the KM Canada Entities from the Massachusetts formula allocation with respect to costs in certain RCs.

112. The Commission also rejects ACV Shippers’ contention that SFPP presented no evidence of any internal protocols for monitoring the reasonableness or accuracy of G&A overhead time and costs assignments. They assert that SFPP has not established that its system for capturing costs is reliable because there are no accounting or quality-control procedures in place. The Commission finds that SFPP established that there is uniform time keeping system in place, that it is periodically reviewed to see if there are discrepancies between budgeting and performance, and that the system has protocols for changing an employee’s base allocation of time within cost centers if the employee’s assignment or function changes. A statement by one employee that he was unaware of the system is simply another example of attempting to discredit an entire system based on one observation. The Commission affirms that the KMI/KMEP overhead cost allocation system is conceptually sound and is an acceptable regulatory construct. The Commission also rejects ACV Shippers’ argument that the KMI/KMEP overhead cost allocation methodology may be invalid because it has some business purpose. An efficient regulatory accounting system must be grounded in the business aspects of the regulated entity’s operations if the regulatory system is to have any effective purpose. If the regulatory system and actual business practice are too divergent, then the accounting system will fail its most fundamental purpose, which is to support a close relationship between cost incurrence and cost allocation. But the fact that there are divergences or different systems for different business purposes does not render the various systems invalid in their own right.

113. Based on the foregoing, the Commission rejects the Shipper Parties’ general challenge on rehearing to the quality of all direct assignments and, again, rejects argument that the most reasonable method for allocating overhead costs in this proceeding is their “all in” method. This order now turns to arguments regarding specific cost assignments and allocations, including some of the detailed assertions that the Shipper Parties made in support of their generic argument that their “all in” method was the most appropriate one for this proceeding.
4. **Exclusion of Certain KMEP Subsidiaries**
   
   a. **General Issues**
      
   i. **Rehearing Requests**
      
   114. Tesoro seeks rehearing of the Commission decision to permit SFPP to exclude from any allocation of G&A overhead costs (i) eight corporate entities that KMEP owns and KMI operates; (ii) four joint ventures in which KMEP has an ownership interest; and (iii) KM Canada Entities. Tesoro states that the record evidence dictates allocating G&A overhead costs to these entities. However, Tesoro basis its argument exclusively on the subsequent East Line Initial Decision in which the ALJ rejected the exclusion of the above-identified entities.
      
   115. The ACV Shippers also argue that the Commission erred in permitting the exclusion of KMEP subsidiaries from the allocation of KMEP G&A overhead costs. In general, ACV Shippers allege that Commission precedent requires all KMEP subsidiaries and joint ventures to be included and accorded a proportional level of G&A overhead costs in a proper Massachusetts formula allocation of such costs, rather than being completely excluded. ACV Shippers state that the exclusion of any KMEP subsidiary causes the remaining KMEP subsidiaries (which includes SFPP) to subsidize the excluded entities. ACV Shippers criticize the Commission’s interpretation that *Williams* left open the possibility that a subsidiary may reasonably be excluded from a Massachusetts formula allocation if it receives only a small amount of overhead services and inclusion would result in an irrational or excess allocation of costs. In short, ACV Shippers argue that the Commission should not have departed from the objective standard set forth in *Williams* that if a subsidiary benefitted “at all” it would be included in the Massachusetts formula allocation.
      
   ii. **Commission Determination**
      
   116. The Commission first rejects Tesoro’s request for rehearing regarding the exclusion of KMEP subsidiaries because Tesoro inappropriately relies exclusively on the East Line Initial Decision to support its request. Next, the Commission turns to the ACV Shippers’ request for rehearing regarding the Commission’s interpretation and application of *Williams* in Opinion No. 511 regarding the inclusion or exclusion of affiliated subsidiaries in the parent’s Massachusetts formula. The ACV Shippers construe *Williams* as requiring the inclusion of any subsidiary in the Massachusetts formula allocation when directors and officers of the parent company have any responsibility, however, nominal, for the operations of the subsidiary. In Opinion No.
511, the Commission explained that *Williams* is not as categorical as Valero\(^{145}\) asserted.\(^{146}\) The Commission interpreted *Williams* as leaving open whether it may be reasonable to exclude a subsidiary receiving less than a five percent overlap of costs if inclusion of the affiliate would result in an unreasonable or excessive allocation to or from the regulated entity.\(^{147}\) The Commission further found that the statement in *Williams* that, "all subsidiaries, including those that WNG considers to be marginal activity subsidiaries, must be included in the allocation formula if they benefitted from the corporate cost center,"\(^{148}\) is unduly rigid in an era of increasing corporate complexity where a company often owns numerous jurisdictional entities.

117. On the issue of which entities must be included in a Massachusetts formula allocation, the Commission has previously cited *Williams* for the proposition that "even if the parent company's employees only expended 5 percent of their time on a subsidiary, such an insignificant amount of time should not be ignored for cost allocation purposes."\(^{149}\) In Opinion No. 511, the Commission clarified that if the expended effort is less than 5 percent, there is no rigid requirement that the subsidiary be included for purpose of allocating overhead costs. Thus, there is no support for ACV Shippers' interpretation that *Williams* mandates a strict bright-line approach under which any

\(^{145}\) Valero did not join with the ACC Shippers to form the ACV Shippers group until rehearing. Accordingly, Valero presented its own witnesses at hearing and independently filed a Brief on Exceptions and Brief Opposing Exceptions.

\(^{146}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 107.

\(^{147}\) *Id.* P 109.

\(^{148}\) *Williams*, 85 FERC at 62,137.

\(^{149}\) *SFPP, L.P., et al.*, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240, at P 134 n.186 (2007) December 2007 Order. See also, *Chevron Prods. Co., et al., v. SFPP, L.P.*, 127 FERC ¶ 63,024, at P 354 (2009) (noting "all parties agree that the applicable standard is the one adopted by the Commission in the *Williams* case; that even if the employees of the parent company expend only 5% of their time on a subsidiary, that time is sufficient for the inclusion of that subsidiary within the parent company's application of the formula."); see also *Mid-America Pipeline Co., et al.*, LLC, 124 FERC ¶ 63,016, at P 785-786 (2008) (citing *Williams*, the ALJ found that certain subsidiaries must be included in the overhead cost allocation because the record reflects that "significant" and "substantial" overhead costs and oversight actions related to those entities).
benefit, no matter how minute, from the corporate parent requires an entity’s inclusion in the overhead cost allocation.

118. The Commission has properly applied Williams in this rate proceeding to determine whether to include certain Kinder Morgan entities. This entails performing a careful analysis of particular costs and cost centers to determine whether to require a portion of each cost center to be allocated to a subsidiary. Consistent with Commission precedent, if the record evidence demonstrates that a particular entity received more than a de minimis benefit from the parent company or a specific RC, i.e., at least 5 percent, then the costs from that cost center must be included in the Massachusetts formula allocation of the costs associated with the entities relevant to that particular RC. Thus, if costs directly assigned to SFPP from a particular RC are inadequately justified in the Commission’s judgment, then the costs from that RC must be rolled into the Massachusetts formula for the lowest-level tier to which those costs apply. This could be the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, the Tier 2 KMEP pipeline group, or the general KMEP Tier 1 as appropriate. The specific application of this principle is discussed in the following subsections of this order.

b. **Exclusion of the KMI-Operated Natural Gas Pipelines**

i. **Rehearing Requests**

119. ACV Shippers argue that the Commission erroneously determined that SFPP may exclude KMEP’s natural gas pipeline subsidiaries that are operated by KMI from any allocation of KMEP’s G&A overhead costs. In support of their argument, ACV Shippers state that the Commission arbitrarily ignored substantial record evidence with respect to the level of service performed for the benefit of the KMI-Operated entities. They note that Opinion No. 511 arbitrarily dismisses the undisputed record fact that various GP Services employees are principal officers of the KMEP natural gas pipeline subsidiaries or its direct controlling parent. ACV Shippers point to the record regarding Ms. Armstrong, a “GP Services employee and owner of RC 1007,”150 who is a principal officer (i.e., VP-Accounting) of the excluded KMEP natural gas pipeline related subsidiaries TransColorado, KMIGT, Trailblazer, and Kinder Morgan NatGas Operator LLC and the KMI subsidiary Kinder Morgan Illinois Pipeline LLC. In addition, ACV notes that Ms. Armstrong is a principal officer of the excluded KMEP Tejas Consolidated natural gas pipelines.151 ACV Shippers state that the Commission erred in concluding

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150 ACV Rehearing at 172.

151 *Id.* (citing Ex. ACV-57 at 4, 6, 9, 10, 14; Ex. ACV-239 at 14; ACV-240 at 14).
that it appears reasonable that Ms. Armstrong does not have responsibility for the accounting functions of the KMI-Operated Entities, despite the fact that Ms. Armstrong’s official job description, posted on Kinder Morgan’s website, as the “P-Accounting” for these KMEP natural gas pipeline subsidiaries. Specifically, the website states that such an officer has primary responsibility for management of the organization’s accounting function and responsibility for maintaining all accounting records, designing and implementing budgetary and other systems for internal control, and preparing financial reports for management and shareholders.\textsuperscript{152}

120. ACV Shippers further state that Opinion No. 511 glosses over the fact that other GP Services employees hold officer positions associated with the KMI-Operated Entities. Specifically, Mr. Bannigan, President of Products Pipelines, Mr. Jeff Armstrong, President of KMEP’s Bulk Terminals, and, Mr. R.T. Bradley, President of KMEP’s CO\textsubscript{2} division are all principal officers of Kinder Morgan OLP-A, which is the direct parent of the multiple KMI-Operated Entities as well as Kinder Morgan Management and which has ultimate control and management authority over KMEP and all KMEP subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{153} ACV Shippers further state that Opinion No. 511 summarily ignores the fact KMEP, as the owner of the KMI-Operated Entities, retains both managerial and oversight authority and performs other G&A overhead responsibilities that generate G&A overhead expenses. For example, ACV Shippers state operating and reimbursement agreements specifically indicate that KMEP, as the owner of the KMI-Operated Entities, is to play a material role in the management of the natural gas pipeline subsidiaries.

\textbf{ii. Commission Determination}

121. The Commission denies rehearing on the exclusion of the natural gas pipelines from the KMEP overhead cost allocation. Opinion No. 511 fully analyzed shipper arguments, principally Valero’s, that KMEP’s officers and directors have operating and legal responsibility for the KMI-Operated natural gas pipelines and therefore, those entities should be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. In particular the Commission scrutinized the testimony regarding Ms. Armstrong’s role.\textsuperscript{154} ACV Shippers raise no arguments on rehearing that alter the Commission’s conclusion on this issue.

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Id.} at 173 (citing Ex. ACV-300).

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Id.} at 174 (citing Ex. ACV-72 at 5-8; Ex. ACV-170 at 14-15).

\textsuperscript{154} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC \textsection 61,121 at P 123.
122. ACV Shippers’ argument on rehearing that KMEP, as the owner of the KMI-Operated Entities, retains both managerial and oversight authority and performs other G&A overhead responsibilities that generate G&A overhead expenses is similar to the arguments ACV Shippers raised regarding the joint ventures, as discussed above. Likewise, the Commission’s conclusion is the same, as discussed below. ACV Shippers present no evidence that KMEP’s ownership oversight authority over the KMI-Operated natural gas pipelines would result in benefits or costs that were more than miniscule, or that any benefits or costs were even incurred. ACV Shippers have not attempted to quantify these possible costs. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that these possible benefits and costs arising from KMEP’s ownership oversight were more than de minimis, i.e., more than five percent of the total costs within each RC that are subject to allocation via KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies rehearing regarding the exclusion of the KMI-Operated natural gas pipelines.

c. Exclusion of KM Canada

i. Rehearing Requests

123. ACV Shippers argue that SFPP failed to carry its burden of proof with regard to whether the KM Canada Entities155 should be excluded from KMEP’s G&A overhead cost allocation. They further assert that the Commission erred in giving SFPP an opportunity to submit additional evidence to support KM Canada’s exclusion in its Compliance Filing. ACV Shippers argue that giving SFPP this opportunity to supplement the record violated fundamental due process principles, and is highly prejudicial to shippers who have participated fully and actively throughout the proceeding. ACV Shippers state that the Commission’s decision effectively allows SFPP to relitigate its failed attempt at justifying its proposed G&A overhead accounting methodology.

124. Further, ACV Shippers argue that Opinion No. 511 arbitrarily failed to address any of the evidence which conclusively demonstrated that Mr. Bradley’s purported survey lacked any evidentiary credibility. ACV Shippers argue that at hearing they demonstrated that the purported KM Canada survey prepared by Mr. Bradley contained multiple erroneous entries and was far from comprehensive in attempting to capture related overhead costs. For example, ACV Shippers state that contrary to Mr. Bradley’s claim that he removed all costs associated with KM Canada from his G&A overhead allocation model, the record established that various RCs and associated employees were

155 The terms “KM Canada Entities” and “KM Canada” are used interchangeably in this order.
not involved in or investigated as part of the historical survey and that substantial G&A overhead expense were not captured as part of the survey. For example, Mr. Bradley conceded that RC 1002 (Commercial Management Team Orange) was not part of the KM Canada survey. Yet the record unambiguously established that various GP Services employees in RC 1002 were actively involved in providing G&A overhead support and services to KM Canada. ACV Shippers conclude that, in light of the deficiencies in SFPP’s analysis of KMI-shared and GP Services G&A overhead services provided to KM Canada, there is no evidentiary foundation to claim that KM Canada has “few services” provided by KMEP or KMI or that Kinder Morgan’s accounting methodology is designed to accurately isolate and accurately record such costs for specific entries.

ii. SFPP Compliance Filing

126. In its April 25, 2011 Compliance Filing, SFPP submitted additional information regarding KM Canada. The Compliance Filing includes the affidavit of Mr. Bradley, SFPP’s Director of Property Accounting for KMI (Bradley Affidavit). In his affidavit, Mr. Bradley summarizes record evidence regarding KM Canada including the following: (i) KM Canada is operated and managed almost exclusively by Canadian employees with limited G&A support from employees in certain KMI or GP Services RCs; (ii) the vast majority of the G&A costs associated with the operation and management of the KM Canada Entities are incurred by KM Canada and are kept in separate accounts and in a separate general ledger from the costs associated with all other KMI and KMEP subsidiaries; (iii) the limited amount of G&A cost incurred in 2007 by KMI-shared and GP Services employees on behalf of KM Canada Entities has been removed from the costs allocated through KMEP’s Cost Allocation Methodology in this proceeding to ensure that none are allocated to SFPP. In the Compliance Filing, SFPP removed all of the labor, payroll taxes, and benefits as well as non-labor support provided to KM Canada in 2007 by KMI-shared employees and GP Services, removing an amount equal to $213,507.

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156 ACV Rehearing at 166 (citing Tr. 1328; Valero Brief on Exceptions at 33 n. 34; Tr. 1329-30).

157 Bradley Affidavit at P 7 (citing Ex. SFP-133).

158 Id.

159 Id. P 37 and Tab D, Exhibit 9.
127. SFPP included in its Compliance Filing a detailed discussion of the KM Canada survey. SFPP notes that the KM Canada Entities were acquired over the course of 2007; thus in 2007, Kinder Morgan was in the process of determining a permanent method of G&A cost recovery. SFPP explains that to account for the costs associated with the support of the KM Canada Entities during the interim period before a permanent method of G&A cost recovery was implemented Kinder Morgan surveyed both KMI-shared and GP Services RCs in November and December 2007. The 2007 survey resulted in a finding that KMI and GP Services employees incurred approximately $477,000 in labor and non-labor costs related to the KM Canada Entities. A permanent survey method was implemented in 2009.

128. SFPP witness Bradley states that in the course of re-surveying and recalculating costs related to support the KM Canada Entities he identified several errors and omissions related to the original 2007 survey data. Thus, in the SFPP Compliance Filing, Bradley advocated using the 2009 survey method to better capture estimates of the labor and non-labor G&A costs associated with the services GP Services and KMI-shared RCs provided to the KM Canada Entities in 2007. Bradley conducted a re-survey using the 2009 survey method to correct for the issues identified with the original 2007 interim survey method. Based on the re-survey of the relevant RCs, the total amount associated with services provided to the KM Canada Entities in 2007 that was removed from the pool of costs allocated through KMEP’s methodology is $1,438,011 (in SFPP’s original filing the amount attributed to KM Canada was $477,000). Specifically, Bradley proposes to deduct $1,156,215 from the KMEP Tier, $65,893 from the PPL Tier, $43,224 from the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, and $172,679 from the Terminal and MidCon Tiers. Bradley states the total reduction to SFPP’s costs is $213,507.

129. Regarding the KM Canada Entities’ Acquisition Costs, Bradley states that no acquisition costs associated with the KM Canada Entities are included in the KMEP G&A costs allocated to SFPP. Bradley explained that in surveying the RCs regarding their estimated labor expenses committed to each of the KM Canada Entities in 2007 and annualized those amounts. The KM Canada survey results reflect a normalized, prospective labor commitment from the RCs that dedicate time to the KM Canada Entities. According to Bradley, because these percentages were normalized, any time committed to the acquisition of the KM Canada Entities by employees in these RCs was already excluded from KMEP’s cost allocation methodology.

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160 Id. P 50.
161 Id. P 58.
130. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP further notes that the $1,471,698 in non-labor costs associated with the Trans Mountain Acquisition has been removed from the KMI cross charge.\(^{162}\) SFPP witness Bradley further states that the remaining $5.5 million in G&A costs identified in KMEP’s Form 10-K represents the G&A costs incurred by KM Canada employees on behalf of Trans Mountain prior to the acquisition. These costs were captured by KM Canada and were not allocated through KMEP’s cost allocation methodology.

iii. Response to Compliance Filing

131. In response to SFPP’s Compliance Filing, Trial Staff argues that KM Canada should be included in the KMEP Massachusetts formula. Trial Staff notes that SFPP’s argument at hearing for removing KM Canada from the KMEP Massachusetts formula was that “only a few of KM Canada’s costs were incurred within GP Services or KMEP.”\(^{163}\) Trial Staff argues that now that SFPP has significantly increased the total amount of costs incurred within GP Services or KMI to support KM Canada from $477,000 to $1,438,011, this increase contradicts SFPP’s initial argument that KM Canada received only de minimis benefits. Trial Staff concludes that the re-survey highlights the errors in SFPP’s original case and its failure to establish that KM Canada should be excluded from the KMEP Massachusetts formula.

132. In their protest of the Compliance Filing, ACV Shippers argue that SFPP’s newly proposed adjustments to the assignments of G&A overhead costs to KM Canada lack credibility, reliability and reasonableness. The ACV Shippers note that SFPP’s Compliance Filing does not provide the additional evidence necessary to justify and support the KM Canada costs originally presented in the rate proceeding; rather, SFPP provides an entirely new amount, of approximately $1.4 million based on a survey conducted in 2011. ACV Shippers note that the SFPP witness on the issue, Mr. Bradley, has changed positions three times regarding the basis and accuracy of the cost entries associated with the original 2007 KM Canada survey. ACV Shippers conclude that SFPP’s new KM Canada survey conducted in conjunction with the Compliance Filing, like the original 2007 survey, lacks any indicia of reliability or credibility and fails to

\(^{162}\) Id. P 59 (noting that this $1.5 million is the cost identified in KMEP’s Form 10-K as highlighted by Valero).

\(^{163}\) Trial Staff July 11, 2011 Reply Comments on SFPP Compliance Filing at 8 (Trial Staff Reply Comments) (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 118; Ex. SFP-38 at 35-37).
reflect an accurate, verifiable or reasonable level of G&A overhead costs associated with KM Canada.

133. In support of the ACV Shippers’ protest, Dr. Daniel Arthur, the ACV Shippers’ economic consultant, states that it is inappropriate to exclude the KM Canada entities from receiving an allocation of Kinder Morgan overhead expenses. Dr. Arthur notes that SFPP’s basis for excluding KM Canada was that the costs associated with KM Canada are kept separate from the costs associated with all other Kinder Morgan entities and are assigned solely to the KM Canada Entities. Dr. Arthur states it is clear that multiple KMI-shared and GP Services overhead employees are providing overhead services for the benefit of the KM Canada Entities, and SFPP is unable to credibly identify and directly assign a justified and reasonable amount of overhead expenses to KM Canada.164 First, Dr. Arthur notes that SFPP’s Compliance Filing fails to comply with the Commission’s directive in Opinion No. 511 that SFPP provide greater clarity regarding its assignment of G&A costs to KM Canada as well as a fuller explanation and documentation of its proposed assignment of $477,000 of G&A overhead costs to KM Canada. Instead, SFPP admitted in its Compliance Filing that it cannot support the claimed $477,000 of G&A overhead cost assignment for KM Canada based on the 2007 survey and instead would rely on a 2011 survey of the activities performed during 2007 to exclude KM Canada. Dr. Arthur characterizes SFPP’s Compliance Filing as an abandonment of Kinder Morgan’s prior record evidence in support of its claimed $477,000 of G&A costs associated with KM Canada. Based on SFPP’s inability to rely on its own 2007 survey and its attempt to recreate a survey in 2011, Dr. Arthur argues it is more reasonable to include KM Canada, and all overhead expenses purported to be associated with the KM Canada Entities, in a single Massachusetts formula allocation.

134. Dr. Arthur also reasserts the ACV Shippers’ argument attacking the credibility of SFPP’s position that RC 0020 (Treasury), RC 0050 (Human Resources), RC 0065 (KMI Controller), RC 0077 (KMI Financial Process), RC 0031 (Legal), and RC 0999 (KMI G&A Corporate Costs) do not provide any overhead support or services to the KM Canada Entities in 2007.165 ACV Shippers argue that this is inconsistent with the fact that $7 million in unallocated G&A overhead expenses, which they assert would have involved all of these RCs, were reported to be generated in 2007 in connection with the pre-acquisition and acquisition of TransMountain by KMEP.166

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164 ACV Protest, Affidavit of Dr. Daniel Arthur at P 89 (Arthur Affidavit).

165 Arthur Affidavit at n.195.

166 Id. (citing Ex. ACV-231 at 77-78).
iv. SFPP Reply Comments

135. In its July 11, 2011 reply comments, SFPP responds to Shipper Parties’ arguments that the updated KM Canada survey should be rejected and that KMEP’s entire cost allocation methodology should be replaced with the Shipper Parties’ proposed “all-in” methodology. SFPP states that *Williams* does not support ACV Shippers’ arguments for including the KM Canada Entities in the KMEP Massachusetts Formula. Specifically, SFPP states:

*Williams* focused on whether particular subsidiaries benefitted from particular G&A costs and caused those G&A costs to be incurred. Only after analyzing specific cost centers and finding that at least five to ten percent of a cost center’s G&A costs benefited a particular subsidiary did *Williams* require a portion of that cost center to be allocated to the subsidiary. *Williams* does not require, or even suggest, that it would be appropriate to allocate a portion of all of the parent company’s cost centers to a subsidiary merely because the subsidiary was found to have benefited from a single cost center, as ACV and Dr. Arthur suggest. Instead, *Williams* suggests that when certain costs are associated with only a subset of subsidiaries, the appropriate course of action is to allocate those costs only to that subset.\(^{167}\)

136. In defense of the updated survey, SFPP states that the process for removing from KMEP’s Cost Allocation Methodology the cost of services provided by GP Services and KMI-shared RCs to the KM Canada Entities has evolved with the benefit of time and experience. SFPP argues that this evolution has led to a more accurate capturing of costs related to the KM Canada Entities. SFPP asserts that using the updated KM Canada survey results in a more accurate distribution of G&A costs to the KM Canada Entities than use of a Massachusetts Formula allocation and a better matching of costs with the entities that caused them to be incurred.\(^{168}\)

137. SFPP further argues that, in contrast, the inclusion of the KM Canada Entities in a Massachusetts formula allocation, as proposed by ACV, Dr. Arthur, and Staff, would cause SFPP to subsidize services provided to KM Canada Entities and would completely disregard the Commission’s preference for matching costs with the entities that generated

\(^{167}\) SFPP Reply Comments at 52-53.

\(^{168}\) *Id.* at 54.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

them. SFPP describes the ACV Shippers' position as requiring all of the KM Canada Entities' G&A costs to be lumped together with the KMEP-Operated Entities G&A costs and then allocated through a single Massachusetts formula allocation. SFPP urges the Commission to reject ACV Shippers' and Trial Staff's "all-in" proposal, noting that, in Williams, the Commission expressed concern about going "further than necessary to correct the misallocation problem."170

v. Commission Determination

138. The Commission grants rehearing on this issue. While SFPP attempts in its Compliance Filing to correct the substantial newly identified errors with the 2007 survey, SFPP offers little evidence that would attest to the probable accuracy of SFPP's 2011 survey of the relevant GP Services and KMI-shared RCs performed services for KM Canada entities. Despite the fact that SFPP, based on its 2011 survey, has almost tripled the amount of costs associated with KM Canada to be removed from overhead costs that are allocated to SFPP, the fact that the amount tripled calls into question whether SFPP's original justification for excluding KM Canada for the Massachusetts formula still stands. SFPP's witness, Mr. Bradley, in his October 16, 2008 direct testimony, stated that "in order to ensure that no portion of SFPP's rates could possibly be subsidizing KM Canada, I removed the entire amount of $477,000 from the cross charge account before performing the Massachusetts formula allocations for purposes of this proceeding. . . . The removal of the entire $477,000 from the cross-charge ensures that no overhead costs associated with KM Canada are charged to SFPP."171 SFPP's Compliance Filing provides little support for SFPP's avowal that even under SFPP's 2011 re-survey, which identified $1.4 million of costs associated with KM Canada, "no portion of SFPP's rates could possibly be subsidizing KM Canada."

139. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission instructed:

Consistent with Williams II, SFPP should structure any further analysis on a cost center by cost center basis, and assuming adequate documentation, remove the costs from KMEP's total costs accordingly. For example, if all of KM Canada's human resource activities were handled through its own administrative structure and

169 Id. at 55.

170 Id. at 57-58 (citing Williams, 85 FERC at 62,137).

171 Ex. SFP-38 at 36-37.
none by GP Services or KMI, then that particular KM Canadian RC may be excluded from KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Finally, if portions of KM Canada cost are included in KMEP’s Massachusetts Formula this does not mean all of KM Canada’s costs must be included. This is because, as Williams II requires, the review centers on individual KM Canada RCs, not the overhead costs of that entity in their entirety.\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 121.}

The Commission finds, upon review of SFPP’s Compliance Filing regarding the KMI-shared employees and GP Services employee’s costs associated with providing services to KM Canada, SFPP fails to provide adequate documentation with respect to any of the relevant RCs. This means the Commission is unable to determine, with respect to each of RCs that provided services to the KM Canada Entities, whether the amount of such services is de minimis or if it is at or greater than the five percent rebuttable threshold consistent with Williams.\footnote{Notably, the vast majority of the updated surveys reflect that for each RC ten percent of the individual RC’s total labor costs were provided for the benefit of the KM Canada Entities, which is twice the Williams five percent threshold. The specific percentage break-down is: Vancouver Wharves, three percent; Trans Mountain, five percent; and Cochin Canada, two percent.}

140. To correct this lack of documentation, the Commission makes the following determinations. First, the Commission again rejects the Shipper Parties’ proposed “all-in” solution to correct for SFPP’s inability to identify in the relevant time period the costs associated with services provided to the KM Canada Entities. As SFPP notes in its reply comments, the “all-in” proposal is inconsistent with Williams and would “be choosing to use an ax rather than a scalpel to perform what should be a careful removal of costs.”\footnote{See SFPP Reply Comments at 58.} Second, consistent with Williams and Opinion No. 511, with respect to the KM Canada Entities, no amount, neither the $477,000 nor the $1.4 million, should be removed from KMEP’s total overhead costs. Further, the KM Canada Entities must be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts formula allocation with respect to any GP Services or KMI-shared RC that SFPP has identified in this proceeding as providing any amount of services to the KM Canada entities in 2007.\footnote{To be clear, we are not directing or suggesting that any of the cost of the G&A services provided by KM Canada to KM Canada Entities be included in the pool of}
Canada Entities must be included in the Massachusetts formula for allocating the costs from each RC listed in Tab D, Exhibit 9 of SFPP’s Compliance Filing.

d. **Exclusion of Joint Ventures Heartland, Red Cedar, and Thunder Creek**

i. **Rehearing Requests**

141. The ACV Shippers argue that, with respect to the Joint Ventures, Heartland, Red Cedar, and Thunder Creek, the Commission failed to analyze the specific benefits received or their materiality, let alone examine whether inclusion of these Joint Ventures would result in an excess or irrational allocation of overhead costs. ACV Shippers argue that each of the three Joint Ventures have two sets of relevant overhead costs. First, there are the G&A overhead costs associated with managing the actual operations and day-to-day activities of these Joint Ventures. Second, there are the G&A overhead costs that are specifically incurred by Kinder Morgan’s management overseeing KMEP’s ownership interest and related employees. The ACV Shippers assert that SFPP is wrong to claim that the second category of G&A overhead services are not provided by Kinder Morgan employees. ACV Shippers argue that it is inconceivable to believe that some other entity independent of Kinder Morgan employees would oversee KMEP’s ownership interest in a Joint Venture. With respect to each of these three Joint Ventures, ACV Shippers argue that although Kinder Morgan’s Office of the Chairman oversees and supervises all subsidiaries, including KMEP’s ownership interests in these Joint Ventures, SFPP has made no attempt to quantify or exclude any of the executive-related supervisory costs (or any related G&A support costs such as HR, IT, or Benefits costs) as it relates to the Joint Ventures. In short, ACV Shippers claim that the Office of the Chairman costs, including those associated with supervising the ownership interest in each of Heartland, Red Cedar and Thunder Creek, are included, in part, in the KMI cross-charge and, thus allocated to all of the KMEP-Operated subsidiaries, including SFPP.

142. Further, ACV Shippers complain that SFPP’s G&A overhead proposal allocates a significant quantity of KMEP residual overhead costs, costs that cannot be identified with any individual subsidiary or group of KMEP subsidiaries, even though these residual KMEP costs to be allocated to the KMEP-Operated Entities. The only costs at issue here are the costs incurred by GP Services and KMI-shared employees on behalf of the KM Canada Entities. Nor is the Commission directing or suggesting that the KM Canada Entities generally be included in KMEP Massachusetts formula cost allocation used for allocating costs to the KMEP-Operated Entities.
costs necessarily benefit all KMEP subsidiaries including Heartland, Thunder Creek, and Red Cedar Joint Ventures.

143. With respect to Heartland, the ACV Shippers claim that SFPP witness Mr. Bradley stated that KMI employees provide certain physical operational support services to Heartland based on Heartland’s proximity to other KMI assets, and that Heartland reimbursed KMI for these operational employees’ services. ACV Shippers argue it is implausible that the KMI operational employees that generate $1 million a year in billings to Heartland do not also require the incurrence of G&A overhead costs associated with such items as HR, IT, Payroll, Benefits, and Accounting at the KMI-shared RC level.

144. With respect to Red Cedar, the ACV Shippers note that there are G&A overhead costs that are incurred as a result of Kinder Morgan overseeing, managing, and supervising its 49 percent ownership interest in Red Cedar. ACV Shippers assert that KMEP provides direct oversight activities associated with Red Cedar through its three KMEP managers who sit on Red Cedar’s management committee. These KMEP managers’ costs are included in KMI-shared RC 0375. SFPP witness Mr. Bradley states that the costs of RC 0375 are removed from the KMI cross-charge. But, ACV Shippers nonetheless argue that the removal of the RC 0375 costs does not capture all of the overhead costs associated with Red Cedar because it does not remove any HR, IT or Benefit costs (reflected, respectively in RC 0050, RCs 0080-0092, and RC 0999) that are associated with the managers booking their time to RC 0375.

145. With respect to Thunder Creek, ACV Shippers state that whether or not Kinder Morgan performs G&A support for Thunder Creek regarding its day-to-day operations is irrelevant to the issue of whether Kinder Morgan incurs G&A overhead costs with respect to supervising and managing its ownership interest in Thunder Creek. ACV Shippers note that KMEP holds a 25 percent ownership interest in Thunder Creek and that Kinder Morgan has at least one representative on the operating committee which is responsible for evaluating the success of the Joint Venture and managing the affairs of the operation.176 ACV Shippers make the same argument as made for Red Cedar. Specifically, that SFPP’s exclusion of Thunder Creek was justified because SFPP had removed the costs associated with the KMI-shared RC 0375. ACV Shippers state that this is not enough because it does not quantify or capture other costs such as the supervisory, benefits, HR and IT G&A overhead costs associated with the managers that supervise the ownership interest in Thunder Creek.

176 ACV Rehearing at 161 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 24-25).
ii. Commission Determination

146. The Commission denies rehearing and affirms its determination in Opinion No. 511 that SFPP properly excluded Heartland, Red Cedar, and Thunder Creek Joint Ventures from the overhead cost allocation. The question at issue is whether any of these three Joint Ventures benefit from services provided under RCs that are charged to KMEP for allocation via the Massachusetts formula. And, if so, whether the benefits are more than a de minimis amount with five percent being a rebuttable threshold of what constitutes a significant or more than de minimis amount. Heartland, Red Cedar and Thunder Creek are joint ventures in which KMEP owned in 2007 an equity interest in of 50 percent or less. Each Joint Venture is managed by and receives all overhead services and support from an unaffiliated third party.177

147. First, the Commission will address Heartland. SFPP acknowledges that KMEP had a representative on Heartland’s board of directors, a KMI employee in RC 1001 who charged all his time and expenses to OLP-A, the KMEP subsidiary that held the equity interest in Heartland. SFPP testified that neither RC 1001 nor any other OLP-A expenses are included in the KMI cross-charge to KMEP, thus the expenses associated with this KMI employee sitting on Heartland’s board of directors are not allocated to SFPP or another other KMEP-Operated Entity.178

148. Second, regarding Red Cedar, SFPP states that as with Heartland, a KMI employee sat on the board of Red Cedar in 2007. All of the expenses associated with that KMI employee were charged to RC 0375, which is a KMI-shared RC. Because RC 0375 is charged to KMEP through the KMI cross-charge, SFPP removed the entire costs associated with RC 0375 from the KMI cross-charge for 2007.179 With respect to Thunder Creek, SFPP stated that like Red Cedar, a KMI employee sat on the board of directors of Thunder Creek in 2007, but all time and expenses associated with this activity were charged to RC 0375, the same RC discussed above, which SFPP removed from the KMI cross-charge for 2007. Accordingly, SFPP’s record evidence shows that there are no residual expenses associated with these Joint Ventures that could be subject to allocation through KMEP’s Massachusetts formula.180

177 Ex. SFPP-38 at 37.

178 Id. at 37-39.

179 Id. at 39.

180 Id. at 41.
149. The thrust of ACV Shippers' argument is that with respect to each of these three Joint Ventures the KMI/KMEP Office of the Chairman necessarily must oversee and supervise all subsidiaries, including KMEP's ownership interests in these Joint Ventures and thus, there must be some executive-related supervisory costs. ACV Shippers' second argument is that SFPP has not identified certain residual costs associated with the Joint Ventures. Specifically, ACV Shippers state that there necessarily are human resources, IT or benefits overhead costs (respectively, RC 0050, RCs 0080-0092, and RC 0999) associated with either the Chairman's office or the KMI managerial employees that sit on the Joint Ventures' boards of directors.

150. The Commission finds that based on the record evidence regarding the management and oversight of these Joint Ventures that if there is any time or costs associated with either the Chairman's office or related to HR, IT and benefits associated with the KMI employee board member that such time and costs would be miniscule. ACV Shippers have not quantified these possible costs. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record that these possible benefits and costs would be more than de minimis, i.e., five percent or more of the total costs within each RC that are subject to allocation via KMEP's Massachusetts formula. Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies rehearing regarding the exclusion of Heartland, Red Cedar, and Thunder Creek Joint Ventures.

e. Exclusion of Joint Venture International Marine Terminal

151. ACV Shippers note that SFPP excluded Marine Terminal from the overhead cost allocation because only one KMEP representative sits on Marine Terminal's board of directors and the costs associated with this single representative are captured in GP Services RC 001, which was assigned to KMEP's MidCon Tier, and away from SFPP. ACV Shippers argue that Marine Terminal should be included because SFPP witness Mr. Bradley subsequently testified in the East Line Rate Case that "while Marine Terminal has historically been excluded from KMEP's cost allocation methodology because it was not operated by KMEP, it is now included in the allocation methodology because GP Services employees, on behalf of KMEP, took over its operations and management." ACV Shippers acknowledge that there is no similar testimony in the record in this proceeding.

152. The Commission denies rehearing on the issue of the exclusion of Marine Terminal because the ACV Shippers' entire argument regarding Marine Terminal is

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181 ACV Rehearing at 163 (quoting Docket No. IS09-437, Ex. SPE-139HC at 44).
based on record evidence from a subsequent East Line proceeding. As stated previously, the Commission will only consider the record in this case.

f. Exclusion of Rockies Express Pipeline

i. Rehearing Requests

153. ACV Shippers argue that the Commission improperly excluded Rockies Express Pipeline (REX), a limited liability company joint venture pipeline of which KMEP is a 51 percent owner, from the allocation of KMEP's G&A overhead costs.\textsuperscript{182} ACV Shippers argue that the Commission failed to address REX in Opinion No. 511, stating that the only reference to REX in Opinion No. 511 was in a single footnote. ACV Shippers argue that despite SFPP's claim that KMI operates REX, certain corporate documents show otherwise. ACV Shippers point to an operating agreement and REX's 2007 FERC Form 2 which designate KMEP or its subsidiary Kinder Morgan NatGas Operator, LLC (NatGas Operator) as the operator of REX.\textsuperscript{183} ACV Shippers note that NatGas Operator is a wholly-owned subsidiary of OLP-A and claim that before and after January 1, 2008, employees of KMI or GP Services were performing services for REX on behalf of KMEP or its indirect wholly-owned subsidiary, NatGas Operator.\textsuperscript{184}

154. ACV Shippers argue that any KMI or GP Services employee performing overhead services for REX, for the time period at issue, was performing such services as an agent (or on behalf) of KMEP or its indirect wholly-owned subsidiary, NatGas Operator, for the benefit of REX. Thus, these employees should have been assigning or allocating their time and overhead expense to KMEP or NatGas Operator which, as owner and/or operator would assign or allocate these same overhead expenses to REX as the beneficiary thereof. ACV Shippers claim there is no evidence that KMEP has allocated or assigned any overhead costs to REX. Further, ACV Shippers argue that there is no evidence regarding to what extent KMI, as the entity which employed the KMI or GP Services personnel who were performing the overhead services on behalf of KMEP and/or Nat Gas Operator, has assigned any G&A overhead costs to REX. ACV Shippers further state that while SFPP witness Mr. Bradley contends that REX pays a management fee intended to reflect overhead costs and that certain overhead costs were assigned to REX, Mr. Bradley failed to provide any evidence or specifics regarding the management

\textsuperscript{182} Id. at 181 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 17).

\textsuperscript{183} Id. at 182 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 18; Ex. ACV-58 at 12).

\textsuperscript{184} Id. (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 18).
fee or even the amount thereof. Moreover, SFPP failed to present any evidence that the receipt of this management fee serves to reduce, in any way, KMI's cost center levels which specifically make up the KMI cross-charge. Finally, ACV Shippers conclude that the record clearly reflects that the costs KMI assigned to REX reflect costs associated with operational personnel rather than any costs associated with KMI G&A overhead costs centers. Accordingly, ACV Shippers reassert that REX should be included in the allocation of KMEP’s G&A overhead costs.

ii. Commission Determination

155. The Commission denies rehearing regarding the exclusion of REX from KMEP’s G&A overhead cost allocation. Contrary to ACV Shippers’ assertions, the Commission fully discussed the basis for the exclusion of REX in Opinion No. 511. 185 As noted in Opinion No. 511, REX is one of the eight KMI-Operated entities. 186 SFPP stated on the record that KMI was reimbursed for its overhead costs associated with REX through the payment of a fee that varied monthly based on REX's actual direct payroll expenses. 187

156. In reaching its conclusion in Opinion No. 511 that the KMI-Operated Entities, including REX, should be excluded from KMEP’s G&A cost allocation, the Commission noted that in response to shipper exceptions on this issue, SFPP established that even after a survey and audit, Valero (the sole exception shipper on this issue) did not uncover a single situation where the employees of the audited RCs that directly assigned costs to SFPP included the costs of any of the KMI-Operated Entities. The Commission found that the costs of the employees responsible for the KMI-Operated Entities are captured in Account 184600 and that four of the KMI-Operated Entities are billed fixed fees for these costs. The Commission further found any of the Account 184600 costs that are not recovered through fixed fees are allocated only to KMI-Owned and KMI-Operated Entities through KMI’s Massachusetts formula. Thus, it is clear the costs associated with REX and the other KMI-Operated Entities do not and cannot reach SFPP. Specifically, with respect to REX, which is one of the four KMI-Operated Entities that pays a fixed fee to KMI, there is no possibility of a cross-subsidy by SFPP for any shortfall amount to the extent the fee REX pays does not fully cover the costs incurred. SFPP stated that any residual costs that are not covered by the fixed fees are allocated by KMI’s Massachusetts formula which allocates costs only to KMI-Owned Entities and KMI-Operated Entities.

185 See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 122-127.

186 Id. P 138, n.226.

187 See Ex. SFP-38 at 29.
157. The Commission also addressed in Opinion No. 511 Valero’s argument in its brief on exception, which argument is reasserted in ACV Shippers’ Rehearing, that because KMEP’s officers and directors have operating and legal responsibility for the KMI-Operated Entities, these entities should be included in KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. The Commission found SFPP’s testimony on the issue to be credible and Valero’s evidence, which the Commission described as corporate documents, to be inadequate to contradict explicit witness testimony from SFPP. The Commission has weighed the record evidence on this issue and affirms that SFPP properly excluded REX from KMEP’s G&A overhead cost allocation.

5. **Appropriateness of Certain Cost and Revenue Components**

158. Both ACV Shippers and Tesoro challenge the Commission determinations regarding (i) removing PAAs when calculating the gross plant factor for the Massachusetts formula and (ii) whether to capitalize or expense certain overhead costs related to KMI’s “going-private” transaction. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission affirmed the 2009 ID conclusion that SFPP properly removed all PAAs from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities in applying KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. The Commission also concluded that SFPP adequately proved that $5.572 million of the $26.2 million of “going-private” costs incurred when KMI went private were recurring costs and may be included in SFPP’s cost of service. ACV Shippers also seek rehearing of the decision to allow the use of net revenues in place of gross revenues in the Massachusetts formula Allocation of G&A Overhead costs to KMEP’s subsidiary Tejas Consolidated.

a. **PAAs**

i. **Rehearing Requests**

159. With regard to SFPP’s PAAs, both the ACV Shippers and Tesoro challenge SFPP’s removal of PAAs from the gross property, plant and equipment allocation factor of KMEP’s unregulated subsidiaries. Tesoro asserts that this contravenes Commission precedent. Tesoro and the ACV Shippers cite to the 1992 Arkla Energy order which supports that PAAs are to be removed from the gross property, plant and equipment factors only for regulated subsidiaries,\(^{188}\) arguing that the purpose of removing the PAAs is to ensure that the gross property balances of regulated facilities reflect the original cost.

\(^{188}\) *Arkla Energy Resources, a Division of Arkla Inc., et al.*, 61 FERC ¶ 61,004, at 61,037-38 (1992) (*Arkla Energy*) (if a party purchases jurisdictional facilities for a price in excess of their net book value, it is not entitled to recover the excess through its jurisdictional rates).
of the asset. ACV Shippers state the removal of PAAs from only rate-regulated entities has a long established basis and underlying rationale founded in original cost ratemaking.

160. ACV Shippers explain that the fundamental premise for removing PAAs from the gross property of rate-regulated entities is to have the gross property balance reflect original cost and not to have the allocation of overhead expense to the rate regulated subsidiaries be influenced by the purchase price of the regulated subsidiaries. ACV Shippers state that the Commission, in concluding that the PAAs should be removed from both the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities, failed to recognize that, unlike regulated entities which have a distinct rate base, there is no relationship between the prices, revenues, and profitability of unregulated subsidiaries and the original cost of an unregulated subsidiary's gross property and no rate base. ACV Shippers claim that the Commission erred in concluding that failure to remove the PAAs from the non-jurisdictional entities will overstate their relative weight in the asset (rate base) component of KMEP’s and KMI’s Massachusetts formulas. They further note that the Commission failed to cite to any precedent or support for this proposition.

161. Finally, ACV Shippers acknowledge that in a February 13, 2006 order on rehearing, the Commission did require SFPP to remove PAAs from gross property, plant, and equipment balances for both KMEP’s regulated and unregulated subsidiaries. However, ACV Shipper state that this February 2006 Order was an anomaly and is of questionable precedential value.

ii. Commission Determination

162. The Commission denies rehearing and affirms that SFPP properly removed all PAAs from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities in applying KMEP’s

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189 ACV Shippers also cite SFPP, L.P., et al., 113 FERC ¶ 61,277, at P 85-86 (December 2005 Order).

190 ACV Rehearing at 200-201 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 37-38; Arkla Energy, 61 FERC at 61,037-38).

191 Id. at 198-199.

192 Id. at 199 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 142).

Massachusetts formula. Re-reviewing the record, the Commission finds that SFPP submitted sufficient evidence demonstrating that failure to remove the PAAs from the non-jurisdictional entities will overstate their relative weight in the asset (rate base) component of KMEP's and KMI's Massachusetts formulas. Specifically, a SFPP witness testified that removing the PAAs from FERC-regulated entities while including the PAAs of other entities could distort the Massachusetts formula, since it allocates corporate overhead expenses to both classes of entities.\(^{194}\)

163. Further, contrary to Tesoro's and ACV Shippers' claims, SFPP's removal of the PAAs from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities is consistent with Commission precedent. In a December 16, 2005 order, the Commission stated:

\[
\text{[F]or gross plant, SFPP fails to include all of KMEP's subsidiaries (e.g., Red Lightning, Plantation Pipeline Co., Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission, and Trailblazer Pipeline Co.) and includes the PAA for other KMEP subsidiaries, including SFPP. Gross plant is the net book value of plant – the original plant cost less accumulated depreciation of the facilities. SFPP's use of the purchase premiums in its calculations of gross plant for KMEP and itself results in an inflated ratio of overhead costs...}
\]

Accordingly, the Commission requires SFPP to recalculate its Massachusetts Formula allocation factors based on Staff's calculation of gross plant. This adds the costs attributable to the additional KMEP subsidiaries acquired during the test period (calendar year 1999), and removes the PAA from KMEP's subsidiary plant costs.\(^{195}\)

In 2006, the Commission again affirmed that SFPP is to remove the PAAs from the calculation of the gross plant factor with respect to the allocation of corporate overhead expenses under the Massachusetts formula among the various KMEP entities, including non-jurisdictional entities.\(^{196}\) Moreover, the case that Tesoro and the ACV Shippers cite as precedent, *Arkla Energy*, addresses the treatment of PAAs in a different context than what is at issue here. In *Arkla Energy*, the Commission affirmed the longstanding

\(^{194}\) Ex. SF-38 at 21-22.

\(^{195}\) December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 85-86.

\(^{196}\) February 2006 Order, 114 FERC ¶ 61,136 at P 16-17.
principle that a jurisdictional utility can include in its rate base only that portion of an asset’s purchase price that represents the net book value of the property to the original owners, regardless of the acquisition cost.\textsuperscript{197} However, \textit{Arkla Energy} does not address whether the PAAs should be removed from both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional entities when calculating the gross plant factor to be used in the allocation of corporate overhead costs under the Massachusetts formula. Accordingly, Tesoro’s and ACV Shippers’ requests for rehearing on the issue of the removal of PAAs are denied.

b. \textbf{Going-Private Costs}

i. \textbf{Rehearing Requests}

164. In this proceeding, $5.572 million of the $26.2 million in costs associated with KMI’s “going private” transaction were included in the pool to be allocated through KMEP’s 2007 Massachusetts formula. Tesoro refutes SFPP’s claim that the $5.572 million of the $26.2 million in “going-private” costs were a recurring costs that represented normal employee bonuses.\textsuperscript{198} Tesoro points to the fact that in a California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) proceeding, SFPP witnesses claimed that the “going private” transaction would have no effect on SFPP, claiming that it is improper for SFPP to attempt to recover any costs associated with the going private transaction after previously swearing in testimony that it would never attempt to do so. Tesoro further states that in the 2007 SEC 10-K KMEP stated that it had no obligation to pay any of the expenses and did not expect to do so.

165. The ACV Shippers also challenge the inclusion of the $5.572 in going-private costs stating that the Commission erroneously found Valero’s argument based on KMEP’s 2007 SEC Form 10-K to be insufficient to rebut SFPP’s specific evidence that the $5.572 million is a recurring cost. ACV Shippers argue that for a cost to be a recurring cost, it must be a cash expense. ACV Shippers argue that the $26.2 million in going-private costs are non-cash costs for KMEP. In support of this conclusion, ACV Shippers point to KMEP’s 2008 SEC Form 10-K. In it, they state that KMEP described its unallocated 2007 G&A overhead costs as including the $26.2 million expense allocated to KMEP from KMI associated with the going-private transaction and stated that “[KMEP] do[es] not have any obligation, nor do we expect to pay any amounts

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{Arkla Energy}, 61 FERC at 61,038.
\item \textsuperscript{198} No party challenges that KMI incurred $26.2 million in costs when the company went private and became Knight, Inc.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
related to this expense.\textsuperscript{199} ACV Shippers further state that SFPP's witness Mr. Bradley makes no claim that any of the $26.2 million reflects cash expenses.\textsuperscript{200} Next, ACV Shippers state that for a cost to be a recurring cost, the cost must be related to an event that recurs and not a one-time event. They assert that a going-private transaction is clearly a one-time event. Last, ACV Shippers reassert their argument that the $26.2 million in overhead costs related to KMI going-private did not benefit KMEP or SFPP, as SFPP represented to the CPUC.\textsuperscript{201}

\section*{ii. Commission Determination}

166. The Commission denies rehearing on this issue. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission noted that SFPP presented witness testimony that the $5.572 in going-private costs at issue related to stock options that would have previously been granted to employees, which were replaced by cash bonuses of approximately the same level.\textsuperscript{202} Based on this record evidence, the Commission concluded that Valero's argument based on KMEP's 2007 Form 10-K was insufficient to rebut SFPP's specific evidence that the $5.572 million at issue should be considered a recurring cost.\textsuperscript{203} The Commission rejects Tesoro's and ACV Shippers' arguments that SFPP witness testimony before the CPUC should have any bearing on the treatment of the going-private costs in a proceeding before the Commission. First, the SFPP witness testimony relates to the effect the going-private transaction would have on SFPP's transportation services in California, i.e., SFPP's intrastate rates, not its interstate rates. This is made clear from other portions of the testimony.\textsuperscript{204} A regulated entity's recovery or treatment of a cost in its intrastate rates is irrelevant to the treatment of that cost in Commission jurisdictional rates.\textsuperscript{205}

\begin{notes}
\item[199] ACV Rehearing at 197 (citing Ex. ACV-231 at 62-63, 77-78).
\item[200] Id. (citing Ex. SFP-129 at 48-52).
\item[201] Id. at 197 (citing Ex. ACV-40 at 41-42; CPUC D.07-95-061 at 30 (2007) (quoting SFPP stating they "unreservedly commit that they will not seek recovery in utility rates of any cost associated with the proposed [going private] transaction.")).
\item[202] Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 143.
\item[203] Id.
\item[204] See Prepared Testimony of Thomas A. Bannigan, CPUC Application No.: 06-09-016, January 24, 2007, included in the record as Ex. ACV-83. Specifically Mr. Bannigan testifies "Given that the proposed transaction has no effect upon the status quo as it pertains to either SFPP's or Calnev's intrastate pipeline facilities and related

(continued...)
167. The only record evidence that Tesoro and ACV Shippers presented to counter
SFPP’s position regarding the $5.572 portion of the going-private costs is the following
statement from KMEP’s 2007 SEC Form 10-K: “[KMEP] do[es] not have any
obligation, nor do we expect to pay any amounts related to this expense.”206 SFPP
witness Dale Bradley testified that approximately $26.2 million of costs associated with
the going-private transaction were costs incurred to buy out employees’ restricted stock
grants and stock options and to pay the associated payroll taxes.207 Mr. Bradley further
testified: “in a typical year (i.e., one in which there is no going-private transaction), these
types of costs – restricted stock grants and stock options, as well as associated payroll
taxes – would be allocated between KMI and KMEP, and among the KMEP-Operated
Entities, exactly as they were here.”208 Mr. Bradley further explained that: (i) the costs at
issue were typical costs associated with employee compensation which are pushed down
to the subsidiaries within the Kinder Morgan organization; (ii) employee compensation
costs typically amortize over time; (iii) because of the going-private transaction, the
amortization scheduled for all of the restricted stock grants and stock options at issue
accelerated causing the costs to be charged to KMEP in a single year; (iv) he performed
an analysis to account for the fact that the costs were accelerated to determine what
amount of the costs would have been allocated through the KMEP Massachusetts formula
in 2007 had the going-private transaction not occurred; (v) his analysis determined that
$5.572 of the $26.2 million of employee compensation costs is the portion of the
employee compensation costs that SFPP would have received in a typical year.209 In
other words, Mr. Bradley testified that $5.572 million represents the amount that would

operations, there will be no adverse impact on competition for refined petroleum product
transportation services in California.” Id. at 5:24-27. Another example, Mr. Bannigan’s
following statement: “Given that the proposed transaction has no effect upon the status
quo as it pertains to either SFPP’s or Calnev’s intrastate pipeline facilities and related
operations, there will be no adverse impact on employees.” Id. at 6:9-11.

(holding “The treatment of a cost at the wholesale level . . . is unrelated to whether a state
regulator will or will not permit recovery of a rate that includes such costs in a wholesale
customer’s retail rates.”).

206 ACV Rehearing at 197 (citing Ex. ACV-231 at 62-63, 77-78).

207 See Ex. SFP-129 at 48:13-23.

208 See id. at 49:11-14.

209 See id. at 51-52.
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have been allocated through KMEP’s 2007 Massachusetts formula in 2007 had the going-private transaction not occurred. Neither ACV Shippers nor Tesoro presented any evidence that directly counters the analysis that Mr. Bradley performed. Accordingly, the requests for rehearing regarding the going-private transaction costs are denied.

c. Use of Net Revenues in Place of Gross Revenues

168. ACV Shippers challenge the Commission decision to allow the use of net revenues instead of gross revenues for the KMEP subsidiary referred to as Tejas Consolidated.\(^{210}\) The Commission denies rehearing because this issue is moot. Tejas Consolidated is one of the eight KMI-Operated Entities.\(^{211}\) The Commission in Opinion No. 511, as affirmed in this order, has excluded Tejas Consolidated, along with all of the other KMI-Operated Entities from KMEP’s Massachusetts formula. Thus, the issue of whether, with respect to Tejas Consolidated, to allow the Distrigas methodology to be used to perform the revenue allocation factor of the Massachusetts formula is moot.

6. KN Method

a. Rehearing Request

169. SFPP seeks rehearing of the Commission’s determination that SFPP’s proposed approach to the KN Method was incorrect and that SFPP instead must follow the KN Method set forth in Opinion No. 731.\(^{212}\) SFPP argues the Opinion No. 731 KN Method allocates G&A expenses in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle of cost-causation and, thus, is inconsistent with the Commission’s principles. SFPP uses the KN Method to allocate G&A costs at the SFPP company level, i.e., among the individual functions or services provided by SFPP.

170. SFPP’s proposed approach to the KN Method is a “simple average approach” that is similar to its Massachusetts formula in that it utilizes a simple average of the three

\(^{210}\) ACV Rehearing at 186 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 147).

\(^{211}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 78, n.89, P 146 (citing Ex. SFP-38 at 26, 27-30; Ex. SFP-129 at 31-32).

\(^{212}\) Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. Inc., 53 FPC 1691 (1975) (Opinion No. 731), order on reh'g, 54 FPC 923, aff'd, Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. Inc. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
factor ratios (gross plant, direct labor and gross revenue) to allocate all residual G&A expenses. SFPP states that Trial Staff, which endorses using the traditional KN Method as articulated in Opinion No. 731, asks only whether the G&A costs are labor-related or plant-related. SFPP argues that under the Opinion No. 731 approach, if the G&A costs are labor related (such as salary for an accountant who performs work at the G&A level) the costs are allocated 100 percent to labor at the SFPP level. If the G&A costs are associated with plant costs, the costs would be allocated 100 percent to plant at the SFPP level. Thus, SFPP argues under this traditional KN Method, virtually all G&A expenses ultimately would be allocated based, not on the purpose for which the G&A expenses were incurred, but simply because the G&A costs are themselves labor or plant.

171. SFPP provides specific examples of how Trial Staff’s traditional Opinion No. 731 KN Method would disregard the purpose for which the G&A costs were incurred. According to SFPP, this approach runs contrary to the principle of cost causation. One example is the cost of lighting and office equipment at Kinder Morgan’s corporate offices. SFPP argues that these costs would be allocated as plant at the SFPP level even though the power at these offices supports all aspects of SFPP’s business and not just SFPP’s plant.

b. Commission Determination

172. The KN Method is used to allocate general and administrative expenses among a pipeline company’s divisions or functions after the overhead costs are allocated from the pipeline’s parent company to the pipeline company through the Massachusetts formula. Under Opinion No. 731, such G&A costs are allocated based on the ratio of direct labor and capital investment of each of the pipeline’s functions and services at issue to the total direct labor and capital investment of all divisions involved. Opinion No. 731, which originally set forth the formula for the KN Method, requires that G&A expenses first be divided in labor-related, plant-related, and “other” categories. After the initial division, the “other” category is allocated between the labor- and plant-related categories in proportion to each category’s total so that all expenses are classified as either plant or labor related. The categories are then allocated among the jurisdictional entity’s (in this case SFPP) functions by multiplying the total labor-related G&A by each function’s direct labor ratio, and multiplying the total plant-related G&A by each function’s direct plant ratio. Then, within each function, the expenses are added together and the ratio of each total to the total amount allocated is that function’s KN ratio. The final step is to multiply each A&G expense by the applicable KN ratios in order to allocate it across the

213 See SFPP, L.P. et al., 86 FERC ¶ 61,022 at 61,082 (1999) (citing Mojave Pipeline Co., 83 FERC ¶ 61,267 (1998)).
functions. Opinion No. 731's KN formula has been affirmed by the Commission in numerous decisions.214

173. SFPP does not appear to dispute that the KN Method, as articulated in Opinion No. 731, is as set out in the above two paragraphs. Rather, SFPP continues to argue on rehearing that its “simple average approach” for applying the KN Method is an appropriate substitution in lieu of the KN Method articulated in Opinion No. 731. SFPP justifies using its “simple average approach,” arguing that it is fully consistent with KMEP’s Massachusetts formula and that “Trial Staff’s approach” to the KN Method runs directly contrary to the principle of cost causation. First, SFPP fails to present how the Trial Staff’s approach differs from the KN Method set forth in Opinion No. 731. Second, the Commission did not, as SFPP states in its rehearing request, “order[] SFPP to follow Staff’s approach.” Rather, the Commission clearly ordered in Opinion No. 511 SFPP to follow the KN Method as articulated in Opinion No. 731. Accordingly, the Commission denies rehearing regarding the KN Method and affirms its determination in Opinion No. 511 that SFPP’s “simple average approach” does not conform to Opinion No. 731 and that SFPP must apply the KN Method set forth in Opinion No. 731.215

174. The Commission also rejects SFPP’s arguments that its “simple average approach” should be accepted because it is fully consistent with its Massachusetts formula, which SFPP states uses a simple average of three factors to allocate residual costs. If the Commission had intended for the same formulaic approach to be used for allocating residual G&A costs among both affiliate subsidiaries as well as among functions within the regulated company, then the Commission would not have adopted and continued to use separate methods, the KN Method and the Massachusetts formula, for each type of allocation.

175. For the foregoing reasons, SFPP’s request for rehearing regarding the KN Method is denied.


215 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 150.
C. **Compliance Filing On Cost Allocation Issues**

176. On April 25, 2011, SFPP submitted its Compliance Filing implementing Opinion No. 511. The Compliance Filing includes supporting explanatory statements and documentation regarding overhead cost allocation issues as required in Opinion No. 511. The supporting documentation includes an affidavit of Mr. Bradley and supporting documentation for the overhead cost allocation as required in Ordering Paragraph (B) of Opinion No. 511. At issue is whether to accept the supporting documentation on overhead cost allocation provided in the Compliance Filing.

177. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission directed SFPP, as part of its Compliance Filing to, on the issue of whether the KMI-shared costs allocated or assigned to KMEP or directly to SFPP from a particular RC are reasonable and are reasonably well documented, identify the RCs that require the most critical examination and document the details of the costs allocated within those critical RCs. The Commission also directed SFPP to provide a fuller analysis and explanation of its previous clarifications and adjustments in its Compliance Filing, along with the source materials for such an audit and the supporting analysis. The Commission also ordered SFPP to respond to Valero’s criticisms, particularly for assignments and allocations to and within the Products Pipeline Group.

[In its compliance filing SFPP must clearly explain the basis for any deduction from KMEP’s cost of service for ambiguous situations based on its review of the time sheets or time split involves. If SFPP’s pending assignment and allocation of costs to SFPP involves ambiguous situations, SFPP must explain how these will be resolved. For example, SFPP might determine that the best resolution is to roll some of the costs now directly assigned to SFPP (about $9.3 million) up to a higher level in its accounting structure, such as the Pacific or the Products Pipeline Group. This would result in some reallocation of costs below the KMEP level, but would not affect the allocation of costs to KMEP-Operated Entities that have nothing to do with product pipeline operations. Similarly, if some elements included in the cross-charge to KMEP are unclear,

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216 Id. P 135.

217 Id. P 137.

218 Id.
SFPP could provide documentation that supports eliminating some dollar amount of a specific cross-charge from KMEP’s total cost of service, or alternatively, assign or allocate those costs to those entities that are operated by KMI.\textsuperscript{219}

178. With regard to the overhead cost issues, the Commission generally accepts the Compliance Filing, with some exceptions, as discussed in detail below.

1. **G&A Costs Directly Assigned to SFPP, Pacific Pipeline Group Sub-tier, or PPL Tier**

a. **Compliance Filing**

179. SFPP’s Compliance Filing includes the following background information regarding its organizational structure and how it intersects with its cost allocation methodology. SFPP is one of the KMEP-Operated Entities. KMEP has no employees. GP Services and KMI-shared employees provide all the support for the KMEP-Operated Entities. GP Services employees operate and manage the KMEP-Operated Entities. With only a few exceptions, GP Services employees do not perform work for the KMI-Owned Entities or the KMI-Operated Entities. GP Services employees do perform work for KM Canada. KMI-shared employees perform certain managerial and other G&A functions for the KMEP-Operated Entities as well as the KMI-Operated Entities.

180. SFPP also explains in its Compliance Filing its RC accounting concept. SFPP states that all costs, including G&A costs, originate in RCs and flow to the subsidiaries each RC serves. KMI-shared employees and GP Services employees (and their associated costs) are divided into RCs based on their functional duties and, in some instances, the geographic locations of the subsidiaries they support. Each RC has its own budget and tracks its labor and non-labor costs. The relevant focus in the Compliance Filing is the GP Services costs assigned to the PPL Tier, the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier and to SFPP individually. According to SFPP, GP Services G&A costs are distributed among KMEP-Operated Entities (which includes SFPP) using a combination of direct assignments to individual entities and to groups of entities (e.g., PPL Tier or Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier), with residual costs allocated via a Massachusetts formula.

181. SFPP states in 2007 only five RCs directly assigned labor costs to SFPP individually. The five RCs are RC 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011, and 1040. These five RCs

\textsuperscript{219} Id.
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also assigned labor costs to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier or the PPL Tier. SFPP resides within both these tiers.

182. These five RCs were subject to an error called the "Location Code 0002" accounting error. SFPP explains that in 2007, the G&A labor costs associated with GP Services employees were generally directed in the accounting system to the applicable subsidiaries or tiers using account codes called "location codes." Generally, in 2007, Location Code 0002 was to be used by employees to tag costs to be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, which includes SFPP, Calnev, and West Coast Terminals. However, for RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011, and 1040 (the RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP), the accounting department read Location Code 0002 as tagging costs to be assigned directly to SFPP, even though the employees who assigned the location code thought Location Code 0002 was to be used to tag costs assignable to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier. The result of the Location Code 0002 error was that too many G&A labor costs originating in the five affected RCs were directly assigned to SFPP.

183. Mr. Bradley states he identified this error when reviewing Exhibit No. ACV-279HC in this proceeding. Mr. Bradley states that he has corrected this error for ratemaking purposes in this proceeding. To correct the error, Mr. Bradley and Ms. Armstrong interviewed the individuals within the five RCs, and created the surveys in Exhibit SFP-334HC. If the surveyed employee stated that the salary split in the general ledger accurately reflected how he or she spent their time in 2007, SFPP left the salary split as recorded in the general ledger for that employee. If an employee indicated that the salary split was wrong, the interviewer asked the employee to indicate the subsidiaries or groups of subsidiaries for which they had provided G&A support and asked them indicate the percentage of time they had spent on each. For any individual who was no longer employed by KMEP, that employee's labor costs were corrected by placing all the costs in the PPL Tier. Mr. Bradley states that the surveys and corrective actions reflect that approximately $1.7 million was erroneously directly assigned to SFPP. Thus, in its Compliance Filing, SFPP reduced the direct assignments amount attributed to SFPP by $1.7 million.

184. Outside of the Location Code 0002 error, SFPP states that the surveys conducted in 2009 set forth in Exhibit SFP-334HC provide the "detail regarding the salary splits and the associated labor costs." Mr. Bradley asserts that the surveys accurately capture employees' salary splits for 2007 and should be used in this proceeding.

220 Bradley Affidavit at P 29.
185. Mr. Bradley also notes that the labor costs for employees in RCs 1009 and 1011 who did not code to Location Code 0002 were not interviewed as part of the survey. Therefore, the labor costs associated with those RC 1009 and 1011 employees remain unchanged. The applicable labor costs from RC 1009 were coded to the PPL Tier and the labor costs from RC 1011 were coded to either the West Coast Terminals or Calnev. Mr. Bradley further states that the remaining non-labor costs in RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011, and 1040 (the five RCs that directly assign costs to SFPP) bear no relation to labor. Mr. Bradley states these non-labor costs were coded by the accounting department and did not involve interpretation of employees' labor coding. Thus, to the extent any of these costs were directly assigned to SFPP, Mr. Bradley states those direct assignments were correct.

186. Next, SFPP addressed the RCs that directly assign costs to either the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier or the PPL Tier. SFPP states that, in addition to the five RCs noted above, six other RCs assigned costs to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier or the PPL Tier. These six RCs are 1003, 1010, 1012, 1030, 1064, and 1007. SFPP states that none of these six RCs directly assign costs to SFPP individually. SFPP stated that there are no other GP Services RCs that assigned costs to SFPP (either individually or through a shared cost distribution) in 2007. Mr. Bradley further describes that while some RC 1012 G&A costs were assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, the costs for RCs 1030 and 1012 generally were assigned to the PPL Tier and allocated among the subsidiaries in the products pipeline group (PPL Tier), including SFPP. RCs 1003, 1010, 1064, and a portion of the accounting group in RC 1007 generally assign their non-residual costs to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier.

187. Mr. Bradley also describes the adjustments to the GP Services costs made in testimony and at hearing and further adjustments made in the Compliance Filing. These new adjustments include: (1) reallocating and reassigning health and welfare costs, pension costs, and the cost of other benefits to follow labor costs resulting in a reduction in the amount of $146,128 in costs that flow to SFPP; (2) adjusting certain non-labor costs that follow labor costs based on the 2009 survey to correct the Location Code 0002 error, resulting in a $178,808 reduction in costs flowing to SFPP; (3) adjustments made to reflect corrected amount of costs associated with the support of the KM Canada Entities, which reflects a $213,507 reduction in these costs flowing to SFPP; and (4) adjusting the property, plant and equipment (PP&E) balances to reflect only year-end 2007 balances, which changes slightly the percentages used in the allocations.

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221 Id. at P 34-38.
b. Protest

188. The ACV Shippers were the only party to protest SFPP’s Compliance Filing materials supporting the direct assignments. With respect to the Location Code 0002 error, ACV Shippers generally assert that SFPP’s explanation and proposed correction of the Location Code 0002 error exemplifies the fact that SFPP repeatedly abandons any reliance on Kinder Morgan’s accounting structure, underscoring that it is inaccurate and unreliable. ACV Shippers argue that SFPP attempts to introduce new corrections and proposals based on retroactive surveys of employees. ACV Shippers’ consultant, Dr. Arthur, explains that SFPP’s survey of the individuals in the five RCs that directly assign G&A overhead costs to SFPP was substantially incomplete and highly questionable. ACV Shippers state that SFPP’s attempt at correct the $9.8 million of direct assignments to SFPP through Mr. Bradley’s survey process shows that this information is highly questionable and unreliable given (i) the significant time period that elapsed between when the work was performed and when Mr. Bradley conducted the survey, (ii) the presence of contradictory survey data collected by a third-party accounting firm during the test period in this proceeding, and (iii) the incomplete, arbitrary, and deficient nature of Mr. Bradley’s survey process itself. 222

189. Dr. Arthur recaps his prior testimony and evidence that he asserts shows that SFPP’s proposed direct assignment of $9.8 million to SFPP was clearly erroneous. 223 Dr. Arthur states that Exhibit ACV-279HC is a summary of the salary assignments by individual employees in three RCs who were directly assigning overhead costs to SFPP. One example of potential errors identified in Exhibit ACV-279HC is with RC 1002. RC 1002 showed 100 percent of James Kehlet’s 2007 salary was assigned to SFPP, yet Mr. Kehlet testified that he was responsible for (i) the regulatory affairs for SFPP, Calnev, and West Coast Terminals and (ii) supervising individuals who allocated a portion of their time to entities other than SFPP. Dr. Arthur also states that Exhibit ACV-279HC showed that the vast majority of the employees in RC 1040 (Environmental Compliance) assigned their time and costs only to SFPP, which in Dr. Arthur’s opinion was implausible given the extent of KMEP’s operations and assets.

190. With respect to the Location Code 0002 error, Dr. Arthur states that Mr. Bradley’s description of the error is inconsistent with the proposed correction. 224 Dr. Arthur quotes Mr. Bradley’s affidavit on this issue as stating that the “G&A employees in all of the RCs

222 ACV Protest at 22-23 (citing Arthur Affidavit at P 62-70, 74-78).
223 Arthur Affidavit at P 50-54.
224 Id. P 55.
Dr. Arthur argues that based on Mr. Bradley’s description of the Location Code 0002 error, i.e., that the Location Code 0002 expenses were intended to be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, the correction for the Location Code 0002 error should have been to switch the dollar amounts from being directly assigned to SFPP to being directly assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier. Dr. Arthur notes that SFPP did not do this in its Compliance Filing, and instead SFPP choose to: (1) reject its accounting records completely, (2) attempt to survey individual employees in mid-2009 regarding their activities during 2007, and (3) reallocate the labor-costs based on the incomplete results of that survey. Finally, Dr. Arthur stated that Mr. Bradley fails to provide any information or data to verify that the direct assignments to groups of subsidiaries by the RCs that also relied on the Location Codes to assign costs are accurate or reasonable. Dr. Arthur supports this attack on SFPP’s general reliance on location codes based on data provided in the East Line proceeding.

With respect to the non-labor costs in the five RCs affected by the Location Code 0002 error, Dr. Arthur asserts that the assignment of these costs are not credible because the costs were assigned by the accounting department and it does not appear that any RC manager or anyone else associated with the actual RCs reviewed the data to determine whether the costs should be directly assigned to SFPP. Dr. Arthur also states that the data provided by Mr. Bradley does not verify the accuracy of Mr. Bradley’s claims as the data is simply a printout of general ledger data with brief descriptions of the cost item that provides no detail and no assurance that the costs are uniquely related to SFPP.

ACV Shippers also challenge one of SFPP’s adjustments proposed in the Compliance Filing. First, ACV Shippers argue that SFPP’s new treatment of the benefit costs lacks any verifiable basis. ACV Shippers complain that SFPP fails in its Compliance Filing to provide any backup material regarding the proposed reallocation and reassignment of benefits costs to individual subsidiaries or groups of subsidiaries. Dr. Arthur explains that in the Compliance Filing, SFPP removes tens of millions of dollars of benefits costs from the KMP Tier, and directly assigns it to specific groups

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\[225\] Id. P 56 (quoting Bradley Affidavit at P 22).

\[226\] Id. P 59.

\[227\] Id. P 72.

\[228\] Id. P 80-81.
(lower tiers) and to individual subsidiaries. As a result of this adjustment, SFPP is now assigned $7.4 million of these benefits costs. Dr. Arthur notes that the backup material for the adjustment to the benefits costs is a one page schematic that shows the results of its reallocation and reassignment, without any of the underlying calculations or a justification for the underlying calculations. Consequently, ACV Shippers were unable to verify the accuracy or reasonableness of SFPP's calculations.

c. SFPP Reply Comments

193. SFPP asserts in its reply comments that ACV Shippers and Dr. Arthur have put forth no evidence that the GP Services G&A costs assigned and allocated to SFPP are inaccurate. SFPP asserts that ACV Shippers offer scant actual analysis of the documents provided in the Compliance Filing and instead reply on evidence imported from the East Line rate proceeding, Docket No. IS09-437-000. SFPP claims that in their comments ACV Shippers' witness Dr. Arthur simply recapitulates previously identified and corrected errors. Regarding the Location Code 0002 error, SFPP notes that the error had been identified, corrected and explained at the time of the hearing. Thus, Dr. Arthur’s critique that Mr. Bradley’s explanation is not plausible is “tardy as well as off-base.” Further, SFPP states:

"[E]rrors in RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011, and 1040 do not reflect upon the individual RC owners’ ability to track their own or their employees’ costs. In 2007, each RC owner received a report each month that detailed the RC’s labor distribution that reported to which location code – not to which entity or entities – their employees’ time (and costs) was being billed. When managers in these RCs saw that labor was being coded to Location Code 0002, it would have appeared to them that people were assigning their time to the Pacific Tier because that is how the employees, including managers, were intending Location Code 0002 to be used."

Regarding the Location Code 0002 correction, SFPP states that the “simple” correction of throwing all of the Location Code 0002 labor costs back into the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier would not have been as precise as the survey approach undertaken by

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229 SFPP Reply Comments at 40 (citing Arthur Affidavit at P 50-52).

230 Id. at 40.

231 Id. at 41-42.
Mr. Bradley. In support of its position that the Location Code 0002 survey correction was more precise, SFPP details:

By mid-2009, KMEP was implementing what it had learned from the KPMG Study in the normal course of business. KMEP was confident that the employees in the affected RCs could identify their labor costs to an individual entity rather than to a tier, as had been the practice in 2007. Based on this knowledge, KMEP felt confident that, in correcting the error, costs could be assigned more precisely to the entities that incurred them.

Further, SFPP states that contrary to Dr. Arthur's assertion, the Location Code 0002 error does not reflect on the employee's ability to code their time.

194. Regarding Dr. Arthur's argument that the 2008 KPMG Study undermines the 2007 G&A cost assignments, SFPP states this argument is without merit as the 2008 Study has no relevance to this proceeding and reflects an attempt by Dr. Arthur to import select evidence from the East Line rate proceeding.

195. SFPP states that Dr. Arthur's claim that SFPP failed to provide data from RCs whose costs are allocated or assigned to SFPP is patently false and shows that Dr. Arthur did not analyze or ignored the data given to him. SFPP asserts that discarding an entire methodology because of a limited number of errors pertaining to a limited number of costs in a limited number of RCs, which errors were corrected, would make no sense.

196. Regarding the employee benefits costs, SFPP states that the schematic provided in its Compliance Filing at Tab D, Exhibit No. 2, page 5, shows the reassignment of benefits SFPP made in compliance with the Commission directive in Opinion No. 511. SFPP further states that, after reviewing ACV Shippers' comments regarding the lack of supporting documentation, it realized that it failed to include with the Compliance Filing a work paper showing the calculations that underlie the benefits reassignment.

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232 Id. at 42.

233 Id. (internal footnote omitted).

234 Id. at 46.

235 Id. at 47.

236 Id. at 50-51.
schematic. SFPP’s attached work paper details the reassignment of employee related costs and shows that the reassignment resulted in a $146,128 reduction in the amount being allocated to SFPP.

d. **Commission Determination**

197. With respect to the Location Code 0002 error, in Opinion No. 511, the Commission directed SFPP to explain any ambiguous situations based on its review of the time sheets or time splits involved. The Commission further stated that, if SFPP’s pending assignment of costs to SFPP involves ambiguous situations, SFPP must explain how these will be resolved and noted that SFPP might determine that the best resolution is to roll some of the costs now directly assigned to SFPP (about $9.3 million) up to a higher level in its accounting structure, such as the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier or the Products Pipeline Group.

198. SFPP described the Location Code 0002 error as follows: “G&A employees in all of the RCs – including the five RCs that were the subject of the error – intended that their labor costs coded to Location Code 0002 be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier and allocated among SFPP, Calnev and West Coast Terminals.” The Commission reads this statement to mean that every employee that billed their time to one of these five RCs used Location Code 0002 to designate a cost that should be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, not directly assigned to SFPP. However, for the five RCs at issue, the accounting department directly assigned costs coded to Location Code 0002 to SFPP. SFPP proposes to correct the Location Code 0002 error by surveying in 2009 the applicable employees or, where the particular employee was unavailable, interviewing the employee’s supervisor or manager or even a co-worker “who was thoroughly familiar with that individual’s duties,” and asking them to indicate the percentage of time they spent in 2007 on SFPP.

199. The Commission rejects SFPP’s proposed resolution of the Location Code 0002 error. The obvious correction for this error is, as the ACV Shippers advocate, to treat any labor cost in RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011 and 1040 coded with Location Code 0002 as a cost assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier to be allocated via a Massachusetts

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237 *Id.* at 51 & Attachment.

238 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 138.

239 *Bradley Affidavit* at P 22.

240 *Id.* P 25.
formulas among the three entities within the Pacific Pipeline Group – SFPP, Calnev, and West Coast Terminals. To be consistent, the non-labor costs in RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011, and 1040 that follow labor costs that were coded with Location Code 0002 must also be assigned to the Pacific Pipeline Group. SFPP is directed to make this change and reflect the change in the rates to be filed in a further compliance filing.

200. To the extent there are any other labor or non-labor costs from RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011 and 1040 that were not coded to Location Code 0002 or do not follow costs coded to Location Code 0002, no party raised specific challenges to these cost assignments. The only specific argument ACV Shippers raise is a challenge to the credibility of the Location Code 0002 non-labor costs, which concern has been addressed by the above directive that SFPP assign all such non-labor costs to the Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier. ACV Shippers’ general arguments in their protest regarding the reliability and credibility of the process for assigning and allocating G&A overhead costs are insufficient to move the Commission to direct any further changes to the GP Services G&A costs directly assigned to SFPP, Pacific Pipeline Group sub-tier, or PPL Tier from RCs 1002, 1006, 1009, 1011 and 1040 and RCs 1003, 1010, 1012, 1030, 1064, and 1007.

201. With respect to the four adjustments described in Mr. Bradley’s affidavit, ACV Shippers challenge the adjustment to the employee benefits costs. Specifically, ACV Shippers assert SFPP failed to provide the supporting analysis that would allow for the accuracy of this adjustment to be verified.241 In Opinion No. 511, the Commission directed:

> Since the calculation is relatively mechanical, SFPP should be able to adjust these employee-related costs based on the information now available to it and which underpins the record. SFPP must prepare its compliance filing accordingly and provide a supporting analysis therewith.242

In response to ACV Shippers’ protest on this issue, SFPP submitted in its reply comments the supporting work paper that shows how it calculated the amount of benefits costs to be redistributed to SFPP. Thus, the Commission finds SFPP complied with the directive in Opinion No. 511 requiring it to provide a supporting analysis. Further, the Commission has reviewed the work paper and finds that SFPP complied with the

241 ACV Shippers’ challenge to the KM Canada adjustment is discussed supra at P 123-139.

242 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 141 (emphasis added).
Commission's directive that any employee benefits costs that relate to G&A labor be allocated and assigned to follow labor. Accordingly, the Commission accepts SFPP's reallocation and assignment of health and welfare costs, pension costs and the cost of other benefits as set forth in its Compliance Filing and Reply Comments.

2. **G&A Costs in KMI Cross-Charge**

   a. **Compliance Filing**

202. SFPP witness Mr. Bradley states that KMI uses three shared-services accounts to capture corporate G&A costs that cannot be directly assigned to a particular KMEP-Operated, KMI-Owned or KMI-Operated Entity. The three accounts are as follows: Account 184601, Account 184600, and Account 107001. Account 184601 is the KMI cross-charge account. This account is used to capture the G&A costs incurred by KMI-shared employees and RCs for the benefit of the KMEP-Operated Entities, which includes SFPP. Thus, the only KMI costs that are charged to the KMEP-Operated Entities are those in Account 184601. KMI-dedicated employees and KMI-dedicated RCs are not allowed to budget expenses or charge time to Account 184601.

203. SFPP states that 39 RCs assign costs to Account 184601. SFPP provides the 2009 salary splits for the KMI-shared employees as an example of how the costs of KMI-shared employees are accounted for in the Kinder Morgan accounting system. SFPP notes that the 2007 salary splits are no longer available, thus it cannot produce the actual individual salary splits for 2007. Last, SFPP provides the detail for the 39 RCs that code to the KMI cross-charge. The supporting documents include the journal entries from 2007 pulled from the general ledger and the raw data from Kinder Morgan's general ledger before any adjustments.

204. Next, SFPP explains the adjustments made to the KMI-shared costs. These adjustments are as follows: (1) correction of the misapplication of the fixed fee payments KM North Texas Pipeline and KM Mexico made to KMI that should have been applied to Account 184600, (2) removal of all costs in RC 0375 as well as applicable benefits and

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243 Costs recorded in Accounts 184600 and 107001 are charged only to KMI-Owned Entities and KMI-Operated Entities. They are not included the KMI cross-charge.

244 The 39 RCs are listed in SFPP's Compliance Filing. See SFPP Compliance Filing at Tab D, Exhibit 4.

245 Bradley Affidavit at P 44-48.
payroll taxes from RC 0999 from the KMI cross-charge in order to ensure that none of the costs of the time spent on Red Cedar’s management committee are allocated to SFPP, and (3) reduction by $7.974 million of the amount of restricted stock and stock options recorded in May 2007 related to the going-private transaction to reflect only the $5.572 million in recurring costs. Further, SFPP details the source of the $7.68 million that was removed from the KMI cross-charge in Exhibit SFP-134.

205. In addition, SFPP describes two new adjustments that SFPP proposes in the Compliance Filing (1) removal of certain costs associated with the Trans Mountain acquisition, and (2) certain legal costs. SFPP states that these adjustments resulted from the review SFPP undertook as a result of Opinion No. 511. Regarding the Trans Mountain acquisition costs, SFPP states that its review of KMI-shared costs showed that six invoices related to KMEP’s acquisition of Trans Mountain were erroneously included in the KMI cross-charge in RC 0999. Those six invoices totaled $1,471,698, and have been removed from the KMI cross-charge.246 Regarding the legal invoices, SFPP identified two legal invoices, totaling $99,574 related to the natural gas entities that were misapplied to the KMI cross-charge and thus, $99,574 has been removed from the KMI cross-charge.247

b. Protests

206. In their protest, ACV Shippers reassert that SFPP has failed to justify or support the costs included in the KMI cross-charge.248 The ACV Shippers’ consultant Dr. Arthur states the data provided by SFPP does not reflect the basis or justification for the KMI-shared employee allocations. Specifically, Dr. Arthur states the additional data provided by SFPP is simply a summary of the amounts allocated to three separate accounts (Account 107001 – Capital Burden Pool; Account 184600 – KMI G&A Overhead Pool; and Account 184601 – Cross-Charge) as well as the underlying general ledger data that is after the allocations are made to the various accounts; i.e., SFPP is simply providing a presentation of the results of the allocation, not the basis or justification for the initial allocation among the three accounts, nor any evidence that the allocation is accurate.249 Dr. Arthur notes that it is “the initial splitting of the KMI-shared costs that is relevant, which should include an examination of the reasonableness and accuracy of the initial

246 Id. P 46.

247 Id. P 47.

248 ACV Protest at 17-20.

249 Arthur Affidavit at P 26.
allocation of overhead costs by Kinder Morgan to the various groups of subsidiaries, not simply looking at the amount allocated to one group as a result of the initial allocation.\textsuperscript{250}

207. Dr. Arthur next asserts that evidence shows that the initial split of KMI shared costs among the three accounts is not accurate because overhead services were clearly performed for entities that are excluded from the KMEP Massachusetts formula. Dr. Arthur asserts that this record, including the Compliance Filing, is devoid of any information or evidence which can be used to verify, test, audit, or substantiate: (i) the reasonableness, accuracy, or even the basis for the actual splitting of the KMI-shared costs, (ii) that no KMI-dedicated employee assigned costs to Account 184601, or (iii) even the process used in which KMI-shared employees were actually splitting costs between the two accounts.\textsuperscript{251} Dr. Arthur rejects SFPP’s proffer of the 2009 salary splits, stating that the data is not from the relevant time period and the costs were allocated to more than the three accounts used in 2007. Dr. Arthur supports his challenge regarding the veracity and accuracy of KMI-shared employee cost allocations with a discussion of the record evidence in the SFPP East Line rate proceeding, Docket No. IS09-437-000.

208. Last, Dr. Arthur argues that the arbitrariness exercised by Kinder Morgan regarding capitalized overhead costs between KMI and KMEP further contradicts any claims of effectively isolating costs with relevant Kinder Morgan entities, or any related accuracy, credibility, or reasonableness associated with the assignment and/or allocation of KMI-shared G&A overhead labor costs.\textsuperscript{252} Dr. Arthur notes that in 2007, SFPP identified $6.1 million of overhead expenses that were initially allocated to the KMEP-Operated Entities included in Mr. Bradley’s model (through the Account 184601, KMI cross-charge) and that this $6.1 million was subsequently assigned to the KMI-Operated subsidiaries. Dr. Arthur asserts that this shift in cost assignment was made by transferring $6.1 million from Account 184601 to Account 107001, which re-assignment Dr. Arthur believes shows that the allocation of KMI-shared employee costs between the three accounts cannot possibly be an effective method for isolating costs or be accurate or reasonable.

209. With respect to SFPP’s proposed removal of approximately $1.5 million of legal costs related to the Trans Mountain acquisition and $99,574 of legal invoices related to the natural gas entities, Dr. Arthur complains that SFPP provides no supporting data on

\textsuperscript{250} Id. P 28.

\textsuperscript{251} Id. P 29.

\textsuperscript{252} Id. P 38.
how these invoices were assigned to Account 184601 in error, how SFPP determined that these invoices were assigned in error, and no documentation supporting the remainder of the amount of legal costs assigned to Account 184601.

c. SFPP Reply Comments

210. SFPP assert that ACV Shippers' protest of the Compliance Filing focuses on the two KMI-Shared accounts that are irrelevant to this proceeding, Accounts 184600 and 107001. SFPP reiterates that costs allocated or assigned to Accounts 184600 and 107001 are not distributed to SFPP and therefore, are irrelevant. SFPP notes that it has provided transaction-level detail for every cost in Account 184601, and that ACV Shippers witness Dr. Arthur failed to identify a single cost that was misapplied to Account 184601, other than the errant costs that SFPP itself had identified and removed from the KMI cross-charge.

211. With respect to the additional Trans Mountain invoices and legal invoices that SFPP identified and removed from Account 184601 in its Compliance Filing, SFPP notes the fact that these few invoices out of tens of thousands of invoices processed by KMI in 2007 were erroneously included in Account 184601 does not indicate that the overall cost allocation system is unreliable. Rather, SFPP states that all it represents is a mistake occurred in inputting a few invoices, which mistakes have been corrected for in this proceeding. Last, SFPP states that Dr. Arthur did not identify any other costs that were misapplied, despite his suggestion that some errors may exist. SFPP argues that there is no need to reject the entire accounting system simply because someone erred in inputting eight invoices.

212. Regarding Dr. Arthur's criticism of the 2009 salary splits, SFPP explains why the 2009 salary split exhibit contains additional accounts. SFPP states that the exhibit contains all of the salary splits for all of the employees for KMI-shared RCs that charged to Account 184601 and that some of these KMI-shared employees perform shared services for the KMEP-Operated Entities as well as directly for individual KMI-Operated

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253 SFPP Reply Comments at 33-39.

254 Id. at 36.

255 Id. (citing Arthur Affidavit at P 40).

256 Id.

257 Id. at 37.
and KMI-Owned Entities, which costs are reflected in these additional direct assignment accounts. SFPP further explains that it did not address these “additional accounts” because they are not charged to KMEP-Operated Entities. SFPP also responds to Dr. Arthur’s claim that the 2009 salary splits are “unverifiable after-the-fact cost split data,” stating that these are the salary splits provided to accounting by employees to ensure that labor G&A costs and non-labor G&A costs that follow labor were distributed correctly. SFPP further states the only additional detail that could be provided to “verify” the salary splits would be to interview each of the nearly 600 employees to confirm that the splits were accurately reported.\(^{258}\)

**d. Commission Determination**

213. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission directed SFPP to identify the KMI-shared RCs that contribute to the KMI cross-charge that require the most critical examination and to document the details of the costs allocated within those critical RCs.\(^{259}\) The Commission also noted that it was not clear how SFPP reached the $7,681,768 in corrections to the 2007 KMI cross-charge reflected in Exhibit SFP-134.\(^{260}\) Finally, the Commission stated that “if some elements included in the [KMI] cross-charge to KMEP are unclear, SFPP could provide documentation that supports eliminating some dollar amount of a specific cross-charge from KMEP’s total cost of service, or alternatively, assign or allocate those costs to those entities that are operated by KMI.”\(^{261}\) The Commission also noted in Opinion No. 511, that Valero’s “blanket criticisms” are not particularly helpful, particularly because Valero does not state what percentage of the hours on each timesheet may be in error, and the potential impact of the errors.\(^{262}\) Thus, the Commission indicated that it would expect to see “an integrated presentation that addresses the relevance and materiality of its criticism.”\(^{263}\)

214. The Commission accepts SFPP’s Compliance Filing with respect to the adjusted amount of the KMI cross-charge. The Commission finds that supporting documentation

\(^{258}\) *Id.*

\(^{259}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 135.

\(^{260}\) *Id.* P 136.

\(^{261}\) *Id.* P 137.

\(^{262}\) *Id.* P 136.

\(^{263}\) *Id.*
provided in the Compliance Filing with respect to the 39 RCs SFPP identified as contributing to the KMI cross-charge account (Account 184601) to be adequate. ACV Shippers (which group includes Valero) are the sole party to protest the KMI cross-charge with any specificity. However, the ACV Shippers’ criticisms continue to be blanket criticisms, mostly criticisms of the scope and quality of the supporting documentation provided by SFPP in the Compliance Filing. In short, ACV Shippers continue to attack the validity of Kinder Morgan’s overall accounting methods, an argument the Commission, in this order, rejects on rehearing. To the extent ACV Shippers specifically challenge specific RCs, or specific costs, it inappropriately does so based on the record in the East Line rate proceeding (Docket No. IS09-437-000). The Commission will not consider any challenges solely or substantially supported by the East Line ID or record.

215. ACV Shippers also argue that the 2009 salary splits are irrelevant and immaterial. While the Commission agrees that the 2009 salary splits are not illuminating in this proceeding for the reasons detailed by Dr. Arthur, the Commission will not condemn SFPP for its inability to produce the 2007 salary splits. SFPP has explained that the 2007 salary splits are unavailable due to Kinder Morgan’s regular business practice of eliminating the prior year’s salary splits when the new salary splits are decided upon; i.e., each year the updated salary splits automatically replace the prior year’s salary splits in Kinder Morgan’s system. However, SFPP’s inability to produce the 2007 salary splits alone is not enough to undercut the veracity of Kinder Morgan’s overall accounting methodology as it relates to the KMI-shared employees and the KMI cross-charge.

216. With respect to the ACV Shipper’s argument regarding the $6.1 million adjustment related to capitalized overhead costs, the Commission finds the argument meritless. Dr. Arthur argues that KMI’s unilateral shift of $6.1 million in costs from the cross-charge account to another shows that Kinder Morgan’s overall accounting methods are flawed. The Commission finds that SFPP has previously provided a detailed explanation for how the adjustment is made and why.264 Specifically, SFPP explained that if the amount in Account 107001 is insufficient to cover the rate applied to each capital project in a given month, KMI credits the cross-charge account (Account 184601) and the shared-services account for the KMI-Operated and KMI-Owned Entities (Account 184600) for the amount of the insufficiency, and debits Account 107001 for that amount.265 Further, SFPP explained that the amount of the credit is split between

264 See Ex. ACV-77 at 2-3 (SFPP’s Third Supplemental Response to the Second Set of Discovery Requests of ConocoPhillips).

265 Id.
Account 184600 and Account 184601 based on the percentage of the total labor costs in Account 184600 as compared to the total labor costs in Account 184601. The Commission finds this explanation to be sufficient to conclude that KMI does not “unilaterally” or arbitrarily shift costs between the three accounts at issue, Account 184600, 184601, and 107001, such that this $6.1 million adjustment signals a fundamental flaw with Kinder Morgan’s ability to effectively isolate costs.

217. Last, ACV Shippers also complain that SFPP failed to include in the Compliance Filing supporting data regarding the approximately $1.5 million Trans Mountain acquisition invoice adjustment and the $99,574 legal invoice adjustment. SFPP stated that these two adjustments relate to errors identified when preparing the Compliance Filing. Other than pointing out the lack of supporting detail or documentation, the ACV Shippers question the adjustments only to support its over-arching claim that, as a whole, SFPP has not provided sufficient data to verify the amount of the cross-charge. The Commission is uncertain what additional detail ACV Shippers would like to see on this issue. SFPP witness Mr. Bradley stated in his sworn affidavit that when reviewing the KMI-shared costs in conjunction with the Compliance Filing he determined these invoices had been erroneously included in the KMI cross-charge. Upon finding this error, Mr. Bradley removed the total amount of the invoices from the KMI cross-charge. The Commission finds the fact that SFPP did identify these additional errors helps show that it did undertake a closer review of the RCs that charge costs to the KMI cross-charge. The Commission rejects ACV Shippers’ blanket criticism regarding these two adjustments.

3. Indirect G&A Capital Project Costs

218. With respect to the capitalization of overhead costs related to capital investments, in Opinion No. 511 the Commission instructed SFPP to support its position that it only included incidental expenses or indirect costs in its Massachusetts formula.  

a. Compliance Filing

219. Mr. Bradley states that “under Commission regulations, we cannot and do not capitalize any [] indirect G&A costs for ratemaking or FERC Form 6 purposes.”

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266 Id.

267 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 145.

268 Bradley Affidavit at P 62. SFPP also notes that indirect G&A expenses associated with capital projects are treated differently under the Commission’s natural (continued...)
Mr. Bradley explains that indirect expenses associated with KMEP's capital projects are just that—expenses not capital costs. Mr. Bradley states Commission regulations prohibit oil pipelines from capitalizing the indirect G&A costs associated with capital projects into its rate base and recovering them through depreciation over time. SFPP also states that the capitalization of the costs is done through a separate methodology outside of the cost allocation methodology and is done only for GAAP purposes, e.g., for reporting to the SEC and not for ratemaking purposes. Mr. Bradley represented that KMEP expenses all indirect G&A costs associated with capital projects in the period in which they are incurred. SFPP notes that because under the Uniform System of Accounts for oil pipelines there is no separate account to capture indirect G&A expenses associated with capital projects, KMEP treats these G&A expenses like any other indirect G&A cost. Accordingly, the indirect costs associated with capital projects are allocated through KMEP's cost allocation methodology.269

220. According to SFPP, GP Services employees who indirectly support capital projects for the KMEP-Operated Entities charge their indirect costs either to groups of subsidiaries or to the KMP Tier, which is the pool of costs that is allocated through KMEP's Massachusetts formula.270 KMI-shared employees who indirectly support capital projects for the KMEP-Operated Entities charge the KMI cross-charge account, Account 184601. SFPP further notes that these costs are not earmarked or specifically identified in the system as costs associated with KMEP capital projects.

221. SFPP next explains that for GAAP reporting purposes (e.g., SEC reporting) a separate process is undertaken to capitalize a portion of the indirect G&A expenses that have already been distributed to the individual subsidiaries. Specifically, after each KMEP-Operated Entity receives its distribution of G&A costs through KMEP's methodology, each KMEP-Operated Entity determines the portion of its G&A expenses that qualifies for capital treatment for GAAP reporting purposes based on its level of gas pipeline regulations. See id. P 72. Mr. Bradley states that the Commission's natural gas pipeline regulations provide for the capitalization of these indirect costs and also provides a means for capturing these costs in order to segregate them from the indirect G&A costs associated with the other day-to-day activities of the pipeline. See id. P 74. Mr. Bradley further notes that because KMI follows the natural gas pipeline accounting regulations KMI uses Account 107001 (the capital burden pool) for the purpose of capturing the indirect G&A costs associated with capital projects. See id.

269 Id. P 67.

270 Id.
capital spending. Each KMEP-Operated Entity then capitalizes that amount on its GAAP books.\textsuperscript{271} SFPP asserts that capitalizing these costs in its GAAP books is unrelated to KMEP’s allocation of these costs.

222. SFPP lists in its Compliance Filing the RCs that incur indirect G&A expenses in support of KMEP capital projects and the types of activities that generate these costs.\textsuperscript{272} SFPP further notes that because indirect costs associated with capital projects are not differentiated from other indirect costs generated by day-to-day activities, it is not possible to provide the magnitude of these indirect costs on an RC-by-RC basis. The types of activities identified by SFPP include: (i) customer conversations, economic modeling, work with engineers; (ii) engineering and design work; (iii) environmental permitting; (iv) landowner relations; (v) prep line for digs, control center ACTs, coordinating engineering and field operations; (vi) engineering and technical support for drilling wells; and, (vii) contractor safety support, corporate fire safety, and corporate hygiene.

\textbf{b. Protests}

223. Both Tesoro and Trial Staff protest this issue. Tesoro’s protest restates its general attack with respect to capitalized overhead expenses. Tesoro states that recent Commission proceedings have indicated that capitalized overhead should not be included in the Massachusetts formula. Tesoro further states:

\begin{quote}
[I]n his initial testimony [Tesoro witness], Mr. Ashton advocated a single-tier KMEP [Massachusetts] method with total overhead of approximately $307.3 million. Removing capitalized overhead expenses of $53.47 million would therefore reduce the total SFPP overhead to approximately $253.6 million.\textsuperscript{273}
\end{quote}

224. Trial Staff states that Kinder Morgan's RC-based accounting methodology fails in that it does not allow a manner for employees to record time spent providing general support for capital projects related to KMEP-Operated entities.\textsuperscript{274} Trial Staff argues that SFPP’s claims in its Compliance Filing do not address this deficiency. Trial Staff also

\textsuperscript{271} \textit{Id.} P 68.

\textsuperscript{272} \textit{Id.} P 75.

\textsuperscript{273} Tesoro Protest at 24.

\textsuperscript{274} Trial Staff Protest at 6.
reject SFPP’s claim that Commission regulations prohibit oil pipelines from capitalizing indirect G&A costs associated with capital projects. Trial Staff argues that section 3-3 (Cost of Property Constructed) of Part 352 of the Commission’s regulations includes direct and other costs, but excludes “incidental” costs. Trial Staff believes SFPP confuses the term “indirect” with “incidental.” Trial Staff believes “indirect” costs are the “other costs” referred to in section 3-3, and should be capitalized. Trial Staff argues that SFPP must identify which costs are incidental and which are indirect or “other” pursuant to Part 352, section 3-3. Trial Staff asserts that any costs that fall under the “other costs” referred to in section 3-3 should be capitalized.\footnote{275} 

c. SFPP Reply Comments

225. SFPP reiterates in its reply comments that the capitalization of these costs occurs only after all of the expenses have been distributed through KMEP’s cost allocation methodology to SFPP and other entities, and the capitalization occurs outside of, and has no impact on, KMEP’s cost allocation methodology.\footnote{276} SFPP argues that Trial Staff’s implication that KMEP is doing something wrong by expensing indirect G&A costs associated with KMEP capital projects for ratemaking purposes and capitalizing them for GAAP purposes is similar to ACV Shippers’ argument that KMEP is doing something wrong by reporting G&A costs differently for SEC reporting and FERC reporting.\footnote{277} SFPP cites to Sea Robin to support its claim that the Commission requires indirect G&A costs related to capital projects to be reported as expenses, while GAAP requires they be reported as capital expenditures.\footnote{278} SFPP further states that if the Commission does not allow it to expense these costs, SFPP would be deprived of the opportunity to recover these prudently incurred costs because these indirect G&A costs for 2007 and for prior years have not actually been included in SFPP’s rate base. If such costs had been included in SFPP’s rate base, it could then recover the costs through depreciation and its allowed return.\footnote{279}

\footnote{275}Id. at 7. 

\footnote{276}SFPP Reply Comments at 60 (citing Bradley Affidavit at P 63). 

\footnote{277}Id. at 60-61. 

\footnote{278}Id. at 61 (citing Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 795 F.2d 182, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 

\footnote{279}Id.
d. **Commission Determination**

226. The Commission agrees with Trial Staff's description of the Commission's regulations governing treatment of oil pipelines' indirect overhead expenses associated with capital projects. Part 352, section 3-3 lists the "direct and other costs" that is considered a cost of constructing property. Specifically, section 3-3 provides:

Cost of property constructed. The cost of constructing property chargeable to the carrier property accounts shall include direct and other costs as described hereunder:

1. Cost of labor includes the amount paid for labor performed by the carrier's own employees and officers. This includes payroll taxes, vacation pay, pensions, holiday pay and traveling and other incidental expenses of employees. No charge shall be made to these accounts for pay and expenses of officers and employees who merely render services incidentally in connection with extensions, additions or replacements.

7. Cost of injuries and damages includes expenditures for injuries to persons or damage to property when incident to construction projects, and shall be included in the cost of the related construction work.

12. Cost of disposing of excavated material shall be included in the cost of construction.

The Commission reads section 3-3 to mean that the "cost of property constructed" includes the direct costs of constructing property as well as "other costs" as identified in the enumerated list provided in section 3-3; specifically, items (1) through (13). "Other costs" would include those costs listed in section 3-3, such as the cost of an injury to a person or the cost of disposing of excavated material. For purposes of SFPP's Compliance Filing, it is necessary to determine whether SFPP correctly interpreted section 3-3(1) which addresses which labor costs should be considered a cost of property constructed.

227. Section 3-3(1) broadly includes cost of labor performed by the carrier's own employees and officers and is limited only by the statement: "No charge shall be made to

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these accounts for pay and expenses of officers and employees who merely render services incidentally in connection with extensions, additions or replacements."

Incidental means: "depending upon or appertaining to something else as primary; something necessary, appertaining to, or depending upon another which is termed the principal." Here the principal item is the particular construction project whether it is an extension, addition or replacement. A plain reading of section 3-3(1) is that any labor performed by the carrier’s employees in furtherance of constructing the property at issue is chargeable to the carrier property accounts. The Commission reads this section as including labor associated with any of the categories of costs enumerated under section 3-3, such as labor related to permits (section 3-3(8)).

228. Applying this reading of section 3-3, the Commission reviewed the RC activities listed in SFPP’s Compliance Filing as “indirect G&A expenses” associated with capital projects. The Commission finds many of the activities listed by SFPP as indirect labor, such as engineering and design work (RC 1010), environmental permitting (RC 1040), engineering and technical support for drilling wells (RCs 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049), supervision of engineers and project managers (RC 6213), contractor safety support, corporate fire safety, and corporate hygiene (RC 0275), appear to be labor related to the types of “other costs” enumerated in section 3-3. Thus, the Commission disagrees with SFPP’s statement that section 3-3(1) excludes indirect labor costs, and further disagrees with SFPP’s implication that all of the indirect labor costs it identifies in its Compliance Filing are services rendered “incidentally in connection with extensions, additions or replacements.”

229. Accordingly, the Commission finds SFPP’s Compliance Filing to be unpersuasive on this issue. Further, the Commission generally affirms the 2009 ID on this issue, finding that the approach advocated by Trial Staff is the proper approach. Trial Staff asserts that capitalized overhead costs should not be allocated through the KMEP Massachusetts formula. The Commission agrees. Accordingly, SFPP is instructed in its next compliance filing to remove from KMEP’s cost allocation pool, any indirect overhead cost associate with capital projects that Kinder Morgan ultimately capitalized.

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282 Given the limited descriptions of the “RC activities” provided in the Compliance Filing, the Commission cannot undertake an exhaustive review of each “indirect expense” to determine which expenses may relate to an “other cost” category enumerated in section 3-3.

VI. Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital

A. PAA

1. Opinion No. 511

230. As Opinion No. 511 notes, all parties agreed that the capital structure of KMEP, SFPP’s parent company, should be used to determine SFPP’s cost of service. However, the Commission reversed the 2009 ID to hold that capital structure need not be adjusted to account for purchase accounting adjustments (PAA).\footnote{A PAA is an accounting adjustment that occurs when a purchaser pays more than book value (original cost minus accumulated depreciation) for an asset with a resulting increase in the asset base of the regulated entity.} The Commission concluded that the PAAs did not have a distorting effect upon KMEP’s capital structure, and that the most accurate reflection of KMEP’s capital structure was the debt to equity ratio reflected in its financial statements.\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 166-175.} Using similar reasoning, Opinion No. 511 affirmed the 2009 ID that no adjustment was necessary for goodwill related to acquisitions made by KMEP.\footnote{Id. P 179.}

231. The 2009 ID also held that commercial paper and long-term debt due within one year must be incorporated into the debt component when determining KMEP’s capital structure.\footnote{Id. P 183-184.}

2. Rehearing Requests

232. Tesoro was the only party to challenge the Commission’s capital structure decisions on rehearing, and it asserts that the Commission erred in holding that PAAs do not distort KMEP’s capital structure. Tesoro asserts that the Commission in the December 2005 Order\footnote{December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277.} and the February 2006 Order\footnote{February 2006 Order, 114 FERC ¶ 61,136.} addressed the very same PAA

\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 166-175.}
that resulted from KMEP’s acquisition of SFPP at issue in this proceeding. Tesoro states that in these orders, the Commission concluded that this PAA distorted KMEP’s capital structure. Tesoro argues that the Commission’s attempts to distinguish the December 2005 and February 2006 Orders are unconvincing. Tesoro adds that the December 2006 Sepulveda Order cited by the Commission dealt with a different PAA from 1988 and involved a unique fact pattern in which after the purchase involving the PAA SFPP subsequently made an initial public offering of roughly 60 percent debt and 40 percent equity. As a result, Tesoro argues that the 1988 PAA was an adjustment to equity that was made before the creation of SFPP’s capital structure and could have no impact on the amount of debt and equity that were sold at the initial public offering.

233. Tesoro argues that the Commission ignored its prior rulings by accepting arguments based on accounting, not ratemaking. Tesoro also asserts that convincing evidence was presented that the PAAs actually distort KMEP’s capital structure. As support, Tesoro states that testimony by ExxonMobil witness Dr. Horst shows that a write down of the value of a pipeline’s asset must by its very nature alter the equity side of the balance sheet, not the debt side.

234. Tesoro also states that the Commission provided no evidence to support its finding that the impact of the PAAs in KMEP’s capital structure is consistent with the capital structures of other pipelines. Rather, Tesoro asserts that removal of the PAAs would affect rates by lowering the equity component by as much as six percentage points (from 62.8 percent equity to 56.8 percent equity in 2000) and by an average of 3.5 percentage points for the period 2000-2008.

3. **Commission Determination**

235. The Commission denies rehearing on this issue. Tesoro has not raised any arguments that warrant reconsideration of the findings in Opinion No. 511.

236. Tesoro claims that Opinion No. 511 improperly relied upon the December 2006 Sepulveda Order but Tesoro’s attempt to distinguish the December 2006 Sepulveda Order is not persuasive. In the December 2006 Sepulveda Order the Commission explained that it will only adjust the capital structure for the effect of a PAA if the PAA is

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290 Tesoro Rehearing at 46 (citing December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32).

291 Id. at 48 (citing Ex. TES-3).
in fact distorting the capital structure.\textsuperscript{292} Although Sepulveda involved a PAA for a different transaction with a different fact pattern,\textsuperscript{293} these general principles apply whenever the Commission considers potential adjustments to a company’s actual capital structure for PAAs. As Opinion No. 511 stated, a PAA merely increases the size of the asset base of a utility, not necessarily the ratio of debt and equity used to finance the asset base.\textsuperscript{294} Thus, as Opinion No. 511 concluded, the mere presence of a PAA does not necessarily demonstrate that the PAA has in fact distorted capital structure by rendering the debt to equity ratio different than it would have been absent the PAA.\textsuperscript{295} Opinion No. 511 proceeded to explain why alteration to the capital structure due to the PAAs was not appropriate in this case:

In assessing the existence of distortions to capital structure, the primary question to consider is not the financing of any particular transaction, but whether the increased asset base resulting from the presence of the PAAs is distorting capital structure. This is because

\textsuperscript{292} December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32.

\textsuperscript{293} In the December 2006 Sepulveda Order, the Commission considered a PAA resulting from the 1988 sale of assets from the predecessor pipeline to SFPP. The 1988 sale thus increased the size of the asset base when the assets were transferred to the new owner, SFPP. The new owner proceeded to raise financing, resulting in a capital structure of approximately 60 percent debt and 40 percent equity. Under these circumstances, the Commission determined that there was no basis to conclude the PAA had been added entirely to the equity component or that any distortion of capital structure had occurred as a result of the PAA. The Commission explained there is no reason “to believe that this market established debt-equity ratio would have changed if the 1988 asset base resulting from the 1988 sale was the same, smaller, or larger.” December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 32. Thus, the Commission rejected arguments that the capital structure should be adjusted for PAAs.

\textsuperscript{294} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 169. Opinion No. 511 distinguished between the effect of a PAA on capital structure and the effect of a PAA on rate base. \textit{id}. P 167-168. Regarding rate base, the distortions of a PAA are readily apparent. When a PAA is added to rate base, the PAA increases the rate base above book value. If the PAA is not excluded from rate base for ratemaking purposes, the presence of the PAA in rate base would allow the utility to recover depreciation and a return on more than the original investment in the asset. As explained in Opinion No. 511 and in this decision, the effect of a PAA on capital structure is not as straightforward.

\textsuperscript{295} \textit{id}.
capital is fungible. For this reason the financing related to a particular purchase must be considered as a part of the overall pool of funds used to finance the assets of the company. Moreover, over time, financial strategies shift, debt retires, and new issuances of debt and equity are made even as the asset base continues to include the residual effects of PAAs. Thus, for KMEP, an MLP with multiple subsidiaries that regularly makes new issuances of debt and equity, it is not possible to isolate and distinguish the ongoing impact of a PAA on the capital structure’s debt to equity ratio. Moreover, without making any adjustment for PAA, KMEP’s capital structure remains within industry norms. As a result, the evidence does not support a finding that the increase to KMEP’s asset base resulting from the PAAs has distorted capital structure.296

237. Similarly, the Commission is not persuaded by Tesoro’s attempt to rely upon the December 2005 and February 2006 Orders to refute the findings of Opinion No. 511. Opinion No. 511 acknowledged the concerns expressed in the December 2005 and February 2006 Orders that the PAAs were causing distortions to KMEP’s capital structure.297 The December 2005 and February 2006 Orders used this as one justification for adopting SFPP’s capital structure (as opposed to KMEP’s capital structure) in those proceedings.298 However, in this proceeding, all parties agree that KMEP’s capital structure should be used, necessitating a more comprehensive consideration of the effect of PAAs upon KMEP’s capital structure. Given the opportunity for a more comprehensive review, Opinion No. 511 provided an extensive explanation for why no adjustment is appropriate to KMEP’s capital structure in this proceeding. Primarily, it is not clear that the overall ratio of debt to equity in KMEP’s financing would be any different had its acquisition not included the added cost associated with the PAAs. Tesoro’s continued reliance on the December 2005 and February 2006 Orders does not undermine Opinion No. 511’s more extensive analysis.

238. Furthermore, contrary to Tesoro’s assertions, neither the December 2005 Order nor the February 2006 Order determined that an adjustment to KMEP’s capital structure for PAAs would require that the PAAs should be removed entirely from the equity

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296 Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

297 Id. P 172 (citing December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 66; February 2006 Order, 114 FERC ¶ 61,136 at P 15).

298 Id.
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component. Rather, the December 2005 and February 2006 Orders adopted SFPP’s capital structure instead of KMEP’s. Thus, any adjustments in those earlier proceedings to the capital structure involved conditions specific to SFPP, not KMEP. In this proceeding, all parties agree that KMEP’s capital structure should be used, not SFPP’s capital structure. As Opinion No. 511 explained, the record in this proceeding does not support the contention that removing the alleged PAAs entirely from the equity component of KMEP’s capital structure would result in a more accurate estimation of KMEP’s capital costs.

239. Tesoro provides no basis for its further claim that Opinion No. 511 was based upon adherence to accounting rules in disregard of ratemaking principles. Opinion No. 511 considered how the additional asset base created by the PAAs would have altered the ratio of debt to equity in KMEP’s capital structure. Rather, it is Tesoro’s rehearing that seeks to use analogies with accounting principles. Tesoro reiterates arguments raised on exceptions by ExxonMobil/BP and its witness Dr. Horst contending that because a “write down” of the value of an asset alters the equity side of the balance sheet, any adjustment for a PAA must be made to equity. Opinion No. 511 specifically addressed ExxonMobil/BP’s argument, stating “As a matter of accounting, it is true that if an asset is revalued, this revaluation does not reduce a utility’s debt level. However, the Commission’s adjustments to exclude the effect of a PAA from capital structure are not analogous to an actual write down of an asset’s value.”

299 Id.

300 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 171.

301 Id. P 170-174.

302 Despite alleging the Commission was led by SFPP witnesses into using accounting rather than ratemaking principles (Tesoro Rehearing at 47), Tesoro does not show how Opinion No. 511 improperly relied upon SFPP witnesses. As support, Tesoro only cites, without further explanation, to the Commission’s rejection of an attempt by ExxonMobil/BP to analogize adjustments for PAAs to write-downs under accounting rules. See Tesoro Rehearing at 47 n.118 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 173). Opinion No. 511 did not cite to any exhibits produced by SFPP in this part of the decision, and, as discussed above, the Commission rejected ExxonMobil/BP’s analogy precisely because it depended upon accounting principles that were not applicable to evaluating the impact of a PAA on capital structure for ratemaking purposes. Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 173.

303 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 173.
inquiry is whether and how an increased asset base changed KMEP’s debt to equity ratio relative to the debt to equity ratio that would have existed absent the PAA. The PAA represent the additional cost to KMEP of the acquisition above the asset’s book value, and there is no evidence that capital markets required KMEP to raise the additional cost represented by the PAA solely from equity.\(^{304}\)

240. Tesoro has also not refuted Opinion No. 511’s determination that KMEP’s capital structure absent adjustments for PAAs is consistent with industry norms. The Commission typically approves oil pipeline capital structures between 45 and 55 percent equity.\(^{305}\) The companies used in the proxy group for determining the return on equity in this proceeding had capital structures consisting of a range between 58 percent and 46 percent equity.\(^{306}\) In its Compliance Filing based upon the adjustments required in Opinion No. 511, SFPP represents that KMEP’s capital structure is 42.97 percent equity and 57.03 percent debt as of September 30, 2008.\(^{307}\) With an equity level below 45 percent, KMEP’s September 30, 2008, capital structure is slightly more favorable to shippers than the “typical” capital structure because equity typically has a higher rate of return than the interest cost on the pipeline’s debt.

241. Also, Tesoro’s argument that removing the PAA would affect KMEP’s capital structure by an average of 3.5 percent is premised upon removing the PAA entirely from equity. As Opinion No. 511 explained, such a position is not supported in this case.\(^{308}\) Furthermore, Tesoro’s suggestion that the effect of the PAAs on KMEP’s capital structure can be measured is dubious, even if Tesoro had applied more neutral criteria such as the financing used for each transaction containing the PAAs. Capital at the parent company level is essentially fungible and the debt to equity ratio in a particular transaction may be offset by other financial issuances.\(^{309}\) Moreover, any possible effect

\(^{304}\) \textit{Id.} P 170 n.281.

\(^{305}\) \textit{BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc., et al., v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc.}, 123 FERC \(\|\) 61,287, at P 175 (2008).

\(^{306}\) Ex. SFPP-93. The list includes eight pipelines, but Enterprise Products was required to be removed from the proxy group list by Opinion No. 511.

\(^{307}\) SFPP Compliance Filing at Tab A, Schedule 9.

\(^{308}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC \(\|\) 61,121 at P 170-174.

\(^{309}\) \textit{Id.} P 169, 174.
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becomes more difficult to ascertain as the acquisition involving the PAA becomes more distant and the company's financing evolves over time.  

4. Compliance Filing

242. On compliance, SFPP's cost of service incorporates a capital structure of 42.97 percent equity and 57.03 percent debt as of September 30, 2008. SFPP states that this capital structure reflects Opinion No. 511's determination that expiring long-term debt and commercial paper should be added to the debt component of KMEP's capital structure. SFPP states that Opinion No. 511 did not address whether revolving credit facility balances should be included in the debt component of capital structure. However, SFPP states that it had an outstanding revolving credit facility balance as of December 31, 2000, December 31, 2001, and September 30, 2008. To minimize the issues on compliance, KMEP's states that it has incorporated the revolving credit facility balance into the debt component of its capital structure.

243. In protesting SFPP's Compliance Filing, Tesoro once again attacks the findings of Opinion No. 511, arguing that PAA costs should have been removed from KMEP's capital structure. In its Answer, SFPP states that it complied with Opinion No. 511, and SFPP also argues that the PAAs do not distort KMEP's capital structure.

244. The Commission finds that SFPP has complied with Opinion No. 511's requirements regarding the calculation of capital structure. In its protest, Tesoro has not alleged that SFPP's has failed to comply with the directives of Opinion No. 511. Rather, Tesoro challenges the findings of Opinion No. 511 itself. When raised in a protest to a compliance filing as opposed to rehearing, such objections are untimely and procedurally defective.

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310 Id. P 179.

311 SFPP Compliance Filing at Tab A, Schedule 9.
B. Debt Cost

1. Opinion No. 511

245. Opinion No. 511 noted that all parties agree that the cost of debt for SFPP's parent, KMEP, should be used. Opinion No. 511 reversed the 2009 ID and ruled that tax exempt and special purpose debt must be factored into the cost of debt. Opinion No. 511 also concluded that because it calculated KMEP's cost of capital as of September 30, 2008 and KMEP had no outstanding commercial paper on that date, exceptions to the 2009 ID's treatment of commercial paper were moot.

2. Rehearing Requests

246. No party on rehearing challenged the findings of Opinion No. 511 related to commercial paper or industrial revenue bonds. However, ExxonMobil/BP states that the Commission erred by not clearly addressing whether KMEP's long-term debt expiring within one year should be included in its overall weighted average cost of debt. ExxonMobil/BP notes that the Commission held that such debt should be reflected in capital structure, but failed to make any ruling with respect to its treatment regarding the cost of debt. ExxonMobil/BP claims that the Initial Decision also failed to address this issue, but that ExxonMobil/BP had raised this issue in its brief on exceptions. ExxonMobil further adds that where the Commission has required SFPP to include expiring long-term debt in its capital structure, the Commission made no express finding regarding the cost of debt but nonetheless adopted a cost of debt that was calculated using the expiring debt.

247. As discussed below, SFPP states in its Compliance Filing that it will include expiring long-term debt in determining its cost of debt. Thus, the issue raised by ExxonMobil/BP is moot for the purposes of this proceeding.

312 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 191-192.
313 Id. P 186.
314 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 86 (citing February 17 Order, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 184).
315 Id. (citing ExxonMobil/BP January 25, 2010 Brief on Exceptions at 53-54).
316 Id. P 87 (citing December 2005 Order, 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 69).
3. **Compliance Filing**

248. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP calculated its cost of debt to be 6.32 percent,\(^{317}\) determined as of September 2008 as required by Opinion No. 511. SFPP also states that it incorporated into the cost of debt the tax exempt and special purpose debt as required by Opinion No. 511. SFPP adds that although Opinion No. 511 did not address whether the cost of long term debt should include expiring long-term debt and the cost of revolving credit facility balances, it included these types of debt in determining the cost-of-debt to minimize the issues on compliance.

249. No party objects to SFPP’s cost of debt calculations, and the Commission finds that SFPP has complied with Opinion No. 511.

C. **Return on Equity**

250. The Commission determines return on equity based on the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis. The DCF methodology is based on the premise that the price of a stock is determined by the present value of its future cash flows as discounted at a market rate commensurate with the stock’s risk. Under the constant growth DCF formula used by the Commission, the cost of capital is equated with the dividend yield (dividends divided by share price) plus the estimated constant growth in dividends.\(^{318}\) The Commission uses a two-step procedure to determine the projected growth in dividends of the proxy group companies, averaging short-term and long-term growth estimates. The Commission uses five-year Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (IBES) growth projections for the short-term growth projection. The Commission gives two-thirds weight to the short-term growth projection and one-third weight to the long-term growth projection.\(^{319}\)

251. In this case, the parties have not disputed this basic methodology. The issue litigated by SFPP is whether it is appropriate to update the DCF analysis to reflect the most recent financial data in the record, even if it is post-test-period data.

\(^{317}\) SFPP Compliance Filing at Tab A, Schedule 11.


1. **Opinion No. 511**

252. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission upheld the ALJ’s decision to reject SFPP’s proposed use of post-test period data, specifically data for the six month period ending either April 30, 2009 or for the period ending January 31, 2009, for purposes of the DCF analysis. The Commission, like the ALJ, found both the January 2009 and April 2009 post-test period data proposed by SFPP to be anomalous. Thus, even though the Commission typically uses the most recent financial data in the record for calculating a pipeline’s ROE, the Commission declined to do so in this case because the more recent January 2009 or April 2009 cost of equity data is not representative of the pipeline’s long term equity cost of capital. The Commission noted that, depending on the time period from which the data was pulled, the equity cost of capital varies as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Period</th>
<th>ROE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>7.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>14.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>14.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>8.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, the Commission held that because the West Line rate at issue in this proceeding will be in effect indefinitely, the ROEs resulting from a DCF analysis based on data for the six months ending January 2009 or April 2009 are not representative of SFPP’s cost of capital during the future periods the rates proposed in this case may be in effect.\(^{322}\)

2. **Rehearing Requests**

253. SFPP asserts that the Commission erred in not using the most recent rate of return on equity data available, the April 2009 data, with an adjusted inflation factor. SFPP argues that the Commission should follow its policy of using the most up-to-date rate of return on equity data in the record, the data from the six-month period ending April 30, 2009. SFPP notes that the Commission declined to follow its policy because the most recent data in this case reflected an anomalous inflation factor, specifically negative

\(^{320}\) Reflects the end date for the data for the six-month period.

\(^{321}\) This is the ROE accepted in the 2009 ID.

\(^{322}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 209.
inflation. SFPP states that the data from the six months ending September 2008 also reflects an anomalous inflation factor, specifically a 4.94 percent inflation factor which SFPP states is well outside the range of recent economic experience. Accordingly, SFPP argues that whether the data ending April 2009 period is used or the data from the period ending September 2008 is used, the Commission must correct the inflation factor in those rate of return on equity calculations to ensure that the resulting ROE is representative of the actual inflation "that has occurred during the time the rates at issue in this proceeding have been in effect."\(^{323}\)

254. SFPP states that the Commission’s two concerns regarding the April 2009 data are (1) the data from this period “reflects the collapse of the stock market” and (ii) the inflation rate is anomalous. SFPP refutes the first, the collapse of the stock market, as not well founded. SFPP counters the anomalous inflation rate issue by stating that the inflation rate that relates to the September 2008 ROE is equally anomalous. SFPP urges the Commission to follow its policy and to use the April 2009 data and to use an average inflation factor based on the two and a half year period during which the rates in this proceeding have been in effect (August 2008 through February 2011) which is 1.11 percent.

255. SFPP also argues that the September 2008 ROE is unrepresentative. SFPP argues that although the rate of return on equity as of September 30, 2008 is consistent with historical periods (12.63), the real rate of return on equity is not. The real rate of return on equity reflected in the September 2008 ROE is unusually low (7.69 percent), which is the result of an unusually high inflation factor of 4.94 percent as of September 30, 2008. SFPP cites that in the 17 year period between January 1992 and April 2009, the inflation factor equal to or higher than 4.94 percent in only four months. Each of those four months occurred during the six month period reflected in the September 2008 ROE.\(^{324}\)

3. **Commission Determination**

256. The Commission denies SFPP’s rehearing requests to use the post-test period financial data for the six months ending April 30, 2009 and to modify the inflation factor to use an average inflation factor culled from the two and a half year period during which the rates in this proceeding have been in effect (August 2008 through February 2011) rather than the inflation factor from the end of the test period. All parties have

\(^{323}\) SFPP Rehearing at 8.

\(^{324}\) SFPP Rehearing at 12 (citing Ex. SFP-84 and SFP-323).
recognized in this proceeding that the period of time in question was a volatile economic period.

257. As the Commission stated, generally, the Commission's policy is to use the latest six months dividend yields, growth rates and GDP data in the record for its DCF analysis in pipeline rate cases. The Commission applied this policy in a natural gas pipeline rate proceeding, Portland Natural Gas Transmission System (PNGTS), which order issued concurrent with Opinion No. 511. In PNGTS, a case involving a 12 month base period ending December 31, 2007, as adjusted through the test period which ended September 30, 2008, the Commission determined that the appropriate time period for the DCF analysis was the six month period ending April 2009. However, the Commission acknowledged that the ROE arrived at based on using the most recent record data "may not be entirely representative of a long term ROE that one would expect for natural gas pipelines," and that using the most recent financial data in the record for the DCF analysis was particularly warranted because the case involved rates for a limited locked-in period ending November 30, 2010.

258. Conversely, in this proceeding, the Commission justified its decision to depart from the general policy of using the most recent financial data on the record in light of its overarching principal that the cost of service adopted in a rate proceeding should be representative of the costs that the pipeline is likely to incur over the period that the rates at issue are in effect, which in this case could be indefinitely. Specifically, "the goal is to set a future, lawful rate by predicating it upon reliable information that will be

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327 Id. P 246-247 (holding "the ROE approved in this order reflects the effects of the financial crisis that occurred in late 2008 and early 2009 during the locked-in period and yet is limited in its prospective application to a time period representative of the actual effects of that crisis").

328 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 208-209; see also Enbridge Pipelines (KPC), 102 FERC ¶ 61,310, at P 123-128 (2003) (Enbridge KPC) (holding "[c]ost-of-service ratemaking seeks to establish a representative level of future costs based on historical cost and known and measurable changes").
representative of the conditions likely to happen while the rate is in effect, but without being so open-ended as to time that the test year is obscured."^{329}

Whether a pipeline initiates a rate proposal or a complainant successfully has proved that an existing rate is unlawful, the next step in either situation is to have the Commission authorize a just and reasonable, forward-looking rate. Exercising discretion is an essential part of the undertaking. Far from being a mechanical chore, especially these days where a rate may continue indefinitely due to indexing, the objective is to make a reasoned, judicious effort to decide the matter through some type of test-year approach.^{330}

In this case, the Commission declines to use the most recent financial data in the record, the post-test period financial data for the six months ending April 30, 2009, because we do not find that using such updated data will produce a just and reasonable, forward-looking rate, especially given that SFPP's West Line rates set in this proceeding may continue indefinitely.

259. The Commission also declines to modify the inflation factor to use an average inflation factor. It would be incorrect to adjust one input into the ratemaking, the inflation factor, to account for an anomalous economic time period, without making corresponding modification to other inputs, for example applying the same modified period SFPP seeks to use for the inflation factor, for the divided yield average for the DCF analysis to reflect the change in stock prices. If SFPP were permitted to use an averaged inflation factor that reflected a larger and later period (August 2008 through February 2011), the resulting ROE would be artificially higher because there would not be any offsetting downward adjustments to other inputs to the DCF analysis that would arise out of using a later period.


D. Rate Base and Deferred Return

260. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission concluded that SFPP has correctly calculated its deferred return using only the equity portion of the SRB write-up and not the entire SRB write-up as ExxonMobil/BP argued. 331

1. Rehearing Requests

261. ExxonMobil/BP seek rehearing stating that the Commission erred in concluding that SFPP correctly calculated the deferred return on its SRB write-up. 332 ExxonMobil/BP request that the Commission grant rehearing and direct SFPP to recompute its deferred return for each year since 1983, and the resulting net deferred return used in calculating current rates. ExxonMobil/BP state that the issue is not with how the SRB write-up should be calculated. Rather, the only issue is whether SFPP calculated the deferred return from only the equity portion of the SRB write-up rather than from the full net SRB write-up. ExxonMobil/BP state that the full net SRB write-up as of 1983 is $12,173,000 rather than $31,004,000, and the equity portion of the SRB write-up is $4,779,120 ($12,173,000 times 39.26 percent). It is this figure that should be the starting point in 1983 for the computation of deferred return each year. ExxonMobil/BP assert that the use of revised figure, $4,779,120 rather than the $12,173,000 approved in Opinion No. 511, reduces SFPP's deferred return in each year since 1983 and in the test year in this case even though the SRB write-up is fully amortized.

2. Commission Determination

262. The Commission grants rehearing on this issue. The Commission incorrectly found in Opinion No. 511 that SFPP calculated its deferred return using only the equity portion of its SRB write-up rather than the entire SRB write-up. As the presiding ALJ noted in the 2009 ID, SFPP's calculation of deferred return deviates from the standard

331 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶61,121 at P 214.

332 ExxonMobil/BP reiterate this challenge in their June 15, 2011 protest of SFPP's Compliance Filing. See ExxonMobil/BP Protest at 9-11. In turn, SFPP submitted reply comments defending its calculation of the SRB write-up. See SFPP Reply Comments at 21-23. The Commission will not address either ExxonMobil/BP's Protest or SFPP's Reply Comments on this issue because the SRB write-up issue is outside the scope of the Compliance Filing.
deferred return calculation methodology as established in Opinion No. 154-B.\textsuperscript{333} Notwithstanding this deviation the 2009 ID stated:

\par [T]he Commission seems to have approved SFPP's deferred return methodology when it accepted SFPP's compliance filings in the proceeding underlying Opinion No. 435. The Commission is free to permit deviations from its own established methodology as long as the resulting rate is just and reasonable, and that appears to be the case here, as determined previously by the Commission. Therefore, since the Commission previously approved the deferred return methodology employed by SFPP in this case, and since Staff takes no position adverse to SFPP on this issue, and because the Shippers have not produced a study demonstrating the rate-impact of SFPP's deferred return methodology, the undersigned finds that SFPP's deferred return methodology was appropriately calculated in this proceeding. If the Commission believes it inadvertently allowed the aforementioned deviations to take place, it may adopt Exxon's position and should require SFPP to recalculate in accordance with its directives.\textsuperscript{334}

In Opinion No. 511, the Commission did not intend to approve a deviation from the Opinion No. 154-B methodology for calculating the SRB write-up. In Opinion No. 154-B, the Commission explained that the real rate of return times the equity share of the rate base yields the yearly allowed equity return in dollars.\textsuperscript{335} The inflation factor is to be multiplied by the equity rate base to yield the equity rate base write-up or deferred return. In Opinion No. 154-B, the Commission made clear that the deferred return (or the write-up of the starting rate base) is only a write-up of the equity portion of the rate base.\textsuperscript{336} Thus, the Commission affirms that the appropriate method for calculating the SRB write-up is as set forth in Opinion No. 154-B. To the extent the Commission accepted an SRB write-up calculation in past SFPP proceedings that was inconsistent with the Opinion No. 154-B method, such acceptance is applicable in those proceedings only and does not change the Commission's stated policy on this issue as articulated in Opinion No. 154-B.

\textsuperscript{333} 2009 ID, 129 FERC ¶ 63,020 at P 619-621.

\textsuperscript{334} Id. P 621.


\textsuperscript{336} Id. at 61,835.
263. On rehearing, the Commission finds that the record in this proceeding, as developed by ExxonMobil/BP demonstrates that SFPP’s methodology for calculating its SRB write-up does not comply with Commission policy for calculating the SRB write-up as set forth in Opinion No. 154-B.\(^{337}\) On review of ExxonMobil witness, Dr. Horst’s testimony as well as ExxonMobil/BP’s Brief of Exceptions, the Commission finds ExxonMobil/BP accurately identified SFPP’s deviation from the Opinion No. 154-B SRB methodology. SFPP should have multiplied the depreciated original cost (DOC) rate base (SFPP’s Statement E4, Line 12) by the debt ratio, and the ICC valuation rate base (Statement E4, Line 11) by the equity ratio, then add the two results together.\(^{338}\) Next, SFPP should have subtracted the DOC rate base from the result of the first equation, which would have yielded the SRB write-up.\(^{339}\) The SRB write-up should then be multiplied by the equity ratio before calculating SFPP’s deferred return. As Dr. Horst found, instead of following the above-calculation, SFPP subtracted the DOC rate base (Line 12) from the ICC rate base (Line 11) and multiplied the result (Line 13) by the equity ratio (Line 14), yielding a number that SFPP labeled as the “equity portion” of the SRB write-up (Line 15), when it was actually the full SRB write-up.\(^{340}\)

264. The Commission finds ExxonMobil/BP’s illustration of the SRB calculation using actual figures to be helpful. First, ExxonMobil/BP notes that the SRB equals the net replacement new rate base multiplied by the equity percentage plus the net DOC of plant (other than land and ROW) multiplied by the debt percentage. For SFPP, the SRB results from the equation \((51,139,000 \times 39.26\text{ percent}) + (20,135,000 \times 60.74\text{ percent})\) or \(20,077,000 + 12,230,000\). This yields an SRB equal to \(32,307,000\) for SFPP. The SRB write-up is equal to the SRB less the DOC, or \(32,307,000 - 20,135,000 \equiv 12,172,000\). These numbers show that the \(12,172,000\) amount on Line 13 of SFPP’s Statement E4 is the entire SRB write-up, which must be divided between debt and equity so that only the equity portion of the SRB write-up is used to calculate the deferred return.\(^{341}\)

\(^{337}\) Opinion No. 154-B, 31 FERC ¶ 61,377.

\(^{338}\) ExxonMobil/BP January 25, 2010 Brief on Exceptions at 44 (citing Opinion No. 154-B, 31 FERC at 61,833).

\(^{339}\) Id. (citing Arco Pipe Line Co., Opinion No. 351, 52 FERC ¶ 61,055, at 61,236 (1990)).

\(^{340}\) ExxonMobil/BP January 25, 2010 Brief on Exceptions at 44.

\(^{341}\) See id. at 45 n.17.
265. The Commission finds that SFPP’s full net SRB Write-Up as of 1983 is $12,172,000, and the equity portion of the SRB Write-Up is $4,779,000 ($12,173,000 multiplied by 39.26 percent). Accordingly, SFPP is directed to use $4,779,000 as the starting point in 1983 for the computation of deferred return each year in its Statement E2.

VII. Income Tax Allowance Issues

266. This part of the order addresses income tax allowance issues raised on rehearing. The discussion includes the following: (1) a summary of Opinion No. 511, (2) a summary of the issues on rehearing, (3) whether the Commission’s current income tax policy should be revisited, (4) whether granting a master limited partnership (MLP) an income tax allowance results in a double recovery of the partner’s income taxes, (5) whether an MLP income tax allowance is inconsistent with Congressional purpose and the Commission’s rate authority, (6) whether certain aspects of the Commission’s MLP income tax allowance methodology violate the stand-alone doctrine, (7) whether an MLP’s regulatory return should be adjusted to reflect the benefit of tax deferrals from owning a partnership interest, and (8) computational issues, including allowance for deferred income taxes (ADIT) and the proper source for state income taxes.

267. The Commission denies all requests for rehearing asserting that a jurisdictional MLP should not have an income tax allowance or that there should be adjustments to an MLP’s return or cost of service to reflect the benefits of an income tax allowance. The Commission grants one rehearing request regarding the method for calculating SFPP’s ADIT. As with most other matters addressed by this order, the Commission finds that the comments of the Shipper Parties on SFPP’s April 25, 2011 Compliance Filing do not assert that the SFPP failed to comply with the directions of Opinion No. 511 in calculating the income tax component of its regulatory cost of service. Rather, they repeat the numerous arguments opposing SFPP’s income allowance contained in their requests for hearing. Therefore the Commission will accord no weight to those comments.

A. Opinion No. 511

268. Opinion No. 511’s analysis of income tax allowance issues included the following: (1) whether the Commission’s income tax allowance policy should be revisited, (2) the appropriateness of that policy’s implementing methodology, (3) the relevance of the Commission’s stand-alone methodology, (4) proposed adjustments to SFPP’s rate-of-return on equity (ROE) to reflect any benefits that may flow from income taxes deferrals,
(5) issues involving accumulated deferred income taxes, and (6) the method for determining the marginal tax rate for the state income tax component of any allowance.  

269. In response to arguments that the Commission should revisit its income tax allowance policies, Opinion No. 511 concluded that ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. FERC correctly held that income taxes are a real, if imputed, business and regulatory cost for partnerships. Opinion No. 511 thus rejected arguments that BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC is still good law and that a partnership income tax allowance compensates for “phantom taxes,” that is for an income tax cost that a partnership does not incur. Opinion No. 511 further concluded that the fact that cash distributions may be made to a partner and thereby reflected in the after-tax ROE percentages generated by the Commission’s discounted cash flow (DCF) model does not mean that there is a double recovery of a partner’s income tax liability. Opinion No. 511 also acknowledged that because there is no double taxation of a partner’s income, a partner can expect to receive more after-tax cash than a corporate shareholder. Opinion No. 511 recognized that this results in more cash flows flowing through the DCF model that is used to determine a jurisdictional pipeline’s ROE. Therefore, the equity units of a partnership will have a higher market value than the shares of a corporation due to the double taxation on any dividends paid to the corporation’s shareholders. Opinion No. 511 also concluded that this higher market value occurs because financial markets will equalize the percentage return on the equity securities of partnerships and

342 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 219-321.

343 ExxonMobil Oil Corporation v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ExxonMobil).

344 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 230-231.

345 BP West Coast Products, LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (BP West Coast).

346 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 232-240.

347 Id. P 241-250, 261-262.

348 Id. P 245.

349 Id.

350 Id. P 239, 257-258.
corporations of the same risk. Thus, although the dollar return to the partnership’s partner may be higher than that of a corporate shareholder, the percentage ROE will be the same for jurisdictional pipeline securities of the same risk. Opinion No. 511 held this is consistent with the Hope capital attraction standard.

Opinion No. 511 also recognized that the MLP’s higher equity price per unit gives it an advantage in raising equity capital as the higher unit price means that an MLP can issue fewer equity units than a corporation to obtain the same dollar amount of capital, which lowers the MLP’s equity cost of capital. It further concluded that this financial advantage reflects Congress’ intention to encourage investment in energy-related facilities. Opinion No. 511 concluded that this financial incentive is not inconsistent with the Commission’s ratemaking responsibilities under the Interstate Commerce Act, or with the capital attraction standard underpinning a jurisdictional entity’s rates of return. Opinion No. 511 also held that the presumptions the Commission uses to determine the marginal tax rates that are used to impute taxes to a jurisdictional partnership do not incorporate a double recovery of a partner’s income taxes via the DCF model. Opinion No. 511 again concluded that granting an income tax allowance to a jurisdictional MLP is not unfair to its rate payers since an MLP’s revenue requirement is no higher than that of a jurisdictional corporate pipeline. It also held that the Shipper Parties had not proven that MLPs had a higher cost of service and revenue requirement based on a statistical analysis of the fact that MLP natural gas pipelines had higher ROEs than corporate natural gas pipelines in 2007 and 2008. Opinion No. 511 therefore concluded that granting a jurisdictional MLP an income tax

351 Id. P 249.
352 Id. P 245-246, 249.
353 Id. P 259 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944) (Hope)).
354 Id. P 249-250.
355 Id. P 251-259, 261-262.
356 Id. P 296.
357 Id. P 261.
358 Id. P 298-304.
allowance does not result in a phantom income tax cost, the double recovery of the partner’s income tax liability, or unjust or unreasonable rates. 359

271. With regard to the methodology used to implement the Commission’s income tax allowance policy, Opinion No. 511 stated that a partner’s income tax Form K-1 showing positive or negative partnership income was sufficient to prove that an MLP met the actual or potential income tax standard affirmed by ExxonMobil. 360 Opinion No. 511 also held that positive (taxable) partnership income need not be recognized in the base or test year to obtain an MLP income tax allowance 361 and that the actual date of recognition did not need to be known or projected with certainty. 362 Opinion No. 511 also rejected arguments that the capital gains taxes from future sales of equity interest are reflected in the Commission’s income tax allowance methodology. 363 It also held that use of incentive distributions is not inequitable nor do income allocations to the general partner violate the Commission’s stand-alone doctrine. 364 It further concluded that any distributions paid to a mutual fund should reflect that marginal rate paid on those dividends by the shareholder, i.e., whether they are qualified or ordinary dividends for taxation purposes. 365 Opinion No. 511 also held that the state income tax component of an income tax calculation should be based on the source state of the partner’s income. 366

272. Opinion No. 511 did recognize that there are tax deferrals that benefit the partners investing in the MLP format, but that these deferrals and any related tax savings serve to encourage infrastructure investment. Thus the Commission need not pass such tax savings back to the rate payers as any such savings are already reflected in a higher price for the partnership equity units. 367 Opinion No. 511 therefore rejected all proposed

359 Id. P 249-50, 258, 259, 261, 296.

360 Id. P 273 (citing December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 27).

361 Id. P 271-274.

362 Id. P 280-282.

363 Id. P 275-277.

364 Id. P 283-291.

365 Id. P 292-295.

366 Id. P 314.

367 Id. P 302-308.
adjustments to SFPP's ROE to reflect the present value of benefits that might flow to a partner from income tax deferrals resulting from the ownership of an MLP's equity interests. As with the analysis of the double counting issue, it concluded that if there are tax savings from such deferrals, any such deferrals or tax savings reflect Congress' intention to encourage investment in energy MLPs. Opinion No. 511 likewise held that any tax savings that might result from the mandatory election of section 743(b) depreciation do not violate the Commission's stand-alone doctrine and thus any time value of tax savings from such depreciation need not be normalized for the rate payer's benefit. Opinion No. 511 also held that in calculating its cost of service, SFPP must use the highest marginal tax rate in effect in any tax year in calculating the ADIT component of its rates under the Opinion No. 154-B oil pipeline rate methodology.

**B. Summary of the Requests for Rehearing**

273. ExxonMobil/BP and ACV Shippers filed extensive requests for rehearing of Opinion No. 511's findings regarding MLP income tax allowances. Their central argument is that SFPP may not be provided an income tax allowance as this will result in double recovery of its partners' income tax liability. Shipper Parties claim this will occur because the cash flow to pay those taxes is already embedded in the after-tax returns calculated by the Commission's DCF model. They assert that unlike previous SFPP proceedings that addressed income tax allowance issues, this double recovery of an MLP's partner's income taxes is clearly established by the record in this proceeding. They assert that given this new evidence the Commission may not stand on its current income tax allowance policy and its regulatory methodology implementing that policy. Rather, as a matter of law, the Commission must revisit its income tax allowance policy given this new evidence that the double recovery of an MLP's partner's income tax liability will result in rates that are excessively high and therefore are unjust and unreasonable.

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368 *Id.*

369 *Id.* P 309-311.

370 *Id.* P 320; Opinion No. 154-B, 31 FERC ¶ 61,377.


372 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 9-13; ACV Rehearing at 10-14.
274. The Shipper Parties also assert that the Commission’s current income tax allowance policy is grounded on an arbitrary and inaccurate concept of parity that equates the after-tax returns of MLP partners on their equity in a jurisdictional partnership’s rate base and the after-tax ROE on the equity component of the rate base of a jurisdictional corporation having the same risk. They assert that the record establishes that both ExxonMobil and the Commission incorrectly compare an MLP partner’s return to a corporation’s return. Shipper Parties maintain that the proper comparison of the after-tax dollar and percentage ROEs is between those obtained by an MLP’s partners and a corporation’s shareholders. They claim that the capital attraction standard under Hope requires investors in pipeline enterprises of similar risks to receive comparable after-tax ROEs. The investors are the equity holders of the MLP or the corporation. Shipper Parties further argue that granting an MLP an income tax allowance results in higher after-tax cash flow for the partners and a higher revenue requirement for the MLP even though the income tax burden to its partners is less than a corporation’s and its shareholders’ tax burden. Shipper Parties assert that because the partners double recover their income taxes they will obtain an ROE greater than that required to attract capital, which violates the capital attraction standard. They assert that this double recovery gives an MLP a financial and regulatory advantage over a corporation that comes at the cost of excessively high rates for an MLP’s shippers. They conclude that the remedy; i.e., to obtain parity between investors in MLPs and corporations, is to deny MLPs an income tax allowance.

275. The Shipper Parties also assert that Congress did not grant the Commission authority to permit jurisdictional MLP pipelines to double recover an MLP’s investor tax

373 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 28-37; ACV Rehearing at 15-16.
374 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 27-30, 32-36; ACV Rehearing at 26-30.
375 320 U.S. 591, 605.
376 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 27-28, 33-34, 36; ACV Rehearing at 10, 21-22, 28-29.
377 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 24, 40, 57; ACV Rehearing at 24-26.
378 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 16, 27-28; ACV Rehearing at 10, 21-22.
379 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 22-24; ACV Rehearing at 18-19.
380 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 31-32, 37-38; ACV Rehearing at 25-26, 30.
liability when Congress exempted certain partnerships from corporate tax liability. They further assert that Opinion No. 511 improperly relied on Congressional silence in reaching the opposite conclusion. In that regard, the Shipper Parties assert the legislative history cited in Opinion No. 511 does not support the Commission’s conclusions that (i) an MLP income tax allowance is lawful and (ii) section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) authorized an MLP income tax allowance. They also argue that Congress did not authorize the Commission to permit a monopoly pipeline to retain the savings from any income tax allowance exemptions. Shipper Parties urge the Commission to pass all savings through to rate payers, particularly since Congress has stated when it would permit a pipeline to retain those savings. They assert that the just and reasonable ratemaking standard and judicial precedent requires that same result.

276. The Shipper Parties further claim that if an income tax allowance is afforded an MLP, then the Commission must assure that any tax savings from the avoidance of double taxation or from tax deferrals that benefit the MLP or its partners are passed on to the rate payers. In that regard they argue that Opinion No. 511 contains two conclusions that are inconsistent with the Commission’s stand-alone doctrine. They claim that including incentive distributions in the calculation of an MLP’s income tax allowance improperly shifts distributive income from the limited partners to the general partner. They also assert that the limited partners’ use of an IRC section 743(c) deduction provides the limited partners benefits requiring an adjustment to SFPP’s

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381 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 38-40; ACV Rehearing at 30-31, 37-39.
382 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 42-44; ACV Rehearing at 31-33, 39-41.
383 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 53-57; ACV Rehearing at 33-35, 50-57.
384 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 48-49, 68-70; ACV Rehearing at 35-37, 41-42.
385 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 49-50; ACV Rehearing at 41-42, 47-49.
386 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 51-52; ACV Rehearing at 49-50.
387 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 41-42, 49-51; ACV Rehearing at 17-18, 30, 32-33.
388 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 58-61, 64-65, 67-70; ACV Rehearing at 47-50.
389 ACV Rehearing at 58-64.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

They state that this should be done by adjusting the MLP’s ROE to reflect the present value of any benefits that occur. The Shipper Parties also contend that the Commission incorrectly stated that an income tax allowance is required to assure that jurisdictional MLPs will be able to compete for equity capital with non-jurisdictional MLPs in competitive markets as the jurisdictional MLPs are monopolies that do not require such an allowance. They also argue that the state income tax rate used to determine SFPP’s income tax allowance incorrectly uses the marginal tax rate of the source state rather than that of the taxpayer’s residence.

The Shipper Parties therefore urge the Commission to reverse Opinion No. 511 and to adopt the financial analysis advanced at hearing by their witness Dr. Horst. Based on his conclusion that MLP partners double recover their income taxes if the MLP receives an income tax allowance, the Shipper Parties request that the Commission (1) deny SFPP an income tax allowance, or (2) reduce SFPP’s income tax allowance to 78.4 percent of the standard calculation to reflect the tax benefits that limited partners receive from owning equity interests in SFPP’s parent MLP partnership, KMEP. Such an adjustment, together with an adjustment to reflect the proper calculation of the state income tax allowance, would reduce the marginal tax rate on SFPP’s income by approximately two percent.

SFPP has two requests for rehearing on income tax issues related to its ADIT calculation. It first asserts that Opinion No. 511 incorrectly required the use of the statutory maximum rate to calculate the allowance for deferred income taxes (ADIT) to be used in years prior to the 2007 base period in this proceeding. Second, it asserts that the Commission did not select the right date for the application of its Income Tax

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391 Id. at 58-60, 63-65.

392 Id. at 41-42, 48-49; ACV Rehearing at 42-48.

393 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 70-72.

394 Id. at 7, 11, 16-17, 19, 44.

395 Id. at 62-63.

396 Id. at 72.

397 SFPP Rehearing at 22-27.
Allowance Policy Statement to SFPP’s ADIT calculation. SFPP’s reply comments on its April 25, 2011 Compliance Filing support the income tax allowance holdings in Opinion No. 511 and reject the arguments contained in the Shipper Parties’ rehearing requests and their comments on SFPP’s Compliance Filing.

C. Whether to Revisit the Commission’s Income Tax Allowance Policy

279. This part of the order addresses the Shipper Parties’ assertions that the Commission should reverse Opinion No. 511 and thereby hold that BP West Coast remains good law in light of the new record evidence in this proceeding. This section first reviews the regulatory framework governing MLP income tax allowances, which was discussed in detail throughout the income tax allowance part of Opinion No. 511. The order then addresses in detail several technical issues that underpin the Shipper Parties’ core argument that providing an MLP an income tax allowance causes the MLP partners to double recover the income taxes on the distributive income they are allocated by an MLP. Those issues include regulatory, accounting, and financial arguments that the Shipper Parties advance in support of their central conclusion that ExxonMobil incorrectly held that granting an MLP an income tax allowance was reasonable and could be appropriately included in an MLP’s regulatory cost of service. These arguments are centered on the Shipper Parties’ assertion that an income tax allowance double recovers the MLP partners’ income tax liability because that liability is already priced into the ROE generated by the Commission’s DCF model. At bottom this is not a legal determination but a financial, accounting, and mathematical issue. Therefore, this order addresses the technical issues in detail within the context of the regulatory framework discussed in Opinion No. 511. Those analyses include a review of the Commission’s DCF model, an analysis of Dr. Horst’s testimony and analysis on behalf of the Shipper Parties, the Commission’s analysis of the relative after-tax ROEs of partnerships and corporations, an analysis of certain portions of Opinion No. 511, including Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, and a discussion of the capital attraction standard.

280. The Commission’s analysis here also includes a series of Commission-drafted


399 SFPP Rehearing at 27-30.

400 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 219-321.

401 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-554.
tables (Tables 1 through 7) that illustrate that granting an income tax allowance does not result in the double recovery of a MLP partner’s income tax liability. In doing so, the Commission explains and corrects a methodological error in Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 that could lead one to the opposite conclusion. The following analysis also establishes that the revenues required to cover a partner’s income tax liability can be obtained either by grossing up a non-jurisdictional entity’s operating revenues, as such a revenue gross up would be reflected in the DCF analysis, or by obtaining an income tax allowance, but not both. In contrast to the way in which income taxes are grossed up outside the context of Commission regulation, the Commission does not gross up a jurisdictional entity’s operating revenues or return to cover the income taxes that must be paid to obtain its after-tax return. Rather the income taxes on the jurisdictional entity’s allowed equity return are covered through the income tax allowance. Thus there is no double recovery of a partner’s income tax liability by providing an income tax allowance to an MLP. ExxonMobil correctly affirmed granting MLPs an income tax allowance.403

1. The Regulatory Context of an Income Tax Allowance

The central issue Shipper Parties assert is that the Commission must revisit its income tax policy because the record here purportedly establishes that granting an income tax allowance to an MLP results in a double recovery of the MLP’s partners’ income taxes. Shipper Parties also argue that an administrative agency is required to reexamine its existing policies if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that those policies are no longer sound and that failure to do so would be arbitrary and unreasonable. For example, ExxonMobil/BP contend that the record here establishes that an MLP pipeline that is allowed an income tax allowance has a higher revenue

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402 The revenue gross up is the additional revenue the firm must earn to pay the income taxes on its net operating revenue and thereby obtain an adequate after-tax return. For example, if the firm desires an after-tax return of $100 and its marginal tax rate is 35 percent, it must gross up its operating revenue sufficiently to generate approximately $154 in pre-tax income. After payment of the income taxes, the result is after-tax income of $100, the desired dollar return provided in this example. Id.

403 The focus on this proceeding is on MLPs given the increased ownership of jurisdictional assets by such entities. However the income tax allowance issues discussed here are applicable to any other type of jurisdictional partnership. Therefore, this order uses the term “partnership” to reflect all types of FERC jurisdictional partnerships and uses the term “MLP” when specifically addressing master limited partnership issues.

404 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 9-13; ACV Rehearing at 10-14.
requirement and higher rates than a corporate pipeline. Shipper Parties, therefore, argue that Opinion No. 511 erred by following ExxonMobil. They conclude that on rehearing the Commission should hold that providing an MLP an income tax allowance results in the double recovery of an MLP partner’s income taxes and compensates the MLP partners for an unjustified cost in violation BP West Coast.

282. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission provided a detailed review of its income tax allowance policies. Except as necessary to respond to an argument on rehearing, the Commission will not repeat Opinion No. 511’s discussion of the mechanics of the Commission’s income tax allowance policy, but reiterates here the more important statements in ExxonMobil. In upholding the Commission’s Income Tax Policy Statement and the June 2005 Order implementing that Policy Statement, the court in ExxonMobil agreed that tax liability for partnership income occurs at the partner level, and that the partner is responsible for any taxes on distributive income from the partnership. The court stated:

In the Policy Statement and the Remand Order, the Commission resolved the principal defect of the Lakehead policy, which was the unexplained differential treatment of individual and corporate partners. FERC then determined that it would be ‘just and reasonable’ to grant regulated pipelines an income tax allowance to the extent that all of the pipeline’s partners—whether individual or corporate—incur actual or potential tax liability. The Commission

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405 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 24, 38-39, 40.

406 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 9, 12-14; ACV Rehearing at 14-15.

407 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 13, 17, 19, 26, 38, 40 (citing BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1291, 1293); ACV Rehearing at 9-10, 14, 31, 37-38.

408 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 221-321.

409 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139.


411 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-52, 954 (holding that under the principles of partnership law “investors in a limited partnership are required to pay tax on their distributive shares of the partnership income, even if they do not receive a cash distribution”).
reasonably determined that such taxes are 'attributable' to the regulated entity, given that partners must pay tax on their share of the partnership income regardless of whether they actually receive a cash distribution. Additionally, the Commission reasonably relied upon evidence that a full income tax allowance is necessary to ensure that corporations and partnerships of like risk will earn comparable after-tax returns.\footnote{Id. at 955 (emphasis added).}

The court then reviewed a comparison of the pre- and after-tax returns of a corporation and the partners of an MLP absent an income tax allowance:

In the Policy Statement, FERC concluded that it would be inequitable to grant a full income tax allowance to corporations while denying a similar allowance to limited partnerships. For example, if the corporate tax rate is 35 percent, then a pipeline that operates as a corporation is permitted to charge a rate of $154 in order to earn after-tax income of $100. As several commenters pointed out, 'if an income tax allowance is not allowed the partnership, then the partners must pay a $35 income tax on $100 of utility income, leaving them with only an after-tax return of $65.'\footnote{Id. at 953 (interior citations omitted). See also Composition of Proxy Groups for Determining Gas and Oil Pipeline Return on Equity, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048, at P 10-15 (2008) (Proxy Group Policy Statement).}

The court continued:

Based on these comments, the Commission has determined that pipelines operating as limited partnerships should receive a full income tax allowance in order to maintain parity with pipelines that operate as corporations. This conclusion was not unreasonable and we defer to FERC's expert judgment about the best way to equalize after-tax returns for partnerships and corporations.\footnote{ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953 (emphasis added).}

Having again concluded that partnerships have the equivalent of an entity level tax, albeit indirect, on a regulated entity's income, the court stated:

And there is at least one aspect of partnership law that supports
FERC's conclusion but was not advanced by the Commission in *BP West Coast* — investors in a limited partnership are required to pay tax on their distributive shares of the partnership income, even if they do not receive a cash distribution. As explained above, this supports FERC's determination that taxes on the income received from a limited partnership should be allocated to the pipeline and included in the regulated entity's cost of service. In this sense, petitioners' likening of partnership tax to shareholder dividend tax is inapposite because a shareholder of a corporation is generally taxed on the amount of the cash dividend actually received.415

Through these holdings the court recognized that an MLP's partner and a corporation must pay taxes on a jurisdictional entity's income, but that a corporation's shareholders only pay taxes on cash dividends and as such only on income that is actually received. Therefore, dividends are not jurisdictional income that is used to measure the return on the equity component of a jurisdictional entity's rate base.416 The court also recognized that to obtain a regulatory after-tax return of $100, taxable income must be $154 assuming a 35 percent marginal tax rate.417 This requires pre-tax net income of $154, or a gross up of $54.418 The Commission's rate design methodology provides this through the income tax allowance, not by grossing up the firm's operating revenues to cover the income tax liability.419 In contrast, a non-jurisdictional entity would gross up its operating revenue to reach the $154 in pre-tax net income, which after payment of the income taxes results in the required after-tax return of $100.

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415 Id. at 954-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

416 In fact, at bottom *BP West Coast* concurs in this basic fact and the distinction is central to its conclusions. See *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d at 1290-91.

417 *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 953.

418 The standard formula for calculating the amount of the gross up necessary to cover the income taxes on any given dollar of pre-tax income is 1/(1- the marginal tax). Thus, if the desired after-tax income and return is $100 and the marginal tax rate is 35 percent, the formula is $100/(1-.35), or approximately $154. The exact amount is $153.85. This order uses the rounded $154 as was done in *ExxonMobil*. See *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 953.

419 See Appendix for how this is done under the Commission's rate design methodology.
On rehearing, Shipper Parties assert that ExxonMobil incorrectly held that it is necessary to provide an income tax allowance to an MLP in order to obtain an after-tax dollar return of $100. They state that the new evidence provided in this case establishes that it is not necessary to provide the income tax allowance of $54 discussed in ExxonMobil. Their argument is that the $54 "gross up" discussed in that opinion is provided through the tax gross up embedded in the after-tax returns generated by the Commission's DCF model. In essence, their conclusion is that the after-tax return included in the return component of the MLP's regulatory cost of service generates the cash flow needed to provide the required after-tax regulatory rate of return. They claim that this in turn will equalize the after-tax dollar cash flows of partners and shareholders if there is no MLP income tax allowance. Their position thereby rejects the conclusion in ExxonMobil that comparison of returns should be at the entity level. At bottom, Shipper Parties' analytical position is that the after-tax cash flows reflected in the ROEs generated by the DCF model have the same purpose and structure as the cash flows the Commission develops in the context of rate design.

The Shipper Parties' position is fundamentally incorrect because it rejects the distinction between how revenue is grossed up to cover taxes outside the context of Commission ratemaking and how income taxes are covered in the context of Commission ratemaking. As previously stated, outside the context of Commission ratemaking a firm grosses up its operating revenues and return by the amount necessary to pay its income taxes and to obtain the $100 after-tax return discussed in ExxonMobil. However, under the Commission's rate design methodology, the pipeline's cost of service contains a series of discreet cost of service components that form a part of its regulatory cost of service before income taxes. This is shown by Appendices A and B, both of which demonstrate that rate base return, operating expenses exclusive of depreciation, depreciation, and two other items are stated as specific dollar amounts that would be based on test year numbers developed in a general rate case proceeding. Appendices A and B make clear that these cost of service components are not "grossed up" to provide additional operating revenue that would cover income taxes outside the context of ratemaking. In other words, the pipelines rate design will only reflect the specific dollar amounts derived from each of the pipeline's cost of service components. Because those cost of service components are not grossed up in the pipeline's rates, the cash flow

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420 See SFPP 2010 FERC Form No. 6, Page 700, Appendix A hereto. Appendix B reproduces Statement A of SFPP's Compliance Filing and similarly shows separate cost of service components for overall return on rate base, income tax allowance, operating expenses excluding depreciation, depreciation and certain specialized amortizations. See also April 25 Compliance Filing at Statement A; see also Attachment B hereto. See also Williston Basin Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williston).
necessary to pay the taxes on the equity dollar return must be derived from another source. Under the Commission's rate design methodology this is achieved through the income tax allowance which becomes the equivalent of a revenue and return gross up outside the context of Commission rate design. Thus, in the context of rate design the Commission limits a pipeline's pre-tax income to the dollar amount of its equity dollar return component. Absent an income tax allowance a jurisdictional entity will not have the cash flow necessary to pay the income taxes on its income and obtain its regulatory ROE as stated by the analysis in ExxonMobil.

285. To illustrate this critical difference between how the required tax "gross up" functions within and outside the context of Commission rate design, the Commission developed two tables that do not involve the complications of the corporate business model. Moreover, because of the continuing controversy regarding the pass-through characteristics of partnerships, these two tables display the results for a partnership and an individual owning a sole proprietorship as there is no dispute here that the income taxes are a cost of doing business to such an individual. Table 1 therefore compares a sole proprietor and a partnership that are not subject to the Commission's rate jurisdiction. Examples 1 and 3 of Table 1 assume that both business formats have only enough revenue to cover operating costs and earn pre-tax income of $100. With a marginal tax rate of 35 percent, in Examples 1 and 3 after-tax income drops to $65 dollars, or an after-tax return on the firm's equity of 6.5 percent. This is less than the posited required 10 percent after-tax ROE required by its investors and the capitalized value of both firms is only $650. In contrast, Examples 2 and 4 show that if both firms are able to gross up revenues by an additional $54, then pre-tax income is $154. After payment of the income taxes, after-tax income is $100, and their capitalized market value is $1000. By grossing up their revenue both firms earn their required after-tax equity cost of capital.

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421 For the calculation of the gross up for tax purposes see SFPP Compliance Filing at Statement D, appended to this order as Appendix C.

422 As with the parties' analyses, the Commission's examples exclude the growth factor from the equity cost of capital. This simplifies that analysis, but does not change the results. See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 244 n.415; Ex. SFP-94 at 42-43. The analysis also assumes that cash from depreciation is reinvested to maintain the same level of utility. Therefore that cash neither causes growth nor is it distributed.
286. Table 1 also addresses Shipper Parties’ assertion that a MLP should not receive an income tax allowance because an MLP does not actually pay the income taxes.\textsuperscript{423} ExxonMobil rejected this point stating that the Commission reasonably concluded that the taxes a partner must pay on partnership income should be imputed to the partnership.\textsuperscript{424} As such, this federal precedent preempts any state decisions to the contrary. In contrast to any arguments that income taxes are not part of a partnership’s cost of business, Table 1 shows that the sole proprietor pays the income taxes directly and the MLP partners pay the taxes on the partnership income distributed to them. Table 1 also shows the after-tax dollar return, the after-tax ROE and the capitalized ownership values of both formats are the same regardless of whether the sole proprietor or the partners pay the income tax.\textsuperscript{425} However, a rationale based on who actually pays the taxes would grant the sole proprietor an income tax allowance while denying one to the MLP even though the after-tax dollar results are the same for both business formats.

\textsuperscript{423} Motion of Chevron Products Company, Conoco Phillips Company, Continental Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Southwest Airlines Co., US Airways, Inc., and Valero Marketing and Supply Company to Lodge the decisions of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California and the Arizona Corporation Commission dated July 5, 2011. The motion to lodge is denied because the actions of state regulatory agencies at issue here are inconsistent with ExxonMobil and the Commission’s subsequent rulings. Moreover, the cited state decisions add nothing to the arguments that the Shipper Parties are assert here.

\textsuperscript{424} ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-52, 954-55.

\textsuperscript{425} See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 40 (noting how public utility income controlled directly by an individual may be taxed and that an MLP is simply an intermediate ownership device that leads to the same result).
Table 1. Comparison of Income Tax Impacts for an Individual Proprietor and an MLP with no FERC Regulation

The assumed required after-tax return is 10 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Individual without revenue gross up</th>
<th>Example 2 - Individual with revenue gross up</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership without revenue gross up</th>
<th>Example 4 - Partnership with revenue gross up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oper. Rev. Gross up to cover taxes</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>Oper. Rev. Gross up to cover taxes</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Revenue</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Gross Revenue</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Pretax Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Partnership Pretax</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of after-tax return plus revenue gross up for taxes)</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>(Sum of after-tax return plus revenue gross up for taxes)</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Partner Pretax</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>Partner After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Dividend</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>After Tax Dividend</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value at 10 times after tax return</td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>Value at 10 times after tax return</td>
<td>$650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return ?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return ?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
<td>The analysis assumes no growth and there is no FERC regulation. To pay the income taxes the businesses must gross up revenues to cover those income taxes, as reflected in the line captioned “Oper. Rev. Gross up to cover taxes.” The gross revenue is that required to cover all costs including the “Oper. Rev. Gross up to cover taxes.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
287. Table 2 presents the same analysis as Table 1, but for a jurisdictional sole proprietor and jurisdictional partnership. Absent an income tax allowance, taxable income is only $65 for both business formats, and the after-tax ROE is 6.5 percent. This is less than the required 10 percent after-tax ROE and the capitalized value of both firms is only $650. Thus, neither firm recovers the required after-tax ROE or its regulatory cost of service. In contrast, if either firm is granted an income tax allowance, this increases taxable income to $154 and the after-tax ROE (income) is $100. This equals 10 percent of the equity rate base of $1000, results in a capitalized market value of $1000, and both firms recover their after-tax regulatory equity cost of capital and cost-of-service. Table 2 illustrates that no jurisdictional firm will recover its required after-tax ROE if denied an income tax allowance because the Commission does not structure a jurisdictional entity’s cash flows to gross up its operating revenues to obtain the after-tax return generated by the DCF model. Only after the income tax allowance is added to the pipeline’s cost of service through the income tax component of a jurisdictional entity’s rate design will there be sufficient pre-tax return (income) to cover the income taxes on the return component of a jurisdictional cost-of-service.

288. The Commission developed Tables 1 and 2 to illustrate the context in which the findings of ExxonMobil occur. That decision only discussed the narrow mechanics of how an income tax gross up results in the required equity dollar return, that is $100 as stated in that decision.\textsuperscript{426} Tables 1 and 2 illustrate how the result in ExxonMobil flows logically from the cost of service structure and the related cash flows that are embedded in the Commission’s ratemaking methodology.\textsuperscript{427} ExxonMobil thus held that income taxes are an appropriate part of a partnership’s jurisdictional cost of service, albeit an indirect one, and that an income allowance does not result in a phantom income tax.\textsuperscript{428} This order next addresses the relevance of the DCF model to this conclusion.

\textsuperscript{426} ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953.

\textsuperscript{427} In fact, Tables 1 and 2, and the subsequent Tables 3 through 6, are a simplified version of the obligatory cost of service formats reproduced in Appendices B and C.

\textsuperscript{428} Id. at 952-54.
Table 2. Comparison of Income Tax Impacts for an Individual Proprietor and an MLP with FERC Regulation

The assumed required after-tax return is 10 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Individual without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 2 - Individual with tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 4 - Partnership with tax allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$ 900</td>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$ 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$ 100</td>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$ 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax All.</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>Income Tax All.</td>
<td>$ 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost of Service</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Total Cost of Service</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Pretax Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Individual Pretax Return</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Partnership Pretax</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>(Sum of after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>$ 100</td>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>$ 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$ 35</td>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$ 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$ 65</td>
<td>Individual After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Dividend Value at 10 times</td>
<td>$ 65</td>
<td>After Tax Dividend Value at 10 times</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after tax return</td>
<td>$ 650</td>
<td>After Tax Distribution Value at 10 times</td>
<td>$ 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return ?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return ?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions:</td>
<td>The analysis assumes the owners will value the firm at 10 times after tax cash because they desire an after-tax return of 10 percent on their investment. Because there is no growth factor, after tax cash and income are equivalent values. Unlike Table 1, the firms do not &quot;gross up&quot; revenues, but are provided an income tax allowance by Commission policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Analysis of the DCF Methodology**

289. The second core element to Shipper Parties’ double recovery argument is that the Commission’s DCF model reflects after-tax ROEs that include a gross up component for the payment of income taxes on the income distributed to the partners of an MLP, and that this provides the cash flow necessary to pay the MLP partner’s income tax. They provide an example from Opinion No. 511 stating that if the required after-tax ROE is six percent and the marginal tax rate is 25 percent, the investor will require a DCF ROE of eight percent and that the 25 percent marginal tax rate will be reflected in the ROEs calculated by the Commission’s DCF model.\(^\text{429}\) Shipper Parties assert that because a tax gross up is built into an after-tax DCF ROE, this means that an MLP income tax allowance is not required to obtain the after-tax ROE required by the capital attraction standard contained in *Hope Natural Gas*.\(^\text{430}\) Shipper Parties repeatedly refer to the gross up reflected in the ROE’s as a “built in” income tax allowance.\(^\text{431}\)

290. As previously discussed, this argument fails because the tax gross up is not built into the ROE component of the jurisdictional rates of either a corporate pipeline or an MLP pipeline since the Commission does not gross up a jurisdictional pipeline’s revenues to cover the income tax liability on the pipeline’s allowed equity dollar return. This is in contrast to the operation of the Commission’s DCF model which develops the after-tax return that is to be applied to the equity component of the pipeline’s rate base. Such DCF results do reflect the actual after-tax returns, and therefore the pre-tax gross up, of the jurisdictional firms included in the DCF sample, but do not provide after-tax cash flow or income in the context of Commission rate design.\(^\text{432}\) To explain this distinction fully requires a further review of the DCF model.

291. The Commission stated in its Proxy Group Policy Statement,\(^\text{433}\) that the Supreme Court has held that “the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with the

\(^{429}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 13.


\(^{431}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 13, 22, 29, 30.

\(^{432}\) These actual returns reflect the firm’s operations and do not necessarily equate to the amount of the allowed return embedded in the firm’s jurisdictional rates.

\(^{433}\) Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 3.
return on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.\textsuperscript{434} Therefore, since the 1980s, the Commission has used a DCF model to develop a range of ROEs earned on investments in companies with corresponding risks for purposes of determining the ROE to be awarded natural gas and oil pipelines. The DCF model was originally developed as a method for investors to estimate the value of securities, including common stocks. It is based on the premise that "a stock's price is equal to the present value of the infinite stream of expected dividends discounted at a market rate commensurate with the stock's risk."\textsuperscript{435} With simplifying assumptions, the investor uses the following DCF formula to determine the share price:

\[ P = \frac{D}{(r-g)} \]

where \( P \) is the price of the stock at the relevant time, \( D \) is the current dividend, \( r \) is the discount rate or rate of return, and \( g \) is the expected constant growth in dividend income to be reflected in the capital appreciation of the stock over the time of the analysis.\textsuperscript{436}

292. The Commission uses the DCF model to determine the ROE (the "\( r \)" component) to be included in the pipeline's rates, rather than to estimate a stock's value. Therefore, the Commission solves the DCF formula for the discount rate, which represents the rate of return that an investor requires in order to invest in a firm. Under this DCF formula, ROE equals current dividend yield (dividends divided by share price) plus the projected future growth rate of dividends:

\[ r = \frac{D}{P} + g \]

This approach means that the Commission observes what is occurring in the market by examining the price of the security and the dividend paid in order to determine the yield, including the compounding return caused by DCF model's short and long term growth factors. Because no two firms have exactly the same risk, the Commission develops a proxy group of firms with comparable risks in order to arrive at a representative yield for the jurisdictional firms included in the sample. It is clear from the parties' exhibits that

\textsuperscript{434} Hope, 320 U.S. 591, 605.


\textsuperscript{436} See id.; see also National Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 51 FERC ¶ 61,122, at 61,337 n.68 (1990); Ozark Gas Transmission System, 68 FERC ¶ 61,032, at 61,104 n.16 (1994).
the resulting median DCF return is the required after-tax ROE.\textsuperscript{437} This median after-tax ROE is applied to the equity portion of the pipeline’s rate base to obtain the after-tax dollar ROE that becomes the equity return rate component of the pipeline’s rate design.\textsuperscript{438}

293. The analysis in the prior section explained a fundamental consequence of the different approaches used by an investor and the Commission. That difference is demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2. In those Tables, the first point for comparison is the firm’s return on book equity or the equity component of its rate base. In both those Tables the firm has equity of $1000 and earns $100 after all expenses and income taxes by either grossing up revenues to cover the income taxes or by obtaining an income tax allowance for the same purpose. However, either case results in an after-tax ROE of 10 percent. Regardless of the ROE (in dollars or a percent) earned by the firm, the investor obtains the required after-tax return of 10 percent. If the firm has an after-tax return of $100, the investor values the firm at $1000, or its book equity, because $100 is 10 percent of $1000. If the firm only has an after-tax return of $65 as it lacks the revenues to cover the income taxes, the investor values the firm at $650 because $65 is 10 percent of $650.

294. In contrast to the investor, the Commission would conclude from prior examples here that the investor is requiring an after-tax ROE of 10 percent because if the dollar return to the investor is $100, the investor values the firm at $1000. The Commission would also conclude that the after-tax cost of capital is 10 percent if the dollar return to the investor is $65 and the investor pays $650 to obtain that return. But in one case the firm is earning 10 percent after-tax on its equity and in the other the firm is only earning an after-tax on equity of 6.5 percent.\textsuperscript{439} In the latter case the firm would not recover its cost of equity capital even though the market values its equity interest at 10 times its after-tax return because the investor’s required after-tax equity ROE is 10 percent.

295. As explained in the prior section, the Shipper Parties’ argument breaks down upon application of the median DCF ROE to a jurisdictional entity’s rate base. The ROEs generated by the DCF model do reflect how the firms included in the DCF sample have grossed up their revenues above non-tax costs to generate the discounted cash flows to meet the required after-tax ROE. Thus, Examples 2 and 4 of Table 1 reflect the fact that

\textsuperscript{437} See Ex. XOM-1 at 41, Table 2 prepared by Dr. Horst; see also Ex. SFP-97, intended to correct Dr. Horst’s Table 2.

\textsuperscript{438} See SFPP Compliance Filing, Schedule D.

\textsuperscript{439} This calculation is illustrated in Tables 2 through 6.
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- the firm has "grossed up" its operating revenue to produce a ROE (and the related distributions or dividends) that will provide the required after-tax return of $100. But as Table 2 demonstrates, the Commission's rate design methodology does not "gross up" a jurisdictional pipeline's operating revenues to achieve the required pre-tax ROE as is displayed in Table 1. As Table 2 displays, the Commission first determines the jurisdictional entity's operating revenue and return requirements without grossing up its revenue or its return to reflect the income tax cost element that is embedded in the investor's required after-tax ROE. The Commission then uses the income tax allowance to add back the required income tax rate design component (Examples 2 and 4 of both Tables) to achieve the necessary after-tax ROE. This provides the jurisdictional entity the cash flow that is necessary to pay the income taxes on its allowed equity return. The difference between the cash flows and returns in Table 1 and Table 2 is subtle, but essential to the difference of how a jurisdictional entity's cost of-service is defined and how its revenue requirements would be reflected in the returns generated by the Commission's DCF model. At bottom, the ROEs generated by the DCF model inform the Commission of the equity rate of return (a percent) to be used to design a jurisdictional pipeline's rates. However the dollar equity return that results from the application of that percent that is included in the pipeline's cost of service does not in itself generate the funds to cover the income taxes that must be paid on that return because that return is not grossed up to do so.

296. Thus the central error of the Shipper Parties' argument is again that it equates the way that cash flows, and thereby returns, are reflected in the after-tax ROEs generated by the DCF model with the way that a jurisdictional entity's revenues and cash flows are structured under the Commission's rate design methodology. To reiterate, Table 1 reflects the cash flows in a non-jurisdictional context. If the firm is able to "gross up" its revenues to recover the tax impacts on its net revenue income, it will recover all of its costs, including its after-tax cost of capital. If the firm cannot gross up revenue, it will not recover its equity cost of capital. As Table 2 displays, if a jurisdictional partnership does not obtain an income tax allowance, it lacks the equivalent of the "gross up" of the non-jurisdictional firm and thus will not recover its regulatory cost of service. Thus,

440 See SFPP 2010 FERC Form No. 6, Page 700, Attachment A hereto.

441 See Lines 3 and 8 of Appendix C for the derivation of the total dollar taxable allowed return prior to the application of the income tax allowance.

442 This does not mean that an MLP denied an income tax allowance will have negative income or cash flow. In the examples here, a jurisdictional MLP only has an after-tax return 6.5 percent on its equity rate base if denied an income tax allowance rather than the after-tax return of 10 percent generated by the DCF model. However,
contrary to the Shipper Parties’ arguments, denying an income tax allowance to a jurisdictional MLP reduces both its after-tax dollar and percent equity return below that required by the capital attraction standard of Hope. 443

3. Comparative Analysis of MLP and Corporate Returns

This section of the order extends the previous analyses to address arguments regarding (1) the relative after-tax dollar and percentage returns on equity of an MLP and a Schedule C corporation and (2) their respective revenue requirements. The Shipper Parties’ premise is that an income tax allowance provides more after-tax cash and percentage returns on equity to the MLP partner than to a corporation shareholder holder. 444 ExxonMobil/BP asserts that Opinion No. 511 demonstrates that MLPs make greater cash distributions to an MLP’s partners that a corporation does to its shareholders and that this results in an over-recovery of the MLP partners’ income tax costs. 445 ExxonMobil/BP further argues that this alleged extra cash of an MLP causes the MLP to have a higher revenue requirement than a corporation even though an MLP and its partners have an overall lower tax burden than a corporation and its shareholders. 446 They conclude that the resulting higher security prices for an MLP thus stem from total revenues that are higher than is necessary to meet the capital attraction standard of Hope. 447 The Shipper Parties assert that the resulting benefits to the MLP and the MLP’s partners means an MLP’s rates will be higher than would be the case without an income tax allowance and therefore the rates are unjust and unreasonable. 448 even though it has a positive return, the MLP will not obtain the after-tax return of 10 percent that a corporate pipeline earns if the latter is provided an income tax allowance. See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 33.

443 Hope, 320 U.S. 591, 605; see also ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 954 (noting the practical results of denying an MLP an income tax allowance).

444 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 15-16, 18, 24, 38; ACV Rehearing at 18-19, 22-23, 28-30.

445 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 38.

446 Id. at 24, 38-40.

447 Id. at 31, 36, 38 (citing Hope, 320 U.S. 591, 605); ACV Rehearing at 18, 24-26, 28-30.

448 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 38-39, 43-44; ACV Rehearing at 12-13, 21-22, 28-29.
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298. This portion of the Shipper Parties’ requests for rehearing is grounded in two analyses. The Shipper Parties rely in part on the statistical analysis Dr. Horst submitted at hearing to establish (1) that an MLP’s partners will double recover their income taxes if an MLP is provided an income tax allowance and (2) that an MLP income tax allowance will result in a higher revenue requirement for an MLP than a corporation. They also rely heavily on the two exhibits attached to Opinion No. 511 as appendices, Ex. SFP-98 and SFP-99 to support their position. Ex. SFP-98 concluded that granting an income tax allowance to both an MLP and a corporation results in a greater after-tax value for the MLP securities, but that the partner and the shareholder will receive the same percentage ROE. Ex. SFP-99 concluded that the after-tax value of an MLP and a corporation will be equal if an MLP is denied an income tax allowance and if the MLP investor and the shareholder have the same marginal tax rate. The Commission turns first to a review of Dr. Horst’s testimony on behalf of the Shipper Parties, second to its own technical analysis of the relative after-tax returns of partnerships and corporations, and third, reprise the analysis of Opinion No. 511 and of the two SFPF exhibits attached to that Opinion.

a. Analysis of Dr. Horst’s Statistical Methodology

299. Opinion No. 511 affirmed the ruling by the 2009 ID that Dr. Horst’s statistical methodology did not establish that there was a double recovery of an MLP partner’s income tax liability. On rehearing, the Shipper Parties reprise Dr. Horst’s analysis in several important regards and urge the Commission either to deny SFPP an allowance or adjust SFPP’s ROE. Shipper Parties rely in part on Dr. Horst’s testimony that (1) an MLP income tax allowance results in the double recovery of an MLP partner’s income tax liability from an MLP, and (2) this is reflected in the higher ROEs of MLP natural gas pipelines compared to corporate natural gas pipelines. Opinion No. 511 did not

449 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 13-14, 16.

450 Id. at 16, 20, 22-23, 30; ACV Rehearing at 14, 24-25.

451 See Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 respectively. The Commission explains below why this conclusion is incorrect in the context of the Commission’s rate design methodology.

452 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 298-301.

453 Prepared Answering Testimony of Thomas Horst on Behalf of ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, Ex. XOM-1 at 5-23.
analyze Dr. Horst's recommendation in detail. Rather Opinion No. 511 stated that if two firms have equivalent risks, but different after-tax cash flows, their stock prices will adjust to reflect a higher after-tax security price.\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 245-249. Dr. Horst (ExxonMobil) and Dr. Schink (SFPP) appear to agree on this point. See Ex. XOM-1 at 17-18 and Ex. SFP-94 at 16. Where they disagree is the source of the difference in the after-tax cash flows, i.e., whether it is from the double recovery of the MLP partner's income tax liability or due to the impact of double taxation.} Opinion No. 511 then reasoned that because there is no double recovery of the MLP partner's income tax liability, the higher security price of an MLP's equity interests is not caused by the MLP's income tax allowance, but because there is no double taxation of the MLP partner's income.\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 301. The Income Tax Policy Statement noted this adjustment at the outset of the debate about partnership income tax allowances. See Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 4 n.6. See also, Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 65 n.82.} The Commission therefore concluded that no further analysis was required based on the ruling that an MLP income tax allowance was appropriate under ExxonMobil.

300. Dr. Horst served as a witness for ExxonMobil at hearing. There he testified that an MLP income tax allowance does not result in the parity of after-tax returns of MLP and corporate pipelines, and that in fact granting an MLP income tax allowance results in a higher ROE for the MLP pipelines even though the MLP and its partners have a lower combined income tax burden than a corporate pipeline and its shareholders. Dr. Horst concluded that there was a difference in the median after-tax ROE between MLPs and corporations of 3.67 percent in 2008\footnote{See Ex. XOM-4.} and 4.01 percent in 2007.\footnote{See Ex. XOM-5.} Dr. Horst explained that he analyzed the relative risk of the members of his proxy group sample to assure that differences in risks were not the cause of the difference in MLP and corporate ROEs. Dr. Horst concluded that a 3.67 percentage point difference in an MLP ROE and a corporate ROE creates a 4.68 percent after-tax difference in the ROE of a MLP partner versus a corporate shareholder.\footnote{See Ex. XOM-1 at 41, Table 2.} He further testified that the source of this difference in after-tax percentage return is driven by the additional cash provided the MLP by the income tax allowance and is reflected in the difference between the ROEs of MLP and
corporate gas pipelines in 2008. Given this supposed discrepancy, Dr. Horst sought to equalize the DCF ROEs of the MLP and the corporate pipelines by denying an MLP income tax allowance. By doing so, he reduced the after-tax 3.67 percent differential between a partner’s and a shareholder’s after-tax ROE in 2008 to 1.01 percent. Alternatively, Dr. Horst recommended adjusting the ROE of MLP pipelines to the median ROE of the corporate natural gas pipelines to 10.13 percent based on his 2008 sample. He also recommended adjusting SFPP’s ROE to reflect the present value of any income tax deferrals benefits from the ownership of the limited partnership interests.

301. The Commission did not address SFPP’s criticisms of Dr. Horst’s methodology in Opinion No. 511 because it reasoned there was no double recovery. However, the core issue in reviewing Dr. Horst’s analysis is whether the seven MLPs and seven corporate gas pipelines used in his proxy group analysis have similar risks. If they do not, this could account for the 3.7 percent difference in ROE between MLPs and corporations. In its rebuttal testimony, SFPP provided a table that summarized the business activities of the seven MLPs and seven corporations for the three years 2006 through 2008. These activities were divided into three groups: gas pipelines, local distribution companies (LDC), and other activities. With one exception, Dr. Horst’s MLPs had natural gas pipeline activities of 84 to 100 percent. The exception was Atlas Pipeline Partners, L.P. (Atlas), which had natural gas pipeline activities of 7 to 14 percent. Moreover, one of the MLPs lacked an investment grade credit rating and two MLPs had no credit rating. Of the seven natural gas pipelines only two, El Paso and Southern Union, had

459 See id. at 42, Table 3.

460 See id. 13-17.

461 See Ex. XOM-1 at 35-36 and Ex. XOM-10, as amended by Ex. XOM-21 and Ex. XOM-25. See also ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 63, n.27.

462 See Petal Gas Storage, L.L.C. v. FERC, 496 F.3d 695, 697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Petal); see also, ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953. Both opinions cite Hope, 320 U.S. 603.

463 Other activities include exploration and production, marketing, treating natural gas, retail propane, petrochemical services, and timber. These are market driven activities that Commission has found to be riskier than gas pipeline activities.

464 See Ex. SFP-103.

465 See Ex. SFP-94 at 22.
pipeline related activities of more than 50 percent. Two natural gas corporations had strong LDC activities and four had a range of other activities. Similarly, Questar and three other corporate pipelines had significant other activities that had exceeded the natural gas pipeline and LDC functions combined. 466 Two corporate pipelines, El Paso and Williams lacked an investment grade debt rating and had notably unstable dividend payouts. 467

302. Against this background, the Commission concludes that Dr. Horst included firms in his sample that had significantly different characteristics from each other, and thus this could account for the 3.7 percentage point difference in the after-tax ROE for the MLPs and corporations in his analysis. Furthermore, the Commission would not have included six of the fourteen entities in a proxy group because of these deficiencies. The Commission notes that within the MLP group one pipeline (Atlas) is particularly dependent on non-pipeline revenue and three have credit ratings that are either below investment grade or none at all. At least three of the corporate pipelines, Williams, Questar, and Oneok had significant exposure to other activities in 2008 and Williams lacked an investment credit rating as well. 468 For these reasons all six of those companies would not be included in a Commission proxy group as they would be viewed as having too much risk to be a representative firm. 469 One of the firms, National Fuel, had an LDC component of about 50 percent and second one, Equitable, close to 40 percent. 470 These two firms have a risk profile below what the Commission generally considers representative. 471 In fact, only one of the corporate natural gas pipelines meets the

\[\text{466 See Ex. SFP-103.}\]

\[\text{467 See Ex. SFP-94 at 22-23.}\]

\[\text{468 See Ex. SFP-94 at 21-22 and Ex. SFP-104.}\]

\[\text{469 Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 129 FERC } \| 61,240, \text{ Opinion No. 486-C, at P 21 n.37 & 69 (2009) (regarding the exclusion of Williams Gas Marketing, Inc. and El Paso Natural Gas Company from a proxy group due to their undue financial risk. Opinion No. 486-C excluded one diversified natural gas company, Questar Corporation, on the grounds that its risk was too high due to its heavy exploration and production function).}\]

\[\text{470 Ex. SFP-103, lines 10 and 9 respectively.}\]

\[\text{471 Opinion No. 486-C, 129 FERC } \| 61,240 \text{ at P 62, 65-69 (explaining why diversified natural gas companies with a large LDC component generally have less risk that an interstate gas pipeline with a transmission function that equals at least 50 percent (continued...))}\]
Commission’s standards for inclusion in proxy group as a firm of comparable risk to SFPP. Therefore Dr. Horst did not successfully modify his sample for risk, as SFPP’s testimony at hearing convincingly demonstrates. Consequently, Dr. Horst’s analysis sought to establish that the difference in after-tax ROEs between MLP and corporate gas pipelines is attributable to Commission’s income tax allowance assuming all other things are equal. In short, the Commission finds that Dr. Horst failed to establish that a 3.7 percent difference in 2008 between the ROEs of MLPs and corporations in Dr. Horst’s proxy group stem from the Commission’s income tax allowance policy and not differences in business focus and risks.

303. Dr. Horst’s analysis is also deficient because it does not isolate sources of the cash flow for the dividends or distributions. Indeed, Dr. Horst’s proxy group analysis does not distinguish between the revenues generated by jurisdictional activities and those from of its activities). In the Kern River rate proceeding, the Commission ultimately excluded two LDC dominated firms, Equitable Gas Resources, Inc. and NiSource, from Kern River’s proxy group. See Opinion No. 486-C, 129 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 72-80, 86-93. NiSource was also excluded because it had cut its dividend and this could result in an unrepresentative DCF calculation. See also Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 51.

472 See Ex. SFP-94 at 18-20; Ex. SFP-102 passim.

473 See Ex. XOM-1 at 6.

474 The DCF model’s first component is the dollar distribution in the last six months of the test year. This determines the current yield when measured against the price of the equity interest. Because the distribution is compounded in the subsequent years and then discounted back to the test year, a large distribution has a material impact on the calculation. In some cases the five year IBES forecast for an MLP can be close to that of a corporation. If the MLP distribution is significantly higher than that of a corporation, the MLP ROE could be higher. This means that any analysis must carefully compare the source of cash for the distribution. This can include net cash from operations, cash flow from the depreciation component of the cost of service, the return component of the cost of service, distributions of external sources, distributions from non-jurisdictional sources, and the jurisdictional income tax allowance. Dr Horst’s statistical analysis is inadequate to address these different factors and he has provided no analytical basis to support a conclusion that the difference in ROEs between an MLP and a corporation is driven by the MLP’s income tax allowance. Cf. Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at 244-245.
non-jurisdictional activities. If the income and cash flow of a diversified firm is driven by non-jurisdictional activities, the Commission’s income tax allowance is not relevant to that portion of the firm’s operations. However the distributions or dividends from such non-jurisdictional income would still be reflected in yields and in the growth factors contained in the Commission’s DCF formula.\(^{475}\) Compared to complexities and relative subjectivity of Dr. Horst’s analysis, the Commission’s practice of developing an ROE cost-of-capital from a sample of firms with comparable risks is well established.\(^{476}\) The Commission’s DCF approach is therefore grounded in the basic assumption that firms of the same risk will generate similar returns.\(^{477}\) As such, the Commission’s DCF method provides a well defined and reliable measure of relative risk and return under different market conditions while Dr. Horst’s analysis does not.

304. Finally, Dr. Horst’s analysis is grounded in his Table 2 comparing the relative gross ups of an MLP and corporate pipeline and from that comparison the relative after-tax returns of the MLP partner and shareholder. However Dr. Horst’s Table 2 starts from a basic error in its efforts to display the relative after-tax return of the MLP partner and the corporate shareholder. First, it assumes based on Dr. Horst’s statistical analysis that there is a different revenue requirement and after-tax ROE required for an MLP pipeline and a corporate pipeline as adjusted for risk, that is, the 3.67 percent displayed in that Table. The Commission has concluded this statistical analysis is unsound. Second, Dr. Horst’s Table 2 states that the pre-tax return to the MLP and the after-tax return to the partner are both 13.80 percent.\(^{478}\) This is mathematically impossible because the pre-tax and after-tax figures cannot be identical unless the marginal tax rate is zero. It is also inconsistent with the Shipper Parties’ argument that the ROEs generated by the DCF model include a gross up adequate to cover the investor’s income tax liability and to meet the investor’s after-tax return. Under the Shipper Parties’ central theory here the

\(^{475}\) Thus, in the case of National Fuel the Commission’s income tax allowance policy would apply to some ten percent of income compared to 100 percent for Oneok Partners, L.P., assuming that in 2008 either had a full income tax allowance actually embedded in their rates in that year. See Ex. SFP-103, line 10 and line 6 respectively.

\(^{476}\) Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 3, 7, 47-49; see also, Petal, 463 F.3d at 699-700 and ExxonMobil, 476 F.3d at 953.

\(^{477}\) Cf. Petal, 496 F.3d at 698-700. If the firm’s risk, yield, and growth prospects were identical, then their ROE’s also would be. As the text states, adjusting all the factors of a range of firms to reach that identity is difficult, if not impossible.

\(^{478}\) See Ex. XOM-1 at 41.
calculations of the MLP’s pretax DCF return and the MLP’s partner’s after-tax return cannot be the same because the marginal tax rate of the partner is embedded in the ROE generated by the DCF model. SFPP correctly points out, if the partner’s marginal tax rate is 32 percent, the after-tax return to the partner in Table 2 should be 9.34 percent, not 13.8 percent. 479

305. To that end, SFPP’s Ex. 96 partially corrected Dr. Horst’s Table 2 to correctly state that the MLP pipeline and its partners have the same required after-tax ROE of 13.80 percent as does the corporate pipeline. This is because the two business forms have the same costs either in a competitive environment or under Commission regulation, and hence the same revenue requirement. The gross up is somewhat different because the partners and the corporation have different marginal tax rates leaving the MLP pipeline with a before-tax ROE of 20.29 percent and the corporation with a before-tax ROE of 21.23 percent. After allowing for double taxation of the corporate return the after-tax return to the partner is 13.80 percent and 12.42 percent to the shareholder using Dr. Horst’s marginal tax rate on dividends of 10 percent. After the adjustment in the equity price of the MLP and the corporation the return is 13.80 percent with the MLP equity price at $100 and the corporate equity price at $90 based on the 10 percent marginal tax rate Dr. Horst applies to dividends. 480 SFPP’s Ex. 97 extends the analysis in Ex. SFP-96 to assume a marginal tax rate on dividends of 32 percent. At that marginal tax rate the adjustment results in a corporate share price of $68 compared to a MLP equity price of $100, and thus is again a direct function of the marginal tax rate on the dividends. 481 These tables and the Commission’s analysis below start from the basic financial assumption that an MLP and a corporate pipeline have the same economic

479 See Ex. SFP-94 at 15, 40-41.

480 Ex. SFP-96. SFPP’s corrections are described at Ex. SFP-94 at 28-33. The after-tax value for the corporation equity of $90 is similar to the $85 after-tax value of corporate equity in the Commission’s Table 4 infra, which uses a marginal tax of 15 percent rather than the 10 percent assume in Dr. Horst’s analysis. See Ex. XOM-1 at 10. As discussed below in Tables 3 through 7, the difference in the value of the equity interests is a function of the marginal tax rate on the dividends paid to the shareholders.

481 Ex. SFP-97. SFPP’s additional adjustments are discussed at Ex. SFP-94 at 39-40. The result is comparable to the Commission’s Table 6 infra which uses a marginal tax rate on dividends of 35 percent and therefore results in a corporate share price of $65 compared to the MLP equity price of $100. The Commission takes no position on the appropriateness of the 32 percent marginal rate as this does not affect the outcome here. Either way the stock price will adjust to reflect the shareholder’s marginal rate.
functions. As such, they correctly conclude that the difference in the after-tax cash return and the price adjustment is a function of double taxation, not a statistical difference driven by the income tax allowance.

306. Therefore, for the reasons stated, the Commission rejects Dr. Host’s analysis and his conclusions that (1) the difference in ROEs between MLP and corporate pipelines is driven by “double recovery” of the MLP partner’s income tax liability due to excess cash resulting from an MLP income tax allowance, and (2), that granting an income tax allowance thereby destroys the parity of regulatory returns of MLP and corporate pipelines. In this regard ExxonMobil cites paragraph 261 of Opinion No. 511 for the proposition “granting an income tax allowance to MLPs results in an adjustment in the relative investment price of an MLP’s and a corporation’s securities to the former’s advantage.”\(^{482}\) The implication is the income tax allowance provides unnecessary cash to cover the income tax liabilities of the partners and that this results in an undeserved price advantage for the MLP. The actual context is:

Under both the Income Tax Policy Statement and ExxonMobil, the comparison of relative returns was between the MLP as a regulated entity, including the imputed income tax liability, and the corporation as a regulated entity, with its explicit income tax liability. The comparison was not between the individual unit holder and the corporate shareholder as the ACV Shippers urge here. The Income Tax Policy Statement recognizes that unlike corporate income, MLP income is not subject to double taxation. Thus granting an income tax allowance to MLPs results in an adjustment in the relative investment price of an MLP’s and a corporation’s securities to the former’s advantage. ExxonMobil accepted the Commission’s determination that elimination of the allowance would create a disincentive for using partnerships because it would lower the relative returns for partnerships as compared to corporations. Thus the difference in dollar returns resulting from an income tax allowance was addressed in the examples provided in the Income Tax Allowance Statement and was affirmed by ExxonMobil. Further, the price advantage MLPs hold over corporations was recognized in the Income Tax Policy Statement and was upheld by

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\(^{482}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 18, 24 (citing in part Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 261).
In contrast to ExxonMobil/BP’s inference, Opinion No. 511 established that an MLP income tax allowance is necessary for parity at the entity level and that it is the impact of double taxation that causes an advantage at the investor level. As discussed further in the next section, the taxation of dividend income unquestionably means a shareholder will have less after-tax income and cash return than an MLP partner due to the impact of double taxation of the corporation and of the shareholder. But this does not mean that an MLP necessarily distributes more cash to its partners than a corporation could in dividends. This is because an MLP has the same cost of service as a corporation and therefore the same pre-tax revenue and pre-tax cash flows. Rather, as Opinion No. 511 states, the difference between the MLP and corporate equity holder is properly reflected in the adjusted price of their equity interests, which results in their having the same percent ROE.\footnote{Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 261 (citations omitted).}

b. Commission’s Technical Analysis of the Relative After-tax Returns of an MLP Pipeline and a Corporate Pipeline

In a prior section the Commission presented a basic example of the impact on the relative after-tax cash flows and the values of equity interests of an income tax allowance (both the presence and absence of one), but without the corporate format. Here the Commission extends its analysis to compare the relative after-tax cash flows, ROEs, and value of the ownership interests of an MLP partner and a Schedule C corporation shareholder, again with or without an income tax allowance. Tables 3 through Table 7 and the related analysis demonstrate that granting an MLP an income tax allowance does not result in (1) a higher after-tax percentage ROE for MLP partner compared to a shareholder, and (2) an MLP having a higher revenue requirement than a corporation even though an MLP partners have an overall lower income tax burden than the combined income tax burden of a corporation and its shareholders. The five additional tables compare the after-tax dollar and percent ROEs of a partner and the corporation, and the relative after-tax cash flow and dollar value of a partner’s and the shareholder’s equity interests. These tables also show whether an MLP or corporate pipeline recovers its after-tax equity cost of capital and thus its regulatory cost of service. The analysis here also serves as a foundation for the analysis in the next section of the order of the portions of Opinion No. 511 that relied in part on Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 in addressing these same topics.

\footnote{Id. P 301; Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at n.6. See also December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 53.}
As before, the Commission's analysis does not include a growth component and posits an all equity firm with a required after-tax rate of ROE of 10 percent. Moreover, as all cash flow from depreciation is reinvested to maintain the same level of service and all other net cash is distributed, taxable income and pre-tax cash flow of the partnership and corporation are the same, as are their respective distributions and dividends.

Imputing the partner’s income tax liability to the partnership as per ExxonMobil, the income tax allowance is stated on the same line for both the partnership and the corporation. To distinguish the results of the MLP, the partner, and a corporation, the analyses display separately the partnership’s, the partner’s, and the corporation’s after-tax income and percent ROE as well as the pre-tax and after-tax dollar return to the shareholder. In Tables 3 through 7 a 35 percent tax rate always applies to the partner’s and the corporation’s taxable income and a marginal tax range of 0 to 35 percent apply to the shareholder’s dividend income.

Having calculated both the partner’s and the shareholder’s after-tax dollar ROE, the tables then determine the capitalized value of the partner’s and the shareholder’s equity interests at ten times the dollar value of the distribution or dividend. That value reflects the principal amount required to provide an after-tax 10 percent ROE on the investor’s equity interest. For example, if the after-tax dollar return to a partner is $100 and the after-tax dollar return for the shareholder is $85, given the required after-tax ROE of 10 percent the partner’s equity is valued at $1000 and the shareholder’s equity is valued at $850. The Commission adopts this format because a dollar figure displays most clearly the impact of double taxation on after-tax dollar returns and equity values.

Table 3 compares the partnership and shareholder ROEs and values when the marginal tax rate on dividends is zero percent. Example 4 of Table 3 discloses that when there is no tax on dividends the corporation has 10 percent after-tax ROE. Example 3 of Table 3 further shows that in the absence of double taxation the after-tax percentage ROE to the partnership (and its partners) is the same as that corporation, 10 percent, and the after-tax dollar return of the partner and the shareholder is the same, $100, as is the value of their equity, $1000. Example 1 and Example 2 of Table 3 demonstrate the partnership (and thus its partners) and the corporation both earn an after-tax rate ROE of only 6.5 percent if either is denied an income tax-allocation. Thus neither the partnership nor the corporation earns the required after-tax ROE. However, whether the after-tax return is 6.5 percent or 10 percent given the presence or absence of the income tax allowance, the partner and the shareholder have the same after-tax dollar and after-tax percent ROEs if there is no double taxation.

In contrast to Table 3, Tables 4 through 6 include a tax on corporate dividends at different marginal tax rates. The marginal tax rate for Table 4 is 15 percent, Table 5 is 25 percent, and Table 6 is 35 percent. The results at the entity level are always the same for the MLP (and thus for its partners) and the corporation for both the after-tax dollar
and percentage returns. Thus in Table 4 if both the partnership and the corporation are provided an income tax allowance, both the partners and the corporation will have an after-tax ROE of 10 percent and their after-tax income is the same. If neither is provided an income tax allowance, the after-tax ROE drops to 8.5 percent for both entities and neither obtains the required after-tax rate of return. Regardless of whether the after-tax ROE is 10 percent or 8.5 percent, the after-tax dollar and percent ROEs at the entity level are the same.\(^{485}\) Moreover, if an income tax allowance is provided to the partnership, the dollar return to the partner remains $100 and the capitalized value of the partner’s equity is $1000 as there is no double taxation of that income. But the shareholder’s dollar return and equity value drop in proportion to the marginal tax rate on dividends. Table 4 thus shows a shareholder return of $85 and a capitalized value of $850, Table 5 shows a shareholder value of $75 and a capitalized value of $750, and Table 6 shows a shareholder value of $65 and a capitalized value of $650.

312. Tables 3 through 6 thereby show that if an MLP has no income tax allowance, it will not recover its cost of capital. Of equal importance, Tables 3 through Table 5 show that if the MLP is denied an income tax allowance, the after-tax dollar return to its partners will be less than the after-tax return to the shareholder and the MLP equity interests will have a lower capitalized value than the shareholders until the partner and the shareholder have the same marginal tax rate of 35 percent, the essential holding of ExxonMobil.\(^{486}\) Table 6 shows that the MLP will not recover its cost of service when the partner and the shareholder have the same after-tax dollar return because this occurs only if the MLP does not have an income tax allowance.\(^{487}\) Tables 3 through 6 also show that an MLP and a corporate pipeline have the same revenue requirement regardless of the marginal tax rate if both are provided an income tax allowance.

\(^{485}\) This assumes that an MLP and a corporation are both either granted or denied an income tax allowance so that there is no difference in their comparative cash flows.

\(^{486}\) Compare Example 1 to Example 4 on each of the Tables.

\(^{487}\) See Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 248. As discussed below, Opinion No. 511 did not make this point and that Opinion has therefore been construed by the Shipper Parties as an admission that the returns of the partner and the shareholder are equal if the MLP is denied an income tax allowance. However, in the context of Commission rate design policy, got the MLP Ex. SFP-99 incorrectly grosses up the return in the example as well as denying an income tax allowance. As previously noted, Ex. SFP-99 will reach the same result as the Commission’s Table 6 if the gross up to the return line is eliminated, namely that the MLP does not recover its cost of service.
313. It is important to note that just because the capitalized value of the after-tax return to the shareholders is less than the dollar value of the corporation's equity rate base does not mean that the corporation fails to earn its required after-tax ROE under the Commission's ratemaking methodology if it is provided an income tax allowance. The corporation's after-tax return is $100, which is the required after-tax ten percent ROE on the corporation's equity rate base of $1000. However given a 15 percent marginal tax rate, at a required ten percent after-tax ROE the shareholder's after-tax dollar return is $85 or the capitalized value of the shares is $850, the principal amount required for a 10 percent after-tax rate of return ROE. But a comparison of the partner's and the shareholder's after-tax percent ROE shows that the after-tax percent ROE is the same both, that is a 10 percent after-tax return on the capitalized value of their interests.

314. Tables 3 through 6 confirm that an MLP benefits from the absence of double taxation through the higher equity dollar value that results from the absence of double taxation. However, as Opinion No 511 states, the MLP partners will not benefit from the absence of double taxation if the prices adjust to accurately reflect the difference in the capitalized value of the after-tax cash flows because the MLP partners pay a higher price for the security than the corporate shareholders in order to obtain the same after-tax dollar return. 488 Thus, while Opinion No. 511 did state that Congress intended that any tax benefits from use of the MLP format were for the account of the investors and not the rate payers, 489 it is more accurate to say that the benefits are to flow to the MLP through the lower cost of equity capital it derives from the higher priced shares. Even so, the single taxation and tax deferrals can make for an attractive investment vehicle for the MLP partner, if the investor captures some of the higher equity price that theoretically flows to the MLP. But in either case there is no doubt that Section 7704 of the IRC was to provide that incentive for certain types of business formats to encourage investment. 490

Where the Shipper Parties and the Commission disagree is that the Commission again concludes that Congress intended that either the investor or the MLP retain the benefits of single taxation and tax deferrals depending on the price the investor actually pays for the MLP equity interests. Opinion No. 511 was correct in concluding any tax advantage to an MLP from single rather than double taxation is not for the benefit of the rate payers.

488 As noted, this is a point that Dr. Horst conceded in his testimony. See Ex. XOM-1 at 17-18; see also Ex. SFP-94 at 16, 32-33, 36-37, 40.

489 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 251-256.

490 Id. P 253, 256, 259, 308.
Table 3. Comparison of after-tax returns of MLP and Corporation at the entity level and the relative value of a partner and the shareholder interest assuming a required after-tax return of 10 percent and a 0 percent tax on dividends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Partnership</th>
<th>Example 2 - Corporation</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership</th>
<th>Example 4 - Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>without tax allowance</td>
<td>without tax allowance</td>
<td>with tax allowance</td>
<td>with tax allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Pretax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner After tax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>Corporate Dividend</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder Rate</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dollar Tax Paid</strong></td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Value</strong></td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion – When there is no tax on the dividend and the MLP and the corporation both receive an income tax allowance, both entities earn the required return and after-tax value of the partnership's and the corporate equity's interest are identical.
Table 4. Comparison of after-tax returns of MLP and Corporation at the entity level and the relative value of a partner and the shareholder interest assuming a required after-tax return of 10 percent and a 15 percent tax on dividends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Partnership without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 2 - Corporation without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership with tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 4 - Corporation with tax allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>$ -</td>
<td>$54</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</em></td>
<td><em>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</em></td>
<td><em>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</em></td>
<td><em>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Pretax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>No Pass Through</strong></td>
<td><strong>Partner Pretax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>No Pass Through</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>N.A:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$54</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner After tax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Corporate Dividend</strong></td>
<td><strong>Partner After tax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Corporate Dividend</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder Rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dollar Tax Paid</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shareholder Rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shareholder Rate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dollar Tax Paid</strong></td>
<td><strong>After Tax Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Partner Value</strong></td>
<td><strong>Partner Value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$55</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Value</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shareholder Value</strong></td>
<td><strong>After Tax Return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Shareholder Value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$650</td>
<td>$553</td>
<td>$85</td>
<td>$850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong> - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. The difference in value between the partner's and the shareholder's interest is a direct function of the marginal tax rate on dividends, or $15.</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong> - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. The difference in value between the partner's and the shareholder's interest is a direct function of the marginal tax rate on dividends, or $15.</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong> - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. The difference in value between the partner's and the shareholder's interest is a direct function of the marginal tax rate on dividends, or $15.</td>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong> - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. The difference in value between the partner's and the shareholder's interest is a direct function of the marginal tax rate on dividends, or $15.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Comparison of after-tax returns of MLP and Corporation at the entity level and the relative value of a partner and the shareholder interest assuming a required after-tax return of 10 percent and a 25 percent tax on dividends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 – Partnership</th>
<th>Example 2 - Corporation</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership</th>
<th>Example 4 - Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Rate Base</strong></td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operating Exp.</strong></td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income Tax All.</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost of Service</strong></td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pretax Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return (plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Pretax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax at 35 Percent</strong></td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After Tax Income</strong></td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Return on Equity</strong></td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner After tax Income/Return</strong></td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>Corporate Dividend</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shareholder Rate</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dollar Tax Paid</strong></td>
<td>$16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partner Value</strong></td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>$488</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. The difference in value between the partner's and the shareholder's interest is a direct function of the marginal tax rate on dividends, or $25.
Table 6. Comparison of after-tax returns of MLP and Corporation at the entity level and the relative value of a partner and the shareholder interest assuming a required after-tax return of 10 percent and a 35 percent tax on dividends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Partnership without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 2 - Corporation without tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership with tax allowance</th>
<th>Example 4 - Corporation with tax allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equity Rate Base</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Equity Rate Base</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax All.</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>Income Tax All.</td>
<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Service</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>Cost of Service</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretax Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>Pretax Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Pretax Income/Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Income</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>After Tax Income</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>Corporate Dividend</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Rate</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Dollar Tax Paid</td>
<td>$23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Return</td>
<td>$42</td>
<td>After Tax Return</td>
<td>$42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Value</td>
<td>$423</td>
<td>Shareholder Value</td>
<td>$423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion - Under the stated assumptions the partnership will not earn the required return on equity if denied an income tax allowance but the corporation earns the required return on equity if granted an income tax allowance. If the partnership is denied an income tax allowance, then partner and shareholder after tax values are the same, but the partnership does not recover its regulatory cost of service.
It is in this context that the Shipper Parties assert that Opinion No. 511 concedes that the MLP format is a tax advantaged business format that distributes extra after-tax cash flow to their partners compared to that available to a corporation.\footnote{ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 38, 40; ACV Rehearing at 19, 30-31, 53.} In that regard, the Commission has always recognized the MLPs have financial advantages over corporations because the income of an MLP is not subject to double taxation when it is distributed, unlike corporate dividends.\footnote{Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 4, 9, 30, 33, n.6.} Moreover, the Commission has recognized that MLPs usually make greater cash distributions to the partners than a corporation does with its dividends because MLPs normally distribute all available cash to their partners.\footnote{The Commission has ruled that corporations usually retain more cash for use as internal financing. MLPs rely more on external financing and may distribute the cash generated by depreciation and external financing in addition to that from earnings and the income tax allowance. See Proxy Group Policy Statement, 123 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 11-13, 15, 92-93. But as the tables display, this does not mean that an MLP generates more cash from operations than a corporation or that the greater amount of cash distributed comes from the income tax allowance assuming both firms have the same costs, revenues, and risk. The Shipper Parties’ inference to the contrary is inaccurate.} This in turn results in a reduction of the partner’s basis and the deferral of income taxes to the extent the distributed cash exceeds the partner’s distributed income.\footnote{Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 36, n.35. See also December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 45 (recognizing this point but then reaching the incorrect conclusion that there must be an adjustment to the pipeline’s equity return to reflect the value of any income tax deferrals).} But this does not mean that MLPs distribute cash that results in the double recovery of partner’s income tax liability. The pre-tax cash distributions to the partner and the pre-tax dividends to the shareholder are the same assuming that all available cash is distributed, but the MLP partner obtains more after-tax cash than the corporate shareholder. This result is precisely because the partners (and under ExxonMobil the MLP) have a lower over-all tax burden than a corporation and its shareholders.\footnote{As argued by ExxonMobil/BP in their rehearing request at 24, 38-39, 40.} It does not follow that the over-all lower tax burden results in excessive after-tax cash flow to the MLP’s partners or the double recovery of the MLP partner’s income tax liability.
Rather the difference in the price of their equity securities is due to single taxation that makes the MLP a tax-advantaged entity, not that there are any income tax dollar savings on net operating income (return) generated by the entity’s jurisdictional operations. In other words, the MLP’s tax advantage occurs at the investor level when the MLP limited partners pay a higher price for the MLP’s equity interests. ExxonMobil/BP distorts this basic conclusion by citing paragraph 247 of Opinion No. 511 for the proposition that extra cash generated by the income tax allowance causes an unwarranted rise in this price. The actual statement is that “as the risk is the same for both business models, the higher MLP unit price reflects its higher after-tax dollar income and cash returns compared to the corporation.” Opinion No. 511 at paragraph 245 makes clear, however, that this sentence occurs in the context of “comparing the after-tax returns of an MLP and a corporation as presented in the Income Tax Policy Statement and repeated in ExxonMobil.” Aside from the fact that both the cited sources approved the income tax allowance as necessary to maintain parity in the returns of partnerships and corporations, any inference that Opinion No. 511 stated that the excess cash is generated by an MLP income tax allowance is incorrect. The double taxation of corporate income or an MLP partners’ tax deferrals occur at the investor level and not at the level of the operating entities regardless of whether they are a partnership or a corporation. Thus, as a matter of cost of service analysis, it is incorrect to imply that the “tax savings” to the MLP partners from the elimination of double taxation or tax deferrals are reflected in the MLP’s regulatory cost of service or rate design.

In contrast to the Shipper Parties’ arguments, an MLP’s financial advantage stems from the avoidance on the tax on dividends that must be paid by a corporation’s shareholders. This means that the corporation’s equity interests are priced lower than those of the MLP because neither the corporation nor the MLP can charge higher rates nor obtain lower costs than the other. Because the corporation cannot obtain higher gross revenues or lower costs than the MLP, the corporation’s gross revenues will never be sufficient to cover the income tax on the dividends it distributes to its shareholders.

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496 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 30, 38 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 247).

497 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 247.

498 Id. P 245 (citations omitted).

499 Id. P 41. Similarly, the conclusion at P 45 of the December 2006 Sepulveda Order that the pipeline benefits at the expenses of the rate payers contradicts the earlier statement at P 41 that income tax deferrals are not part of the pipeline’s cost of service.
Thus, as long as there is a tax rate on dividends, the after-tax cash flow to the shareholder and the value of the shareholder's interest is always less than that of MLP partner even though both the dollar and the percentage returns on rate base are the same at the entity level.

318. However ExxonMobil further argues that the Commission arbitrarily excluded shareholders as investors by focusing parity on the first tier of ownership, i.e., at the MLP partner and the shareholder level. But this argument assumes that the shareholder and the partner have identical ownership interests, which they do not. Because the MLP is a pass through entity, the MLP partner has a direct interest in assets which are reflected in the partner’s partnership account. The partner’s returns directly reflect the revenue, expenses, and income of the partnership and the partner must pay the taxes thereon whether or not provided the cash to pay the taxes. In this regard, the MLP partner’s ownership interest is accounted for on a balance sheet and income statement that is very similar to those of a corporation. The MLP partner’s tax return reflects net changes to the entity’s capital account from net income, plant, and investments from external sources and from losses and distributions (similar to dividends). In contrast, the shareholder’s interest in the assets is indirect and the shareholder has no direct accounting interest in the corporation’s assets and the corporation’s balance sheet is not reflected in shareholder’s net worth. A shareholder has no asset account that replicates the entity’s rate base and has no liability for taxes on the income generated by the entity’s rate base. ExxonMobil clearly recognized this fundamental distinction.

319. The foregoing shows that the Shipper Parties are simply incorrect that the Commission should equalize the returns of partners and shareholders. Indeed, the court in ExxonMobil affirmed the Commission’s decision to equalize the after-tax returns at the level of the jurisdictional entity. It is at the entity level the Commission establishes the allowed ROE on the rate base of a jurisdictional entity and it is at that level that the Commission determines if a jurisdictional entity has a realized ROE that is less than, equals, or exceeds its allowed jurisdictional after-tax return. Tables 3 through 6 in this order apply the ExxonMobil analysis to the equity rate base of partnership and corporate business structures and calculate the resulting ROEs. Those tables show that when both business formats obtain an income tax allowance the returns on the equity portion of the

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500 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 30, 34, 36; cf. ACV Rehearing at 27-28.

501 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 951-53.
jurisdictional rate base are the same for both business formats. This is true even though the after-tax dollar return to the shareholder is less than that of the MLP partner due to the impact of double taxation. In turn the percentage return to the partner and the shareholder is the same due to difference in the capitalized value of their positions.

320. However, in theory the Commission could equalize both the after-tax percentage and the after-tax dollar returns of partners and shareholders as urged by the Shipper Parties and assure that both earn their required regulatory ROE. This could be done by providing the corporation an additional income tax allowance to cover the marginal tax rate on the shareholder’s dividends. This would replicate how a corporation must gross up operating revenue not only for the 35 percent tax on its earnings, but also to cover the estimated tax cost on the dividends distributed to its shareholders. This is shown by Examples 2 and 4 in Table 7. In Example 4, the corporate after-tax dollar return increases to $118 and to a percentage after-tax ROE of 11.77 percent instead of 10 percent. After applying the marginal tax rate to the dividend, the partner’s and the shareholder’s after-tax value of their equity interests is the same. However the corporation over-recovers its cost of service.

321. Therefore, consistent with Opinion No. 511, the Commission again concludes that it is mathematically incorrect to argue that an MLP’s partners will double recover their income taxes if the MLP is provided an income tax allowance. Contrary to the assertions on rehearing, as discussed above, the difference in dollar value between a partner’s and the shareholder’s equity interest results from double taxation and not from granting the MLP an income tax allowance. Because an MLP will not recover its cost of service if denied an income tax allowance, that difference cannot be remedied under the Commission’s ratemaking methodology by means that will allow a partnership and corporation to both earn an appropriate after-tax return on the equity portion of their jurisdictional rate base.

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507 Table 7 assumes a 15 percent marginal tax rate on dividends.

504 Opinion No. 151, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 250.

505 See ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953-55 (holding that a comparison of equity returns must be at the entity level).
Table 7. Comparison of after-tax returns of MLP and Corporation at the entity level and the relative value of a partner and the shareholder interest assuming a required after-tax return of 10 percent and a 15 percent tax on dividends.

In this case the Commission provides an income tax allowance to cover the 15 percent tax on the dividends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example 1 - Partnership</th>
<th>Example 2 - Corporation</th>
<th>Example 3 - Partnership</th>
<th>Example 4 - Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>without tax allowance</td>
<td>without tax allowance</td>
<td>with tax allowance</td>
<td>with tax allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Rate Base</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Exp.</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Tax All.</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Service</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretax Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
<td>(Sum of the after-tax return plus income tax allowance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Pretax Income/Return</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>No Pass Through</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax at 35 Percent</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Income</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner After tax Income/Return</td>
<td>$65</td>
<td>Corporate Dividend</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Rate 15%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dollar Tax Paid $10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Tax Return</td>
<td>$55</td>
<td>Shareholder Value $553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Value</td>
<td>$650</td>
<td>$553</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Equity Earn the Required Return?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion – When the dividend marginal tax rate is 15 percent both the partnership and the corporation earn their required return and thus their regulatory cost of service when the comparison of returns is at the entity level but the corporation over-recovers its cost of service.
c. **Reprise of Opinion No. 511**

322. The previous sections in this part of the order have explained why an MLP will not recover its regulatory cost of service if denied an income tax allowance because the Commission's rate design methodology does not permit a jurisdictional entity to gross up operating revenue or the pipeline's return component to recover the income taxes on the after-tax return derived from the Commission's DCF model.\(^{506}\) The analysis in Opinion No. 511 was more narrowly focused and held that denying an MLP an income tax allowance would have two results. First, the MLP would have lower after-tax cash flow than a corporation, as was affirmed in ExxonMobil.\(^{507}\) Second, the MLP after-tax dollar return and the price of the MLP equity interests would drop relative to those of a corporation, but the MLP equity owner and the shareholder would continue to have the same percentage ROE because the price of the securities would adjust to reflect the difference in the after-tax cash flow.\(^{508}\) Opinion No. 511 also held that while the distributions or dividends to pay income taxes on distributive income is reflected in the ROEs generated by the DCF model, the argument of a double-recovery of an MLP's partners income tax allowance was incorrect because corporations and MLPs have the same revenue requirements.\(^{509}\) In doing so, Opinion No. 511 relied in part on Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 to conclude that granting an MLP an income tax allowance will not provide a higher ROE to the MLP investor or cause a higher revenue requirement for the MLP than for a shareholder or the corporation. Thus, Opinion No. 511 held there is no double recovery of an MLP partner's income tax liability from an MLP income tax allowance.\(^{510}\)

323. In their rehearing requests, the Shipper Parties placed increased reliance on the Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 to assert\(^{511}\) that (1) Opinion No. 511 concedes that the after-tax

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\(^{506}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 263.

\(^{507}\) Id. P 264, 301.

\(^{508}\) Id. P 245-46, 249, 261.

\(^{509}\) Id. P 250.

\(^{510}\) Id. P 249-250, 265.

\(^{511}\) ExxonMobil/BP at 16, 17-18, 20-21, 22-23; ACV Rehearing at 18, 24. The arguments regarding Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 are within the bounds of a rehearing request of despite the fact that they were embedded in a section of ExxonMobil/BP's request for rehearing captioned by a reference to the East Line initial decision in Docket

(continued...
dollar returns of a MLP partner and a corporate shareholder will be the same only if the
MLP is denied an income tax allowance, and (2) that Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 support
this conclusion because they demonstrate that an MLP income tax allowance double
counts cash flow required to pay a partner’s income tax liability. ExxonMobil/BP
further contends that SFPP’s own witness Dr. Schink agreed that a jurisdictional MLP
can obtain an adequate return without an income tax allowance. They therefore again
conclude that an income tax allowance is unnecessary to recover an MLP partner’s
income taxes as the necessary cash flow is reflected in the ROEs calculated by the
Commission’s DCF model.

324. The Commission denies the double recovery rehearing requests consistent with its
rulings in Opinion No. 511. Opinion No. 511 explained that the after-tax cash flow of an
MLP partner and a corporate shareholder will differ depending on (1) whether the MLP is
provided an income tax allowance, and (2) the level of the marginal tax rate on corporate
dividends. The analysis in Opinion No. 511 relied on the fundamental fact that a greater
distribution or dividend will result in a higher stock price and a lower distribution or
dividend will result in lower stock price because prices adjust to reflect the same after-tax
return. In doing so Opinion No. 511 did not concede that the income tax allowance
was a double recovery of the investor’s income tax cost, that an income tax allowance
resulted in an artificial cost, or that the fact that the ROE reflects an after-tax cost support
this conclusion. The statement that an ROE analysis must reflect a pre-tax yield 8
percent to reflect an ROE yield of 6 percent did not mean that Opinion No. 511 conceded
that the gross up to 8 percent is reflected in the regulatory return component of a
jurisdictional entity’s regulatory cost-of-service.

No. IS09-437-000. Id. at 19-20. Therefore the arguments are addressed here but without
regard to the East Line ID.

512 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 18, 21, 22-23; ACV Rehearing at 24.

513 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 16.

514 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 16, 20-21, 25; ACV Rehearing at 18-19, 24-26,
29-30.

515 Cf. Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 246-249. This conclusion is
implicit in Opinion No. 511’s discussion of the relative cash flows of an MLP pipeline
and a corporate pipeline with and without an income tax allowance, but is not explicitly
stated.
325. In fact, in examining a jurisdictional entity’s cost of service and cash flows Opinion No. 511 reached the same conclusion as the court’s example in ExxonMobil,\(^\text{516}\) namely that absent an income tax allowance a jurisdictional MLP (and its partners) will not have as much after-tax return (or cash) as that of a jurisdictional corporation. Opinion No. 511 thus concluded that a jurisdictional MLP will have lower after-tax cash flow if denied an income tax allowance. It thus followed the MLP would have a lower security price than a corporation if denied an income tax allowance. This necessarily supports the conclusion in ExxonMobil that “termination of the allowance would clearly act as a disincentive for the use of the partnership format, because it would lower the returns of partnerships vis-à-vis corporations, and because it would prevent certain investors from realizing the benefits of a consolidated income tax return.”\(^\text{517}\) As noted, Opinion No. 511 assumed that a jurisdictional MLP would not recover its regulatory cost of service if denied an income tax allowance.\(^\text{518}\) The earlier analysis in this order shows that this would be the case and thus that the ultimate conclusions in Opinion No. 511 are correct.

326. Turning now to Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, these exhibits were developed for two purposes. The first was to display the proper format for comparing the after-tax percentage ROEs of partners and shareholders and thereby display how the relative price MLP and how the equity interests adjust to reflect the difference in the after-tax cash flows of a partner and a shareholder. Both exhibits start with a required after-tax percent equity return (line 1), gross up the percentage ROE (not dollars) to the required pre-tax percent ROE (line 3), state several cost of service assumptions (lines 6-12) determine the after-tax cash flow available to the MLP unit holder and the shareholder (line 21), and then calculate an imputed share price (line 25), the investor’s after-tax percent ROE (line 26), and the resulting DCF ROE (line 27).\(^\text{519}\) These two SFPP exhibits do support two conclusions in Opinion No. 511 as they stand. First, that with or without an income tax allowance the after-tax percentage ROE is the same for the partner and the shareholder as the price of the equity interests always adjusts to obtain that result. This is also the conclusion of the Ex. SFP-96 and Ex. SFP-97, which corrected Dr. Horst’s Table 2 testimony that the difference in the ROE’s of an MLP and corporate gas pipeline in 2007

\(^{516}\) ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953.

\(^{517}\) Id. at 952-53 (affirming the Commission’s rationale).

\(^{518}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 261, 263-264.

\(^{519}\) See Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 (both of which were included, respectively, as Appendix B and Appendix C to Opinion No. 511).
and 2008 was caused by an MLP income tax allowance.\textsuperscript{520} Second, Ex. SFP-98 shows that if an MLP is afforded an income tax allowance, the revenue requirement of an MLP pipeline is no greater than that of a corporate pipeline, but affords the MLP partner a higher after-tax cash distribution. However, this does not result in a higher percent ROE to the MLP investor. Rather an MLP partner pays a higher price for an equity interest due to the greater after-tax cash distributions as the equity prices adjust to reflect the higher after-tax cash flow that is available to the MLP partners. Ex. SFP-99 shows that the revenue requirement is necessarily lower if an MLP is not afforded an income tax allowance, and the dollar and the percentage ROE is the same to the partner and the shareholder but incorrectly assumes that the MLP is recovering its regulatory cost of service.\textsuperscript{521}

327. However it became apparent on review that both the cited SFPP exhibits contain a methodological error in structuring a jurisdictional entity’s cash flow and income statement and do not reflect how these statements should function in the context of Commission ratemaking. This is because the required dollar return stated in both exhibits is grossed up to reflect the required pre-tax equity ROE for both the MLP and the corporation in contradiction to the Commission’s rate design methodology. That methodology provides that the after-tax return is grossed up to cover the income taxes on the pipeline’s net income. Rather an income tax allowance is provided instead of the gross up of the return. Therefore, if an income tax allowance is added to the analysis in Ex. SFP-98 and SFP-99 in addition to the exhibit’s grossing up of the after-tax return, this will overstate the revenue requirement of both the MLP and the corporate pipeline because the necessary income tax gross up is already reflected in the dollar return component of both entities. Because the cited exhibits incorrectly include both a gross up of the equity return and an income tax allowance, they give an impression that an income tax allowance over-recovers the MLPs cost-of-service.\textsuperscript{522} However if

\textsuperscript{520} See Ex. SFP-97 and Ex. SFP-98.

\textsuperscript{521} Ex. SFP-99, lines 25 and 27. As discussed below, this exhibit assumes that both the MLP and the corporation are grossing up the return component of their cost of service. The corporation receives an income tax allowance in addition to the gross up but the MLP does not. Under the Commission’s rate design methodology neither the corporation nor the MLP would be permitted to gross up the revenue component of their cost of service. If Ex. SFPP-99 reflected this practice the MLP would not recover its regulatory cost of service.

\textsuperscript{522} In this regard Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99 apply a pre-tax rate of return of 13.8 percent to the equity base to get the after-tax dollar return on rate base, or the $6,900,000 on line 13, which when included in the revenue requirement reflects the grossed-up

(continued...)
Ex. SFP-99 is revised to reflect Commission rate design methodology by eliminating the return gross up. It would show that the MLP will not recover its after-tax return or its regulatory cost of service because the MLP will have neither grossed up its return nor obtained an income tax allowance. By removing the gross up of the dollar return from both the MLP and corporate formats in Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, both exhibits will then establish the Commission's points that (1) there is no double recovery of the income tax liability, (2) the revenue requirement of a partnership and a corporation is the same, and (3) a jurisdictional MLP will not recover its revenue requirement without an income tax allowance. Appendix D contains a partial modification of Ex. SFP-99 to reflect the proper method for stating the required dollar equity return under the Commission's rate design methodology.

328. To clarify this matter further it should be noted that the Commission's Table 6 reaches many of the same conclusions as Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, but without the error of the gross up of the dollar return. Examples 3 and Example 4 of Table 6 show that if the MLP is provided an income tax allowance, then the after-tax dollar return of the MLP partner is $100 and the after-tax dollar return to the corporate shareholder is $65. The capitalized values are $1000 and $650, respectively. However, the ROE at the MLP and corporate entity level is the same for both the after-tax dollar return and the percent ROE. In contrast, Examples 1 and 4 of Table 6 show that if the MLP is denied an income tax allowance at a marginal tax rate of 35 percent, then the partner and the shareholder will also have the same after-tax dollar return of $65 and the capitalized value of their equity interests is $650. Thus Examples 1 and 2 in Table 6 demonstrate that neither the partnership nor the corporation earns its required after-tax equity cost of capital or its regulatory cost of service if either is denied an income tax allowance. Only when the Commission adds back in the income tax allowance as a separate rate element to the rate design will a jurisdictional entity recover its regulatory cost of service. Although Opinion No. 511 did not expressly discuss this limitation of Ex. SFP-98 and Ex. SFP-99, Tables 3 through 6 demonstrate that Opinion No. 511 correctly concluded that an MLP has a higher market value than a corporation results from the tax implications of the corporate structure not the Commission's income tax allowance policy.523

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523 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at 249, 257, 301.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

329. Finally, it should be noted that contrary to the Shipper Parties’ assertions, Dr. Schink denied that there was a double recovery on the income tax allowance. It does not follow from this conclusion, however, that there is a double recovery of the MLP’s income tax allowance or that an income tax allowance is an improper component of an MLP’s cost of service. Rather, the transcript’s related discussion of “tax savings” is directed to the Shipper Parties’ argument that the absence of double taxation of an MLP partner’s income produces tax savings at the entity level. The Shipper Parties first assert that an MLP and its partners have only one level of taxes compared to the two levels of taxes paid by a corporation and its shareholders. They then assert that this difference is reflected in the fact that while an MLP only has to gross up to $154 to cover the taxes of the partners, a corporation has to gross up to $237 to cover the taxes of the corporation and the shareholder. They assert that the difference of $83 is a savings that should be reflected in a lower cost of service for the MLP and conclude that the MLP should have lower rates than the corporation because the “tax savings” from the absence of double taxation will be passed through to the rate payers.

330. But their assumption is incorrect. Under conditions of competition the only difference in the two firms is their business form and both are price takers. As such they will only be able to gross up their revenues to cover the taxes required on the revenue earned at the business entity level that is on their net operating revenue. This is true because competition precludes the corporation from obtaining the higher gross up

524 See Tr. 595-95.

525 See Tr. 533-542.

526 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 24, 30-31; ACV Rehearing at 24-26.

527 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 38, 41, 44, 48, 53-54; ACV Rehearing at 41-42, 44-47.

528 Because competition determines both firms’ costs (their inputs) and the prices they can charge, they are price takers. On rehearing the Shipper Parties expand the concept of competition between the MLP and the corporation beyond that stated in Opinion No. 511, but fail to recognize that competition requires both firms to have the same revenue requirements and that their revenue will be limited to that of the firm with the lowest operating and cost of capital cost.
needed to cover the additional income taxes on shareholder’s distributions. Similarly, under Commission regulation, an MLP and a corporation are both limited to their actual operating costs (including depreciation) and their cost of capital, which includes an ROE. Under Commission regulation, both entities are also limited to an income tax allowance which takes the place of the return gross up that occurs under conditions of competition. Thus, as Tables 2 through 6 demonstrate, their cost of service will be the same and their after-tax dollar return and ROE will be the same at the entity level. Contrary to the Shipper Parties’ assertions, the income tax “savings” occur at the investor level because the MLP partner does not have to pay a second tax on the income received. If there is a marginal tax rate on corporate dividends, then the shareholder must pay it. But, as Table 3 demonstrates, if there is no marginal tax rate on corporate dividends, then the ROE to the partnership, the partner, the corporation, and the shareholder are the same. However, any equivalence of the MLP partner’s and the corporate shareholder’s after-tax cash returns disappears once there is a marginal tax rate on corporate dividends. In sum, any “tax savings” are strictly at the investor level and are not reflected in an entity’s regulatory cost of service. Consequently, there is no merit to the argument that there will be tax savings at the entity level from the lack of double taxation on MLP income these should be reflected in the MLP’s cost of service and its rates.

4. **Capital Attraction Standard**

331. On rehearing the Shipper Parties again assert that the granting an MLP an income tax allowance violates the capital attraction standard of *Hope*.*529* As noted the Supreme Court has held that “the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with the return on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, must be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.”*530* Regarding this standard, the Shipper Parties again argue that (1) an MLP partner’s income tax allowance is recovered through the after-tax ROEs generated by the DCF model, and (2) granting an MLP income tax allowance is a double recovery of the MLP partners’ income taxes and thereby violates that capital attraction standard.*531* They contend that Opinion No. 511 erred by holding that an MLP income tax allowance does not violate the capital attraction standard.

332. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission explained the Shipper Parties’ capital

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*529* ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 4-5, 26-28; ACV Rehearing at 17-18, 22.

*530* *Hope*, 320 U.S. at 605.

*531* ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 26, 29, 31-32; ACV Rehearing at 22.
attraction argument was contrary to *ExxonMobil*, where the court had ruled that the Commission had adequately explained that income taxes were a cost to a partnership and therefore the Commission was correct to rule that an income tax allowance was necessary. The Commission also noted that the *ExxonMobil* court had specifically described the capital attraction standard and it concluded that the Commission’s adoption of an income tax allowance for partnerships was reasonable under that standard. Therefore, the Commission affirmed the 2009 ID on this point.

333. On rehearing, the Shipper Parties have not given the Commission any reason to reverse that ruling. Rather, the Commission will further expound upon the inadequacies of the Shipper Parties arguments in light of Tables 2 through 6. Table 2 through Table 6 show that if an MLP is denied an income tax allowance, an MLP will not earn enough after-tax revenue (after attribution of the partner’s income taxes) to earn the required after-tax ROE on the equity portion of its rate base. Moving beyond the more generic argument presented by those tables, the Shipper Parties assert that the Commission’s income tax analysis overlooks the fact that a corporation must gross up its pre-tax income twice in order for a shareholder to obtain the same after-tax dollar and percentage return as an MLP partner. They argue if the corporation has a marginal tax rate of 35 percent and the shareholder a marginal tax rate of 35 percent, then the corporation grosses up revenues first to cover the 35 percent tax and then grosses up the resulting revenue another 35 percent to obtain the total revenue, or percentage, gross up required to cover both the corporation’s and the shareholder’s income taxes. In contrast, they assert that the unregulated MLP has to gross up only once to cover the 35 percent marginal tax rate on the partner’s income. To state the same point in dollar terms, the Shipper Parties assert that an MLP grosses up to $154, pays no taxes, and passes this $154 through to its partners. After paying a 35 percent marginal tax rate, the partner’s return is $100. They state the corporate investors also gross up their return to $154 cover the tax on the dividends and the corporation will gross up to $237 in order to pay its taxes. After payment of $83 in corporate taxes, the corporation passes through $154 and the shareholder pays $54 dollars in taxes and earns $100. The Shipper Parties assert this will result in equal dollar returns to partners and shareholders.

334. Shipper Parties’ central conclusion from this analysis of the difference between the gross up required by a corporation and a partnership is that an MLP income tax allowance results in unnecessary cash to cover an MLP partner’s income tax allowance. They claim it is this extra cash purportedly generated by the income tax allowance that

532 *ExxonMobil/BP* Rehearing at 28-29, 32; *ACV* Rehearing at 24-25.

533 *ExxonMobil/BP* Rehearing at 30-32; *ACV* Rehearing at 24-26, 28-30.
causes the higher MLP stock price that the Commission concluded resulted from the impact of the double taxation of corporate dividends. The Shipper Parties contend that the difference in the after-tax cash flow between an MLP partner and a shareholder and the resulting adjustment of the shareholder's equity price is only the mirror image consequence of an unnecessary MLP income tax allowance. They then conclude that the only possible way to achieve equality of returns between investors in corporations and MLPs is to remove what they view as the additional cash flows that an MLP partner receives from the inclusion of an income tax allowance in the pipelines regulatory cost of service. Shipper Parties also contend that their analysis invalidates the difference between the second and first tier taxation that underpins the income tax allowance policy as it was affirmed in ExxonMobil. Consequently, they advocate equating shareholder dividend income and partnership distributive income contrary to ExxonMobil's holding of the difference between first and second tier income.

The Commission disagrees. There are two major flaws in the Shipper Parties' argument. The first flaw is the Shipper Parties' continuing assumption that under Commission rate design methodology the gross up reflected in the after-tax returns of FERC jurisdictional MLPs and FERC jurisdictional corporations is reflected in Commission rate design. As discussed earlier in this order at Sections VII.C.1 and 3.b, this is simply incorrect. The second flaw in the Shipper Parties' argument is that they incorrectly assume that a non-jurisdictional corporation can actually obtain the total revenue of $237 to cover the gross up required for both levels of taxation. As noted, an MLP only requires total revenue of $154. But under conditions of competition the gross revenues and operating expenses of the MLP and the corporation will be the same, and therefore so will their pre-tax net operating income. If gross revenues and all other expenses are the same for the corporation and the MLP, the corporation's pre-tax net revenue and return will never exceed $154. As the corporation cannot gross up above $154, the shareholder can only achieve the same after-tax percentage ROE as the partner by paying a lower price for the corporation's stock, in this case to $65. Therefore the equality in after-tax dollar return urged by the Shipper Parties cannot be obtained by

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534 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 18, 26, 30, 34, 38; ACV Rehearing at 19.

535 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 25-288; ACV Rehearing at 13, 25.

536 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 26, 28, 30, 32, 35-36; ACV Rehearing at 19-21, 26-288.

537 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952, 954-55.
grossing up the corporation’s operating revenues to $237 under conditions of competitive.\textsuperscript{538}

336. Similarly, under Commission regulation the corporation is not permitted to gross up to $237 as this would cause the corporation to over-recover its cost of service, as is shown by Table 7.\textsuperscript{539} As Table 2 through Table 6 display, given the limitations on gross revenue imposed under the Commission’s rate design methodology, both a corporation and an MLP will earn an after-tax return of $100 on their equity after the income tax is added back to the return component. The income tax allowance provides the equivalent of a non-jurisdictional revenue gross up to $154 for both the MLP and the corporation, but the income tax allowance does not duplicate the DCF gross up due to the limitations of the Commission’s rate design methodology. As either competition or regulation will

\textsuperscript{538} Id. at 952, 954. The ACV Shippers raise a similar argument. They assert that a corporation must gross up its prices to cover its cash income tax costs and that a MLP need not gross up prices to the same level because the MLP does not have cash income tax costs. They assert that in the short run the MLP will charge prices at the same level as the corporation and have a higher return because it has excess cash flow above its cash operating costs, including its ROE. They assert that over time new firms will enter the market and drive the higher cost corporations out of business and price levels will drop. ACV Rehearing at 46-47. But as has been discussed, this assumes that the corporation under competition can and will price its services above those of the MLP. This is incorrect because the costs of both firms transportation functions and their transportation prices are the same. If the income tax for both (including at the partner level) is 35 percent, then both the MLP and the corporation will price at a level that provides the gross up necessary to cover the taxes on their net operating income. However, competition will prevent the corporation from pricing at a higher level needed to cover the taxes on the shareholder’s dividends and therefore the after-tax dollar return to the shareholder is less. Moreover, the ACV Shippers’ present no empirical evidence that MLPs, or any other partnership, will put competing corporations out of business due the absence of double taxation. The MLPs will not because a corporation will have the same after-tax return on assets as the partnership. The difference in the after-tax cash flow is reflected at the shareholder level since the after-tax cash flow from operations is the same for both formats. The corporation’s higher cost of capital is from the double taxation of its return, which reflected in its share price, not a difference in the corporation’s pre-tax operating cash flow.

\textsuperscript{539} The exercise of market power would occur because under conditions of competition the corporation cannot obtain higher gross revenues or lower expenses than an MLP, and as such may not have a higher cost of service or revenue requirement.
constrain the corporation’s pre-tax revenue and return, the shareholder adjusts the stock price as revenue is not available to pay the taxes on the dividends.

337. Therefore, contrary to the Shipper Parties’ assertions, the Commission’s income tax allowance methodology correctly replicates an equity capital market. Under ExxonMobil, the first tier of taxable income is that of the partnership as distributed to its partners as well the taxable income of the corporation. The second tier of taxable income stems from the dividends paid to the corporation’s shareholders, whose return is not measured against the equity component of the corporation’s rate base, but as reflected in the corporation’s stock price. As the share price varies based on a combination of the dividend, relative risk, and the marginal tax rate on dividends (all of which the Commission cannot control), it is the entity level regulation that establishes the dollar and percentage return on the equity component of the rate base necessary to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise. It is also at the entity level (first tier) that the regulation applies the income tax allowance to cover the taxes on the required equity dollar return.

338. Therefore, the Shipper Parties are incorrect that by comparing returns at the entity level the Commission has arbitrarily excluded shareholders from participating in getting the same return on assets as the partners. But this occurs because of double taxation and, as Table 3 shows, if the marginal tax rates on dividends is zero, there will be no difference as the after-tax cash return is the same for the partnership, the partners, the corporation, and the shareholder. The Commission does not control marginal tax rate on dividends; Congress does, and it was Congress that provided MLPs relief from the burden of double taxation on partnership net income. However, given that there is a tax on dividends, the after-tax dollar return and the equity values of the partner and the shareholder will diverge, but the after-tax percentage return of the partner and the shareholder remain the same. For that reason the December 2006 Sepulveda Order incorrectly held that the MLP’s financial advantage is at the expense of the MLP’s rate

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540 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 48-51, 63-64; ACV Rehearing at 44-47.

541 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952, 954-55.

542 Williston, 165 F.3d at 56-57.

543 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 34-36; ACV Rehearing at 28.
As an MLP income tax allowance does not cause an excessive return for the partners, it is consistent with the *Hope* capital attraction standard.

## 5. **Summary and Conclusion**

This part of the order has demonstrated that Opinion No. 511 correctly declined to revise the Commission’s Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement’s conclusion that the proper comparison of regulatory returns should be at the entity level. This part also expands on Opinion No. 511’s analysis of *ExxonMobil*’s determination as to whether an MLP would recover its required after-tax return absent an income tax allowance. To this end, the Commission has included Tables 2 through Table 6, which display this point by taking the after-tax dollar amounts used in the court’s example and applying them to a hypothetical equity rate base of $1000. Under that analysis, if the required after-tax return is 10 percent, with an income tax allowance the corporation earns $100 of after-tax income on $1000 of equity or a ROE of 10 percent at the entity level. In contrast, if an MLP is denied an income tax allowance, an MLP has only $65 after-tax income on $1000 of equity, or an ROE of 6.5 percent at the entity level. Denying a jurisdictional MLP an income tax allowance creates a rate design that precludes it from having a reasonable opportunity to recover its cost of service contrary to *Hope.*

The foregoing also shows that the Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement correctly concluded that the returns of MLP and corporate pipelines should be compared at the entity level, not the investor level. The Commission therefore again concludes here “that a full income tax allowance is necessary to ensure that corporations and partnerships of like risk will earn comparable after-tax returns” and to recover the income tax costs that are properly included in their regulatory costs-of-service. As Opinion No. 511 states, the Shipper Parties’ double recovery argument fails because it erroneously considers the taxes an MLP partner pays on the MLP distributed income to be the financial and cost of service equivalent of the taxes a shareholder pays on dividends. *ExxonMobil* recognized that that they are not equivalent because an MLP is a pass-through entity and therefore the partner’s income taxes are properly imputed to an MLP’s

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544 December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 45-46.

545 *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 953.

546 *Cf. Hope*, 320 U.S. at 603 (precluding this result).

547 *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 952, 954-55.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

regulatory cost of service. Rehearing is denied for all of the preceding income tax allowance issues.

D. Other Legal and Policy Issues

341. This part of the order examines additional legal and policy arguments that have been made on rehearing. They include: (1) Congress's intent in permitting energy MLPs; (2) the interpretation of section 7704 on the IRC; (3) the Commission's standalone methodology; (4) whether to adjust SFPP's income tax allowance or return to reflect any tax benefits or savings from the MLP business format; (5) the treatment of accumulated deferred income taxes; and (6) how to calculate the state marginal income tax rates. These issues are discussed in light of the earlier findings that an MLP income tax allowance does not: (1) cause an MLP partner to double recover the income tax liability on distributive income; (2) cause an MLP pipeline to over-recover its cost of service or have a revenue requirement greater than that of a corporate pipeline; or (3) violate the Hope capital attraction standard or the just and reasonable rate standard of the ICA.

1. Congressional Purpose in Permitting Energy MLPs

342. Opinion No. 511 concluded that granting a jurisdictional MLP an income allowance was consistent with Congress's purpose of encouraging investment in energy infrastructure by allowing energy partnerships to use the MLP business format. Opinion No. 511 recognized the MLP business form gives an MLP pipeline a financial advantage over a corporate pipeline, but held that a review of the limited legislative materials available established that Congress (1) authorized the use of energy MLPs as a vehicle to encourage investment in energy infrastructure and (2) did not intend to prohibit a jurisdictional MLP from having a regulatory income tax allowance. Opinion No. 511 also held that this interpretation did not create a tax cost where none had existed before, and thus it was consistent with ExxonMobil's approval of the use of a MLP income tax allowances in Commission rate design.

548 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 250.

549 Id. at P 253-258.

550 Id. at P 253, 256-57; see also December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29-30.

551 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at. P 265.
343. The Shipper Parties assert on rehearing that there are no grounds to conclude that Congress intended to provide a jurisdictional MLP pipeline with a regulatory advantage as well as a financial advantage since any regulatory advantage would be at the expense of the rate payers in violation of the rate reasonableness provisions of the ICA. They argue that the Commission erred by concluding that a jurisdictional MLP may have an income tax allowance because Congress was silent on whether such an income tax allowance is lawful. The Shipper Parties assert that an MLP income tax allowance results in an over-recovery of an MLP’s regulatory cost of service, therefore, they argue that the Commission has effectively amended through silence the maximum rate provisions of the ICA without specific statutory authorization from Congress to do so.

344. The Commission, however, explained in Sections VII.C.3 and 4 why a jurisdictional MLP will not over-recover its cost of service if granted an income tax allowance and why an MLP partner will not double recover its tax liability on distributed income. The Commission further explained that, to the contrary, a FERC-jurisdictional MLP will not be able to recover its regulatory cost of service if denied an income tax allowance. For this reason, the Commission affirmed that granting an MLP an income tax allowance did not violate the Hope capital attraction standard or the rate reasonableness standards of the ICA. In short, if an MLP income tax allowance does not result in a rate that is unjust and unreasonable, as the Commission has held here, then all arguments that the Commission improperly amended the ICA by silence are irrelevant.

345. Moreover, while the legislative history is quite limited, there is no evidence on this record that Congress expressly intended to deny FERC-jurisdictional MLPs a regulatory income tax allowance. Shipper Parties acknowledge that Section 7704 was intended to provide a single level of taxation for entities such as MLP energy pipelines. Their argument, however, is that in the absence of specific authority this exemption does not extend to permitting a jurisdictional MLP income tax allowance as that results in an unlawful over-recovery or because explicit authority is necessary to extent the single taxation format to jurisdictional pipelines. As the prior analysis demonstrates, an MLP pipeline obtains no regulatory advantage over a corporate pipeline if the MLP pipeline is provided an income tax allowance because its jurisdictional cost of service is the same as the corporate pipeline. Therefore the Commission concludes that adopting this argument would create a regulatory structure that would make it impossible for a FERC-jurisdictional MLP to recover its cost of service. Such action would be contrary to Hope and its ruling that the Commission may not deny a jurisdictional pipeline a reasonable

552 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 43, 45; ACV Rehearing at 30-32.

553 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 45-47; ACV Rehearing at 33-34.
chance to recover its full cost of service at the entity level compared to that of a corporate pipeline.\textsuperscript{554} Therefore, consistent with the Commission's rulings in Opinion No. 511, the Commission rules that an MLP pipeline does not have a regulatory advantage over a corporate pipeline.

346. Finally, the Shipper Parties assert that in certain circumstances Congress has specifically precluded jurisdictional entities from capturing the benefits of investment tax credit provisions of section 203(e) of the Revenue Act of 1964 through their rates.\textsuperscript{555} The Commission concludes that this limitation was designed to assure that investment tax credit provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964 did not override the Commission's tax normalization practices. Those limitations applied to investment incentives involving investments in the pipeline's rate base. In that regard, the Commission’s accounting regulations state that “a pipeline must compute income tax component of its cost of service using tax normalization for all transactions.”\textsuperscript{556} A transaction means an activity of the pipeline that gives rise to an accounting transaction.\textsuperscript{557} The tax effect of a transaction that must be normalized is “the tax reduction or addition associated with a specific expense or revenue transaction.”\textsuperscript{558} The decision to remove the burden of double taxation by allowing the use of the MLP business format has nothing to do with the pipeline’s accounting transactions or the depreciation or amortization of its rate base. This is because the absence of double taxation at the investor level causes no activity giving rise to a specific expense or revenue transaction at the pipeline level.\textsuperscript{559} Rather it

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{554} \textit{Hope}, 320 U.S. at 603.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{555} \textit{ACV} Rehearing at 49 (citing Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 203(e), 78 Stat. 35 and \textit{Kupark Trans. Co.}, 45 FERC ¶ 63,006, at 65,058 (1988), aff'd \textit{55 FERC} ¶ 61,122, at 61,383 (1991); see also ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 49-53.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{556} Tax normalization means computing the income tax component as if the \textit{transactions} recognized in each period for \textit{ratemaking purposes} are also recognized in the same amount and in the same period for income tax purposes. 18 C.F.R. § 154.305(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{557} 18 C.F.R. § 154.305(b)(7) (2011).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{558} 18 C.F.R. §154.305(b)(6) (2011).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{559} Section 154.305(c)(2) of the Commission’s regulations states that “rate base reductions or additions must be limited to deferred taxes related to rate base, construction, or other costs and revenues affecting \textit{jurisdictional} cost-of-service.” 18 C.F.R. § 154.305(c)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
\end{itemize}
reduces the total tax burden on the net income that results from all accounting transactions of the pipeline’s jurisdictional operations. Since the double counting argued by the Shipper Parties does not exist, it is hard to see why Congress would deprive an MLP pipeline the benefits of the MLP format through silence when Congress did so explicitly regarding the investment tax credit provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964. This would certainly seem to be the case when denying an MLP an income tax allowance means that an MLP would under-recover its cost of service and obtaining an after-tax return on its rate base less favorable than those of a corporate pipeline. As stated in ExxonMobil, this would be a clear disincentive to investment in the MLP business model. The use of normalization at the pipeline operating level has no such penalty. Rehearing is denied.

2. Interpretation of Section 7704 of the IRC

Opinion No. 511 held that any benefits from the absence of double taxation or tax deferrals were for the benefits of the investors and the MLP in order to encourage investment in the interstate pipeline system. The Shipper Parties advance several arguments asserting that the Commission incorrectly interpreted the purpose and legislative history of section 7704 of the IRC, which authorized the creation of energy MLPs. These include that: (1) section 7704 did not authorize income tax allowances for FERC-jurisdictional MLPs; (2) the Commission’s interpretation of section 7704 improperly amended the ICA; (3) the Commission did not properly interpret the context in which the section was enacted; (4) the legislative history cited by the Commission does not support its interpretation; (5) the committees responsible for the oversight of the ICA did not address section 7704; (6) Congress did not intend an MLP to retain any tax savings and has specifically stated when it wished a jurisdictional entity

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560 ExxonMobil, 486 F.3d at 952-53.


563 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 53-57; ACV Rehearing at 35-36, 38-39.

564 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 44-45; ACV Rehearing at 33-35.

565 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 42-44; ACV Rehearing at 50-55.

566 ACV Rehearing at 55-57.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

to do so;\(^{567}\) (7) an income tax allowance is not necessary to enable FERC-jurisdictional MLPs to duplicate the results of non-jurisdictional MLPs;\(^{568}\) (8) the Commission had previously determined in Lakehead that an MLP income tax allowance is not necessary to encourage investment in pipeline infrastructure;\(^{569}\) and (9) that Lakehead correctly concluded that section 7704 did not require an income tax allowance because partnerships do not have income tax cost.\(^{570}\) They also assert that BP West Coast held that the enactment of section 7704 did not authorize the Commission to provide investment incentives if this meant creating a regulatory cost where one does not exist and that is what the Commission did through its income tax allowance policies.\(^{571}\)

348. As discussed in Section VII.D.1 above, the Commission rejected the arguments that (1) Congress did not authorize jurisdictional MLPs to have an income tax allowance because there are no express provisions denying such MLPs an income tax allowance, and (2) that the Commission amended the ICA by silence. The Commission agrees with ExxonMobil that Congress did not include language explicitly restricting the tax benefits of investment from section 7704 in the same manner as Congress restricted those that would flow from the investment tax credits under the Revenue Act of 1962. However, the Commission does not agree with ExxonMobil that in the absence of any explicit restrictive statutory language, BP West Coast nonetheless requires the Commission to deny jurisdictional MLPs the benefits of any income tax allowance since BP West Coast requires ratepayers to obtain all tax savings.\(^{572}\) To this end, ExxonMobil relies on statutory silence to reach this conclusion by assuming that BP West Coast purportedly requires that all tax savings of any kind must be passed through to the ratepayers and, (3) that the avoidance of double taxation is a tax savings that is reflected in the MLP's regulatory cost of service. Both assumptions are demonstrably incorrect.

349. Neither City of Charlottesville nor BP West Coast held that the Commission must pass through all tax savings to the ratepayer.\(^{573}\) Rather BP West Coast held that income

\(^{567}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 51-55; ACV Rehearing at 41-43, 49-50.

\(^{568}\) ACV Rehearing at 44-47.

\(^{569}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 49-50; ACV Rehearing at 47-48.

\(^{570}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 51-52; ACV Rehearing at 30-31.

\(^{571}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 43-44; ACV Rehearing at 31.

\(^{572}\) ExxonMobil Request for Rehearing at 52-53.

\(^{573}\) City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d 1205, 1211, 1215-16.
tax costs are the same as any other costs and that the costs of a parent company may not be included in the cost of service of a jurisdictional subsidiary. *BP West Coast* therefore concluded that because an income tax cost is not actually incurred by the jurisdictional pipeline whose rates are at issue, a partnership pipeline may not be afforded an income tax allowance. The court ruled that this is true whether or not the partners involved were corporations or individuals.\(^{574}\) After *BP West Coast*, the Commission issued its Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement explaining why income taxes are not the same as all other costs.\(^{575}\) *ExxonMobil* affirmed the Commission’s analysis by holding that income taxes were a legitimate component of a FERC-jurisdictional partnership’s cost of service.\(^{576}\) As such, there is no logical connection between Congress’s decision not to deny MLPs an income tax allowance and the reference to a legal point on which *BP West Coast* is itself silent.

350. Second, it is also incorrect that the elimination of double taxation creates an income tax savings at the entity level. While income taxes are a legitimate part of an MLP’s regulatory cost of service, the marginal tax rate to be applied to the equity return component of the MLP’s cost of service is based on the weighted average of the MLP’s partners. While the marginal tax rate is applied at the entity level, as with a corporation, in the case of the MLP the taxes are paid at the investor level due to the pass through nature of the MLP. Taxes are also paid at the shareholder level, but this is the second tier income tax in addition to the income taxes that are paid at the corporate entity level. It is the absence of the second level of taxation that results in the tax savings for the MLP partner.

351. Moreover, the MLP income tax allowance does not create an improper investment incentive by creating an income tax cost where one would not have otherwise existed. This is because there is no double recovery of the MLP partner’s income tax liability, and therefore the Commission is not creating regulatory cost where one would otherwise not exist in violation of the holding in *BP West Coast*.\(^{577}\) Given the findings in this order that part of *BP West Coast* is not controlling since *ExxonMobil*’s held that an income tax allowance properly imputes the MLP partner’s income tax cost to MLP.\(^{578}\) Thus Opinion

\(^{574}\) *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d 1263, 1291-92.  

\(^{575}\) Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 9, 21-22.  

\(^{576}\) *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 945-55.  

\(^{577}\) *BP West Coast*, 374 F.3d at 1292-94.  

\(^{578}\) *ExxonMobil*, 487 F.3d at 945-55.
No. 511 correctly held that an MLP income tax allowance is necessary to achieve the investment goals of section 7704 but this ruling does not create an improper incentive for investment at the expense of the rate payers. Conversely, denying an MLP income tax allowance would be a disincentive to investment.

Shipper Parties also argue that Congress intended to restrict the scope of section 7704 based on the Treasury Department's complete opposition to that section. However, Congress passed the bill over the Treasury Department's opposition and did not restrict MLPs from benefiting from its provisions. This is in contrast to the explicit limitations that were placed on the investment incentive provisions of the Revenue Act of 1964 that were discussed earlier in this order. The Shipper Parties also assert that the Congressional committees responsible for the oversight of the ICA did not review or take action on section 7704. Because the Commission has not amended the ICA through its Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement, any argument based on the Commission's purported oversight responsibility of Congress is irrelevant as the Commission does not have jurisdiction over Congress. In fact, Shipper Parties' own analysis belies their argument. Indeed, there is no express statutory language or legislative history stating that MLP pipelines may not have an income tax allowance. As such, the Shipper Parties' arguments rely on inferences based on portions of the legislative history that are inconsistent with what Congress actually did in enacting section 7704.

Turning to the Commission's prior interpretations of section 7704, it is true that the Commission's 1994 decision in Lakehead stated that partnerships did not need an income tax allowance because the partnership format alone provided enough incentives for investment without a tax allowance, and that in any event section 7704 did not authorize the recovery of a non-existent tax cost. However both conclusions were overruled by the Commission's Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement and that Policy Statement was affirmed by ExxonMobil's holding that the an MLP income tax

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579 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 265.

580 ACV Rehearing at 54-55.

581 Id. at 55-57.


583 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 1, 32-33, 38-40.
allowance does not create a non-existent tax cost.\(^{584}\) That conclusion has been reaffirmed here based on the detailed financial and cost analysis in this order. As such, the Commission views ExxonMobil as having explicitly overruled BP West Coast's holding that the Commission could not use a need for investment incentives to create a cost where one does not otherwise exist. ExxonMobil could not have been clearer that this argument is no longer relevant if one concludes that an income tax allowance is properly included in an MLP pipeline's regulatory cost of service. Given that income taxes do not over-recover an MLP’s income tax allowance and are a cost properly included in an MLP’s regulatory cost of service, albeit indirectly, it is rational to conclude that denying a jurisdictional MLP its ability to recover its regulatory cost of service will reduce the incentive to use in MLP’s regardless of whatever other benefits might flow from that business format.\(^{585}\) Rehearing is denied for the reasons stated.

3. **Commission’s Stand-Alone Policy**

354. Opinion No. 511 held that an MLP income tax allowance did not violate the Commission’s stand-alone policy.\(^{586}\) On rehearing, Shipper Parties assert that there are two aspects of MLP tax accounting practices that violate the Commission’s stand-alone policy. The first is that allocating income to a general partner in proportion to the cash distributed to the general partner under the incentive distribution provisions of many MLP partnership agreements violate of the Commission’s stand alone policy.\(^{587}\) The second is the practice of providing additional depreciation to KMEP’s limited partners under section 743(b) of the IRC.\(^{588}\) Shipper Parties assert that Opinion No. 511 should have held that these MLP accounting practices violate the stand-alone policy. They also make several secondary arguments to the same affect.

355. Opinion No. 511 explained that the Commission’s stand-alone policy separates the cost of service calculations and the accounting records of a jurisdictional subsidiary from

\(^{584}\) ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 953-55.

\(^{585}\) Id. at 952-53.

\(^{586}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 287-289.

\(^{587}\) ACV Rehearing at 57-58, 62-64.

\(^{588}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 65-67.
that of its jurisdictional parent. What is most relevant here is that under the traditional stand-alone analysis, the dollar amount of an income tax allowance would be determined by applying the relevant marginal tax rate to the net income of a corporate subsidiary and not combining that subsidiary’s net income with that of a parent company to determine the marginal tax rate. Similarly, the depreciation accounts of the subsidiary and the parent company are separated. As such, under City of Charlottesville there is no obligation to adjust the income tax allowance for deferrals in the year they occur when these flow from the parent company’s non-jurisdictional activities. The Commission further notes that before the adoption of the Income Tax Allowance Policy Statement, partnerships were treated like corporate subsidiaries for purposes of the stand-alone methodology because the Lakehead doctrine permitted an income tax allowance on the income that was attributed to the parent corporation, i.e. the parent’s numerical partnership interests. Thus, the limited use of jurisdictional pipeline partnerships prior to the early 1990’s did not normally raise stand-alone issues before the increased use of the MLP business form.

a. Incentive Distributions

356. The ACV Shipper’s argue that the Opinion No. 511 leaves to the general partners’ undue discretion how to define how the income tax allowance is determined by the amount of income that may be shifted. Opinion No. 511 explained, however, that income shifts from incentive distributions are a function of a lawful partnership structure and as such properly reflects the partnership’s tax cost because that cost is the actual or potential tax burden the partners do or will incur on their distributed income. It is true that the Commission does not control the amount of the income that may be shifted to the general partner through the use of incentive distributions, but there is nothing illegal about provisions that are used throughout partnerships, not just in the context of MLPs.

589 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 287, 289. See also December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 41.

590 City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 774 F.2d 1205 (1985) (City of Charlottesville).

591 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 32-33. See also December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 27.

592 ACV Rehearing at 63-65.

593 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 291.
Docket Nos. ISO8-390-004 and ISO8-390-006

357. The ACV Shipper’s also argue that the shift in distributed income inequitably shifts SFPP’s marginal tax rate toward the higher corporate marginal tax rate compared to that of other income categories used to determine the weighted marginal tax rate. This is true with regard to the income that is shifted, but this is a function of a lawful partnership business form, not the Commission’s income tax allowance policy. Moreover, the weighted tax calculation is based on the income distributed to the six partnership categories used to develop the jurisdictional entity’s weighted marginal tax rate, not the taxable income of a partner that results after all costs and credits that may offset distributed income when a partner prepares an IRS return. As long as the use of the MLP format results in a lower marginal tax rate on jurisdictional income, the rate payers are no worse off than they would be from using the corporate 35 percent marginal tax rate.

358. As discussed in Opinion No. 511, under an incentive distribution provision cash distributions provide a general partner an increasing percentage of distributed cash as the amount of cash available for distribution increases, to as much as forty-nine percent, hence the term incentive distributions. Opinion No. 511 further explained that dollar income is allocated to the general partner in proportion to the dollar amount of the distribution. This usually allocates income away from the limited partners while leaving their allocation of the partnership’s expenses unchanged. There are two consequences of such an allocation. The Commission’s income tax allowance is based on the weighted income tax cost of distributed partnership income. Thus, if the general partner has a book partnership interest of one percent, the limited partners have a ninety-nine percent interest in the partnership assets. Absent the incentive distribution provision, the limited partners would be allocated ninety-nine percent of distributive income and their collective marginal tax rate would apply thereto. However, if forty-nine percent of distributive income is allocated to the general partner, (usually a corporation), then the marginal tax rate of the corporation will apply to the fifty percent of income so allocated. The limited partners’ marginal tax rate, which is usually collectively lower than that of a corporation, would then apply to only fifty percent rather than ninety-nine percent of the partnership income. Therefore this shift in distributed income increases the weighted marginal tax rate of the partnership as a whole. Moreover, allocation of distributed income away from the limited partners may result in a tax loss as their income is reduced,

594 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 285, 291.

595 Id. P 266, 276, 285, 291; see also ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952, 954; December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 46-47, 51.
but their share of distributed expenses is not. Thus incentive distributions allocated to the
general partner can be a major source of tax deferrals for the limited partners.\footnote{596}

359. At bottom, failure to reflect the income allocated to the general partner under the
incentive distribution provisions would understate the actual or potential income tax cost
of the partnership and thereby understate the partnership’s regulatory cost of service.
This would be inconsistent with Hope and its requirement that the partnership have a
reasonable opportunity to recover its cost of service and return on the equity invested in
the firm. It would also deter the use of consolidated returns in some cases where that
would be economically efficient for some public utility investments.\footnote{597} Opinion No. 511
therefore correctly recognized that a practical adjustment must be made to the stand-alone
document to accommodate MLP tax accounting practices in a manner consistent with the
recovery of the MLP’s regulatory cost of service.\footnote{598}

b. Section 743(b) Depreciation

360. The additional depreciation a partner receives under an IRC section 743(b)
adjustment is unique to each partner. As stated in Opinion No. 511, such depreciation
reflects the amortization of the difference between the book equity value of a partnership
interest and the price paid for the partnership interest at the time it was acquired.\footnote{599}
The depreciation rate to recover the difference is based on the composite depreciation rate of
the partnership. On rehearing the ExxonMobil/BP assert that because the dollar amount
of the section 743(b) depreciation deduction reflects the depreciation rate of the
partnership’s assets, that amount is therefore part of the jurisdictional entity’s cost of
service.\footnote{600} They state that the dollar amount of this depreciation, which is a deduction on
a partner’s K-1 federal income information form and on the partner’s tax return, often
results in negative partnership taxable income for the partner and therefore often causes
an income tax deferral. Thus, as with other deferrals that are caused by the pipeline’s

\footnote{596} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 305; December 2007 Order, 121
FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 56-57.

\footnote{597} Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 29; ExxonMobil, 487
F.3d at 952-53.

\footnote{598} See December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 57-58.

\footnote{599} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 310-311.

\footnote{600} ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 62-63, 66-67.
cost of service, ExxonMobil/BP would address this concern by adjusting the pipeline’s return for any benefits that flow to the limited partners from such deferrals. 601

361. The Commission finds that ExxonMobil/BP is incorrect that there is a cost of service linkage between the depreciation account of a specific jurisdictional entity and a limited partner’s section 743(b) deduction. One of ExxonMobil/BP’s own witnesses recognizes that the amount of the section 743(b) depreciation is unique to each partner and that it reflects the difference between the unit market price of each such interest and the book value of the partnership interest at the time of purchase. 602 Of importance here is that the depreciation rate of the KMEP partnership, and not that of SFPP’s jurisdictional rate base, that defines the section 743(b) deduction that is applied when the KMEP partnership interest is purchased. This means that for the some 50,000 KMEP limited partners there is a different 743(b) dollar depreciation rate for each of the partnership interests that those limited partners purchased at different times. The depreciation rate for the KMEP partnership depreciation is in turn derived from a large number of jurisdictional and non-jurisdiction operations, each with its own depreciation rate.

362. In fact, as Dr. Horst stated in his Prepared Answering Testimony and the Shipper Parties recognize on rehearing, it is impossible to normalize the depreciation rate of the individual partners based on the difference in depreciation rates of the limited partners developed at the time those partners purchased their KMEP partnership interests. 603 This would seem to undercut Shipper Parties’ position that the section 743(b) deduction violates the stand-alone doctrine. But more fundamentally, while the composite KMEP depreciation rate at issue is derived in part from SFPP’s own composite depreciation rate, the section 743(b) depreciation rate is not part of SFPP’s regulatory cost of service. As was previously discussed, under the Commission’s accounting regulations normalization applies only to tax affects of a transaction and activity that involves the jurisdictional entity’s cost of service. In fact, the section 743(b) depreciation does not even effect the calculation of the income tax allowance because the latter is calculated on the allocations of distributed partnership income. The section 743(b) deduction offsets distributed income at the level of the individual partner and thus may lead to negative taxable income and income tax deferrals at that level. Therefore, any adjustment to reflect

601 Id. at 63-65.

602 See Prepared Answering Testimony of Christopher P. Sintetos on behalf of BP West Coast Products LLC, Ex. BPW-6 at 39.

603 Id.
benefits that may flow from the section 743(b) deduction is not properly grounded in the stand-alone doctrine because the so-called tax savings are not reflected in the jurisdictional entity’s cost of service.

c. **Other Stand-alone arguments**

363. The ACV Shippers raise two further arguments that relate to partnership accounting in the context of the Commission’s stand-alone policy. They first assert that because the stand-alone method separates the jurisdictional entity’s revenues and expenses from those of parent, the Commission incorrectly allows the aggregation of income at the KMEP and the partner’s level, but does not require the aggregation of all expenses or credits at the partner level. They also appear to conclude that the Commission inconsistently treats the distributed income that occurs at the partner level, but does not offset that income by the credits and tax savings that occur at the partnership level. They thus conclude that the marginal tax rate is improperly determined at the KMEP level, not that of SFPP. 604

There is no merit to this position. KMEP consists of a series of interlocking partnerships, one of which is SFPP. Under basic partnership law at each level the expense of each such affiliate offsets the operating income of the same affiliate and both the income and expenses flow up through the partnership chain. Thus the net income of all KMEP’s

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604 ACV Rehearing at 61-62. ACV Shippers incorrectly state that the December 2007 Order held that the marginal tax rate should be derived from SFPP’s income, not KMEP’s. The December 2007 Order explicitly states that the marginal tax rate is applied at the SFPP level once the marginal rate is determined at the KMEP level. See December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 48. Likewise, the December 2007 Order is clear that the marginal tax rate is developed based on the categories of the publicly traded securities owned by the partners, which are indisputably owned at the KMEP level. Id. P 35 (stating “In light of this basic financial principal the Commission affirms it prior conclusion in the Policy Statement, the December Order, and the December 2006 Sepulveda Order that the income tax allowance of a pass-through entity will be determined by the weighted marginal tax rate of the owning partners.”). Moreover, in the December 2007 Order, the Commission developed the marginal tax rates for those partners based on IRS statistics for various categories of those partners. To conclude that this means that KMEP’s income was not relevant to determining the marginal tax rate of those partners is a distortion of the relevant paragraphs. Id. P 37-39. The December 2007 Order states that incentive distributions are not improper and that “SFPP properly used KMEP partnership income to determine the distributive income of KMEP’s partners.” Id. P 47. No fair reading of the December 2007 Order could conclude otherwise.
subsidiaries is distributed to the partners and all offsets in the entire enterprise are considered in the calculation of KMEP’s distributable income. The Commission’s presumptions of the marginal tax rate for each partnership category also recognize that any positive or negative benefits from the partnership will be reduced or enhanced by the other income and deductions used to determine the partner’s marginal tax rate. Thus, if tax deferrals occur at the partner level as a result of incentive distributions or the section 743(b) election, these are not different than deductions or credits that may flow to a limited partner from that partner’s other economic activities to the extent that the partner is actually permitted to recognize the benefits from those activities.

ExxonMobil’s recognition that partnerships are pass-through entities for income tax purposes also implicitly recognized that stand-alone method would have to be modified to accommodate the reality of partnership taxation. But even with the effect of the incentive distributions, the rate payers are better off under the MLP format than paying a 35 percent corporate marginal tax rate on the $5.328 million dollar equity return contained in SFPP’s regulatory cost of service. Removing the incentive to invest in MLPs may cause pipelines to revert to the corporate mode would likely result in the application of the 35 percent marginal corporate rate to all income rather than some 32 percent weighted marginal tax rate that often applies to a jurisdictional MLP.

Second, the ACV Shippers assert that the Commission’s Income Tax Policy Statement provide that the income tax allowance should be calculated only on the actual or potential income tax on the jurisdictional entity’s utility income. This essentially asserts that the marginal tax rate should be determined only on the $5.238 million in equity return included in SFPP’s 2007 cost of service because that return is separated stated from KMEP’s consolidated income. Thus, if the general partner was allocated

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605 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 281-82; December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29, 47; Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 38.

606 Even BP West Coast, while rejecting a partnership income tax allowance, recognized that neither the flow-through nor the stand-alone method can be literally applied to SFPP’s rates. See BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1286 (noting that both methodologies arose in the context of the corporate ownership of a jurisdictional pipeline by a tax-paying corporation which is part of an affiliated group). This historical fact is equally true for any opinion that approved a partnership income tax allowance prior to the adoption of the Lakehead methodology, which BP West Coast overruled.

607 ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-54.

608 ACV Rehearing at 63-64.
50 percent of distributed income, ACV Shippers’ theory would appear to be that the marginal tax rate for the general partner should reflect $2.669 million. Likewise, if the general partner is only allocated one percent of utility income, then the tax rate would be that on $52,380. But this suggests that if a limited partner has an actual or potential tax liability on $4000 distributed KMEP income, that the marginal tax rate for this income should be zero even if the partner actually has a $100,000 in investment income alone and the partner’s marginal tax rate is well in excess of 28 percent.

365. Unlike the case of a corporate subsidiary, basic partnership law makes it impossible to derive a meaningful marginal tax rate based solely on the MLP subsidiary’s utility income. This is because all income is comingled at the partner level for tax purposes and this determines the marginal rate that will be paid on all of the utility income distributed to the partner, as ExxonMobil recognized.609 Moreover, as City of Charlottesville recognizes, corporations and individuals make investment decisions based on the marginal rate applicable to a particular category of taxable income.610 In the instant case that is the partner’s total ordinary taxable income, of which the partnership income allocated to the partner is one component. The ACV Shippers provide no realistic answer to this problem, which arises regardless of whether incentive distributions are used to determine the proportion of partnership income that is allocated to a corporate general partner or there are deferrals and credits that may affect a partner’s marginal tax rate.

4. Proposed Changes to SFPP’s Income Tax Allowance and Return

366. This section addresses the Shipper Parties’ arguments that for various reasons the Commission should pass any tax savings or benefits that flow from the use of the MLP business format through to SFPP’s rate payers. These include: (1) proposed adjustments to the income tax allowance to reflect the double recovery of the partner’s income tax allowance or the absence of an income tax liability, (2) proposed reductions to SFPP’s equity return to reflect the time value of income tax deferrals that may flow to the limited partners from investing in MLPs, (3) arguments that Congress and the courts require that any tax savings be passed through to the rate payers, and (4) assertions that competitive markets would required any tax savings to be reflected in the consumer’s prices.

609 Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 32, 33, ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952, 954.

610 City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d at 1207.
a. Adjustments to the Income Tax Allowance

367. Turning first to the requests to adjust the weighted average of SFPP’s income tax allowance, ACV Shippers assert that mutual funds, pensions, and other pass-through entities receiving distributions from KMEP should be attributed a zero marginal income tax rate weight in developing the weighted average cost of any income tax allowance. The ACV Shippers assert that their economic witness Matthew P. O’Loughlin establishes that any income tax allowance is already reflected in the ROEs calculated by the Commission’s DCF model. The Commission examined and rejected this argument earlier in this order and therefore denies rehearing. Mr. O’Loughlin’s testimony also attributed a marginal tax rate of zero to such pass-through entities because they pay no taxes. The Commission has consistently rejected this argument by holding that pass-through entities such as mutual funds or pension trustees make distributions to institutions and individuals that pay income taxes on the distributions. The marginal tax rates of the beneficiaries are reflected in the price they pay for the mutual funds and in the benefits from their pensions or trusts. Thus the marginal tax rates of the beneficiaries are properly reflected in the income tax cost of an MLP’s regulatory cost of service.

b. Adjustments to return based on equity and fairness

368. Shipper Parties request the Commission to reduce SFPP’s rate of return to reflect the time value of any tax benefits to a limited partner from owning an MLP’s limited partnership interests. In addition to their arguments based on the double recovery of an MLP partner’s income tax allowance, they assert Opinion No. 511 erred by not adjusting SFPP’s return as a matter of equity and fairness, citing the December 2006 Sepulveda Order. They urge the Commission to reduce the amount of SFPP’s equity return to reflect the present value calculations of Dr. Horst, who would reduce the income tax marginal tax rate by a factor of 78.4 percent to reflect the present value of the lower tax burden a partner incurs if the income tax burden on the income from KMEP’s units is deferred for eight years. Dr. Horst’s adjustment would reduce SFPP’s marginal tax

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611 ACV Rehearing at 64-65.


613 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 58-70.

614 Id. at 63-64. The analysis for Dr. Horst’s 65.1 percent factor is at Ex. XOM-1 at 37-39. The calculations are at Ex. XOM-10 at 2 and Ex. XOM-1 as corrected by Ex. XOM-21 and XOM-25.
rate from 34.94 percent to 32.92 percent. The lower marginal tax rate would mean a lower dollar amount for income tax allowance since the marginal tax rate is applied to the dollar equity return component of the pipeline's regulatory cost of service. This in turn would reduce the pipeline's revenue requirement and thereby its rates.

369. Like the December 2007 Order before it, Opinion No. 511 over-ruled the December 2006 Sepulveda Order's holding that fairness requires adjusting a MLP's equity return to reflect the present value of any tax deferrals. On rehearing, the Commission again concludes that there is a basic problem with any such adjustment. As previously discussed, basic finance theory states that tax savings from any deferrals will be reflected in the price an MLP partner pays for an MLP equity interest. As the Shipper Parties' witness Dr. Horst states, investors will always pay more for an instrument that has a lower tax impact. But whatever the resulting ROE, that is market-based and reflects investor's after-tax expectations. Lowering the equity rate of return to reflect the present value of tax deferrals obtained by an MLP limited partner reduces the yield on MLP equity interests twice, once when the limited partnership interests are purchased and a second time in a Commission proceeding. A second reduction understates the cost-of-equity by reducing the yield on the MLP's equity interest below that resulting from the application of the Commission's market-based DCF methodology. The December 2006 Sepulveda Order failed to raise and address this fundamental contradiction between the Commission's reliance on a DCF model for determining a pipeline's equity cost of capital and the reduction in the capitalized value of the firm that would result. The

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615 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 72.

616 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 29, 32.

617 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at 307-308.

618 Ex. XOM-1 at 17-18; accord Ex. SFP-75 at 20-21.

619 See Ex. SFP-75 at 20-24.

620 If the required after-tax return generated by the DCF model is 10 percent and the equity rate base is $1000, the required after-tax dollar return to be included in the cost of service is $100. If the marginal tax rate is 35 percent, the required tax gross up is $54, or a total pre-tax return of $154 ($153.85) before payment of the income taxes. Application of the marginal tax rate then results in an after-tax return of $100, or 10 percent on the equity component of the rate base. Dr. Horst's adjustment would reduce the tax gross up to $49.08 (100/ (1 - 32.92)), or a pre-tax return of $149.08. This reduces the pipeline's revenue requirement by $5.77. However the market would continue to

(continued...)
December 2006 Sepulveda Order likewise did not consider that adjusting an MLP pipeline’s return would cause it to have a return on jurisdictional assets that is less than that of corporate pipeline.\textsuperscript{621} This oversight resulted in a holding that was inconsistent with the purpose of the Income Tax Policy Statement\textsuperscript{622} and ExxonMobil’s recognition of the need to maintain the parity of MLP and corporate returns so that both have the same opportunity to raise equity capital.\textsuperscript{623}

Moreover, as noted, reducing the yield artificially would cause the market price of the MLP equity interest to fall in response the artificially lower yield established by the Commission. This means that an MLP would have to issue more equity units to raise the same amount of capital, thus undercutting the investment incentives and advantage the Congress intended the MLP business format to possess in the first place.\textsuperscript{624} Thus, if the incentives are to be effective, the tax deferrals must ultimately be for the benefit of the MLP, not for the rate payers. In that regard Opinion No. 511 states Congress intended that any tax benefits from deferrals accrue to the MLP unit holders in order to encourage investment.\textsuperscript{625} This statement was not wholly accurate as it overlooked the

apply a marginal tax rate of 35 percent to the pipeline’s return and this would depress the equity price accordingly. Equity markets would view the difference in the marginal tax rate at approximate $94.44 ($100 - $5.77), or an after-tax return of 9.44 percent on $1000. But the posited cost of equity capital is 10 percent. Therefore the price of the equity security will adjust to $944.44 (10 x $94.44). The jurisdictional entity under-recovers its equity cost of capital of 10 percent and does not obtain a capitalized value equal to the equity component of its equity rate base ($944.44 versus $1000), a 6.6 percent reduction. Thus the MLP pipeline has an after-tax ROE and value that is less than that of a corporate pipeline.

\textsuperscript{621} December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 39-42.

\textsuperscript{622} Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 1, 9-10, 27, 33, 35.

\textsuperscript{623} ExxonMobil, 487 F.3d at 952-54.

\textsuperscript{624} The lower yield would be reflected in the equity cost-of-capital included in the pipeline’s cost of service, but the lower equity price makes it harder to raise equity capital. This apparent paradox occurs because the yield is artificially depressed. Therefore the price of the equity interests must decline to provide the market-based yield. See Ex. SFP-75 at 30 for a historical example of how prices dropped when the return was adjusted involving the Lakehead Pipeline Co., L.P.

\textsuperscript{625} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 253-254, 265, 305-308.
fact that the limited partners will pay a higher price for their equity interests and therefore may not capture the entire benefit of the income tax deferrals for themselves.

371. However, regardless of whether one views the tax deferrals as a benefit to the MLP partner during the early years of the deferrals, or concludes that the MLP benefits from the resulting higher equity prices reflecting those deferrals (or some combination of both), reducing the present value of the tax deferrals reduces the incentives to invest in the MLP and misstates an MLP’s equity cost-of-capital. As discussed earlier, there is no credible evidence here that Congress intended to deprive jurisdictional MLPs or their limited partners of any benefits derived from income tax deferrals resulting of an MLP. Opinion No. 511 therefore correctly affirmed the Commission’s prior finding that the December 2006 Sepulveda Order incorrectly held that an MLP’s rate of return should be adjusted to reflect the value of the income tax deferrals obtained by an MLP’s limited partners.

c. **Adjustments Based on Congressional intent**

372. The Shipper Parties again argue that Congress has required that the savings of any tax benefits from income tax provisions designed to encourage investment in public utilities must be passed through to the rate payers by the normalization of those benefits. Alternatively, they assert that there is no basis for the Commission to conclude that Congress intended the jurisdictional entity to keep the financial benefits that flow from the use of the MLP format.\(^{626}\) This is a variation on their argument that Congress intended that the tax normalization policies of the Commission’s regulations apply to any income tax deferrals that flow from the use of the MLP format. Earlier in this order the Commission rejected arguments that Congress intended to limit the tax benefits that flow from the use of the MLP format by analogy to the limitations on investment tax credit incentives contained in section 203(e) of the Revenue Act of 1964. There is no express statement on the record here that Congress intended the rate payers to obtain any tax benefits that may flow from the MLP business format. This is true whether one views those benefits as the deferrals for the limited partners or the higher equity prices an MLP may obtain from its investors based on those deferrals. As discussed, this would reduce the incentives to use the MLP business format as an investment vehicle, and in any event, an MLP pipeline’s marginal tax rate is usually lower than that of corporate pipeline.

\(^{626}\) ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 51-53; ACV Rehearing at 49-50.
d. Arguments Based on Judicial Precedent

373. In asserting that section 7704 of the IRC provides for a tax savings to be passed on to the rate payers, the Shipper Parties' argue that judicial precedent requires that any savings in tax costs must be passed onto the rate payers. They first cite *El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC*, which they assert holds (1) that full effect must be given to the Congressional intent to make the several tax savings available to this taxpayer because it is in the natural gas business or it is acquiring new equipment subject to the depreciation options of the 1954 Internal Revenue Act, and (2), that these tax benefits should not be translated into additional profits for the jurisdictional entity over and above a reasonable return on its investment. Their quotation from the *El Paso* decision also noted that the tax savings at issue included a substantial incentive for the exploration and development and payment for the gas consumed in reaching its conclusion. The Shipper Parties also cite *Cities of Lexington v. FPC*, which more explicitly held that the benefits for a statutory depletion allowance should be passed through to the rate payers. *Cities of Lexington* did so on the grounds that principles of cost accounting should not be used to set up a fictitious and unreal tax expense that gives the utility the entire benefit of tax saving statutes and passes none to the consuming public. At bottom, Shipper Parties argue that these cases hold that any tax savings must be passed onto the rate payers, including any that may flow from the elimination of double taxation by section 7704.

374. This order previously explained that there are no "tax savings" to the jurisdictional entity from the elimination of double taxation or the from the tax deferrals that occur at the level of the MLP partner. However there are also at least three legal limitations to the Shipper Parties' argument that the two cited cases support a required pass through of "tax savings." First, both cases where decided at a time when the Commission used the flow through method for determining a jurisdictional entity's tax allowance. As explained in *City of Charlottesville*, the flow through method required that all that income and losses, including all deductions for amortization and depreciation, whether jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional, be combined, if necessary at the parent company level. If done at the parent level, the taxable income and thus the taxes of the parent would be allocated among its subsidiaries. In contrast, use of the stand-alone method, as approved by *City of Charlottesville*, usually results in higher tax allowance because the tax base, and hence

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627 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 40-41, 49-51; ACV Rehearing at 47-49.

628 *El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FPC*, 281 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1960) (*El Paso*).

629 *Cities of Lexington v. FPC*, 295 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1961) (*Cities of Lexington*).
the effective tax rate, is not reduced by the losses of the jurisdictional entity’s affiliates.\textsuperscript{630}

375. Second, while these two cited cases were decided in 1960 and 1961 long before the Commission adopted the stand-alone method in 1983 in \textit{Columbia Gas Transmission Co.},\textsuperscript{631} even these cases permitted the use of tax deferrals rather than requiring immediate recognition of tax savings.\textsuperscript{632} Moreover the cited cases, which deal with tax savings from incentives for exploration and production, were also decided over 25 years before \textit{City of Charlottesville}, which unequivocally held in 1985 that the tax savings obtained by a parent company from such activities do not have to be used to adjust the income tax cost, and therefore the income tax allowance, of a subsidiary. \textit{City of Charlottesville} so held even though the tax deferrals and savings were derived from the parent’s gas exploration and production functions might defer recognition of taxable income for a very long period of time, as much as 15 years, or perhaps forever.\textsuperscript{633}

376. Third, the cited language from \textit{El Paso} might be construed as applying to depreciation and amortization that occurs from incentive based investments in pipeline facilities used for the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. But to the extent there are tax deferrals at the pipeline level, the Commission still requires normalization of any tax impacts that flow from activities and accounting transaction at the pipeline level that reflect pipeline operations. In contrast, any benefits that occur to the limited partners from use of the MLP format are equivalent to non-jurisdictional accounting transactions at that the level of a corporate parent company, and as such are not subject to normalization. As discussed, an MLP pipeline has the same revenue requirement as corporate pipeline but the MLP is tax advantaged because the absence of double taxation leads the MLP partner to pay a higher price for the MLP equity interest than would otherwise be the case. The so-called "tax savings" to the MLP do not come

\textsuperscript{630} \textit{City of Charlottesville}, 774 F.2d 1205, 1207-08.

\textsuperscript{631} \textit{Columbia Gas Transmission Co.}, Opinion No. 173, 23 FERC ¶ 61,850 (1983). The Shipper Parties cite this case for the proposition that only income taxes that are part of jurisdictional cost of service should be included in the pipeline’s cost of service, and imply that this case states that MLPs should not have an income tax allowance because this permits MLPs to recover an element of its cost of service twice. The Shipper Parties’ use of this citation is wholly inapposite in that it ignores the holding in \textit{ExxonMobil} that income taxes are properly included in a MLP pipeline’s regulatory cost of service.

\textsuperscript{632} See \textit{City of Charlottesville}, 774 F.2d at 1213.

\textsuperscript{633} \textit{Id.} at 1214-16.
from a reduction in the income tax cost of an MLP or in the equity rate of return generated by the DCF model. In fact, City of Charlottesville recognized that for any tax benefits to accrue to the ratepayers those benefits must be generated at the level of the jurisdictional entity's jurisdictional service as that term is defined by the Commission's cost-of-service and rate design methodologies. 634

377. The Commission previously discussed how it was necessary to adjust the stand-alone method to deal with the realities of partnership law because the relevant marginal tax rates can only be derived by the partner's taxable income. For all other matters involving jurisdictional income and expenses the Commission has retained the stand-alone method approved by City of Charlottesville. The issue here is whether the Commission has properly applied the underlying principles of that case to the complexities of partnership accounting, which the Commission believes that it has.

e. **The Relevance of Competition to Tax Savings**

378. Finally, the Commission addresses here a secondary point discussed in Opinion No. 511. Opinion No. 511 stated that the Commission seeks to replicate the competitive market in its regulation of jurisdictional entities. Opinion No. 511 held that if jurisdictional MLPs are denied an income tax allowance, their returns will be less attractive than those of non-jurisdictional MLPs and thus less likely to attract investment than non-jurisdictional MLPs. 635 On rehearing the Shipper Parties argue that jurisdictional MLPs are monopolies and will not reduce their prices in response to competition while a non-jurisdictional entity are subject to competitive pressure and will pass on any income tax savings to its customers. The ACV Shippers argue at length that a firm's marginal prices will equal its marginal costs. They assert that if a competitive firm has savings in its income tax costs, this will be reflected in its marginal costs. ACV Shippers state that in order to meet competition from another MLP or corporation competing in the same market, competition will force a non-jurisdictional MLP to pass the benefits of single taxation or tax deferrals on to its customer as its prices will decline to reflect the reduced level of its income tax costs. 636 The Shipper Parties are thus arguing that because the Commission has not required a jurisdictional MLP to pass on any tax savings from the use of the MLP business format, the Commission incorrectly

634 City of Charlottesville, 774 F.2d 1205.

635 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 261-262.

636 ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 48-49; ACV Rehearing at 44-47.
concluded that it is replicating a competitive market if it grants a jurisdictional MLP an income tax allowance.

379. The Commission disagrees with the Shipper Parties’ argument that competition will require the tax-advantages of the MLP business format to be passed on in the rates or prices of an MLP pipeline. Their argument has several errors. One is that there are no tax savings to the MLP from the fact that an MLP partner pays only one level of taxations. As the Commission has previously shown, an MLP income tax allowance does not permit the double recovery on the partner’s income tax liability; thus, this first argument lacks any analytical foundation and as such is irrelevant. Second, the Shipper Parties’ marginal price equals marginal cost arguments likewise assumes that any “tax savings” from tax deferrals that may be available to the MLP’s limited partners or the “tax-advantage” from the elimination of double taxation are reflected in an MLP’s marginal costs. As has been previously discussed, this is incorrect. Any benefits to the MLP or its limited partners from the use of the MLP business format are reflected in the pricing investors pay when the purchase an MLP equity interest. Such investors pay a higher price for the MLP equity interest due to the absence of double taxation of corporate dividends or due to the lower tax burden resulting from any tax deferrals.

380. In contrast to costs that are part of the firm’s transportation function, such as operating expenses and the cost of capital, income taxes are imposed on the net income that results from the firm’s operations. For this reason such taxes are often referred to as the income tax burden on earnings.\textsuperscript{637} As an example of this burden the Commission’s tables earlier in this order discussed a required after-tax return of $100 and the marginal tax rate was 35 percent. These show that a non-jurisdictional firm must either gross up revenues to $154 in excess of its operating expenses or the jurisdictional firm must have an income tax allowance of $54. Now assume that the required after-tax dollar return drops to $90 because the equity cost-of-capital has declined but the marginal tax rate remains at 35 percent. The dollar amount of the revenue gross up needed by the non-jurisdictional firm to earn an after-tax return of $90 will decline because the required after-tax return has declined. This change would be the same whether the firm involved is a MLP or a corporation. This is also true regardless of whether they are jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional firms since they are assumed to have the same business risk, the

\textsuperscript{637} This point is also discussed in the Income Tax Policy Statement, 111 FERC ¶ 61,139 at P 21-22, stating arguments that income taxes are not a component of a pipeline’s operating expenses, but are a function of net income and return. See also December 2006 Sepulveda Order also recognized this fundamental fact although it reached the incorrect conclusion that the benefits of any deferrals should be for the rate payers. December 2006 Sepulveda Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 41.
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same output, and the same dollar amount of costs before income taxes and sales. Since a drop in the equity cost of capital lowers the firm's cost of service, the firm's prices or the rates will drop to reflect those lower operating costs.

381. It is of course true that a higher marginal tax rate may make it more difficult for a firm to compete because this requires a higher tax gross up or a higher income tax allowance as part of its cost of service. It is also clear that a lower tax gross up or income tax allowance results in lower prices since income tax costs are a gross up of the revenue needed to cover the firm's operating expenses and its cost of capital. But the firm is not passing on income tax "savings" through lower prices to its customers that stem from elimination of double taxation or from any tax deferrals that flow to the limited partners. Rather the amount of the income tax gross up (or income tax allowance) drops because the income tax burden is lower due to lower taxable income. Moreover, if the imputed tax rate derived from the partners is less than the 35 percent marginal tax rate for the corporation, then the tax cost to the entity is lower as a result and the Commission will provide a lower tax allowance. Similarly a lower marginal tax rate would also be reflected in the lower prices a non-jurisdictional entity needs to meet its tax gross up. Thus the Commission is replicating the price difference that should result from a difference in their marginal tax rates. But that difference in the marginal tax rate occurs at the first tier (MLP and its partners or the corporation), not because there are tax deferrals to the limited partners or because an MLP is "tax advantaged" due to the absence of double taxation at the second tier. Rather it is a function of the limited partner's lower weighted average tax marginal tax rate.

382. Opinion No. 511 simply made the point that if a jurisdictional MLP is to be competitive with non-jurisdiction MLP in raising equity capital, it must have both the same after-tax dollar and percent ROE as the non-jurisdictional MLP with the same risk. As Table 2 shows, if the jurisdictional MLP does not obtain an income tax allowance, the latter will not even recover its equity cost of capital. If a non-jurisdictional MLP is able to earn its after-tax equity cost-of-capital and the jurisdictional MLP cannot, it should be obvious which of the two MLPs would be more attractive to investors. In this regard the relative position of the corporate pipeline is irrelevant to that concern because the corporation is always disadvantaged by the fact of double taxation.

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639 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 263-264.
5. **Other Issues Involving the Income Tax Allowance Calculations**

383. This section of the order addresses three technical issues involving the income tax allowance calculations. The first is the income tax marginal tax rate to be used in calculating the allowance for deferred income taxes (ADIT) in SFPP’s regulatory cost of service. As is the case with other jurisdictional entities, the Commission’s Opinion No. 154-B\(^{640}\) oil pipeline methodology requires the calculation of the increases and decreases in ADIT balances over a large number of years. The ADIT account is intended to reflect the difference in any given year between the taxes actually paid by the carrier and the dollar amount of taxes generated by the income tax allowance component of the pipeline’s cost of service. Since the income tax allowance is determined in part by the marginal tax rate used to develop the pipeline’s cost of service, the amount of the marginal tax rate thereby affects the amount of the ADIT adjustment between the taxes actually paid and the cash generated by the income tax allowance.\(^{641}\)

384. SFPP asserts on rehearing that Opinion No. 511 incorrectly held that the ADIT calculation should be based on the highest marginal income tax allowance rate in effect in for each year of that calculation.\(^{642}\) SFPP first asserts that that the issue of the use of the highest marginal tax rate applies only to the period 1992 through 1996 as no party has raised the issue for period after 1996. SFPP argues that the maximum tax rate for a partnership can vary from year to year, but in any event it is simply incorrect to assume that the applicable 35 percent maximum tax rate actually applied to SFPP for the entire period 1992-1996. SFPP also argues that it should not be required to use the maximum corporate marginal tax rate after 1968 when SFPP became a partnership, but rather the lower marginal rate that would have applied to its partnership between 1988 and 1991.

385. The Commission grants rehearing on the point of whether the maximum corporate tax rate must always be used to determine SFPP’s marginal tax rate, including the period 1992 to 1996. As SFPP states, the marginal tax rate for a partnership or a corporation can vary based on the year in which a rate calculation is performed. As such, it would be incorrect to assume that the maximum corporate marginal tax rate will always apply in determining the amount of ADIT incurred or amortized in any given year. Rather, the proper rate is the marginal tax rate that is embedded in SFPP’s rate design in a given

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\(^{640}\) Opinion No. 154-B, 31 FERC ¶ 61,377.

\(^{641}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 316-317.

\(^{642}\) SFPP Request for Rehearing at 21-27 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 319-320).
year. Thus Opinion No. 511 should have held that the marginal tax rate actually used in a given year for SFPP’s rate design should be the marginal rate used for the ADIT calculation. This assures that the ADIT adjustment for each year is properly calculated and does not change retrospectively absent a Commission order authorizing a change in the pipeline’s rate design, as was done in a series of complaints filed between 1992 and 1996.\footnote{E.g. SFPP, L.P., Opinion No. 435-B, 96 FERC ¶ 61,281, at 62,077 (2001).}

More specifically, in reviewing SFPP’s East Line rates in Docket No. OR-92-8-000, et al., the Commission concluded that SFPP should recalculate its ADIT as of 1992 because that was the first year the Commission directed SFPP to change its rate design for those rates.\footnote{Id.} Thereafter, after the Commission adopted its Income Tax Policy Statement, it continued to hold that SFPP should modify its ADIT as of 1992. In doing so, the Commission notes that before 1992 SFPP would have used a full income tax allowance because the Lakehead methodology was not applied to its cost of service.\footnote{December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 144. Given that rationale, the East Line ADIT would be properly calculated as of 1992 using the Income Tax Allowance Policy methodology. The West Line rates were not revised until May 1, 1996, and therefore the revised ADIT should have begun at that point for those rates. It is too late at this point to make that adjustment given the reparations and refunds for the West Line rates at issue in Docket No. OR96-2-000 have been paid based on a revised ADIT calculation beginning in 1992. Id. P 144 and Ordering Par. E.} From 1988 through 1991, SFPP’s regulatory marginal tax rate was that of a corporation, not a partnership and therefore its income tax allowance was based on the corporate marginal tax rate that was embedded in its jurisdictional rates at that time. Therefore the Commission correctly rejected SFPP’s efforts to be afforded the income tax allowance of a partnership on a retrospective basis to 1988 and it continues to do so here.

For the period 1992 through 1996 the Commission permitted SFPP to change the marginal tax rate in each of those years. In that regard SFPP argues here that the ADIT calculation is a cost calculation that varies in any given year by changes in the dollar amounts on the company’s books of the rate base, book and tax depreciation rates, the cost-of-capital, including the marginal tax rate. This is consistent with SFPP’s earlier argument that an adjustment to the marginal tax rate was similar to the annual cost-of-
capital adjustment included the ADIT calculation. This was approved by the December 2007 Order, and at this point is a closed issue for the period 1992 through 1996 as Opinion No. 511 states. However, the Opinion No. 511 should not have analogized an annual change in the marginal tax rate to the annual change in the cost of capital that occurs in the annual ADIT calculation on the company's books. Opinion No. 511 attempted to explain that the marginal tax rate should not vary from year to year as a matter of rate design. This is because the marginal tax rate is a rate design component derived from the pipeline's cost of service test period unlike such book entries as the rate base, the actual tax payments, or the pipeline's cost of capital.

388. By way of contrast to the marginal tax rate, the cost of capital is the weighted cost of debt and equity on the company's books. This book ratio will change if there is a change in ratio of debt and equity on the company's books in any given year. But the actual cost of the debt and the equity components embedded in the pipeline's rates is determined only in the context of a rate case. Such rate components may not be varied by the pipeline outside a rate proceeding nor should the marginal tax rate component of the pipeline's cost of service be varied from year to year outside the context of a general rate case proceeding. Given that the December 2007 Order should not have permitted SFPP to vary the marginal tax rate from that established by the relevant test periods, the question then becomes how to determine the ADIT calculation that should apply to the instant West Line rates given the cases that have gone before.

389. SFPP is understandably concerned that Opinion No. 511 might be construed as requiring an adjustment to the marginal tax rates that were previously used to design certain of the SFPP's rates in 1992 and 1996 through the effective date of the rates at

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646 December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at P 143 (summarizing SFPP's argument regarding its ADIT calculation).

647 Id. P 144.

648 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 320.

649 Id. P 319-320.

650 Of course if the maximum tax rate changes, it is appropriate to change the weighted marginal tax rate to reflect this. But this is driven by statute, not by a hearing process that determines the relative weight of the partner's marginal tax rate based on their proportionate ownership interests. This should not be changed outside a rate case.
issue here.\textsuperscript{651} As discussed, in the context the Docket No. OR92-8-000 and Docket No. OR96-2-000 complaint cases the Commission applied the Income Tax Policy Statement to the East Line rates in 1992 and the West Line rates in 1996.\textsuperscript{652} This was consistent with its prior determination that SFPP should be treated as a partnership as of 1992, the earliest year for which its rates were modified pursuant to a complaint. SFPP applied the weighted average marginal tax methodology to its East Line rates as of 1992 and the West Line rates as of 1996. In doing so it developed a separate marginal tax rate for each year between 1992 and 1996 and developed its ADIT calculations according.\textsuperscript{653}

390. That calculation helped determine the net rate base for both the East and West Line rates during that period and thereby influenced the net rate base that would apply to the design of the West Line rates in the instant docket. The December 2007 Order also established effective dates for the rates in Docket No. OR92-8-000 as of August 1, 2000 and May 1, 2006 for the rates in Docket No. OR96-2-000. The December 2007 Order thereby established the dates for calculating reparations and refunds until both the East and the West Line rates were supplanted by later filings. Given the settlement of those cases the Commission will not disturb the calculations underpinning the design of the rates established by the December 2007 Order. Revising the ADIT balances for 1992 and 1996 would change the calculation of the West Line rates now before the Commission in a manner favorable to the shippers because the change to the ADIT balances for the period 1992 through 1996. This would be an inequitable and in effect a retroactive rate that would be unjust and unreasonable.

391. Given the previous analysis, Opinion No. 511 erred to the extent it implied that the ADIT calculation for the West Line rates in the instant docket should not reflect the ADIT calculations actually embedded in the East and West Line rates based on the ADIT

\textsuperscript{651} SFPP Rehearing at 27-28.

\textsuperscript{652} See June 2005 Order, 111 FERC ¶ 61,334 at P 73-74 noting it would be necessary to determine whether an income tax allowance was appropriate for the 1994 test year for the first East Line rate proceeding (Docket OR92-8-000) and the 1996 test year proceeding involving both the East and West Line rates in Docket No. OR96-2-000. The Commission thereafter accorded SFPP an income tax allowance for both lines in the December 2005 Order, but required SFPP to make a compliance filing detailing how the income tax allowance would be implemented and a revised cost of service for both the East and West Lines. December 2005 Order, SFPP, L.P., 113 FERC ¶ 61,277 at P 44-47.

\textsuperscript{653} December 2007 Order, 121 FERC ¶ 61,240 at ordering par. (E).
calculations that SFPP made for the period 1992 through 1996.\textsuperscript{654} Therefore the proper marginal tax rate for the calculation of the ADIT component of the West Line rates is as follows. For 1992 through May 1, 1996 the proper ADIT rate was the adjusted annual rate as authorized by the December 2007 Order. Thereafter, as with other cost of service factors in SFPP’s rate design, the marginal tax rate must be fixed until that component was changed on effective date of the current West Line rates in this proceeding.\textsuperscript{655} This will result is a different ADIT calculation for the rates at issue here. However the ruling here will not require SFPP to modify the West Line rates effective May 1, 1996, and which underpin the reparations and refunds applicable to the period before the instant West Line rates became effective on August 1, 2008. In summary, Opinion No. 511 only intended to hold that it is incorrect to vary SFPP’s weighted marginal tax rate for the period after the effective dates of the West Line rates established by the December 2007 Order. As with other rate design factors, the marginal tax rate should be fixed by the test period calculations. Rehearing on the marginal tax rate issues is granted and denied as stated.

392. The third technical issue involving the income tax allowance calculation is whether to use the marginal rate of the state in which a partner resides or the source state in which the income was generated. This decision affects the weighted marginal tax rate to be used in developing the income tax allowance. Opinion No. 511 held that the calculation should be based first on the marginal tax rate of the source state, and then on marginal tax rate of the partner’s resident state. Opinion No. 511 noted that the taxes paid on the source state are normally a partial credit against the income taxes of the partner’s resident state.\textsuperscript{656} On rehearing, the Shippers Parties assert that this should be reversed because there is no evidence that taxes that are paid on the gains incurred when a partnership interest is sold are taxed at the source state.\textsuperscript{657} This argument overlooks the fact that the Commission’s income tax allowance is relevant only to ordinary income. All deferred ordinary income must be recognized when a limited partnership interest is sold and there is no evidence here that such ordinary income would not be apportioned at the source state just as is the ordinary income a partner recognizes in the year it is

\textsuperscript{654} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 3.

\textsuperscript{655} This should be done using the marginal tax rate adopted in the 1996 calculation, the year that established the West Line rate design in effect between May 1, 1996 and the filing of the rate case effective August 1, 2008 in the instant docket.

\textsuperscript{656} Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 320.

\textsuperscript{657} ExxonMobil/BP Rehearing at 72.
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actually earned. Otherwise, the deferral component of the MLP works to the
disadvantage of the source state that would tax that as ordinary income. Moreover, many
states do not recognize the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income
currently recognized at the federal level. This means that on the sale of a partnership
interest the total tax liability to the source state may actually be greater than the amount
reflected in the Commission’s income tax allowance. As Opinion No. 511 states, any
such capital gains are outside the scope of the income tax allowance.658 Therefore
rehearing is denied.

VIII. Substantial Divergence Standard

393. In Opinion No. 511, the Commission held that it could not make final
determination whether SFPP’s June 2010 rate filing in the instant proceeding met the
substantial divergence standard of 18 C.F.R. § 342.4(a)659 until SFPP made its
compliance filing.660 SFPP asserts that the Commission erred for two reasons. SFPP first
asserts that Order No. 561-A clearly intended that the substantial divergence standard is a
threshold standard designed to determine whether the pipeline should be allowed to
pursue a cost of service alternative as a means of establishing just and reasonable rates.661
SFPP argues that the order did not intend to establish a second test at hearing that would
in essence determine whether the rates as filed should be accepted as just and reasonable.
Second, SFPP asserts that there is no correlation between the details contained in a cost
of service filing to support an oil pipeline rate case and the cost of service that underpins
the compliance rates ultimately required by the Commission. Third, SFPP asserts that the
holding in Opinion No. 511 is inconsistent with the purpose of a hearing under section
15(7) of the ICA, which is to establish a just and reasonable rate, not whether the carrier
has a right to file a rate proceeding in the first place.

394. The Commission grants rehearing. As SFPP points out, nothing in Order
No. 561-A suggests that a pipeline must establish later on in a proceeding that it has
complied with a threshold test designed to determine whether there is reasonable grounds

658 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 320.

659 18 C.F.R § 342.4(a) (2011).

660 Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 323.

661 SFPP Rehearing Request at 31-32 (citing Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations
for a making a filing. Order No. 561-A provides that "a pipeline may file a rate increase that exceeds that applicable ceiling, if it can show that its prudently incurred costs are substantially in excess of the cost changes reflected in the index." While somewhat ambiguous, this concept is most reasonably construed as a threshold test. As SFPP points out, there is nothing in Order No. 561-A requiring that the test apply at the actual hearing on the reasonableness of the rates as filed or that it would function as a secondary test for establishing rate reasonableness. Moreover, in Order No. 571, a companion proceeding addressing the Commission’s accounting requirements for oil pipelines, the Commission clearly stated that the substantial divergence test in Order No. 561 is "the means that the Commission has decided are necessary for a pipeline to make a prima facie demonstration that it should be allowed to pursue the cost of service alternative as a means of establishing just and reasonable rates." The cited language removes any ambiguity present in Order No. 561-A or the Commission’s regulations and demonstrates that the holding in Opinion No. 511 contradicts the regulatory concept of a threshold test clearly stated in Order No. 571.

Moreover, there is no necessary correlation between the cost of service in the initial rate filing and that required at the compliance phase. In the instant case, the Commission required SFPP to use a different throughput than contained in its case in chief that is the first nine months of 2008 annualized instead of the 2007 test period SFPP used in its rate filing. The Commission also used a lower equity cost of capital rather than SFPP’s updated equity cost of capital. As SFPP points out, the Commission accepted the rate filing in question and did not hold that it was inadequate or that SFPP had done anything improper. SFPP is correct that revisiting a threshold issue later in a proceeding by requiring the Compliance Filing meet the substantial divergence test is inconsistent with the Commission’s prior ruling that the materials contained in the May 2008 rate filing sufficiently complied with the Commission’s filing requirements to support its acceptance. Moreover, while the cited suspension order left open the question of the reasonableness of the proposed West Line rates as filed, it did not state that the issue of substantial divergence remained open until the compliance phase. The more plausible interpretation is that SFPP had made a sufficient showing that the indexing methodology would not recover SFPP’s costs and that the filing was appropriate and should proceed to hearing. If the filing were not appropriate because it failed to meet the

662 Order No. 561-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,000 at 31,107 (footnote omitted).
substantial divergence standard, then it should have been rejected at the time it was made.

396. Finally, the Commission agrees that Opinion No. 511’s ruling is inconsistent with the purpose of section 15(7) of the ICA. The purpose of that section is to establish a just and reasonable rate based on the cost of service developed on the record at a hearing. Section 15(7) does not require a determination of substantial divergence in addition to the basic finding that the proposed rates are just and reasonable as the filed rates may be modified by the Commission. Rather, the substantial divergence test is imposed by regulation under the EPAct of 1992 as part of the regulatory structure designed to facilitate a simplified ratemaking methodology. To require the substantial divergence standard be met in the compliance phase would complicate, not simplify, the determination of whether the proposed rates as filed are just and reasonable under the ICA. Applying the substantial divergence test would require the Commission to develop an additional standard to determine whether any divergence between the rates as filed and those established by the Commission is a reasonable divergence. Limiting the determination under section 15(7) to the reasonableness of the rates removes any such complexity. In short, there is not a dual standard for determining rate reasonableness under section 15(7) of the ICA. Therefore rehearing is granted.

IX. **Refund Related Issues**

397. In its Compliance Filing, SFPP calculated refunds for movements beginning August 1, 2008, when the rates filed in this proceeding became effective. On May 16, 2011, SFPP filed a supplemental compliance filing to correct its Compliance Filing. In the Supplemental Compliance Filing, SFPP states that it will calculate the refunds based upon (a) the difference between the rates actually paid or projected to be paid and (b) the rates resulting from implementing the Commission’s rulings in Opinion No. 511.

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665 SFPP Compliance Filing, Tab F; SFPP May 16, 2011 Supplemental Compliance Filing.

666 In SFPP’s initial Compliance Filing, SFPP stated that for all movements other than Colton to Phoenix, the rates generated by implementing Opinion No. 511 are lower than the West Line rates. Thus, SFPP, in calculating refunds for these other movements, applied the difference between the rates actually paid or projected to be paid and the rates in effect prior to Opinion No. 511. However, in its May 16, 2011 supplemental compliance filing, SFPP stated that due to the provisions of a recent settlements with Shipper Parties, the last clean rate doctrine does not apply to the pre-Opinion No. 511 West Line rates. Thus, for all destinations, SFPP now proposes to calculate refunds based upon the difference between (a) the rates actually paid or projected to be paid by (continued...)

In calculating the refunds owed to shippers, SFPP applied indexing to the rates to be effective August 1, 2008, pursuant to Opinion No. 511. Oil pipelines may file for an annual rate change every July 1 pursuant to the Commission’s indexing regulations. The indexing methodology is to account for industry-wide cost changes during the prior year. Effective July 1, 2009, oil and petroleum product pipelines were allowed an index increase up to 7.6025 percent. Effective July 1, 2010, the indexing regulation required pipelines to decrease their indexed rates by 1.2974 percent. On compliance, SFPP incorporated these index rate changes into its going-forward rates and refund calculations.

ExxonMobil/BP, ACV Shippers, and Trial Staff all raise concerns about the application of the index increase by 7.6025 percent to be effective July 1, 2009. ExxonMobil/BP and ACV Shippers explain that the 2009 index increase reflects the industry-wide average cost increases during the calendar year 2008. They state that Opinion No. 511 relied upon actual cost and revenue data through September 2008 with respect to throughput, throughput-related operations and maintenance costs, and the allocation of costs based on throughput. They add that SFPP included an uncontested test period adjustment to all of its base period salary and wage expenses to reflect a late 2007 merit increase that would be effective during 2008. ACV Shippers and ExxonMobil/BP note that the Commission previously denied an index increase where a pipeline has filed a cost of service rate increase based on periods encompassed by the index increase.

669 Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 131 FERC ¶ 61,161 (2010). Although oil pipelines are not required to apply an index increase, absent a waiver of Commission regulations, pipelines are required to apply an index decrease. See 18. C.F.R. § 343.3(e) (2011).
670 No party objects to SFPP’s proposed implementation of the July 1, 2010 index rate decrease.
671 ACV Protest at 49 (citing Ex. SFP 34C at 108-111).
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400. Trial Staff also expresses concern regarding SFPP’s application of the indexing methodology to its rates beginning in July 2009. However Trial Staff also states that SFPP complied with the language of the Commission’s regulations providing that if the rate is changed during the year through a method other than indexing, then the pipeline must defer any rate changed to the next subsequent adjustment. Trial Staff urges the Commission to evaluate whether an indexing of a rate on the subsequent adjustment date (in this case July 2009) is appropriate when that rate is substantially based upon actual 2008 costs and could potentially lead to double-recovery of inflation expenses.

401. In its answer, SFPP responds that the protests ignore the fundamental principle behind the Commission’s indexing methodology. SFPP states that in Opinion Nos. 435-A and 435-B, the Commission established just and reasonable rates for 1994 and ordered SFPP to determine the rates for the years 1995 forward using indexing adjustments applicable to those years. SFPP states that the D.C. Circuit in reviewing these orders approved the Commission’s use of indexing to establish just and reasonable rates for the periods after year for which the just and reasonable rates were established.

402. SFPP states that in Opinion No. 511 the Commission decided that the appropriate basis for setting just and reasonable West Line rates for 2008, but did not determine the just and reasonable rate for 2009 or subsequent years. Moreover, SFPP adds that there is no record evidence available for setting a just and reasonable rate for those later years. SFPP argues that it has complied with the Commission’s approach in the past, as asserted by Trial Staff.

403. SFPP contends that the December 2006 Order does not support the protests’ objections to SFPP’s proposed indexing adjustment. SFPP states that in that proceeding, SFPP filed a cost of service rate increase on May 1, 2006, to become effective June 1, 2006, which was based on actual 2005 base period as adjusted through the first 9 months filing Rehearing). ExxonMobil argues that the limited holding in SFPP, L.P., 127 FERC ¶ 61,312 (2009), which accepted SFPP’s 2009 index adjustment to the West Line was a limited holding that does not foreclose an inquiry into the propriety of including the 2009 index increase in the computation of refunds and prospective rates in this case.

673 SFPP Answer at 80 (citing Opinion No. 435-A, 91 FERC ¶ 61,135, at 61,516, order on reh’g, Opinion No. 435-B, 96 FERC, at 62,072).

674 SFPP Answer at 80 (citing BP West Coast, 374 F.3d at 1312).

675 2006 SFPP Index Filing, 117 FERC ¶ 61,271.
of 2006. Later, on May 31, 2006, SFPP states that it filed for an index-based rate increase to be effective July 1, 2006. SFPP states that the Commission concluded that, in the narrow circumstances in which the base period for a cost of service filing is the same as the period on which the indexing adjustment is based, SFPP’s indexing adjustment was inappropriate. SFPP argues that the circumstances here are different, i.e. that the West Line cost-based rate increase was calculated using 2007 as the base period and that the 2009 indexing adjustment is based upon 2008 data.

404. SFPP further argues that its Compliance Filing does not capture cost changes from 2007 and 2008 as claimed by Tesoro and ACV Shippers. SFPP asserts that virtually all of the operating costs reflected in SFPP’s Compliance Filing reflect 2007 costs. SFPP claims that the only costs the Commission required to be used from 2008 are those costs related to throughput such as fuel and power and oil losses and shortages. SFPP states that the test period changes in SFPP’s Compliance Filing were fuel and power costs (which actually caused fuel and power costs to drop), oil losses and shortages expenses, litigation expenses, and a merit increase of 3.5 percent to the base period salaries and wages expense. SFPP adds that wages were about 17 percent of SFPP’s total cost of service.

405. The Commission denies SFPP’s proposal to apply an index increase of 7.6025 percent to its Opinion No. 511 West Line rates effective July 1, 2009. However, the Commission will allow SFPP to increase its West Line rates by 1.9006 percent, which represents one-quarter of the July 1, 2009 index increase permitted under the Commission’s indexing methodology. The one quarter of the index increase for cost changes in 2008 corresponds to the three months of 2008 cost changes that are outside the January 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 adjustment period. Therefore the cost increases in the last quarter of 2008 are not reflected in the cost of service adopted by Opinion No. 511 or the rates SFPP must establish here.

406. SFPP filed for new rates in this docket for its West Line to be effective August 30, 2008. Under Commission regulations, these rates remained the ceiling rates for the remainder of that index year, which started on July 1, 2008, and concluded June 30, 2009. As SFPP notes, Commission regulations permitted SFPP to request an index rate increase for the subsequent index year to take effect on July 1, 2009.

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676 SFPP Answer at 82 (citing Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 9, n.4, 27).

677 While this proceeding was advancing through the hearing process, SFPP submitted a request to increase its West Line for the index year starting July 1, 2009. SFPP, L.P., 127 FERC ¶ 61,312, as modified, 128 FERC ¶ 61,067, order on reh’g, 130 FERC ¶ 61,081 (2010). Because the underlying base rates were subject to the ongoing
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407. However, merely because the Commission regulations permit SFPP to request the index increase does not mean that the Commission is bound to accept the indexed rate increase. Commission regulations consider challenges to a proposed index increase if the increase “is so substantially in excess of the actual cost increases incurred by the carrier that the rate is unjust and unreasonable.” Applying this standard, the Commission has rejected an indexed rate increase following a new cost of service rate filing where the costs incorporated into the new cost of service rates already accounted for the changes in costs associated with the index increase. In the 2006 SFPP Index Filing, the Commission rejected an indexed rate increase to SFPP’s East Line to be effective July 1, 2006, which was filed to recover industry-wide cost changes during 2005. The Commission noted that the East Line rate SFPP sought to increase pursuant to the indexing methodology was a recently filed cost of service rate that was based on SFPP’s actual costs during its 2005 base period with an adjustment period from January 1, 2006 until September 30, 2006. Thus, the cost of service rate based on 2005 data already accounted for the industry-wide cost changes during 2005 that formed the basis for the proposed index increase to the East Line rates. Accordingly, in the 2006 SFPP Index Filing, the Commission found that applying the index to the cost of service rate would be unjust and unreasonable.

408. As SFPP correctly asserts, the scenario presented by this case is considerably more complicated than the fact pattern presented by the 2006 SFPP Index Filing. In the 2006 SFPP Index Filing, the base period used to determine the cost of service rates (2005) overlapped precisely with the year (2005) that served as the basis for the July 1, 2006 index rate increase. By contrast, in this proceeding, SFPP’s 2007 base period data do not

proceedings in this docket, the Commission accepted the resulting rates subject to refund. SFPP, L.P., 127 FERC ¶ 61,312 at P 22. Given that the rates were subject to refund, the Commission may now consider whether it is appropriate to grant the index increase based upon the outcome of this proceeding. BP West Coast Prod. v. SFPP, L.P., 121 FERC ¶ 61,243, at P 5 (2007), rehe’g denied, BP West Coast Prod. v. SFPP, L.P., 123 FERC ¶ 61,121 (2008), aff’d sub nom., ExxonMobil Oil Corp. and BP West Coast Prod. LLC v. FERC, Nos. 07-1163, 363 Fed. Appx. 752, et al. (consolidated) (D.C. Cir.).

678 18 C.F.R. § 343.2(c) (2011).

679 2006 SFPP Index Filing, 117 FERC ¶ 61,271, rehe’g denied, 2006 SF Index Filing Rehearing, 120 FERC ¶ 61,245.

680 2006 SFPP Index Filing, 117 FERC ¶ 61,271 at P 5.

681 Id.; see also 2006 SFPP Index Filing Rehearing, 120 FERC ¶ 61,245 at P 4.
incorporate the 2008 industry-wide cost changes meant to be reflected in its proposed July 1, 2009 indexing increase.

409. However, the distinction drawn by SFPP is too simple. The rates approved by Opinion No. 511 did not rely solely on SFPP's 2007 base period data. Rather, the rates adopted by Opinion No. 511 incorporated substantial cost of service adjustments reflecting data from the adjustment period of January 1, 2008, through September 30, 2008. Specifically, Opinion No. 511 adopted fuel costs and fuel losses and shortages based upon 2008 data.\(^{682}\) SFPP also proposed an annualized 3.5 percent merit increase to its base period salaries and wages expenses.\(^{683}\) Taken together, these costs represent a significant proportion of SFPP total operating costs.\(^{684}\) Capital costs were also heavily influenced by test period modifications to the 2007 base period rate base, the adoption of a September 20, 2008 date for determining cost of debt, and a September 30, 2008 date for determining cost of equity.\(^{685}\)

410. Finally, the throughput adopted by Opinion No. 511 also reflected January 1 through September 30, 2008 volume levels.\(^{686}\) In its initial filing, SFPP proposed

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\(^{682}\) Although SFPP states that the use of 2008 fuel costs actually caused rates to go down, this occurred because the fuel costs reflected decreased throughput. In total, the decreased throughput contained within the cost of service outweighed any related reductions in cost and allowed SFPP to increase its rates.

\(^{683}\) The merit increase became effective in October 1, 2007. However, because the increase became effective in late 2007, it is more fully reflected in SFPP's costs for the January 1, 2008 through the September 30, 2008 period than for SFPP's unadjusted 2007 costs.

\(^{684}\) Excluding depreciation and litigation, SFPP's Compliance Filing indicates that roughly half of its operating costs (labor costs in account 300, fuel and power in account 330, and the portion of costs in account 520 attributable to labor costs) have been adjusted so that they are more reflective of costs during the first nine months of 2008 rather than for the base period. Additionally, although recorded as a gain by SFPP, account 340 for oil shortages and losses also reflects data for the first 9 months of 2008.

\(^{685}\) Opinion No. 511, 134 FERC ¶ 61,121 at P 151.

\(^{686}\) Although not technically a cost, throughput levels were an important factor in the cost of service resulting from Opinion No. 511. Because the index increase will apply to the entirety of SFPP's rates, it seems equitable under these circumstances to consider the extent to which the entirety of January 1- September 30, 2008 data

(continued...)
significant throughput adjustments based upon a significant downturn in volumes transported during the 2008 adjustment period. Although modifying SFPP's initial proposal, Opinion No. 511 recognized the reduction to West Line volumes occurring during the adjustment period, and thus adopted the annualized January 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008 volume data. This resulted in a significant reduction in SFPP's throughput levels as compared to 2007 throughput, and thus a corresponding increase in SFPP's rates.

411. Given the substantial presence of January 1 – September 30, 2008 data reflected in the holdings of Opinion No. 511, the Commission will deny SFPP the full application of the July 1, 2009 Index increase for industry-wide cost changes during 2008. However, Opinion No. 511 did not include cost of service data after September 30, 2008. Thus, in calculating refunds and going-forward rates, SFPP may apply an index increase effective July 1, 2009, to the rates established in Opinion No. 511 and this order corresponding to the last three months of 2008 and equivalent to one quarter of the increase otherwise permitted under the indexing methodology.\(^\text{687}\)

The Commission orders:

(A) The requests for rehearing are granted and denied for the reasons stated in the body of this order. All requests or issues that are not explicitly addressed have been considered, but do not merit further discussion and are hereby denied.

\(^{687}\) This decision to permit only one-fourth of the July 1, 2009 index increase is based upon a fact-specific examination of the conclusions in Opinion No. 511 and a fully developed record following a hearing. Without the conclusion of the rate case, it would not have been possible to know how much cost of service data from the adjustment period would ultimately be incorporated into the going forward rates. In order to preserve the simplicity of the index, when the Commission considers an index increase to a base rate that is subject to challenge, the Commission will continue to apply the "percentage comparison test." \textit{SFPP, L.P.}, 135 FERC ¶ 61,274, at P 12 (2011). At the conclusion of the rate proceeding once aware of its final determinations and with the benefit of a full record, the Commission will re-assess whether application of the indexed increase remains appropriate.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

(B) SFPP's Compliance Filing dated April 25, 2011 is accepted subject to the modifications required in the body of this order.

(C) SFPP shall file revised rates, a revised estimate of refunds, and a revised compliance filing consistent with the holdings of this order within 45 days after this order issues. Comments on the revised compliance filing are due within 30 days after this order issues and reply comments 15 days thereafter.

By the Commission.

(SEAL)

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
Docket Nos. IS08-390-004 and IS08-390-006

Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Respondent</th>
<th>This Report Is:</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
<th>Year/Period of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SFPP, L.P.</td>
<td>(1) X An Original</td>
<td>Mo, Da, Yr</td>
<td>End of 2008/Q4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual Cost of Service Based Analysis Schedule

1.) Use footnotes when particulars are required or for any explanations.
2.) Enter on lines 1-9, columns (b) and (c), the value of the respondent's Operating & Maintenance Expenses, Depreciation Expense, AFUDC Depreciation, Amortization of Deferred Earnings, Rate Base, Rate of Return, Return, Income Tax Allowance, and Total Cost of Service, respectively, for the end of the current and previous calendar years. The values shall be computed consistent with the Commission's Opinion No. 154-B et al. methodology. Any item(s) not applicable to the filing, the pipeline company shall report nothing in columns (b) and (c).
3.) Enter on line 10, columns (b) and (c), total interstate operating revenue, as reported on page 301, for the current and previous calendar years.
4.) Enter on line 11, columns (b) and (c), the throughput in barrels from the Statistics of Operations schedule, page 601, line 33b, total of items (1) and (2), from the current and previous year's FERC Form No. 6.
5.) Enter on line 12, columns (b) and (c), the throughput in barrel-miles from the Statistics of Operations schedule, page 600, line 33a, total of items (1) and (2), from the current and previous year's FERC Form No. 6.
6.) If the company makes major changes to its application of the Opinion No. 154-B et al. methodology, it must describe such changes in a footnote, and calculate the amounts in columns (b) and (c) of lines No. 1-12 using the changed application. 7.) A respondent may be requested by the Commission or its staff to provide its workpapers which support the data reported on page 700.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Current Year Amount (in dollars)</th>
<th>Previous Year Amount (in dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Operating and Maintenance Expenses</td>
<td>81,157,015</td>
<td>75,839,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Depreciation Expense</td>
<td>19,477,899</td>
<td>17,161,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>AFUDC Depreciation</td>
<td>122,292</td>
<td>125,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amortization of Deferred Earnings</td>
<td>2,049,578</td>
<td>1,936,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rate Base</td>
<td>573,013,361</td>
<td>507,241,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rate of Return % (10.25%-10.25)</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>58,447,362</td>
<td>36,156,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>22,155,578</td>
<td>11,973,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Total Cost of Service</td>
<td>183,406,724</td>
<td>143,198,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Total Interstate Operating Revenues</td>
<td>153,871,946</td>
<td>148,856,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Throughput in Barrels</td>
<td>161,335,001</td>
<td>167,404,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Throughput in Barrel-Miles</td>
<td>43,363,733,208</td>
<td>45,465,836,007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

OPINION NO. 511 – SFPP, L.P. COMPLIANCE FILING

SFPP, L.P.
West Line Interstate Cost of Service
($000's)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Test Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overall Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>Statement C, Line 16</td>
<td>$8,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>Statement D, Line 13</td>
<td>$3,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operating Expenses Excl. Depreciation</td>
<td>Statement B, Line 22</td>
<td>$22,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Depreciation Expense</td>
<td>Statement B, Line 14</td>
<td>$5,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Amortization of AFUDC</td>
<td>Statement F2, Lines (3 + 8)</td>
<td>$83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Amortization of Deferred Return</td>
<td>Statement E2, Line 14</td>
<td>$1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Total Cost of Service</td>
<td>Sum Lines (1 through 6)</td>
<td>$41,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

OPINION NO. 511 – SFPP, L.P. COMPLIANCE FILING

SFPP, L.P.

West Line Interstate Income Tax Allowance
($000's)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Test Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overall Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>Statement C, Line 16</td>
<td>$8,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>Statement C, Line 19</td>
<td>$3,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Return on Equity</td>
<td>Lines (1 – 2)</td>
<td>$5,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Amortization of Deferred Return</td>
<td>Statement E2, Line 14</td>
<td>$1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Depreciation of ITC Basis Reduction</td>
<td>Schedule 7</td>
<td>$38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Amortization of Equity AFUDC</td>
<td>Statement F2, Line 3</td>
<td>$105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Amortization of Tax Rate Adjustments</td>
<td>Schedule 7</td>
<td>$168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taxable Allowed Return</td>
<td>Lines (3 + 4 + 5 + 6 - 7)</td>
<td>$6,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Composite Income Tax Rate</td>
<td>Schedule 8</td>
<td>34.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Net-to-Tax Multiplier</td>
<td>Line 9 / (1 – Line 9)</td>
<td>53.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance - Unadjusted</td>
<td>Lines (8 * 10)</td>
<td>$3,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Amortization of Tax Rate Adjustments</td>
<td>Line 7</td>
<td>$168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>Lines (11-12)</td>
<td>$3,275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Partial Modification of Ex. SFP-99 to Conform to FERC Ratemaking Protocols for Return

Display A

Ex. SFP-99 Lines 13 through Line 17 As Currently Stated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MLP</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Equity Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>$6,900,000.00</td>
<td>$6,900,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$3,715,385.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Revenue Required</td>
<td>$13,900,000.00</td>
<td>$17,615,385.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Income Taxes By the Pipeline</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$3,715,385.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Income for Shareholder or the MLP Partner</td>
<td>$6,900,000.00</td>
<td>$6,900,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis: This portion of Ex. SFP-99 includes both a revenue gross up and an income tax allowance for the corporation, but only a revenue gross up for the MLP. In Ex. SFP-99 the revenue gross up is calculated as Line 3 (13.800% pre-tax return) times line 8 (50% capital structure) times Line 7 (total rate base of $100,000,000).

Ex. SFP-99 assumes that the MLP (and its partners) have a different cost of service than the corporation, which is fundamentally incorrect. Moreover, the inclusion of the income tax allowance means the Corporation will have significantly higher rates because of its cost of service even though the income on Line 21 is the same for partner and the shareholder. That occurs because the income tax allowance dollars wash out when the taxes are paid. But they would still be in the rates. Finally, the exhibit implies that that the partner will have the same after-tax dollar return if the MLP is denied on income tax allowance. As shown below, this is not mathematically possible in a Commission rate design context.
Display B

**Ex. SFP-99 Partially Modified to Reflect FERC Rate Design Methodology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>MLP</strong></th>
<th><strong>Corporation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line 13</td>
<td>Equity Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 14</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>$2,208,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 15</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 16</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 17</td>
<td>Revenue Required</td>
<td>$13,900,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>MLP</strong></th>
<th><strong>Corporation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Line 18</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 19</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 20</td>
<td>Income Taxes By the Pipeline</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line 21</td>
<td>Income for Shareholder or the MLP Partner</td>
<td>$6,900,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taxes Paid by Partner or the Shareholder at FERC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>MLP</strong></th>
<th><strong>Corporation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FERC 22</td>
<td>32% rate</td>
<td>$2,208,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERC 23</td>
<td>After-Tax Return to Partner or the Shareholder</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis:** Under this analysis the equity return on rate base does not include the revenue gross because the FERC ratemaking methodology does not provide for either an MLP or the Corporation to do so. The return component is derived as follows from Ex. SFP-99: Line 1 (9.384%) times Line 8 (50 percent capital structure) times Line 7 (total rate base of $100,000,000). The income tax allowance is calculated using a 32 percent marginal tax rate by applying the standard tax computation formula to equity return on Line 13. Line 13 of the analysis shows that the equity return on rate base is the same for the MLP and the corporation per FERC regulatory protocols. It also shows that if an income tax allowance is provided both the MLP and the Corporation, both will have an after-tax return that is equal to the required equity return on Line 13. Please compare Line 21 to Line 23. However the after-tax dollar income to the shareholder on Line 23 is less than the after-tax income to the partner on Line 23 due to the impact of double taxation.
Display C

Display B Modified to Reflect the Absence of an MLP Income Tax Allowance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MLP</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Equity Return on Rate Base</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Income Tax Allowance</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$2,208,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Revenue Required</td>
<td>$11,692,000.00</td>
<td>$13,900,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
<td>$4,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Interest Expense</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
<td>$3,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Income Taxes Paid by Pipeline</td>
<td>$-</td>
<td>$2,208,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Income for Shareholder or the MLP Partner</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
<td>$4,692,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MLP</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Taxes Paid by Partner or the MLP Shareholder at 32% rate</td>
<td>$1,501,440.00</td>
<td>$1,501,440.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>After-Tax Return to Partner or the Shareholder</td>
<td>$2,484,000.00</td>
<td>$3,190,560.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis: This analysis repeats Display B, but without an MLP income tax allowance. As with Display B, the after-tax equity return on rate base is the same for MLP and the Corporation ($4,692,000) as are the operating and interest expenses as shown on Line 13. Line 21 shows that the pretax return to the partner, and therefore the partnership, is the same as the corporate shareholder. The MLP has a lower cost of service than the corporation because the income tax allowance is omitted from its cost of service. However, the after-tax return to the partner, and therefore the partnership, stated on Line 23 is less than the required equity return on Line 13 and is also less than the after-tax return to the shareholder. As such, the partnership and the partners do not recover an adequate return on the equity invested in the partnership and the related rate structure fails the capital attraction standard.