


# Capacity Procurement Mechanism (“CPM”)

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## The California structure

- California PUC and local regulatory authorities have resource adequacy (“RA”) programs to ensure sufficient capacity is available for reliable grid operation
- RA contracting is done through bilateral contracts - no centralized capacity market
- RA resources may not always be sufficient to meet operational needs - requires ISO to have ability to procure backstop capacity under specified circumstances
- FERC has provided backstop procurement authority to ISO through (previously) ICPM and now CPM

## The CPM

- The use of ICPM has been rare, infrequent and unpredictable
- Procurement is for short periods of time, usually one month, and for no longer than 12 months
- Procurement is offered only to existing resources as the need for the backstop capacity is immediate
- Procured at various places on grid as conditions warrant
- Single tariff rate for all capacity at all locations
- Generally procured in small amounts

# ISO backstop procurement is very limited

- Triggered to date solely through Exceptional Dispatch ICPM
  - 23 times over the last 25 months for a total of \$2.7 million
  - No backstop procurement in past 6 months
- There has never been an ISO procurement to backstop the RA programs or for a Significant Event
- There has not been any procurement through other CPM designations to date

# of Instances	Procurement Date	Resource Name	MW	Reason	Cost
<b>Procurement to Backstop RA Programs</b>					
N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	\$ 0
<b>Procurement to address Significant Events</b>					
N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	\$ 0
<b>Exceptional Dispatch issued to Resources for use of Non-RA Capacity that triggered ICPM Payment</b>					
23	Mar 31, 2009 – Apr 26, 2011	Various	703	Local transmission outages	\$2.7 million

Slide 4

## Proposed CPM compensation is appropriate

- Not designed (nor should it be) to incent new generation
- FERC previously ruled that going-forward cost (“GFC”) compensation is just and reasonable for limited, short-term backstop procurement
- Participation is voluntary except for Exceptional Dispatch CPM designations
- Price paid is at least \$55/kW-year for a minimum term of 30 days
- Unit owners can file for a higher rate if their costs per the formula are greater than \$55/kW-year

## Proposed CPM compensation is reasonable

- Based on cost of highest cost gas-fired unit studied by the California Energy Commission (“CEC”) - 50 MW small simple cycle (merchant) combustion turbine new entrant; this enables lower cost types of resources to earn additional revenues that can cover fixed costs
- Includes O&M, plus insurance and ad valorem taxes

## Proposed CPM compensation is reasonable. (cont'd)


- Provides a 10% cost adder to account for measurement error, hard to quantify or additional costs; thus, CPM pricing mechanism relies on more than just GFC; cost adder provides additional revenues to cover fixed costs
- Resource receives capacity payment and gets to keep all revenues earned through the ISO's markets
- Resource owner can file at FERC for a higher compensation rate

# CPM price is within the range of reasonableness.

- Information below is from California PUC's "Resource Adequacy Report for 2010" dated April 22, 2011
  - Points to reasonableness of proposed CPM price of \$55/kW-year
  - There is no indication that ISO backstop price acts as a cap or floor for RA contracting

## CPUC RA Capacity Only Contracts

Figure 10 Breakdown of prices paid for RA Capacity without energy deliveries



Source: 2011 Energy Division survey of IOUs and ESPs, February and March 2011


## FERC precedent

- Supports GFC methodology for short-term procurement such as this
- FERC stated: “ICPM is a mechanism for procuring capacity for short periods to meet system reliability needs, and therefore, is not designed to encourage new investment” – Oct 16, 2008 ICPM Order
- FERC stated in same Order: “Consequently, we find that the CAISO’s proposal to price backstop capacity at the upper end of this range is not unreasonable and provides non-resource adequacy resources with a payment for capacity services that is comparable to the payment received by resource adequacy resources.”
- ISO’s CPM compensation proposal uses same methodology that was filed in ICPM and approved by FERC; it produces a new capacity price that exceeds the pace of inflation

## ISO recognizes FERC's concern that price paid must be adjustable if there is a permanent CPM

- ISO proposes to revise its proposal to include in the tariff a specific provision that CPM price will be updated every two years
  - Will revise pricing using established GFC methodology every two years to coincide with biennial publishing of CEC Comparative Costs of California Central Station Electricity Generation report
  - Will provide updated CPM price to stakeholders for comment and review

There is not an investment problem in California -- the challenge is to get the right capacity



Also, ISO's DMM has reported that in 2010 1500 MW of conventional thermal generation was completed.

## CPM is not an appropriate or necessary mechanism to send investment signals or incent new generation

- CPM should not be used to send price signals through the following mechanisms that seek to reflect supply and demand and incent development of new generation
  - Scarcity conditions pricing mechanisms
  - Demand curve compensation mechanism
- CPM is not the right vehicle for this
- ISO agrees that incentives and signals need to be provided, but there are other initiatives, as well as the RA program, that will provide this

## Several initiatives are currently underway to identify operational needs and new market products

- ISO Renewable Integration Market and Product Review initiative
  - Will develop new spot markets and consider forward procurement of those products to meet operational needs
  - Can build in mechanisms to reflect scarcity
- California PUC Long-Term Procurement Proceeding
  - Can build in appropriate incentives and compensation
- These initiatives are better avenues than CPM to address investment signals and incentives for capacity
- ISO and stakeholders have finite resources and should focus efforts on these initiatives – keep CPM simple

Both the enhanced GFC and demand curve approaches were extensively discussed in CPM stakeholder process

- ISO decided the GFC approach is a better fit for CPM because
  - Complexity of a demand curve is not warranted due to limited amount of backstop procurement
  - Demand curve would in some locations simply raise price to buyers without encouraging new entry
  - Environmental and siting concerns would limit demand curve effectiveness
  - Demand curve could create market power concerns in local areas

## Demand response can participate in CPM

- Demand response that is under an ISO Participating Load Agreement is already eligible to participate in CPM
- ISO is working to implement Proxy Demand Response resources and these resources will be eligible for CPM
- ISO continues to develop opportunities for demand response resources to participate in markets, including RA and CPM