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Appendices

PORTLAND NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

Appendices A Through J to Accompany

the Direct Testimony

of

Paul R. Moul, Managing Consultant
P. Moul & Associates, Inc.

Concerning

Fair Rate of Return

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APPENDIX A TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND, BUSINESS EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

I was awarded a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration by Drexel University in 1971. While at Drexel, I participated in the Cooperative Education Program which included employment, for one year, with American Water Works Service Company, Inc., as an internal auditor, where I was involved in the audits of several operating water companies of the American Water Works System and participated in the preparation of annual reports to regulatory agencies and assisted in other general accounting matters.

Upon graduation from Drexel University, I was employed by American Water Works Service Company, Inc., in the Eastern Regional Treasury Department where my duties included preparation of rate case exhibits for submission to regulatory agencies, as well as responsibility for various treasury functions of the thirteen New England operating subsidiaries.

In 1973, I joined the Municipal Financial Services Department of Betz Environmental Engineers, a consulting engineering firm, where I specialized in financial studies for municipal water and wastewater systems.

In 1974, I joined Associated Utility Services, Inc., now known as AUS Consultants. I held various positions with the Utility Services Group of AUS Consultants, concluding my employment there as a Senior Vice President.

In 1994, I formed P. Moul & Associates, an independent financial and regulatory consulting firm. In my capacity as Managing Consultant and for the past twenty-nine years, I have continuously studied the rate of return requirements for cost of service regulated firms. In this regard, I have supervised the preparation of rate of return studies, which were employed, in

connection with my testimony and in the past for other individuals. I have presented direct testimony on the subject of fair rate of return, evaluated rate of return testimony of other witnesses, and presented rebuttal testimony.

My studies and prepared direct testimony have been presented before thirty-two (32) federal, state and municipal regulatory commissions, consisting of: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; state public utility commissions in Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia; and the Philadelphia Gas Commission. My testimony has been offered in over 200 rate cases involving electric power, natural gas distribution and transmission, resource recovery, solid waste collection and disposal, telephone, wastewater, and water service utility companies. While my testimony has involved principally fair rate of return and financial matters, I have also testified on capital allocations, capital recovery, cash working capital, income taxes, factoring of accounts receivable, and take-or-pay expense recovery. My testimony has been offered on behalf of municipal and investor-owned public utilities and for the staff of a regulatory commission. I have also testified at an Executive Session of the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation concerning the BPU regulation of solid waste collection and disposal.

I was a co-author of a verified statement submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the 1983 Railroad Cost of Capital (Ex Parte No. 452). I was also co-author of comments submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regarding the

Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities in 1985, 1986 and 1987 (Docket Nos. RM85-19-000, RM86-12-000, RM87-35-000 and RM88-25-000). Further, I have been the consultant to the New York Chapter of the National Association of Water Companies, which represented the water utility group in the Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Consider Financial Regulatory Policies for New York Utilities (Case 91-M-0509). I have also submitted comments to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. RM99-2-000) concerning Regional Transmission Organizations and on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute in its intervention in the case of Southern California Edison Company (Docket No. ER97-2355-000).

In late 1978, I arranged for the private placement of bonds on behalf of an investor-owned public utility. I have assisted in the preparation of a report to the Delaware Public Service Commission relative to the operations of the Lincoln and Ellendale Electric Company. I was also engaged by the Delaware P.S.C. to review and report on the proposed financing and disposition of certain assets of Sussex Shores Water Company (P.S.C. Docket Nos. 24-79 and 47-79). I was a co-author of a Report on Proposed Mandatory Solid Waste Collection Ordinance prepared for the Board of County Commissioners of Collier County, Florida. I have been a consultant to the Bucks County Water and Sewer Authority concerning rates and charges for wholesale contract service with the City of Philadelphia. My municipal consulting experience also included an assignment for Baltimore County, Maryland, regarding the City/County Water Agreement for Metropolitan District customers (Circuit Court for Baltimore County in Case 34/153/87-CSP-2636).

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I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysis (formerly the National Society of Rate of Return Analysts) and have attended several Financial Forums sponsored by the Society. I attended the first National Regulatory Conference at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. I also attended an Executive Seminar sponsored by the Colgate Darden Graduate Business School of the University of Virginia concerning Regulated Utility Cost of Equity and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. In October 1984, I attended a Standard & Poor's Seminar on the Approach to Municipal Utility Ratings, and in May 1985, I attended an S&P Seminar on Telecommunications Ratings.

My lecture and speaking engagements include:

Date	Occasion	Sponsor
April 2001	Thirty-third Financial Forum	Society of Utility & Regulatory Financial Analysts
December 2000	Pennsylvania Public Utility Law Conference: Non-traditional Players in the Water Industry	Pennsylvania Bar Institute
July 2000	EEI Member Workshop Developing Incentives Rates: Application and Problems	Edison Electric Institute
February 2000	The Sixth Annual FERC Briefing	Exnet and Bruder, Gentile & Marcoux, LLP
March 1994	Seventh Annual Proceeding	Electric Utility Business Environment Conf.
May 1993	Financial School	New England Gas Assoc.
April 1993	Twenty-Fifth Financial Forum	National Society of Rate of Return Analysts
June 1992	Rate and Charges Subcommittee Annual Conference	American Water Works Association
May 1992	Rates School	New England Gas Assoc.
October 1989	Seventeenth Annual Eastern Utility Rate Seminar	Water Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Utility

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		Commissioners Florida Public Service Commission and University of Utah
October 1988	Sixteenth Annual Eastern Utility Rate Seminar	Water Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Florida Public Service Commission and University of Utah
May 1988	Twentieth Financial Forum	National Society of Rate of Return Analysts
October 1987	Fifteenth Annual Eastern Utility Rate Seminar	Water Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Florida Public Service Commission and University of Utah
September 1987	Rate Committee Meeting	American Gas Association
May 1987	Pennsylvania Chapter annual meeting	National Association of Water Companies
October 1986	Eighteenth Financial Forum	National Society of Rate of Return
October 1984	Fifth National on Utility Ratemaking Fundamentals	American Bar Association
March 1984	Management Seminar	New York State Telephone Association
February 1983	The Cost of Capital Seminar	Temple University, School of Business Admin.
May 1982	A Seminar on Regulation and The Cost of Capital	New Mexico State University, Center for Business Research and Services
October 1979	Economics of Regulation	Brown University

APPENDIX B TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

RATESETTING PRINCIPLES

Traditional cost of service regulation, as implemented by a regulatory agency engaged in ratesetting, such as the Commission, serves as a substitute for competition. In setting rates, a regulatory agency must carefully consider the public's interest in reasonably priced, as well as safe and reliable, service. The level of rates must also provide the public utility and its investors with an opportunity to earn a rate of return for the public utility and its investors that is commensurate with the risk to which the invested capital is exposed so that the public utility has access to the capital required to meet its service responsibilities to its customers. Without an opportunity to earn a fair rate of return, a public utility will be unable to attract sufficient capital required to meet its responsibilities over time.

It is important to remember that regulated firms must compete for capital in a global market with non-regulated firms, as well as municipal, state and federal governments. Traditionally, a public utility has been responsible for providing a particular type of service to its customers within a specific market area. Although this relationship with its customers has been changing, it remains quite different from a non-regulated firm, which is free to enter and exit competitive markets in accordance with available business opportunities.

As established by the landmark Bluefield and Hope cases,[1] several tests must be satisfied to demonstrate the fairness or reasonableness of the rate of return. These tests include a determination of whether the rate of return is (i) similar to that of other financially sound businesses having similar or comparable risks, (ii) sufficient to ensure confidence in the

[1] Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. P.S.C. of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

financial integrity of the public utility, and (iii) adequate to maintain and support the credit of the utility, thereby enabling it to attract, on a reasonable cost basis, the funds necessary to satisfy its capital requirements.

A fair rate of return must not only provide the utility with the ability to attract new capital, it must also be fair to existing investors. An appropriate rate of return which may have been reasonable at one point in time may become too high or too low at a subsequent point in time, based upon changing business risks, economic conditions and alternative investment opportunities. When applying the standards of a fair rate of return, it must be recognized that the end result must provide for the payment of interest on the company's debt, the payment of dividends on the company's stock, the recovery of costs associated with securing capital, the maintenance of reasonable credit quality for the company, and support of the company's financial condition, which today would include those measures of financial performance in the areas of interest coverage and adequate cash flow derived from a reasonable level of earnings.

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EVALUATION OF RISK

The rate of return required by investors is directly linked to the perceived level of risk. The greater the risk of an investment, the higher is the required rate of return necessary to compensate for that risk all else being equal. Because investors will seek the highest rate of return available, considering the risk involved, the rate of return must at least equal the investor-required, market-determined cost of capital if public utilities are to attract the necessary investment capital on reasonable terms.

In the measurement of the cost of capital, it is necessary to assess the risk of a firm. The level of risk for a firm is often defined as the uncertainty of achieving expected performance, and is sometimes viewed as a probability distribution of possible outcomes. Hence, if the uncertainty of achieving an expected outcome is high, the risk is also high. As a consequence, high risk firms must offer investors higher returns than low risk firms, which pay less to attract capital from investors. This is because the level of uncertainty, or risk of not realizing expected returns, establishes the compensation required by investors in the capital markets.

The investment risk of a firm is comprised of its business risk and financial risk. Business risk is all risk other than financial risk, and is sometimes defined as the staying power of the market demand for a firm's product or service and the resulting inherent uncertainty of realizing expected pre-tax returns on the firm's assets. Business risk encompasses all operating factors, e.g., productivity, competition, management ability, etc. that bear upon the expected pre-tax operating income attributed to the fundamental nature of a firm's business. Financial risk results from a firm's use of borrowed funds (or similar sources of capital with fixed

payments) in its capital structure, i.e., financial leverage. Thus, if a firm did not employ financial leverage by borrowing any capital, its investment risk would be represented by its business risk.

It is important to note that in evaluating the risk of regulated companies, financial leverage cannot be considered in the same context as it is for non-regulated companies. Financial leverage has a different meaning for regulated firms than for non-regulated companies. For regulated public utilities, the cost of service formula gives the benefits of financial leverage to consumers in the form of lower revenue requirements. For non-regulated companies, all benefits of financial leverage are retained by the common stockholder. Although providing the benefits to their consumers, regulated firms bear the risk of financial leverage. Therefore, a regulated firm's rate of return on common equity must recognize the greater financial risk shown by the higher leverage typically employed by public utilities.

Although no single index or group of indices can precisely quantify the relative investment risk of a firm, financial analysts use a variety of indicators to assess that risk. For example, the creditworthiness of a firm is revealed by its bond ratings. If the stock is traded, the price-earnings multiple, dividend yield, and beta coefficients (a statistical measure of a stock's relative volatility to the rest of the market) provide some gauge of overall risk. Other indicators, which are reflective of business risk, include the variability of the rate of return on equity, which is indicative of the uncertainty of actually achieving the expected earnings; operating ratios (the percentage of revenues consumed by operating expenses, depreciation, and taxes other than income tax), which are indicative of profitability; the quality of earnings, which considers the degree to which earnings are the product of accounting principles or cost

deferrals; and the level of internally generated funds. Similarly, the proportion of senior capital in a company's capitalization is the measure of financial risk, which is often analyzed in the context of the equity ratio (i.e., the complement of the debt ratio).

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COST OF EQUITY--GENERAL APPROACH

Through a fundamental financial analysis, the relative risk of a firm must be established prior to the determination of its cost of equity. Any rate of return recommendation, which lacks such a basis, will inevitably fail to provide a utility with a fair rate of return except by coincidence. With a fundamental risk analysis as a foundation, standard financial models can be employed by using informed judgment. The methods, which have been employed to measure the cost of equity, include: the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model, the Risk Premium ("RP") approach, the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") and the Comparable Earnings ("CE") approach.

The traditional DCF model, while useful in providing some insight into the cost of equity, is not an approach that should be used exclusively. The divergence of stock prices from company-specific fundamentals can provide a misleading cost of equity calculation. As reported in The Wall Street Journal on June 6, 1991, a statistical study published by Goldman Sachs indicated that only 35% of stock price growth in the 1980's could be attributed to earnings and interest rates. Further, 38% of the rise in stock prices during the 1980's was attributed to unknown factors. The Goldman Sachs study highlights the serious limitations of a model, such as DCF, which is founded upon identification of specific variables to explain stock price growth. That is to say, when stock price growth exceeds growth in a company's earnings per share, models such as DCF will misspecify investor expected returns, which are comprised of capital gains, as well as dividend receipts. As such, a combination of methods should be used to measure the cost of equity.

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The Risk Premium analysis is founded upon the prospective cost of long-term debt, i.e., the yield that the public utility must offer to raise long-term debt capital directly from investors. To that yield must be added a risk premium in recognition of the greater risk of common equity over debt. This additional risk is, of course, attributable to the fact that the payment of interest and principal to creditors has priority over the payment of dividends and return of capital to equity investors. Hence, equity investors require a higher rate of return than the yield on long-term corporate bonds.

The CAPM is a model not unlike the traditional Risk Premium. The CAPM employs the yield on a risk-free interest-bearing obligation plus a premium as compensation for risk. Aside from the reliance on the risk-free rate of return, the CAPM gives specific quantification to systematic (or market) risk as measured by beta.

The Comparable Earnings approach measures the returns expected/experienced by other non-regulated firms and has been used extensively in rate of return analysis for over a half century. However, its popularity diminished in the 1970s and 1980s with the popularization of market-based models. Recently, there has been renewed interest in this approach. Indeed, the financial community has expressed the view that the regulatory process must consider the returns, which are being achieved in the non-regulated sector so that public utilities can compete effectively in the capital markets. Indeed, with additional competition being introduced throughout the traditionally regulated public utility industry, returns expected to be realized by non-regulated firms have become increasing relevant in the ratesetting process. The Comparable Earnings approach considers directly those requirements and it fits the established

standards for a fair rate of return set forth in the Bluefield and Hope decisions. The Hope decision requires that a fair return for a utility must be equal to that earned by firms of comparable risk.

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DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") theory seeks to explain the value of an economic or financial asset as the present value of future expected cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return. Thus, if $100 is to be received in a single payment 10 years subsequent to the acquisition of an asset, and the appropriate risk-related interest rate is 8%, the present value of the asset would be $46.32 (Value = 100\cdot$ $(1.08)^{10}$) arising from the discounted future cash flow. Conversely, knowing the present $46.32 price of an asset (where price = value), the $100 future expected cash flow to be received 10 years hence shows an 8% annual rate of return implicit in the price and future cash flows expected to be received.

In its simplest form, the DCF theory considers the number of years from which the cash flow will be derived and the annual compound interest rate, which reflects the risk or uncertainty, associated with the cash flows. It is appropriate to reiterate that the dollar values to be discounted are future cash flows.

DCF theory is flexible and can be used to estimate value (or price) or the annual required rate of return under a wide variety of conditions. The theory underlying the DCF methodology can be easily illustrated by utilizing the investment horizon associated with a preferred stock not having an annual sinking fund provision. In this case, the investment horizon is infinite, which reflects the perpetuity of a preferred stock. If *P* represents price, *Kp* is the required rate of return on a preferred stock, and *D* is the annual dividend (*P* and *D* with time subscripts), the value of a preferred share is equal to the present value of the dividends to be received in the future discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate, *Kp*. In this circumstance:

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$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1 + Kp)} + \frac{D_2}{(1 + Kp)^2} + \frac{D_3}{(1 + Kp)^3} + \ldots + \frac{D_n}{(1 + Kp)^n}$$

If $D_1 = D_2 = D_3 = \ldots D_n$ as is the case for preferred stock, and *n* approaches infinity, as is the case for non-callable preferred stock without a sinking fund, then this equation reduces to:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{Kp}$$

This equation can be used to solve for the annual rate of return on a preferred stock when the current price and subsequent annual dividends are known. For example, with D_1 = \$1.00, and P_0 = \$10, then *Kp* = \$1.00 ÷ \$10, or 10%.

The dividend discount equation, first shown, is the generic DCF valuation model for all equities, both preferred and common. While preferred stock generally pays a constant dividend, permitting the simplification subsequently noted, common stock dividends are not constant. Therefore, absent some other simplifying condition, it is necessary to rely upon the generic form of the DCF. If, however, it is assumed that D_1, D_2, D_3, **…**D_n are systematically related to one another by a constant growth rate *(g)*, so that $D_0 (1 + g) = D_1$, $D_1 (1 + g) = D_2$, $D_2 (1 + g) = D_3$ and so on approaching infinity, and if *Ks* (the required rate of return on a common stock) is greater than *g*, then the DCF equation can be reduced to:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{Ks - g} \quad or \quad P_0 = \frac{D_0 (1 + g)}{Ks - g}$$

which is the periodic form of the "Gordon" model.[1] Proof of the DCF equation is found in all modern basic finance textbooks. This DCF equation can be easily solved as:

$$Ks = \frac{D_0 (1 + g)}{P_0} + g$$

which is the periodic form of the Gordon Model commonly applied in estimating equity rates of return in rate cases. When used for this purpose, *Ks* is the annual rate of return on common equity demanded by investors to induce them to hold a firm's common stock. Therefore, the variables D_0, P_0 and g must be estimated in the context of the market for equities, so that the rate of return, which a public utility is permitted the opportunity to earn, has meaning and reflects the investor-required cost rate.

Application of the Gordon model with market derived variables is straightforward. For example, using the most recent prior annualized dividend (D_0) of \$0.80, the current price (P_0) of \$10.00, and the investor expected dividend growth rate (g) of 5%, the solution of the DCF formula provides a 13.4% rate of return. The dividend yield component in this instance is 8.4%, and the capital gain component is 5%, which together represent the total 13.4% annual rate of return required by investors. The capital gain component of the total return may be calculated with two adjacent future year prices. For example, in the eleventh year of the holding period, the price per share would be \$17.10 as compared with the price per share of \$16.29 in the tenth year which demonstrates the 5% annual capital gain yield.

[1] Although the popular application of the DCF model is often attributed to the work of Myron J. Gordon in the mid-1950's, J. B. Williams exposited the DCF model in its present form nearly two decades earlier.

Some DCF devotees believe that it is more appropriate to estimate the required return on equity with a model which permits the use of multiple growth rates. This may be a plausible approach to DCF, where investors expect different dividend growth rates in the near term and long run. If two growth rates, one near term and one long-run, are to be used in the context of a price *(P_0)* of $10.00, a dividend *($D_0$)* of $0.80, a near-term growth rate of 5.5%, and a long-run expected growth rate of 5.0% beginning at year 6, the required rate of return is 13.57% solved with a computer by iteration.

Cash Yield

The historical annual cash yields calculated with dividend payments for the Pipeline Group are shown on Schedule 3. The 2002-2006 five-year average cash yield was 5.1% for the Pipeline Group. The monthly cash yields for the past twelve months are shown graphically on Schedule 5. These cash yields reflect an adjustment to the month-end closing prices to remove the pro rata accumulation of the quarterly cash amount since the last ex-dividend date.

The ex-dividend date usually occurs two business days before the record date of the cash payment (i.e., the date by which a shareholder must own the shares to be entitled to the cash payment--usually about two to three weeks prior to the actual payment). During a quarter (here defined as 91 days), the price of a stock moves up ratably by the cash amount as the ex-dividend date approaches. The stock's price then falls by the amount of the cash payment on the ex-dividend date. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the fraction of the quarterly cash payment since the time of the last ex-dividend date and to remove that amount from the price. This adjustment reflects normal recurring pricing of stocks in the market, and establishes a price which will reflect the true yield on a stock.

A six-month average cash yield has been used to recognize the prospective orientation of the ratesetting process as explained in the direct testimony. For the purpose of a DCF calculation, the average cash yields must be adjusted to reflect the prospective nature of the cash payments, i.e., the higher expected cash payments for the future rather than the recent cash payment annualized. An adjustment to the cash yield component, when computed with annualized cash payments, is required based upon investor expectation of quarterly increases.

I have computed the monthly yields for the Pipeline Group with the quarterly payments for those companies and have provided those data on Schedule 5. The Commission previously expressed the belief that a portion of the distributions represent a return of capital (see 112 FERC ¶61,050). In that decision, the Commission seemed to invite the use of MLP data under certain circumstances. The Commission stated:

> The Commission found that it was not clear from the evidence presented by HIOS that the "dividend" figures supplied by HIOS for the MLPs it proposed to include in the proxy group are comparable to the corporate dividends the Commission uses in its DCF analysis. The Commission explained that partnerships make distributions to their partners, rather than pay dividends to stockholders. Those distributions may include payment to the partners of a share of the partnership's earnings; to that extent the distribution is comparable to corporate dividend payments. However, the distributions may also include a return of a portion of the partners' original investment, unlike a corporate dividend. Use of a distribution payment that includes both earnings and a return of investment as an MLPs' "dividend" for purposes of a DCF analysis would skew the DCF results, since the dividend yield would appear higher than it actually was. Thus, the Commission said it would not consider including an MLP in the proxy group, unless the record demonstrates that the distribution used as the "dividend" includes only a payment of earnings and not a return of investment.

It is reasonable to use the entire, unadjusted cash distributions of the MLPs because they have been able to grow their distributions for long periods of time in spite of the

Commission's observations. MLPs have been able to achieve growing distributions through organic growth, acquisition of new projects, drop-down of assets from sponsoring general partners, and by issuing new units that are accretive to growth. Further, unadjusted MLP cash yields are appropriate in this case because PNGTS is a partnership.

First, much of what the Commission has observed regarding the distributions for the MLPs relate to income tax and accounting issues. Regarding the issue of income taxes, the tax bases of the unitholders are reduced by distributions in excess of taxable earnings. Hence, when the units are sold by investors, the profit will be higher than just the difference between the purchase and sales price because the tax basis has been reduced. For accounting purposes, distributions for most MLPs are equal to 100% of distributable cash flow that is determined (by the MLP) without regard to depreciation expense (a non-cash charge to earnings) and with an allowance for maintenance capital expenditures.[2] This policy has a number of implications. First, in the early life of a pipeline, maintenance capital expenditures will be much less than book depreciation expense. However, as a pipeline ages, maintenance capital expenditure would be expected to increase and there is the prospect that distributable cash flow could be less than earnings when maintenance capital expenditures exceed book depreciation expense.

Second, in the context of growth, a MLP generates growth principally through investment in new projects consisting of those related to organic growth, drop-down projects from sponsors of the MLPs, and acquisition of new projects. Growth is also enhanced by the

[2] The term "maintenance capital expenditures" means cash capital expenditures made to maintain the throughput, deliverable capacity, or storage capacity (assuming normal operating conditions, including down-time and maintenance) of the assets of the Company. Generally, maintenance capital expenditures are not revenue producing on an incremental basis or expense reducing in nature.

incentives provided to the general partners through IDRs and through borrowings to finance new proejcts by MLPs.

The procedure to adjust the average cash yield for the expectation of an increase in the cash payment during the initial investment period will be at a rate of one-half the growth component, developed below. The DCF equation, showing the quarterly cash payments as D_0, may be stated in this fashion:

$$K = \frac{D_0(1+g)^0 + D_0(1+g)^0 + D_0(1+g)^1 + D_0(1+g)^1}{P_0} + g$$

The adjustment factor, based upon one-half the expected growth rate developed in my direct testimony, will be 4.250% (8.50% x .5) for the Pipeline Group, which assumes that two cash payments will be at the expected higher rate during the initial investment period. Using the six-month average cash yield as a base, the prospective (forward) cash yield would be 5.17% (4.96% x 1.04250) for the Pipeline Group.

Another DCF model that reflects the discrete growth in the quarterly cash payments *(D_0)* is as follows:

$$K = \frac{D_0(1+g)^{.25} + D_0(1+g)^{.50} + D_0(1+g)^{.75} + D_0(1+g)^{1.00}}{P_0} + g$$

This procedure confirms the reasonableness of the forward cash yield previously calculated. The quarterly discrete adjustment provides a cash yield of 5.22% (4.96% x 1.05258) for the Pipeline Group. The use of an adjustment is required for the periodic form of the DCF in order to properly recognize that cash payments grow on a discrete basis.

In either of the preceding DCF cash yield adjustments, there is no recognition for the compound returns attributed to the quarterly cash payments. Investors have the opportunity to reinvest quarterly cash receipts. Recognizing the compounding of the periodic quarterly cash

$$k = \left[\left(1 + \frac{D_0}{P_0} \right)^4 - 1 \right] + g$$

payments *(D_0)*, results in a third DCF formulation:

This DCF equation provides no further recognition of growth in the quarterly cash payment. Combining discrete quarterly growth with quarterly compounding would provide the following DCF formulation, stating the quarterly cash payments *(D_0)*:

$$k = \left[\left(1 + \frac{D_0 (1 + g)^{.25}}{P_0} \right)^4 - 1 \right] + g$$

A compounding of the quarterly cash yield provides another procedure to recognize the necessity for an adjusted cash yield. The unadjusted average quarterly cash yield was 1.2400% (4.96% ÷ 4) for the Pipeline Group. The compound cash yield would be 5.16% (1.012655^4-1) for the Pipeline, recognizing quarterly cash payments in a forward-looking manner. These cash yields conform with investors' expectations in the context of reinvestment of their cash payments.

For the Pipeline Group, a 5.18% forward-looking cash yield is the average (5.17% + 5.22% + 5.16% = 15.55% ÷ 3) of the adjusted cash yield using the form D_0/P_0 *(1+.5g)*, the

cash yield recognizing discrete quarterly growth, and the quarterly compound cash yield with discrete quarterly growth.

Growth Rate

If viewed in its infinite form, the DCF model is represented by the discounted value of an endless stream of growing cash payments. It would, however, require 100 years of future cash payments so that the discounted value of those payments would equate to the present price so that the discount rate and the rate of return shown by the simplified Gordon form of the DCF model would be about the same. A century of cash receipts represents an unrealistic investment horizon from almost any perspective. Because stocks are not held by investors forever, the growth in the share value (i.e., capital appreciation, or capital gains yield) is most relevant to investors' total return expectations. Hence, investor expected returns in the equity market are provided by capital appreciation of the investment as well as receipt of cash payments. As such, the sale price of a stock can be viewed as a liquidating cash payment which can be discounted along with the annual cash receipts during the investment holding period to arrive at the investor expected return.

In its constant growth form, the DCF assumes that with a constant return on book common equity and constant payout ratio, a firm's earnings per share, cash payments per share and book value per share will grow at the same constant rate, absent any external financing by a firm. Because these constant growth assumptions do not actually prevail in the capital markets, the capital appreciation potential of an equity investment is best measured by the expected growth in earnings per share. Since the traditional form of the DCF assumes no change in the price-earnings multiple, the value of a firm's equity will grow at the same rate as earnings per

share. Hence, the capital gains yield is best measured by earnings per share growth using company-specific variables.

Investors consider both historical and projected data in the context of the expected growth rate for a firm. An investor can compute historical growth rates using compound growth rates or growth rate trend lines. Otherwise, an investor can rely upon published growth rates as provided in widely-circulated, influential publications. However, a traditional constant growth DCF analysis that is limited to such inputs suffers from the assumption of no change in the price-earnings multiple, i.e., that the value of a firm's equity will grow at the same rate as earnings. Some of the factors which actually contribute to investors' expectations of earnings growth and which should be considered in assessing those expectations, are: (i) the earnings rate on existing equity, (ii) the portion of earnings not paid out in cash, (iii) sales of additional common equity, (iv) reacquisition of common stock previously issued, (v) changes in financial leverage, (vi) acquisitions of new business opportunities, (vii) profitable liquidation of assets, and (viii) repositioning of existing assets. The realities of the equity market regarding total return expectations, however, also reflect factors other than these inputs. Therefore, the DCF model contains overly restrictive limitations when the growth component is stated in terms of earnings per share (the basis for the capital gains yield) or cash payments per share (the basis for the infinite DCF model). In these situations, there is inadequate recognition of the capital gains yields arising from stock price growth which could exceed earnings or cash payment growth.

To assess the growth component of the DCF, analysts' projections of future growth influence investor expectations as explained above. One influential publication is The Value

Line Investment Survey which contains estimated future projections of growth. The Value Line Investment Survey provides growth estimates which are stated within a common economic environment for the purpose of measuring relative growth potential. The basis for these projections is the Value Line 3 to 5 year hypothetical economy. The Value Line hypothetical economic environment is represented by components and subcomponents of the National Income Accounts which reflect in the aggregate assumptions concerning the unemployment rate, manpower productivity, price inflation, corporate income tax rate, high-grade corporate bond interest rates, and Fed policies. Individual estimates begin with the correlation of sales, earnings and cash payments of a company to appropriate components or subcomponents of the future National Income Accounts. These calculations provide a consistent basis for the published forecasts. Value Line's evaluation of a specific company's future prospects are considered in the context of specific operating characteristics that influence the published projections. Of particular importance for regulated firms, Value Line considers the regulatory quality, rates of return recently authorized, the historic ability of the firm to actually experience the authorized rates of return, the firm's budgeted capital spending, the firm's financing forecast, and the payout ratio. The wide circulation of this source and frequent reference to Value Line in financial circles indicate that this publication has an influence on investor judgment with regard to expectations for the future.

There are other sources of earnings growth forecasts. One of these sources is the Institutional Brokers Estimate System ("IBES"). The IBES service provides data on consensus earnings per share forecasts and five-year earnings growth rate estimates. The publisher of IBES has been purchased by Thomson/First Call. The IBES forecasts have been integrated into

the First Call consensus growth forecasts. The earnings estimates are obtained from financial analysts at brokerage research departments and from institutions whose securities analysts are projecting earnings for companies in the First Call universe of companies. Other services that tabulate earnings forecasts and publish them are Zacks Investment Research and Market Guide (which is provided over the Internet by Reuters). As with the IBES/First Call forecasts, Zacks and Reuters/Market Guide provide consensus forecasts collected from analysts for most publically traded companies.

In each of these publications, forecasts of earnings per share for the current and subsequent year receive prominent coverage. That is to say, IBES/First Call, Zacks, Reuters/Market Guide, and Value Line show estimates of current-year earnings and projections for the next year. While the DCF model typically focusses upon long-run estimates of growth, stock prices are clearly influenced by current and near-term earnings prospects. Therefore, the near-term earnings per share growth rates should also be factored into a growth rate determination. A historical comparison of the IBES/First Call growth rates as they relate to actual market performance is provided below:

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Buckeye Partners, L.P.																	Change	Percent Change	Per unit from earliest	of purchase price in
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		year to 2006 plus	earliest year
Earnings/ Share	1.98	2.05	2.03	$1.91	$2.05	$2.41	$2.38	$2.56	$2.65	$2.64	$2.76	$2.69	$2.65	$2.90	46.46%	2.98%		
Distributions/ Share	1.4	1.4	1.5	$1.72	$2.10	$2.18	$2.40	$2.45	$2.50	$2.54	$2.64	$2.83	$3.03	$3.23	130.71%	**6.64%**	75.17	438.82%
Payout Ratio				90.05%	102.44%	90.46%	100.84%	95.70%	94.34%	96.21%	95.65%	105.20%	114.34%	111.38%				
Book Value/ unit	10.13	10.79	11.33	11.23	11.06	11.72	12.90	12.99	13.15	13.03	17.54	19.88	20.25	20.00	97.43%	5.37%		
Unit Price close	17.13	17.06	21.31	28.97	29.00	26.00	28.88	37.48	38.40	45.35	42.32	42.22	46.48		171.34%	8.67%		
IRR	**-17.13**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**1.72**	**2.1**	**2.18**	**2.4**	**2.45**	**2.5**	**2.54**	**2.64**	**2.83**	**49.51**				**IRR**	**17.01%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast	4.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	4.00%	5.00%	4.00%				**4.77%**	
DCF	**12.17%**	**13.79%**	**13.07%**	**12.25%**	**12.52%**	**14.23%**	**13.48%**	**11.67%**	**11.61%**	**10.82%**	**10.69%**	**12.18%**	**10.95%**				**DCF**	**12.26%**
Value Line ret'n on															avg			
partner cap			17.90%	16.10%	18.60%	20.60%	18.50%	19.70%	20.10%	20.10%	13.70%	13.20%	13.00%	14.50%	17.17%			
																Annualized	Accumulation	Accumulation as percen
Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P. (Lakehead before 2001)															Change	Percent Change	Per unit from earliest	of purchase price in
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		year to 2006 plus	earliest year
Earnings/ Share	2.61	2.55	2.11	3.02	$3.07	$2.48	$1.78	$0.98	$1.76	$1.93	$2.06	$0.77	$2.98		14.18%	1.11%		
Distributions/ Share	2.51	2.55	2.6	2.92	$3.36	$3.49	$3.50	$3.50	$3.63	$3.70	$3.70	$3.70	$3.70	$3.70	47.41%	**3.29%**	92.25	253.61%
Payout Ratio	96.17%	100.00%	123.22%	96.69%	109.45%	140.73%	196.63%	357.14%	206.25%	191.71%	179.61%	480.52%						
Book Value/ unit	6.01	0.9	0.9	19.02	$18.73	$20.08	$18.36	$19.54	$22.31	$24.26	$23.65	$20.28			237.44%	11.69%		
Unit Price close	36.375	25.5	34.5	43.685	$48.50	$34.81	$41.25	$42.06	$42.15	$49.90	$51.57	$43.90	$49.39		35.78%	2.58%		
IRR	**-36.38**	**2.55**	**2.6**	**2.92**	**3.36**	**3.49**	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.63**	**3.7**	**3.7**	**3.7**	**53.09**				**IRR**	**10.51%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast	6.00%	6.00%	5.00%	5.00%	6.00%	7.00%	8.00%	7.00%	8.00%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%	4.00%				**5.92%**	
DCF	**13.01%**	**16.20%**	**13.46%**	**12.69%**	**13.20%**	**17.05%**	**16.48%**	**15.63%**	**16.78%**	**12.41%**	**12.17%**	**13.43%**	**11.49%**				**DCF**	**14.15%**
Value Line ret'n on															Avg			
partner cap					17.90%	13.40%	11.20%	6.00%	7.90%	8.50%	9.90%	5.20%			10.00%			
																Annualized	Accumulation	Accumulation as perce
Enterprise Products Partners, L.P. (EPD)															Change	Percent Change	Per unit from earliest	of purchase pprice in
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		year to 2006 plus	earliest year
Earnings/ Share					$0.31	$0.82	$1.32	$1.39	$0.54	$0.58	$0.87	$0.91	$1.20	$1.35	335.48%	**17.76%**		
Distributions/ Share					$0.16	$0.90	$1.05	$1.16	$1.33	$1.44	$1.54	$1.66	$1.79	$1.95	1118.75%	**32.03%**	40.01	538.49%
Payout Ratio					51.61%	109.76%	79.55%	83.45%	246.30%	248.28%	177.01%	182.42%	149.17%	144.44%				
Book Value/ unit					4.16	5.86	5.54	6.58	6.94	7.86	14.45	14.87	15.50	15.75	278.61%	15.94%		
Unit Price close					7.43	9.21	15.71	23.52	19.40	24.55	25.86	24.01	28.98		290.04%	18.55%		
IRR					**-7.43**	**0.9**	**1.05**	**1.16**	**1.33**	**1.44**	**1.54**	**1.66**	**30.77**				**IRR**	**28.85%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast					8.00%	9.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	8.00%	8.00%				**9.22%**	
DCF					**20.11%**	**20.40%**	**17.38%**	**15.65%**	**17.42%**	**16.27%**	**16.42%**	**15.46%**	**14.73%**				**DCF**	**17.09%**
Value Line ret'n on															Avg			
partner cap					6.60%	15.20%	23.60%	21.10%	8.80%	8.20%	5.00%	7.40%	9.00%	10.00%	11.49%			
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. KMP (formerly Enron Liquids Pipeline)															Change	Percent Change	Per unit from earliest	of purchase pprice in
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		year to 2006 plus	earliest year
																	Proceeds of sale in 2006	
Earnings/ Share	$0.47	$0.43	$0.45	$0.51	$1.05	$1.32	$1.34	$1.56	$1.96	$2.00	$2.22	$1.58	$2.00	$2.30	389.36%	12.99%		
Distributions/ Share	$0.63	$0.63	$0.63	$0.81	$1.19	$1.39	$1.60	$2.08	$2.36	$2.58	$2.81	$3.07	$3.25	$3.40	439.68%	**13.85%**	70.93	1151.46%
Payout Ratio	134.04%	146.51%	140.00%	158.82%	113.33%	105.30%	119.40%	133.33%	120.41%	129.00%	126.58%	194.30%	162.50%	147.83%				
Book Value/ unit	5.42	4.68	4.50	5.47	13.81	14.87	15.43	18.72	18.48	18.13	18.32	15.86	16.80	18.00	232.10%	9.67%		
Unit Price close	6.16	6.09	6.90	18.06	18.12	20.71	28.15	37.82	35.00	49.27	44.33	47.82	47.90		677.60%	18.64%		
IRR	**-6.16**	**0.63**	**0.63**	**0.81**	**1.19**	**1.39**	**1.6**	**2.08**	**2.36**	**2.58**	**2.81**	**3.07**	**51.15**				**IRR**	**28.96%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast		5.00%	5.00%	13.00%	14.00%	15.00%	15.00%	14.00%	13.00%	9.00%	8.00%	8.00%	7.00%				**10.50%**	
DCF		**15.34%**	**16.74%**	**19.59%**	**21.67%**	**22.73%**	**22.39%**	**20.24%**	**20.37%**	**14.70%**	**14.93%**	**14.80%**	**14.10%**				**DCF**	**18.13%**
Value Line ret'n on															Avg			
partner cap			10.10%	11.80%	8.60%	9.90%	13.10%	14.00%	17.80%	19.80%	21.30%	27.20%	20.00%	21.50%	16.26%			
TEPPCO Partners LP															Change	Percent Change	year to 2006 plus	earliest year
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		Proceeds of sale in 2006	
Earnings/ Share	1.57	1.54	1.90	1.95	1.61	1.91	1.89	1.84	1.79	1.46	1.61	1.71	1.75	1.95	24.20%	1.68%		
Distributions/ Share	1.20	1.33	1.43	1.55	1.75	1.85	2.00	2.15	2.35	2.50	2.64	2.68	2.70	2.80	133.33%	**6.73%**	66.44	260.55%
Payout Ratio	76.43%	86.36%	75.26%	79.49%	108.70%	96.86%	105.82%	116.85%	131.28%	171.23%	163.98%	156.73%						
Book Value/ unit	9.19	9.41	9.85	10.25	7.67	7.90	9.58	13.10	16.34	17.72	16.74	18.05	16.50	15.75	71.38%	4.23%		
Unit Price close	25.50	36.38	41.75	52.38	24.56	19.31	24.56	30.00	27.75	40.30	39.39	34.84	40.31		58.08%	3.89%		
IRR	**-25.50**	**1.33**	**1.43**	**1.55**	**1.75**	**1.85**	**2**	**2.15**	**2.35**	**2.5**	**2.64**	**2.68**	**43.01**				**IRR**	**10.21%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast	5.00%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	5.00%	6.00%	6.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%	5.00%	5.00%				**5.85%**	
DCF	**10.22%**	**7.93%**	**7.71%**	**7.34%**	**12.53%**	**16.36%**	**14.75%**	**15.83%**	**17.01%**	**14.55%**	**14.80%**	**12.75%**	**11.95%**				**DCF**	**12.59%**
Value Line ret'n on															Avg			
partner cap			20.20%	20.20%	23.50%	31.40%	24.60%	16.90%	13.20%	11.00%	13.90%	13.50%	15.00%	17.00%	18.37%			
															Percent	Annualized	Per unit from earliest	of purchase pprice in
Kinder Morgan Inc. KMI (was KN Energy)															Change	Percent Change	year to 2006 plus	earliest year
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	earliest to latest		Proceeds of sale in 2006	
Earnings/ Share	$0.81	$1.22	$1.43	$1.63	$1.10	$0.96	$1.28	$1.97	$2.78	$3.08	3.81	4.43	5.00	5.40	566.67%	15.71%		
Dividends/ Share	$0.65	$0.67	$0.70	$0.73	$0.76	$0.65	$0.20	$0.20	$0.30	$1.10	2.25	2.90	3.50	3.75	476.92%	**14.43%**	120.36	760.33%
Payout Ratio	80.25%	54.92%	48.95%	44.79%	69.09%	67.71%	15.63%	10.15%	10.79%	35.71%	59.06%	65.46%	70.00%	69.44%				
Book Value/ unit	9.52	10.13	11.44	12.62	17.74	14.79	15.70	18.24	19.35	21.55	23.19	29.34	30.75	32.30	239.29%	9.85%		
Unit Price close	15.83	19.42	26.17	36.12	24.25	20.18	52.18	55.69	42.27	59.10	73.13	91.95	105.75		568.04%	17.15%		
IRR	**-15.83**	**0.67**	**0.7**	**0.73**	**0.76**	**0.65**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.3**	**1.1**	**2.25**	**2.9**	**109.25**				**IRR**	**19.77%**
IBES December earnings																	**IBES Avg**	
growth forecast		10.00%	10.00%	13.00%	13.00%	13.00%	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	12.00%	12.00%	11.00%	12.00%				**13.83%**	
DCF		**13.60%**	**12.79%**	**15.10%**	**15.68%**	**13.99%**	**20.38%**	**20.54%**	**22.60%**	**15.81%**	**15.97%**	**14.81%**	**15.55%**				**DCF**	**16.40%**
Value Line ret'n on																		
equity			12.10%	12.60%	5.80%	4.60%	8.20%	10.60%	14.60%	14.30%	16.60%	14.10%	16.50%	17.00%	12.25%			
	Note: Value Line 2006 earnings, distributions, book values and returns on partner capital are estimated since final data are not available, and the values for 2007 are forecasts.																	
Average IRR																	**Average IRR**	**19.22%**
Average DCF																	**Average DCF**	**15.11%**
																	Δ	**4.11%**

Although forecasts of future performance are investor influencing[3], equity investors may also rely upon the observations of past performance. Investors' expectations of future growth rates may be determined, in part, by an analysis of historical growth rates. It is apparent that any serious investor would advise himself/herself of historical performance prior to taking an investment position in a firm. Earnings per share and cash payments per share represent the principal financial variables which influence investor growth expectations.

Other financial variables are sometimes considered in rate case proceedings. For example, a company's internal growth rate, derived from the return rate on book common equity and the related retention ratio, is sometimes considered. This growth rate measure is represented by the Value Line forecast "*B*x*R*" shown on Schedule 7. Internal growth rates are often used as a proxy for book value growth. Unfortunately, this measure of growth is often not reflective of investor-expected growth. This is especially important when there is an indication of a prospective change in payout ratio, earned return on book common equity, change in market-to-book ratios or other fundamental changes in the character of the business. Nevertheless, I have also shown the historical and projected growth rates in book value per share and internal growth rates.

Leverage Adjustment

As noted previously, the divergence of stock prices from book values creates a conflict within the DCF model when the results of a market-derived cost of equity are applied to the common equity account measured at book value in the ratesetting context. This is the situation today where the market price of stock exceeds its book value for most companies. This

[3] As shown in a National Bureau of Economic Research monograph by John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices, University of Chicago Press 1982.

divergence of price and book value also creates a financial risk difference, whereby the capitalization of a utility measured at its market value contains relatively less debt and more equity than the capitalization measured at its book value. It is a well-accepted fact of financial theory that a relatively higher proportion of equity in the capitalization has less financial risk than another capital structure more heavily weighted with debt. This is the situation for the Pipeline Group where the market value of its capitalization contains more equity than is shown by the book capitalization. The following comparison demonstrates this situation where the market capitalization is developed by taking the "Fair Value of Financial Instruments" (Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments -- Statement of Financial Accounting Standards ("FAS") No. 107) as shown in the annual report for these companies and the market value of the common equity using the price of stock. The comparison of capital structure ratios is:

	Pipeline Group	
	Capitalization at Market Value (Fair Value)	Capitalization at Book Value (Carrying Amounts)
Long-term Debt	36.96%	59.77%
Preferred Stock	0.51	0.68
Common Equity	62.53	39.55
Total	100.00%	100.00%

With regard to the capital structure ratios represented by the carrying amounts shown above, there are some variances from the ratios shown on Schedule 3. These variances arise from the use of balance sheet values in computing the capital structure ratios shown on Schedules 3 and 4 and the use of the Carrying Amounts of the Financial Instruments according to FAS 107 (the Carrying Amounts were used in the table shown above to be comparable to the Fair Value

amounts used in the comparison calculations).

With the capital ratios calculated above, is necessary to first calculate the cost of equity for a firm without any leverage. The cost of equity for an unleveraged firm using the capital structure ratios calculated with market values is:

ku = ke - (((ku - i) 1-t) D / E) - (ku - d) P / E

11.55% = 13.68%-(((11.55%-6.11%) .65) 36.96%/62.53%)-(11.55%-6.13%) 0.51%/62.53%

where *ku* = cost of equity for an all-equity firm, *ke* = market determined cost equity, *i* = cost of debt[4], *d* = dividend rate on preferred stock[5], *D* = debt ratio, *P* = preferred stock ratio, and *E* = common equity ratio. The formula shown above indicates that the cost of equity for a firm with 100% equity is 11.55% for the Pipeline Group when using the market value of capitalization. Having determined the cost of equity for a firm with 100% equity, the rate of return on common equity associated with the book value capital structure is:

ke = ku + (((ku - i) 1-t) D / E) + (ku - d) P / E

16.99% = 11.55% + (((11.55%-6.11%).65) 59.77%/39.55%) + (11.55%-6.13%) 0.68%/39.55%

Following the same procedure with the indicated results of the FERC model, the leverage adjustment would be:

ke = ku - (((ku - i) 1-t) D / E) - (ku - d) P / E

11.70% =13.90% - (((11.70%-6.11%) .65) 36.96%/62.53%)- (11.70%-6.13%) 0.51%/62.53%

ke = ku + (((ku - i) 1-t) D / E) + (ku - d) P / E

[4] The cost of debt is the six-month average yield on Moody's A rated public utility bonds.

[5] The cost of preferred is the six-month average yield on Moody's "a" rated preferred stock.

1 17.29% =11.70% + (((11.70% - 6.11%).65) 59.77%/39.55%)+(11.70%-6.13%) 0.68%/39.55%

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Two-stage DCF

1 For illustrative purposes, provided below is a DCF calculation that includes MLPs and gives
2 short term growth two-thirds weight and long term growth one-third weight.

PNGTS Return on Equity Calculation
Six-months ended January 2008

Pipeline Group	Six Month Div. Yield	IBES Growth Rate	GDP Growth Rate	IBES 67% Weighted	GDP 33% Weighted	Combined Growth Rate	Adjusted Dividend Yield	DCF Return
Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, L.P	5.67%	9.50%	4.58%	6.33%	1.53%	7.86%	5.89%	13.75%
El Paso Corporation	0.96%	10.60%	4.58%	7.07%	1.53%	8.60%	1.00%	9.60%
El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P.		12.00%	4.58%	8.00%	1.53%	9.53%		
Enbridge Energy Partners, L.P.	7.38%	5.00%	4.58%	3.33%	1.53%	4.86%	7.56%	12.42%
Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.	6.92%	7.00%	4.58%	4.67%	1.53%	6.20%	7.13%	13.33%
Enterprise Products Partners, L.	6.39%	7.58%	4.58%	5.05%	1.53%	6.58%	6.60%	13.18%
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners,	6.79%	7.60%	4.58%	5.07%	1.53%	6.60%	7.01%	13.61%
ONEOK Partners, L.P.	6.54%	6.00%	4.58%	4.00%	1.53%	5.53%	6.72%	12.25%
Southern Union Co.	1.57%	8.53%	4.58%	5.69%	1.53%	7.22%	1.63%	8.85%
Spectra Energy Corp.	3.60%	6.03%	4.58%	4.02%	1.53%	5.55%	3.70%	9.25%
Spectra Energy Partners	4.76%	10.67%	4.58%	7.11%	1.53%	8.64%	4.97%	13.61%
TC Pipelines, L.P.	7.23%	5.00%	4.58%	3.33%	1.53%	4.86%	7.41%	12.27%
Williams (The) Companies	1.19%	17.00%	4.58%	11.33%	1.53%	12.86%	1.27%	14.13%
Williams Partners L.P.	5.38%	11.67%	4.58%	7.78%	1.53%	9.31%	5.63%	14.94%
				Average				**12.40%**
				Median				**13.18%**
				High				**14.94%**
				Low				**8.85%**
				Midpoint				**11.90%**

Energy Information Administration ("EIA") Table A19

Real Gross Domestic Product

Year	EIA	
2011	$13,175	
2030	$22,494	2.86%

GDP Chain-Type Price Index

Year	EIA	
2011	1.276	
2030	1.815	1.87%
GDP Growth		4.78%

Global Insight

Year	GI	
2011	$16,886.6	
2036	$50,589.7	
GDP Growth		4.49%

Social Security Administration("SSA") Table VI.F.4

Year	SSA	
2011	$16,937	
2056	$120,841	
GDP Growth		4.46%
Average		4.58%

Exhibit No. PNG - 11

APPENDIX F TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT

The rate of return on common equity must be high enough to avoid dilution when additional common equity is issued. In this regard, the rate of return on book common equity for public utilities requires recognition of specific factors other than just the market-determined cost of equity. A market price of common stock above book value is necessary to attract future capital on reasonable terms in competition with other seekers of equity capital. Non-regulated companies traditionally have experienced common stock prices consistently above book value. For a public utility to be competitive in the capital markets, similar recognition should be provided, given the understated value of net plant investment, which is represented by historical, costs much lower than current cost. Moreover, the market value of a public utility stock must be above book value to provide recognition of market pressure, issuance and selling expenses, which reduce the net proceeds realized from the sale of new shares of common stock. A market price of stock above book value will maintain the financial integrity of shares previously issued and is necessary to avoid dilution when new shares are offered.

The rate of return on common equity should provide for the underwriting discount and company issuance expenses associated with the sale of new common stock. It is the net proceeds, after payment of these costs that are available to the company, because the issuance costs are paid from the initial offering price to the public. Market pressure occurs when the news of an impending issue of new common shares impacts the pre-offering price of stock. The stock price often declines because of the prospect of an increase in the supply of shares.

The difficulty encountered in measuring market pressure relates to the time frame considered, general market conditions, and management action during the offering period. An indication of

negative market pressure could be the product of the techniques employed to measure pressure and not the prospect of an additional supply of shares related to the new issue.

Even in the situation where a company will not issue common stock during the near term, the flotation cost adjustment factor should be applied to the common equity cost rate. A public utility must be in a competitive capital attraction posture at all times. To deny recognition of a market value of equity above book value would be discriminatory when other comparable companies receive an allowance in this regard. Moreover, to reduce the return rate on common equity by failing to recognize this factor would likewise result in a company being less competitive in the bond market, because a lower resulting overall rate of return would provide less competitive fixed-charge coverage. It cannot be said that a public utility's stock price already considers an allowance for flotation costs. This is because investors in either fixed-income bonds or common stocks seek their required rate of return by reference to alternative investment opportunities, and are not concerned with the issuance costs incurred by a firm borrowing long-term debt or issuing common equity.

Historical data concerning issuance and selling expenses (excluding market pressure) is shown on Schedule 8. To adjust for the cost of raising new common equity capital, the rate of return on common equity should recognize an appropriate multiple in order to allow for a market price of stock above book value. This would provide recognition for flotation costs, which are shown to be 3.9% for public equity issuances by regulated enterprises from 2002 to 2006. Because these costs are not recovered elsewhere, they must be recognized in the rate of return. Since I apply the flotation cost to the entire cost of equity, I have only used a

modification factor of 1.02, which is applied to the unadjusted DCF-measure of the cost of equity to cover issuance expense. If the modification factor were applied to only a portion of the cost of equity, such as just the dividend yield, then a higher factor would be necessary.

Exhibit No. PNG - 11

APPENDIX G TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

INTEREST RATES

Interest rates can be viewed in their traditional nominal terms (i.e., the stated rate of interest) and in real terms (i.e., the stated rate of interest less the expected rate of inflation). Absent consideration of inflation, the real rate of interest is determined generally by supply factors which are influenced by investors willingness to forego current consumption (i.e., to save) and demand factors that are influenced by the opportunities to derive income from productive investments. Added to the real rate of interest is compensation required by investors for the inflationary impact of the declining purchasing power of their income received in the future. While interest rates are clearly influenced by the changing annual rate of inflation, it is important to note that the expected rate of inflation that is reflected in current interest rates may be quite different than the prevailing rate of inflation.

Rates of interest also vary by the type of interest bearing instrument. Investors require compensation for the risk associated with the term of the investment and the risk of default. The risk associated with the term of the investment is usually shown by the yield curve, i.e., the difference in rates across maturities. The typical structure is represented by a positive yield curve, which provides progressively higher interest rates as the maturities are lengthened. Flat (i.e., relatively level rates across maturities) or inverted (i.e., higher short-term rates than long-term rates) yield curves occur less frequently.

The risk of default is typically associated with the creditworthiness of the borrower. Differences in interest rates can be traced to the credit quality ratings assigned by the bond rating agencies, such as Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard & Poor's Corporation. Obligations of the United States Treasury are usually considered to be free of default risk, and

hence reflect only the real rate of interest, compensation for expected inflation, and maturity risk. The Treasury has been issuing inflation-indexed notes, which automatically provide compensation to investors for future inflation, thereby providing a lower current yield on these issues.

Interest Rate Environment

Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") policy actions, which impact directly short-term interest rates also substantially, affect investor sentiment in long-term fixed-income securities markets. In this regard, the Fed has often pursued policies designed to build investor confidence in the fixed-income securities market. Formative Fed policy has had a long history, as exemplified by the historic 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, and more recently, deregulation within the financial system, which increased the level and volatility of interest rates. The Fed has indicated that it will follow a monetary policy designed to promote noninflationary economic growth.

As background to the recent levels of interest rates, history shows that the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve board ("FOMC") began a series of moves toward lower short-term interest rates in mid-1990 -- at the outset of the previous recession. Monetary policy was influenced at that time by (i) steps taken to reduce the federal budget deficit, (ii) slowing economic growth, (iii) rising unemployment, and (iv) measures intended to avoid a credit crunch. Thereafter, the Federal government initiated several bold proposals to deal with future borrowings by the Treasury. With lower expected federal budget deficits and reduced Treasury borrowings, together with limitations on the supply of new 30-year Treasury bonds, long-term interest rates declined to a twenty-year low, reaching a trough of 5.78% in October 1993.

On February 4, 1994, the FOMC began a series of increases in the Fed Funds rate (i.e., the interest rate on excess overnight bank reserves). The initial increase represented the first rise in short-term interest rates in five years. The series of seven increases doubled the Fed Funds rate to 6%. The increases in short-term interest rates also caused long-term rates to move up, continuing a trend, which began in the fourth quarter of 1993. The cyclical peak in long-term interest rates was reached on November 7 and 14, 1994 when 30-year Treasury bonds attained an 8.16% yield. Thereafter, long-term Treasury bond yields generally declined.

Beginning in mid-February 1996, long-term interest rates moved upward from their previous lows. After initially reaching a level of 6.75% on March 15, 1996, long-term interest rates continued to climb and reached a peak of 7.19% on July 5 and 8, 1996. For the period leading up to the 1996 Presidential election, long-term Treasury bonds generally traded within this range. After the election, interest rates moderated, returning to a level somewhat below the previous trading range. Thereafter, in December 1996, interest rates returned to a range of 6.5% to 7.0%, which existed for much of 1996.

On March 25, 1997, the FOMC decided to tighten monetary conditions through a one-quarter percentage point increase in the Fed Funds rate. This tightening increased the Fed Funds rate to 5.5%. In making this move, the FOMC stated that it was concerned by persistent strength of demand in the economy, which it feared would increase the risk of inflationary imbalances that could eventually interfere with the long economic expansion.

In the fourth quarter of 1997, the yields on Treasury bonds began to decline rapidly in response to an increase in demand for Treasury securities caused by a flight to safety triggered by the currency and stock market crisis in Asia. Liquidity provided by the Treasury market

makes these bonds an attractive investment in times of crisis. This is because Treasury securities encompass a very large market, which provides ease of trading, and carry a premium for safety. During the fourth quarter of 1997, Treasury bond yields pierced the psychologically important 6% level for the first time since 1993.

Through the first half of 1998, the yields on long-term Treasury bonds fluctuated within a range of about 5.6% to 6.1% reflecting their attractiveness and safety. In the third quarter of 1998, there was further deterioration of investor confidence in global financial markets. This loss of confidence followed the moratorium (i.e., default) by Russia on its sovereign debt and fears associated with problems in Latin America. While not significant to the global economy in the aggregate, the August 17 default by Russia had a significant negative impact on investor confidence, following earlier discontent surrounding the crisis in Asia. These events subsequently led to a general pull back of risk-taking as displayed by banks growing reluctance to lend, worries of an expanding credit crunch, lower stock prices, and higher yields on bonds of riskier companies. These events contributed to the failure of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management.

In response to these events, the FOMC cut the Fed Funds rate just prior to the mid-term Congressional elections. The FOMC's action was based upon concerns over how increasing weakness in foreign economies would affect the U.S. economy. As recently as July 1998, the FOMC had been more concerned about fighting inflation than the state of the economy. The initial rate cut was the first of three reductions by the FOMC. Thereafter, the yield on long-term Treasury bonds reached a 30-year low of 4.70% on October 5, 1998. Long-term Treasury yields below 5% had not been seen since 1967. Unlike the first rate cut that was widely

anticipated, the second rate reduction by the FOMC was a surprise to the markets. A third reduction in short-term interest rates occurred in November 1998 when the FOMC reduced the Fed Funds rate to 4.75%.

All of these events prompted an increase in the prices for Treasury bonds, which lead to the low yields described above. Another factor that contributed to the decline in yields on long-term Treasury bonds was a reduction in the supply of new Treasury issues coming to market due to the Federal budget surplus -- the first in nearly 30 years. The dollar amount of Treasury bonds being issued declined by 30% in two years thus resulting in higher prices and lower yields. In addition, rumors of some struggling hedge funds unwinding their positions further added to the gains in Treasury bond prices.

The financial crisis that spread from Asia to Russia and to Latin America pushed nervous investors from stocks into Treasury bonds, thus increasing demand for bonds, just when supply was shrinking. There was also a move from corporate bonds to Treasury bonds to take advantage of appreciation in the Treasury market. This resulted in a certain amount of exuberance for Treasury bond investments that formerly was reserved for the stock market. Moreover, yields in the fourth quarter of 1998 became extremely volatile as shown by Treasury yields that fell from 5.10% on September 29 to 4.70 percent on October 5, and thereafter returned to 5.10% on October 13. A decline and rebound of 40 basis points in Treasury yields in a two-week time frame is remarkable.

Beginning in mid-1999, the FOMC raised interest rates on six occasions reversing its actions in the fall of 1998. On June 30, 1999, August 24, 1999, November 16, 1999, February 2, 2000, March 21, 2000, and May 16, 2000, the FOMC raised the Fed Funds rate to 6.50%.

This brought the Fed Funds rate to its highest level since 1991, and was 175 basis points higher than the level that occurred at the height of the Asian currency and stock market crisis. At the time, these actions were taken in response to more normally functioning financial markets, tight labor markets, and a reversal of the monetary ease that was required earlier in response to the global financial market turmoil.

As the year 2000 drew to a close, economic activity slowed and consumer confidence began to weaken. In two steps at the beginning and at the end of January 2001, the FOMC reduced the Fed Funds rate by one percentage point. These actions brought the Fed Funds rate to 5.50%. The FOMC described its actions as "a rapid and forceful response of monetary policy" to eroding consumer and business confidence exemplified by weaker retail sales and business spending on capital equipment and cut backs in manufacturing production. Subsequently, on March 20, 2001, April 18, 2001, May 15, 2001, June 27, 2001, and August 21, 2001, the FOMC lowered the Fed Funds in steps consisting of three 50 basis points decrements followed by two 25 basis points decrements. These actions took the Fed Funds rate to 3.50%. The FOMC observed on August 21, 2001:

> Household demand has been sustained, but business profits and capital spending continue to weaken and growth abroad is slowing, weighing on the U.S. economy. The associated easing of pressures on labor and product markets is expected to keep inflation contained.
>
> Although long-term prospects for productivity growth and the economy remain favorable, the Committee continues to believe that against the background of its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth and of the information currently available, the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.

After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the FOMC made two additional 50 basis points reductions in the Fed Funds rate. The first reduction occurred on September 17, 2001 and followed the four-day closure of the financial markets following the terrorist attacks. The second reduction occurred at the October 2 meeting of the FOMC where it observed:

> The terrorist attacks have significantly heightened uncertainty in an economy that was already weak. Business and household spending as a consequence are being further damped. Nonetheless, the long-term prospects for productivity growth and the economy remain favorable and should become evident once the unusual forces restraining demand abate.

Afterward, the FOMC reduced the Fed Funds rate by 50 basis points on November 6, 2001 and by 25 basis points on December 11, 2001. In total, short-term interest rates were reduced by the FOMC eleven (11) times during the year 2001. These actions cut the Fed Funds rate by 4.75% and resulted in 1.75% for the Fed Funds rate.

In an attempt to deal with weakening fundamentals in the economy recovering from the recession that began in March 2001, the FOMC provided a psychologically important one-half percentage point reduction in the federal funds rate. The rate cut was twice as large as the market expected, and brought the fed funds rate to 1.25% on November 6, 2002. The FOMC stated that:

> The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still-robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic activity. However, incoming economic data have tended to confirm that greater uncertainty, in part attributable to heightened geopolitical risks, is currently inhibiting spending, production, and employment. Inflation and inflation expectations remain well contained.

> In these circumstances, the Committee believes that today's additional monetary easing should prove helpful as the economy works its way through this current soft spot. With this action, the Committee believes that, against the background of its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth and of the information currently available, the risks are balanced with respect to the prospects for both goals in the foreseeable future.

As 2003 unfolded, there was a continuing expectation of lower yields on Treasury securities. In fact, the yield on ten-year Treasury notes reached a 45-year low near the end of the second quarter of 2003. For long-term Treasury bonds, those yields culminated with a 4.24% yield on June 13, 2003. Soon thereafter, the FOMC reduced the Fed Funds rate by 25 basis points on June 25, 2003. In announcing its action, the FOMC stated:

> The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic activity. Recent signs point to a firming in spending, markedly improved financial conditions, and labor and product markets that are stabilizing. The economy, nonetheless, has yet to exhibit sustainable growth. With inflationary expectations subdued, the Committee judged that a slightly more expansive monetary policy would add further support for an economy which it expects to improve over time.

Thereafter, intermediate and long-term Treasury yields moved marketedly higher. Higher yields on long-term Treasury bonds, which exceeded 5.00% can be traced to: (i) the market's disappointment that the Fed Funds rate was not reduced below 1.00%, (ii) an indication that the Fed will not use unconventional methods for implementing monetary policy, (iii) growing confidence in a strengthening economy, and (iv) a Federal budget deficit that is projected to be $455 billion in 2003 (reported, subsequently, the actually deficit was $374 billion) and $475 billion in 2004 (revised subsequently, the estimated deficit is $500 billion in 2004). All these

factors significantly changed the seniment in the bond market.

For the remainder of 2003, the FOMC continued with its balanced monetary policy, thereby retaining the 1% Fed Funds rate. However, in 2004, the FOMC initiated a policy of moving toward a more neutral Fed Funds rate (i.e., removing the bias of abnormal low rates). On June 30, 2004, August 10, 2004, September 21, 2004, November 10, 2004, December 14, 2004, February 2, 2005, March 22, 2005, May 3, 2005, June 30, 2005, August 9, 2005, September 20, 2005, November 1, 2005, December 13, 2005, January 31, 2006, March 28, 2006, May 10, 2006, and June 29, 2006, the FOMC increased the Fed Funds rate in seventeen 25 basis point increments. These policy actions are widely interpreted as the beginning of the process of moving toward a more neutral range for the Fed Funds rate.

Just after the FOMC meeting on August 7, 2007, where the FOMC decided to retain a 5.25% Fed Funds rate, turmoil in the credit markets prompted central banks throughout the world to inject over $325 billion of reserves into the banking system over a three-day period in reaction to a credit crunch. Problems had been developing earlier in 2007, beginning in the market for asset-backed securities linked to subprime mortgages. Valuation uncertainties for these securities caused liquidity concerns for hedge funds, investment banks, and financial institutions. The market for commercial paper, the most liquid part of the credit markets for non-Treasury securities, was also affected. In response to the market turmoil, the FOMC issued the following statement, the first of its type since after the September 11, 2001 terrorists' attack.

> "The Federal Reserve is providing liquidity to facilitate the orderly functioning of financial markets.

> The Federal Reserve will provide reserves as necessary through open market operations to promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to the Federal Open Market Committee's target rate of 5-1/4 percent. In current circumstances, depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs because of dislocations in money and credit markets. As always, the discount window is available as a source of funding."

Then, one week after its initial announcement, the FOMC made a surprise reduction of 50 basis points in the discount rate to narrow the spread between this rate and the target Fed Funds rate. At the same time, the FOMC made the following statement:

> "Financial market conditions have deteriorated, and tighter credit conditions and increased uncertainty have the potential to restrain economic growth going forward. In these circumstances, although recent data suggest that the economy has continued to expand at a moderate pace, the Federal Open Market Committee judges that the downside risks to growth have increased appreciably. The Committee is monitoring the situation and is prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy arising from the disruptions in financial markets."

Thereafter, at its regularly scheduled meeting on September 18, 2007, the FOMC reduced the target Fed Funds rate to 4.75% and the discount rate was reduced to 5.25% in an effort to forestall the adverse effects of the financial market turmoil on the economy generally. Further reductions of 25 basis points occurred at the next two FOMC meetings on October 31, 2007 and on December 11, 2007. The December 11, 2007 FOMC statement indicated that:

> Incoming information suggests that economic growth is slowing, reflecting the intensification of the housing correction and some softening in business and consumer spending. Moreover, strains in financial markets have increased in recent weeks. Today's action, combined with the policy actions taken earlier, should help promote moderate growth over time.
>
> Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year, but elevated energy and commodity prices, among other factors, may

> put upward pressure on inflation. In this context, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.
>
> Recent developments, including the deterioration in financial market conditions, have increased the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for economic growth and inflation. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to foster price stability and sustainable economic growth.

With these actions, the Fed Funds rate and the discount rate closed the calendar year 2007 at 4.25% and 4.75%, respectively.

In 2008, the FOMC again acted decisively in response to further deterioration of credit conditions and perceived weakness in the economy. Acting prior to its first regularly scheduled meeting in 2008, the FOMC reduced the fed funds target by 75 basis points to 3.50% and the discount rate was reduced by a corresponding amount to 4.00%. Actions by the FOMC between meetings are unusual occurrences in recent years, thereby signifying the urgency that the FOMC saw in taking immediate action on monetary policy. Then on January 30, 2008, the fed fund target rate and discount rate were further reduced by 50 basis points, bringing those rates to 3.00% and 3.50%, respectively. In taking this action the FOMC stated:

> Financial markets remain under considerable stress, and credit has tightened further for some businesses and households. Moreover, recent information indicates a deepening of the housing contraction as well as some softening in labor markets.
>
> The Committee expects inflation to moderate in coming quarters, but it will be necessary to continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.
>
> Today's policy action, combined with those taken earlier, should help to promote moderate growth over time and to mitigate the risks to economic activity. However, downside risks to growth

> remain. The Committee will continue to assess the effects of financial and other developments on economic prospects and will act in a timely manner as needed to address those risks.

Public Utility Bond Yields

The Risk Premium analysis of the cost of equity is represented by the combination of a firm's borrowing rate for long-term debt capital plus a premium that is required to reflect the additional risk associated with the equity of a firm as explained in Appendix H. Due to the senior nature of the long-term debt of a firm, its cost is lower than the cost of equity due to the prior claim, which lenders have on the earnings, and assets of a corporation.

As a generalization, all interest rates track to varying degrees of the benchmark yields established by the market for Treasury securities. Public utility bond yields usually reflect the underlying Treasury yield associated with a given maturity plus a spread to reflect the specific credit quality of the issuing public utility. Market sentiment can also have an influence on the spreads as described below. The spread in the yields on public utility bonds and Treasury bonds varies with market conditions, as does the relative level of interest rates at varying maturities shown by the yield curve.

Pages 1 and 2 of Schedule 10 provide the recent history of long-term public utility bond yields for the rating categories of Aa, A and Baa (no yields are shown for Aaa rated public utility bonds because this index has been discontinued). The top four rating categories of Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa are known as "investment grades" and are generally regarded as eligible for bank investments under commercial banking regulations. These investment grades are distinguished from "junk" bonds, which have ratings of Ba and below.

A relatively long history of the spread between the yields on long-term A-rated public utility bonds and 20-year Treasury bonds is shown on page 3 of Schedule 10. There, it is shown that those spreads were about the one percentage during for the years 1994 through 1997. With the aversion to risk and flight to quality described earlier, a significant widening of the spread in the yields between corporate (e.g., public utility) and Treasury bonds developed in 1998, after an initial widening of the spread that began in the fourth quarter of 1997. The significant widening of spreads in 1998 was unexpected by some purportedly savvy investors, as shown by the debacle at the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund. When Russia defaulted its debt on August 17, some investors had to cover short positions when Treasury prices spiked upward. Short covering by investors that guessed wrong on the relationship between corporate and Treasury bonds also contributed to run-up in Treasury bond prices by increasing the demand for them. This helped to contribute to a widening of the spreads between corporate and Treasury bonds.

As shown on page 3 of Schedule 10, the spread in yields between A-rated public utility bonds and 20-year Treasury bonds were about one percentage point prior to 1998, 1.32% in 1998, 1.42% in 1999, 2.01% in 2000, 2.13% in 2001, 1.94% in 2002, 1.62% in 2003, 1.12% in 2004, 1.01% in 2005, 1.08% in 2006, and 1.16% in 2007. As shown by the monthly data presented on pages 4 and 5 of Schedule 10, the interest rate spread between the yields on 20-year Treasury bonds and A-rated public utility bonds was 1.22 percentage points for the twelve-months ended January 2008. For the six- and three-month periods ending January 2008, the yield spread was 1.42% and 1.56%, respectively. Beginning in January 2008, spreads widened significantly with the development of the credit crunch.

APPENDIX G TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

Risk-Free Rate of Return in the CAPM

Regarding the risk-free rate of return (see Appendix I), pages 2 and 3 of Schedule 10 provides the yields on the broad spectrum of Treasury Notes and Bonds. Some practitioners of the CAPM would advocate the use of short-term treasury yields (and some would argue for the yields on 91-day Treasury Bills). Other advocates of the CAPM would advocate the use of longer-term treasury yields as the best measure of a risk-free rate of return. As Ibbotson has indicated:

> The Cost of Capital in a Regulatory Environment. When discounting cash flows projected over a long period, it is necessary to discount them by a long-term cost of capital. Additionally, regulatory processes for setting rates often specify or suggest that the desired rate of return for a regulated firm is that which would allow the firm to attract and retain debt and equity capital over the long term. Thus, the long-term cost of capital is typically the appropriate cost of capital to use in regulated ratesetting. (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation - 1992 Yearbook, pages 118-119)

As indicated above, long-term Treasury bond yields represent the correct measure of the risk-free rate of return in the traditional CAPM. Very short term yields on Treasury bills should be avoided for several reasons. First, rates should be set on the basis of financial conditions that will exist during the effective period of the proposed rates. Second, 91-day Treasury bill yields are more volatile than longer-term yields and are greatly influenced by FOMC monetary policy, political, and economic situations. Moreover, Treasury bill yields have been shown to be empirically inadequate for the CAPM. Some advocates of the theory would argue that the risk-free rate of return in the CAPM should be derived from quality long-term corporate bonds.

APPENDIX H TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS

The cost of equity requires recognition of the risk premium required by common equities over long-term corporate bond yields. In the case of senior capital, a company contracts for the use of long-term debt capital at a stated coupon rate for a specific period of time and in the case of preferred stock capital at a stated dividend rate, usually with provision for redemption through sinking fund requirements. In the case of senior capital, the cost rate is known with a high degree of certainty because the payment for use of this capital is a contractual obligation, and the future schedule of payments is known. In essence, the investor-expected cost of senior capital is equal to the realized return over the entire term of the issue, absent default.

The cost of equity, on the other hand, is not fixed, but rather varies with investor perception of the risk associated with the common stock. Because no precise measurement exists as to the cost of equity, informed judgment must be exercised through a study of various market factors, which motivate investors to purchase common stock. In the case of common equity, the realized return rate may vary significantly from the expected cost rate due to the uncertainty associated with earnings on common equity. This uncertainty highlights the added risk of a common equity investment.

As one would expect from traditional risk and return relationships, the cost of equity is affected by expected interest rates. As noted in Appendix G, yields on long-term corporate bonds traditionally consist of a real rate of return without regard to inflation, an increment to

reflect investor perception of expected future inflation, the investment horizon shown by the term of the issue until maturity, and the credit risk associated with each rating category.

The Risk Premium approach recognizes the required compensation for the more risky common equity over the less risky secured debt position of a lender. The cost of equity stated in terms of the familiar risk premium approach is:

$$k=i+RP$$

where, the cost of equity *("k")* is equal to the interest rate on long-term corporate debt *("i")*, plus an equity risk premium *("RP")* which represents the additional compensation for the riskier common equity.

Equity Risk Premium

The equity risk premium is determined as the difference in the rate of return on debt capital and the rate of return on common equity. Because the common equity holder has only a residual claim on earnings and assets, there is no assurance that achieved returns on common equities will equal expected returns. This is quite different from returns on bonds, where the investor realizes the expected return during the entire holding period, absent default. It is for this reason that common equities are always more risky than senior debt securities. There are investment strategies available to bond portfolio managers that immunize bond returns against fluctuations in interest rates because bonds are redeemed through sinking funds or at maturity, whereas no such redemption is mandated for public utility common equities.

It is well recognized that the expected return on more risky investments will exceed the required yield on less risky investments. Neither the possibility of default on a bond nor the

maturity risk detracts from the risk analysis, because the common equity risk rate differential (i.e., the investor-required risk premium) is always greater than the return components on a bond. It should also be noted that the investment horizon is typically long-run for both corporate debt and equity, and that the risk of default (i.e., corporate bankruptcy) is a concern to both debt and equity investors. Thus, the required yield on a bond provides a benchmark or starting point with which to track and measure the cost rate of common equity capital. There is no need to segment the bond yield according to its components, because it is the total return demanded by investors that is important for determining the risk rate differential for common equity. This is because the complete bond yield provides the basis to determine the differential, and as such, consistency requires that the computed differential must be applied to the complete bond yield when applying the risk premium approach. To apply the risk rate differential to a partial bond yield would result in a misspecification of the cost of equity because the computed differential was initially determined by reference to the entire bond return.

The risk rate differential between the cost of equity and the yield on long-term corporate bonds can be determined by reference to a comparison of holding period returns (here defined as one year) computed over long time spans. This analysis assumes that over long periods of time investors' expectations are on average consistent with rates of return actually achieved. Accordingly, historical holding period returns must not be analyzed over an unduly short period because near-term realized results may not have fulfilled investors' expectations. Moreover, specific past period results may not be representative of investment fundamentals expected for the future. For instance, holding period returns may include negative returns, which are not

representative of either investor requirements of the past or investor expectations for the future. The short-run phenomenon of unexpected returns (either positive or negative) demonstrates that an unduly short historical period would not adequately support a risk premium analysis. It is important to distinguish between investors' motivation to invest, which encompass positive return expectations, and the knowledge that losses can occur. No rational investor would forego payment for the use of capital, or expect loss of principal, as a basis for investing. Investors will hold cash rather than invest with the expectation of a loss.

Within these constraints, page 1 of Schedule 11 provides the historical holding period returns for the S&P Public Utility Index which has been independently computed and the historical holding period returns for the S&P Composite Index which have been reported in Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation published by Ibbotson & Associates. The tabulation begins with 1928 because January 1928 is the earliest monthly dividend yield for the S&P Public Utility Index. I have considered all reliable data for this study to avoid the introduction of a particular bias to the results. The measurement of the common equity return rate differential is based upon actual capital market performance using realized results. As a consequence, the underlying data for this risk premium approach can be analyzed with a high degree of precision. Informed professional judgment is required only to interpret the results of this study, but not to quantify the component variables.

The risk rate differentials for all equities, as measured by the S&P Composite, are established by reference to long-term corporate bonds. For public utilities, the risk rate differentials are computed with the S&P Public Utilities as compared with public utility bonds.

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The measurement procedure used to identify the risk rate differentials consisted of arithmetic means, geometric means, and medians for each series. Measures of the central tendency of the results from the historical periods provide the best indication of representative rates of return. In regulated ratesetting, the correct measure of the equity risk premium is the arithmetic mean because a utility must expect to earn its cost of capital in each year in order to provide investors with their long-term expectations. In other contexts, such as pension determinations, compound rates of return, as shown by the geometric means, may be appropriate. The median returns are also appropriate in ratesetting because they are a measure of the central tendency of a single period rate of return. Median values have also been considered in this analysis because they provide a return, which divides the entire series of annual returns in half, and are representative of a return that symbolizes, in a meaningful way, the central tendency of all annual returns contained within the analysis period. Medians are regularly included in many investor-influencing publications.

As previously noted, the arithmetic mean provides the appropriate point estimate of the risk premium. As further explained in Appendix I, the long-term cost of capital in rate cases requires the use of the arithmetic means. To supplement my analysis, I have also used the rates of return taken from the geometric mean and median for each series to provide the bounds of the range to measure the risk rate differentials. This further analysis shows that when selecting the midpoint from a range established with the geometric means and medians, the arithmetic mean is indeed a reasonable measure for the long-term cost of capital. For the years 1928 through 2006, the risk premiums for each class of equity are:

	S&P Composite	S&P Public Utilities
Arithmetic Mean	5.86%	5.41%
Geometric Mean	4.25%	3.35%
Median	10.17%	7.29%
Midpoint of Range	7.21%	5.32%
Average	6.54%	5.37%

The empirical evidence suggests that the common equity risk premium is higher for the S&P Composite Index compared to the S&P Public Utilities.

If, however, specific historical periods were also analyzed in order to match more closely historical fundamentals with current expectations, the results provided on page 2 of Schedule 11 should also be considered. One of these sub-periods included the 54-year period, 1952-2006. These years follow the historic 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord which affected monetary policy and the market for government securities.

A further investigation was undertaken to determine whether realignment has taken place subsequent to the historic 1973 Arab Oil embargo and during the deregulation of the financial markets. In each case, the public utility risk premiums were computed by using the arithmetic mean, and the geometric means and medians to establish the range shown by those values. The time periods covering the more recent periods 1974 through 2006 and 1979 through 2006 contain events subsequent to the initial oil shock and the advent of monetarism as Fed policy, respectively. For the 55-year, 33-year and 28-year periods, the public utility risk

premiums were 6.40%, 5.61%, and 5.83% respectively, as shown by the average of the specific point-estimates and the midpoint of the ranges provided on page 2 of Schedule 11.

APPENDIX I TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

Modern portfolio theory provides a theoretical explanation of expected returns on portfolios of securities. The Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") attempts to describe the way prices of individual securities are determined in efficient markets where information is freely available and is reflected instantaneously in security prices. The CAPM states that the expected rate of return on a security is determined by a risk-free rate of return plus a risk premium, which is proportional to the non-diversifiable (or systematic) risk of a security.

The CAPM theory has several unique assumptions that are not common to most other methods used to measure the cost of equity. As with other market-based approaches, the CAPM is an expectational concept. There has been significant academic research conducted that found that the empirical market line, based upon historical data, has a less steep slope and higher intercept than the theoretical market line of the CAPM. For equities with a beta less than 1.0, such as utility common stocks, the CAPM theoretical market line will underestimate the realistic expectation of investors in comparison with the empirical market line, which shows that the CAPM may potentially misspecify investors' required return.

The CAPM considers changing market fundamentals in a portfolio context. The balance of the investment risk, or that characterized as unsystematic, must be diversified. Some argue that diversifiable (unsystematic) risk is unimportant to investors. But this contention is not completely justified because the business and financial risk of an individual company, including regulatory risk, are widely discussed within the investment community and therefore influence investors in regulated firms. In addition, I note that the CAPM assumes that

through portfolio diversification, investors will minimize the effect of the unsystematic (diversifiable) component of investment risk. Because it is not known whether the average investor holds a well-diversified portfolio, the CAPM must also be used with other models of the cost of equity.

To apply the traditional CAPM theory, three inputs are required: the beta coefficient *("β")*, a risk-free rate of return *("Rf")*, and a market premium *("Rm - Rf")*. The cost of equity stated in terms of the CAPM is:

$$k = Rf + \beta (Rm - Rf)$$

As previously indicated, it is important to recognize that the academic research has shown that the security market line was flatter than that predicted by the CAPM theory and it had a higher intercept than the risk-free rate. These tests indicated that for portfolios with betas less than 1.0, the traditional CAPM would understate the return for such stocks. Likewise, for portfolios with betas above 1.0, these companies had lower returns than indicated by the traditional CAPM theory. Once again, CAPM assumes that through portfolio diversification investors will minimize the effect of the unsystematic (diversifiable) component of investment risk. Therefore, the CAPM must also be used with other models of the cost of equity, especially when it is not known whether the average public utility investor holds a well-diversified portfolio.

Beta

The beta coefficient is a statistical measure, which attempts to identify the non-diversifiable (systematic) risk of an individual security and measures the sensitivity of rates of

return on a particular security with general market movements. Under the CAPM theory, a security that has a beta of 1.0 should theoretically provide a rate of return equal to the return rate provided by the market. When employing stock price changes in the derivation of beta, a stock with a beta of 1.0 should exhibit a movement in price, which would track the movements in the overall market prices of stocks. Hence, if a particular investment has a beta of 1.0, a one percent increase in the return on the market will result, on average, in a one percent increase in the return on the particular investment. An investment, which has a beta less than 1.0, is considered to be less risky than the market.

The beta coefficient *("β")*, the one input in the CAPM application, which specifically applies to an individual firm, is derived from a statistical application, which regresses the returns on an individual security (dependent variable) with the returns on the market as a whole (independent variable). The beta coefficients for utility companies typically describe a small proportion of the total investment risk because the coefficients of determination (R^2) are low.

Pages 1 and 2 of Schedule 12 provide the betas published by Value Line. By way of explanation, the Value Line beta coefficient is derived from a "straight regression" based upon the percentage change in the weekly price of common stock and the percentage change weekly of the New York Stock Exchange Composite average using a five-year period. The raw historical beta is adjusted by Value Line for the measurement effect resulting in overestimates in high beta stocks and underestimates in low beta stocks. Value Line then rounds its betas to the nearest .05 increment. Value Line does not consider dividends in the computation of its betas. With regard to the betas of the MLP Pipeline Group, their relatively low levels can be

attributed to their small size and less liquidity for their stock.

Market Premium

The final element necessary to apply the CAPM is the market premium. The market premium by definition is the rate of return on the total market less the risk-free rate of return *("Rm - Rf")*. In this regard, the market premium in the CAPM has been calculated from the total return on the market of equities using forecast and historical data. The future market return is established with forecasts by Value Line using estimated dividend yields and capital appreciation potential.

With regard to the forecast data, I have relied upon the Value Line forecasts of capital appreciation and the dividend yield on the 1,700 stocks in the Value Line Survey. According to the February 8, 2008 edition of The Value Line Investment Survey Summary and Index, (see page 5 of Schedule 12) the total return on the universe of Value Line equities is:

	Dividend Yield	+	Median Appreciation Potential	=	Median Total Return
As of February 8, 2008	2.1%	+	13.34%[1]	=	15.44%

The tabulation shown above provides the dividend yield and capital gains yield of the companies followed by Value Line. Another measure of the total market return is provided by the DCF return on the S&P 500 Composite index. As shown below, that return is 13.76%.

[1] The estimated median appreciation potential is forecast to be 65% for 3 to 5 years hence. The annual capital gains yield at the midpoint of the forecast period is 13.34% (i.e., $1.65^{.25}$ - 1).

DCF Result for the S&P 500 Composite

D/P	(	1+.5g	)	+	g	=	k
2.21%	(	1.05750	)	+	11.42%	=	13.76%

where:	Price (P)	at	31-Jan-2008	=	1378.55
	Dividend (D)	for	4th Qtr. '07	=	7.62
	Dividend (D)		annualized	=	30.48
	Growth (g)		First Call EpS	=	11.42%

Using these indicators, the total market return is 14.60% (15.44% + 13.76% = 29.20% ÷ 2) using both the Value Line and S&P derived returns. With the 14.60% forecast market return and the 4.50% risk-free rate of return, a 10.10% (14.60% - 4.50%) market premium would be indicated using forecast market data.

With regard to the historical data, I provided the rates of return from long-term historical time periods that have been widely circulated among the investment and academic community over the past several years, as shown on page 6 of Schedule 12. These data are published by Ibbotson Associates in its Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation ("SBBI"). From the data provided on page 6 of Schedule 12, I calculate a market premium using the common stock arithmetic mean returns of 12.3% less government bond arithmetic mean returns of 5.8%. For the period 1926-2006, the market premium was 6.5% (12.3% - 5.8%). I should note that the arithmetic mean must be used in the CAPM because it is a single period model. It is further confirmed by Ibbotson who has indicated:

> *Arithmetic Versus Geometric Differences*
> For use as the expected equity risk premium in the CAPM, the *arithmetic* or *simple difference* of the *arithmetic* means of stock market returns and riskless rates is the relevant number. This is because the CAPM is an additive model where the cost of capital is the sum of its parts. Therefore, the CAPM expected

> equity risk premium must be derived by arithmetic, *not geometric*, subtraction.
>
> *Arithmetic Versus Geometric Means*
> The expected equity risk premium should always be calculated using the arithmetic mean. The arithmetic mean is the rate of return which, when compounded over multiple periods, gives the mean of the probability distribution of ending wealth values. This makes the arithmetic mean return appropriate for computing the cost of capital. The discount rate that equates expected (mean) future values with the present value of an investment is that investment's cost of capital. The logic of using the discount rate as the cost of capital is reinforced by noting that investors will discount their (mean) ending wealth values from an investment back to the present using the arithmetic mean, for the reason given above. They will therefore require such an expected (mean) return prospectively (that is, in the present looking toward the future) to commit their capital to the investment. (Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation - 1996 Yearbook, pages 153-154)

For the CAPM, a market premium of 8.30% (6.5% + 10.10% = 16.60% ÷ 2) would be reasonable which is the average of the 6.5% using historical data and a market premium of 10.10% using forecasts.

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COMPARABLE EARNINGS APPROACH

Value Line's analysis of the companies that it follows includes a wide range of financial and market variables, including nine items that provide ratings for each company. From these nine items, one category has been removed dealing with industry performance because, under the approach employed, the particular business type is not significant. In addition, two categories have been ignored that deal with estimates of current earnings and dividends because they are not useful for comparative purposes. The remaining six categories provide relevant measures to establish comparability. The definitions for each of the six criteria (from the Value Line Investment Survey - Subscriber Guide) follow:

Timeliness Rank

> The rank for a stock's probable relative market performance in the year ahead. Stocks ranked 1 (Highest) or 2 (Above Average) are likely to outpace the year-ahead market. Those ranked 4 (Below Average) or 5 (Lowest) are not expected to outperform most stocks over the next 12 months. Stocks ranked 3 (Average) will probably advance or decline with the market in the year ahead. Investors should try to limit purchases to stocks ranked 1 (Highest) or 2 (Above Average) for Timeliness.

Safety Rank

> A measure of potential risk associated with individual common stocks rather than large diversified portfolios (for which Beta is good risk measure). Safety is based on the stability of price, which includes sensitivity to the market (see Beta) as well as the stock's inherent volatility, adjusted for trend and other factors including company size, the penetration of its markets, product market volatility, the degree of financial leverage, the earnings quality, and the overall condition of the balance sheet. Safety Ranks range from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest).

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Conservative investors should try to limit purchases to equities ranked 1 (Highest) or 2 (Above Average) for Safety.

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Financial Strength

The financial strength of each of the more than 1,600 companies in the VS II data base is rated relative to all the others. The ratings range from A++ to C in nine steps. (For screening purposes, think of an A rating as "greater than" a B). Companies that have the best relative financial strength are given an A++ rating, indicating an ability to weather hard times better than the vast majority of other companies. Those who don't quite merit the top rating are given an A+ grade, and so on. A rating as low as C++ is considered satisfactory. A rating of C+ is well below average, and C is reserved for companies with very serious financial problems. The ratings are based upon a computer analysis of a number of key variables that determine (a) financial leverage, (b) business risk, and (c) company size, plus the judgment of Value Line's analysts and senior editors regarding factors that cannot be quantified across-the-board for companies. The primary variables that are indexed and studied include equity coverage of debt, equity coverage of intangibles, "quick ratio", accounting methods, variability of return, fixed charge coverage, stock price stability, and company size.

Price Stability Index

An index based upon a ranking of the weekly percent changes in the price of the stock over the last five years. The lower the standard deviation of the changes, the more stable the stock. Stocks ranking in the top 5% (lowest standard deviations) carry a Price Stability Index of 100; the next 5%, 95; and so on down to 5. One standard deviation is the range around the average weekly percent change in the price that encompasses about two thirds of all the weekly percent change figures over the last five years. When the range is wide, the standard deviation is high and the stock's Price Stability Index is low.

Beta

A measure of the sensitivity of the stock's price to overall fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Average. A Beta of 1.50 indicates that a stock tends to rise (or fall) 50% more than the New York Stock Exchange Composite

Average. Use Beta to measure the stock market risk inherent in any diversified portfolio of, say, 15 or more companies. Otherwise, use the Safety Rank, which measures total risk inherent in an equity, including that portion attributable to market fluctuations. Beta is derived from a least squares regression analysis between weekly percent changes in the price of a stock and weekly percent changes in the NYSE Average over a period of five years. In the case of shorter price histories, a smaller time period is used, but two years is the minimum. The Betas are periodically adjusted for their long-term tendency to regress toward 1.00.

Technical Rank

A prediction of relative price movement, primarily over the next three to six months. It is a function of price action relative to all stocks followed by Value Line. Stocks ranked 1 (Highest) or 2 (Above Average) are likely to outpace the market. Those ranked 4 (Below Average) or 5 (Lowest) are not expected to outperform most stocks over the next six months. Stocks ranked 3 (Average) will probably advance or decline with the market. Investors should use the Technical and Timeliness Ranks as complements to one another.