On June 28, 1985, the Commission issued Opinion No. 154-B. 1 In that Opinion, the Commission established principles pursuant to which it will test the reasonableness of oil pipeline rates. On July 26, 1985, Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon) filed a request for rehearing. On July 29, 1985, the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL), 2 ARCO Pipe Line Company (ARCO), and the United States Department of Justice (Justice) filed requests for rehearing. Justice also asked for clarification of the order. 3 On July 29, 1985, the Mid-Continent Shippers petitioned for reconsideration. Most of the arguments raised by the petitioners are not new and have been fully addressed in Opinion No. 154-B. Except for those matters dealt with herein, the Commission finds...
that no facts or principles of law have been presented which warrant modification of Opinion No. 154-B.

Summary of Opinion No. 154-B

In Opinion No. 154-B, the Commission:

1. adopted net depreciated trended original cost (TOC) as the form of rate base and stated that only the equity portion thereof would be trended;

2. concluded that rate of return should be determined on a case-by-case basis by the usual approach of using embedded debt costs and setting a risk-related equity rate of return;

3. stated that as a general policy the proper capital structure to use was the pipeline's or its parent's actual capital structure, depending on how capital was raised;

4. adopted a starting rate base for existing assets consisting of the sum of a pipeline's debt ratio times book net depreciated original cost and the equity ratio times the reproduction cost portion of the valuation rate base depreciated by the same percentage as the book original cost rate base has been depreciated;

5. ruled that oil pipelines should use their actual interest expense in computing their income tax allowance in their cost-of-service;

6. adopted normalization as the proper treatment for book and tax timing differences in the recognition of certain expenses and noted that oil pipelines must exclude all deferred tax amounts from their rate bases; and

7. removed the previously imposed limitations on the suspension of unprotested oil pipeline rate filings and on the participation of Commission staff in oil pipeline rate cases.

Interest Expense Deduction

ARCO and Justice object to the method adopted in Opinion No. 154-B for determining the interest expense deduction in calculating a pipeline's income tax allowance.

In Opinion No. 154-B, the Commission held:

[One]...tax issue is the determination of the interest expense deduction to use in calculating a pipeline's tax allowance. The usual method is to multiply the company's weighted cost of debt times its rate base. This will not work for oil pipelines. This is so because under the TOC [Trended Original Cost] methodology adopted in this opinion the rate base includes an equity write-up. The Commission holds, therefore, that oil pipelines should use their actual interest expense.

Both ARCO and Justice argue that the interest expense deduction for determining the tax allowance should be the same as the interest produced by the capital structure adopted for rate of return purposes. The Commission agrees that, as a general rule, tax and return interest should be the same. The problem here, as stated in Opinion No. 154-B and as recognized by ARCO, is that the TOC methodology adopted in Opinion No. 154-B includes an equity write-up. Hence, the usual method of multiplying the company's weighted cost of debt times its rate base will not produce a proper interest expense deduction. The Commission's solution to this problem was to require the use of
a pipeline's actual interest expense. The Commission is now persuaded that the better solution is to use the same actual capital structure for both the interest expense deduction and the allowed interest return. This is in accord with our decision in *Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, a Division of Arkla, Inc.*\(^6\) in which we expressed a general preference for using actual capital structures rather than hypothetical capital structures when determining gas pipelines' rates of return. That decision assumed that the interest expense deduction would be the same as the debt return produced by the capital structure. We see no reason why this should not also be the case for oil pipelines, if the equity write-up can be eliminated. At this time, therefore, subject to re-examination on a case-by-case basis, it appears appropriate for an oil pipeline to determine its interest expense deduction by multiplying its weighted cost of debt times its net depreciated original cost rate base.

*Capital Structure, Rate of Return and Depreciation*

Justice asks for clarification or modification of several aspects of the capital structure principles established by Opinion No. 154-B. The first clarification concerns the date to be used in determining the capital structure. For pipelines whose rates are not currently under investigation by the Commission or whose rates may have been set for investigation after issuance of Opinion No. 154-B, the capital structure to be used in determining the starting base is as of the date of Opinion No. 154-B (June 28, 1985). If a pipeline has a case pending before the Commission in which rates are being collected subject to refund, the capital structure to be used is that in existence on the date the rates under investigation became effective.\(^7\)

The second issue raised by Justice is whether the parent's actual capital structure includes or excludes non-guaranteed debt issued by subsidiaries. We believe this question should be resolved on a case-by-case basis.\(^8\)

Third, Justice argues that the capital structure used to determine the starting rate base should be permanent for the service life of the property. If changes to the debt-equity ratios are permitted, states Justice, pipelines will be able to manipulate their returns. We disagree. The starting rate base freezes only the dollars in that base. As with other regulated companies, capital structure may change from time to time.

Fourth, Justice asks whether the Commission intended that a real rate of return, once determined, would be used without change unless altered in a later rate case. Justice is correct. Our reference to changes in the real rate was meant to indicate that the risks of the pipeline could be reexamined. One mechanism for doing this would be to derive a new nominal rate and subtract therefrom the inflation rate using whatever inflation index is finally established.

Fifth, Justice requests clarification on how equity depreciation for existing pipelines will be treated. While it is true, as stated by Justice, that under TOC, the original cost of equity is not a component of the starting rate base, we intend that the equity, as well as the debt, depreciation component for cost-of-service purposes will be based on original cost.\(^9\)

Lastly, Justice asks us to place on pipelines the burden of going forward with evidence that a pipeline's investors had relied on the future recovery of deferred earnings under the valuation methodology. Opinion No. 154-B permitted participants challenging the starting rate base to prove that investors had not relied upon the previous rate base method. Justice states that participants raising such challenge would have to engage in years of discovery to prove that there was no reliance.
However, Justice then implicitly contradicts itself when it argues that *prima facie* evidence of earnings in past years, higher than those allowed under valuation, should be sufficient to require the pipeline to come forward with evidence of its reliance. Evidence of such earnings obviously does not take years of discovery to obtain and is clearly one avenue for participants to pursue in showing that a pipeline was not relying on future earnings under the valuation methodology.

The other issues raised by Justice, such as the appropriate inflation index, are better addressed and resolved in the context of particular cases.

This is also true for the question raised by the Mid-Continent Shippers of whether a parent should be compensated for its guarantees of a pipeline's debt when the parent's capital structure is used for rate of return purposes. Opinion No. 154-B has provided the basic framework for oil pipeline ratemaking; certain matters, however, are more appropriately fleshed-out in a specific pipeline setting.

**Request for Stay**

The AOPL asks that the Commission stay the effectiveness of Opinion No. 154-B pending judicial review. The AOPL states that it has made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal and is concerned about the potential waste of resources if the court of appeals vacates Opinion No. 154-B. The Mid-Continent Shippers oppose the AOPL's request. They state that under the criteria established in *Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc.*, 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the petitioner for stay is required to show that without such relief, it will be irreparably injured. They state that the AOPL has not identified the nature or extent of any injury. Hence, the AOPL has not shown irreparable injury. The Mid-Continent Shippers also observe that the Commission has left some matters to a case-by-case determination. Thus, application of the principles of Opinion No. 154-B will clarify and elaborate those principles. Furthermore, since Opinion No. 154-C provides guidance as to the methodology the Commission intends to apply in all pending and future rate cases, but allows changes to this methodology on a case-by-case basis, the members of AOPL will not be harmed if the stay is denied.

The Commission agrees with the Mid-Continent Shippers. Although the Commission will grant a stay when "justice so requires," here the public interest is best served by letting the oil pipeline industry begin the business of applying the generic principles enumerated in Opinion No. 154-B without further delay. Moreover, the Commission believes that moving forward in those cases will have the salutary effect of enabling the Commission to fine-tune those principles.

The Commission orders:

(A) All requests for rehearing and clarification are denied except as described in the body of this order.

(B) AOPL's request for a stay is denied.

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**Footnotes**


2 The AOPL included in its filing verified statements of certain individuals as matters relied upon in its request for rehearing.

3 The AOPL and Phillips Pipe Line Company filed responses in opposition to the motion for clarification by Justice.

4 If a parent guarantees debt issued by its pipeline subsidiary, the parent may be considered to be the issuer of the debt.
Michiana Hydro-Electric Power Corp., Project No. 7848-002

Order Denying Appeal

(Issued December 10, 1985)


By letter dated August 29, 1985, the Director, Office of Hydropower Licensing (Director), dismissed the accepted license application of Michiana Hydro-Electric Power Corporation (Michiana) for the proposed Bainter Town Water Power Project No. 7848, to be located on the Elkhart River in the Town of Bainter, in Elkhart County, Indiana. The Director dismissed Michiana's application because Michiana had failed to respond to the Director's letter of April 25, 1985, requiring Michiana to file within 90 days (July 24, 1985) additional information described therein. Michiana has filed a timely appeal of the Director's action dismissing its application, requesting reinstatement of its application. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the appeal.

Background

Under Section 4.32(f) of the Commission's regulations, the Director has authority to require license applicants to provide the Commission with additional information he considers relevant for informed Commission decisions on the applications. In addition, that section permits the Director, at his discretion, to dismiss license applications for the failure of the applicants to adequately provide the Commission with such information. In reviewing such actions taken by the Director, the Commission overturns his decisions only if he acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.

In his April 25, 1985 letter, the Director requested that Michiana provide, inter alia: (1) evidence showing that it had been granted a water quality certificate or that certification had been denied or waived, or in the alternative, if the responsible state agency had not yet acted upon Michiana's request for such certification, copies of any correspondence between Michiana and that agency; (2) a description of water quality in the Elkhart River in the vicinity of the project; (3) a description of the impacts of Michiana's proposed 50 cubic feet per second (cfs) minimum flow on temperature and dissolved oxygen in the proposed bypassed reach of the river; (4) a map showing the location and extent of wetlands within the vicinity of the proposed project; and (5) a copy of a report documenting the results of a cultural resources inventory of the project impact areas. With respect to items (2), (3) and (4) above, Michiana was instructed to provide comments from the appropriate consulting agencies. Michiana was instructed that it "should make written requests for these comments; if the agencies do not reply, [Michiana] should provide the Commission with copies of the letters of request. The letters of request should be dated no later than 45 days from the date of [the Director's April 25 letter], and must allow a minimum of 30 days for agency response." The letter stated that, if the requested information was not submitted within 90 days, Michiana's application might be dismissed.

On January 10, 1985, the Director, Division of Project Management, had requested Michiana to respond to agency letters commenting on its application within 30 days. However, since the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the Indiana Department of Natural Resources had requested Michiana to provide certain hydrologic data (fishery and flow analyses) in order for them to be able to comment on the application, Michiana requested, by letter filed with the Commission on April 25, 1985, that it be granted an extension of time to comply with the January 10, 1985 request. The Director granted that request by letter dated May 9, 1985, in which he stated that "[y]ou are hereby granted an extension of time until July 31, 1985, to submit your response to any