

Commonwealth Associates, Inc.




Who We Are

- We are a consulting engineering firm that specializes in the services related to the transmission and use of electrical energy.
- We have offices in Michigan, Washington and Atlanta.
- We are employee owned and managed.

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Project Locations – Last 5 Years



 *States with Projects*

 *States without Projects*

System Studies and TRANSMISSION 2000



Services

- Electrical Studies
- Electrical Engineering Support to Transmission Department
- Electrical Engineering Support to Substation Department
- TRANSMISSION 2000[®] and Customized Computer Programming



Electric Grid Cascading Outage Analysis

- A verifiable and complete list of “breaker-to-breaker” contingencies
- Identification of ALL contingencies that cause violations and a direct or indirect assessment of all double (Category B and C) contingency combinations
- An analytical methodology to supplement your engineer’s experience and judgment

Electric Grid Cascading Outage Analysis

Provides an objective, repeatable, and reasonable classification of contingencies:

- those that will not cause outages beyond a predetermined area
- those that cannot be eliminated as potential causes for widespread outages

Electric Grid Cascading Outage Analysis

Provides a priority list of trouble facilities that identifies and suggests root causes for contingencies that may initiate widespread outages

Electric Grid Cascading Outage Analysis

Provides an independent evaluation of your system suitable for use as compliance documentation that management can include in their “due diligence” reporting



Data Requirements

- Minimum
 - Power flow case in standard format (PSS/E or GE)
- Additional Data
 - Contingency Lists (*.con, *.mon, and *.sub files)
 - FERC Form 715 One-Line or Switching Diagrams

Contingency Identification

Contingencies can be:

- Provided by you
- Generated for Power Flow Data
- Breaker to Breaker Contingencies from One-Line or Switching Diagrams


* Process is most effective with a “good” set of base contingencies




NERC Category C Contingencies

- Combinations of NERC Category B Contingencies (Double Contingencies)
- Bus Section Contingencies
- Breaker Failure Contingencies

Bus Section and Breaker Failure Contingencies



Combinations of Category B Contingencies



Objective Criteria for Discounting Vulnerability to Widespread Outages

Base Assumption

If a system does not have violations, it is secure and will not cascade. If rating violations exist, the transmission element may fail.

Methodology

Simulate the system under quasi-steady state operation until there aren't any applicable rating violations

Verification

Process is verifiable by following outage sequences with any standard power flow



Objective Criteria for Discounting Vulnerability to Widespread Outages

- No applicable rating violations
- Load drop less than specified amount (we use 500 MW)
- Power flow solves
 - Load drop to eliminate unsolved cases
 - Interrupted power flow is a violation until solved



Identifying Significant Contingencies

- Load Drop Index – total amount of load dropped by every combination that includes that Category B contingency
- Violation Index – number of violation-causing combinations each Category B contingency participates in
- Can we preclude cascading?

Reliability Compliance Report


- Provide an independent engineer's evaluation of your system for compliance with NERC Category C requirements
- Identify those Category C contingencies that cannot be ruled out as possible initiating events to cascading outages
- Document your due diligence in completing a Category C analysis
- Provide focus on potential problems in your system that may need to be addressed

Example of Category C Contingency that we can preclude as a likely cause for Widespread Outages

- Romulus to Trenton Channel (L4264)
Romulus to Alison (L3580) 120 kV Lines
- Loss of Dayton 120/40 kV Transformer (28741-28693-1)
- Four steps of load drop to solve
- 156 MW load drop
- Outline for operating procedure




1. Trip Dayton Transformer 2-5. Drop Load at Romulus, Wayer, Digia & Dayton




Category C Contingency that cannot be precluded as a cause for Widespread Outages


- Wayne-Wixom-Quaker 345 kV Multi-Terminal Line (MT010)
Wixom to Hancock 120 kV Line (L0220)
- Loss of four lines:
Akron to Sunset 120 kV (28706-28861-1)
Evergreen to Northwest 120 kV (28749-28817-1)
Northwest to L-N-NW 120 kV (28817-28942-1)
Sunset to Haggerty Rd 120 kV (28861-28872-1)
- Load drop at five buses:
Northwest (28817), Quaker (28855), Drexel (28901), Drake (29045), and Hancock (28782)
- Criteria: Loss of over 500 MW of Load



1. Trip Akron to Sunset




2. Trip Evergreen to Northwest




3. Trip Northwest to L-N-NW

4. Drop Load at Northwest




5. Trip Sunset to Hager 6-9. Drop load at Quaker, Drexel, Drake & Hancock



An Abbreviated Study of a Real System

- Used NERC 2009 Summer Peak Case (2004 Series for 2005 Model Year)
- Contingencies only for the sub-system (390 buses, 550 branches)
- Monitored the sub-system and 2 buses away
- No verification of Category B operating procedures and liberal rating changes
- Liberal Category C criteria change (10% flow and voltage)
- Liberal cascade criteria (88% voltage and 110% overload)




Summary of Results for Category B

- Category B Contingency Standard Results
 - 2 contingencies diverged
 - 36 contingencies caused 41 overload violations ($>100\%$)
 - 14 contingencies caused 56 low voltage violations (<0.90)

Summary of Results for Category B

- Cascade Analysis for Category B Contingencies
 - 52 contingencies were run through the cascade tool
 - 1 aborted the cascade sequence because no further loads could be found to drop
 - 3 aborted because the 500 MW load drop limit had been reached
 - 19 resulted in some level of load drop
 - The four contingencies where the cascade sequence was aborted were NOT subsequently combined to create Category C contingencies



Summary of Results for Category C

- Category C Contingency Generation
 - The 549 Category B contingencies have 150,426 possible unique combinations
 - Using sensitivity criteria of 10% flow change and voltage change to identify mutually-dependent combinations yielded 8,280 combinations. This is 5.5% of the total number of possible combinations.



Summary of Results for Category C

- Category C Standard Results
 - 211 contingencies diverged
 - 1,893 contingencies caused 3,097 overload violations (>100%)
 - 454 contingencies caused 2,928 low voltage violations (<0.90)
 - The 2,354 (1.6% of the total possible combinations) contingencies causing these violations were subsequently run through the Cascade Analysis Tool



Summary of Results for Category C

- Cascade Analysis for Category C Contingencies
 - 2 aborted the cascade sequence because no further loads could be found to drop
 - 3 aborted because the power flow solution interrupted in two consecutive attempts
 - 157 aborted because the 500 MW load drop limit had been reached



Priority List of Significant Contingencies

- 83 root cause contingencies have the potential for further cascade
- 80 root causes can be reasonably excluded as having the potential to lead to cascade

Further Consideration

- Adding Probability Measures to the Assessment
- Geo-Referencing Substations
- Extending Screening to Transient Stability
- Periodic Usage
- Extend and Complete Automatic Contingency Generation

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