154 FERC ¶ 61,121
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Norman C. Bay, Chairman;
Cheryl A. LaFleur, Tony Clark,
and Colette D. Honorable.

Southwest Power Pool, Inc. | Docket Nos. ER16-13-000
ER16-13-001

ORDER ON TARIFF REVISIONS

(Issued February 19, 2016)

1. On October 2, 2015, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) filed proposed revisions to its Open Access Transmission Tariff (Tariff) to reduce the number of Auction Revenue Rights (ARR) made available in the annual ARR allocation process by placing limits on the percentage of available transmission system capability used to determine simultaneous feasibility. On December 23, 2015, SPP provided additional information regarding its proposal in response to a request for additional information. In this order, we accept SPP's proposed Tariff revisions,[1] subject to condition, effective January 28, 2016, as discussed below.

I. **Background**

2. As part of the original design of its Integrated Marketplace, SPP established mechanisms to provide market participants with financial tools to manage congestion costs and to allow them to sell their rights to others (Transmission Congestion Rights

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[1] *See* the Appendix to this order for e-Tariff designations.

(TCR)[2] and ARRs,[3] respectively). Market participants could convert firm transmission service reservations into a product, i.e., a credit against daily congestion costs, either through a TCR or through payments received for the ARR. SPP proposed verifying the amount of firm transmission service for each customer on an annual basis, allocating ARRs (that are simultaneously feasible given SPP's transmission system) to firm transmission customers, and holding TCR auctions to allow ARR holders to convert their ARRs into TCRs and to allow market participants to buy and sell TCRs. SPP also proposed conducting monthly TCR auctions to allow market participants to convert ARRs to TCRs and to buy and sell TCRs.

3. In its original Integrated Marketplace proposal, SPP proposed allocating ARRs in a single, annual allocation process.[4] SPP assumed 100 percent transmission system capability year-round when determining the feasibility of ARRs for the annual ARR allocation.[5] In contrast, because market participants could obtain TCRs in two processes—annual and monthly TCR auctions—SPP based its proposed simultaneous feasibility determination in the annual TCR auction on certain reduced transmission system capability percentages (see Table 1).[6] SPP states that assuming reduced capability throughout the year would allow for topology changes between the TCR market models and day-ahead market models, which would mitigate the potential for

[2] TCRs are financial instruments entitling the holder to a stream of revenues or charges based upon the difference between the hourly day-ahead marginal congestion component of the locational marginal price at the source and sink settlement locations associated with the TCR. TCRs are obtained in TCR auctions, either through purchase or self-conversion of ARRs, or through secondary sales of TCRs. *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 141 FERC ¶ 61,048, at n.330 (2012) (Integrated Marketplace Order).

[3] An ARR can result in a credit or charge to the holder, based upon the TCR auction clearing price on the particular ARR path. Eligible entities may either self-convert awarded ARRs into TCRs or hold the ARR to receive a share of the revenue SPP collects from auction purchasers of TCRs. *Id.* n.329.

[4] Under SPP's original design, this served as the only point at which market participants could obtain ARRs, with the exception of incremental ARRs requested by entities with new transmission service confirmed after the annual TCR auction but before the next annual ARR allocation. SPP October 2, 2015 Filing at 4.

[5] SPP states that it had to assume 100 percent system capability year-round because it proposed allocating ARRs in a single, annual process. SPP December 23, 2015 Deficiency Response at 1.

[6] *See infra* P 9.

underfunding and associated uplift.[7] In the order on SPP's original Integrated Marketplace proposal, the Commission directed SPP to modify its ARR allocation design by expanding incremental ARR allocation to entities with historical rights to the existing transmission system.[8] In response, SPP proposed a monthly ARR allocation process subsequent to the annual ARR allocation process, in order to make ARRs available to all entities with remaining ARR eligibility not awarded in the annual TCR auction.[9] The Commission accepted this proposal.[10]

II. SPP Filing

4. On October 2, 2015, SPP submitted revisions to its Tariff to address the underfunding of TCRs in the Integrated Marketplace. SPP explains that this underfunding resulted from an over-allocation of ARRs. SPP concludes that disparate system capability percentages used between the ARR and TCR processes were largely responsible for the over-allocation of ARRs and resulting awarding of infeasible ARRs. Accordingly, to reduce this over-allocation and, thereby, reduce the potential for TCR underfunding, SPP proposes to more closely align the system capability percentages used between the annual ARR allocation and TCR auction processes.[11]

5. Specifically, SPP proposes revisions to section 7.3 of Attachment AE of its Tariff to specify that, in its annual ARR allocation process, feasibility of ARRs will be determined based on 100 percent transmission system capability in June, 90 percent in July through September, and 80 percent during the fall, winter, and spring seasons (i.e., October through May), as detailed in Table 1.

6. SPP also proposes modifications to section 7.5.2 of Attachment AE, which describes SPP's monthly TCR auction process. Specifically, SPP proposes to reduce system capability percentages within the calculation used to determine the number of ARRs obtained in the annual allocation that may be submitted for self-conversion during the two-round TCR auction process for the months of October through May.

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[7] SPP December 23, 2015 Deficiency Response at 1.

[8] Integrated Marketplace Order, 141 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 281.

[9] ARRs deemed infeasible in the annual allocation are carried forward to the monthly ARR allocations. SPP October 2, 2015 Filing at 5.

[10] *Sw. Power Pool, Inc.*, 144 FERC ¶ 61,224 (2013).

[11] SPP October 2, 2015 Filing at 5-6. SPP requests that its proposed Tariff revisions become effective January 28, 2016.

Additionally, SPP proposes revisions to section 7.7 of Attachment AE that update the calculation for the ARR settlement for the annual TCR auction with the proposed, reduced system capability percentages.

III. Notice of Filings and Responsive Pleadings

7. Notice of SPP's filing in Docket No. ER16-13-000 was published in the *Federal Register*, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,894 (2015), with interventions and protests due on or before October 22, 2015. Timely motions to intervene were filed by: DC Energy, LLC; Exelon Corporation; American Electric Power Service Corporation, on behalf of its affiliates Public Service Corporation of Oklahoma and Southwestern Electric Power Company; Xcel Energy Services, Inc. (Xcel); and TDU Intervenors.[12] The SPP Market Monitoring Unit (Market Monitor) filed a motion to intervene and comment. On November 9, 2015, Xcel filed a motion for leave to answer and answer.

8. On November 23, 2015, Commission staff issued a letter indicating that the filing submitted by SPP was deficient and requested further information. On December 23, 2015, SPP submitted a deficiency response that included additional information. Notice of SPP's deficiency response in Docket No. ER16-13-001 was published in the *Federal Register*, 80 Fed. Reg. 81,538 (2015), with interventions and protests due on or before January 13, 2016. The Market Monitor submitted comments.

A. Comments and Answer to SPP Filing

9. The Market Monitor agrees with SPP that much of the excessive allocation of ARRs stems from the market design and the quantity of system capability made available in the ARR allocation process, which contributes to the underfunding of TCRs in the Integrated Marketplace. However, the Market Monitor does not support SPP's proposal to use a system capability percentage of 80 percent for the October through May period during the annual ARR allocation process.[13] Rather, the Market Monitor requests that the Commission conditionally accept SPP's proposal, subject to either (1) SPP providing justification for the 80 percent ARR allocation percentage or (2) modifying the ARR allocation to 60 percent for the October through May period.[14] For ease of comparison, the following table provides a comparison of transmission system capability percentages assumed during the annual ARR allocation and annual TCR auction processes under

[12] TDU Intervenors include the City of Independence, Missouri, the Kansas Power Pool, and the Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission.

[13] Market Monitor October 23, 2015 Comments at 1-2.

[14] *Id.* at 2, 10.

SPP's existing Tariff, SPP's instant proposal, and the Market Monitor's preferred approach:

Table 1: Comparison of system capability percentages used during the annual ARR allocation and TCR auction processes under the existing Tariff, SPP's proposal, and the Market Monitor's preferred approach.

	ARR Allocation			TCR Auction
	Existing Tariff	SPP Proposal	Market Monitor Proposal	Existing Tariff
June	100	100	100	100
July - Sept.	100	90	90	90
Oct. - May	100	80	60	60

Note: SPP's proposal does not modify the system capability assumptions used in the annual TCR auction.[15]

10. As background to its request, the Market Monitor states that, in the first full TCR year of Integrated Marketplace operations,[16] a high degree of disparity existed between TCR payments, net of TCR uplift, and TCR auction charges. The Market Monitor asserts that this indicates that TCR auction prices did not accurately reflect the realized value of TCRs. The Market Monitor recognizes three contributing factors to this outcome: (1) the awarding of ARRs and TCRs beyond the physical limits of the transmission system, (2) the delayed reporting of planned transmission outages, and (3) the excessive valuing of self-converted TCR bids in auctions. The Market Monitor states that each of these factors creates difficulty for market participants in estimating the value of TCRs, which hinders the full information necessary for efficient market outcomes. The Market Monitor notes that TCR funding was 82 percent for the first full TCR year, while the ARR funding level was 113 percent. The Market Monitor also provides data demonstrating that, in every month, day-ahead congestion revenues fell short of TCR payments, while auction revenues exceeded ARR payments.[17]

11. Regarding the first contributing factor, the Market Monitor explains that in the monthly ARR allocation and TCR auction models, SPP expands transmission constraint

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[15] Table based on SPP October 2, 2015 Filing, Market Monitor October 23, 2015 Comments.

[16] The TCR year runs from June through May. The first TCR year ran from June 2014 through May 2015. Market Monitor October 23, 2015 Comments at 5 (citing SPP Tariff, Attachment AE section 7.4.2).

[17] *Id.* at 4-5.

limits in the monthly ARR and TCR models to preserve the integrity of the rights awarded in the annual processes. The Market Monitor also explains that the expanded limits can lead to situations where TCR market flows exceed day-ahead energy market flows for particular transmission paths, resulting in TCR underfunding.[18] The Market Monitor views aligning the system capability used between the ARR allocation and TCR auction processes as a crucial first step in creating a more efficient and transparent TCR market. The Market Monitor contends that the effectiveness of future enhancements to outage reporting, modeling, and the process for converting ARRs to TCRs will be limited if SPP does not fully resolve this mismatch.[19]

12. However, the Market Monitor does not support SPP's proposed use of 80 percent system capability during the October through May period to determine feasibility in the annual ARR allocation process because it does not match the 60 percent system capability figure used in the TCR auction process. Thus, the Market Monitor asserts, this mismatch would result in potential TCR underfunding.[20] The Market Monitor also contends that this aspect of SPP's proposal is contrary to an earlier proposal, presented by SPP staff to the SPP Market Working Group, which aligned the ARR and TCR system capability percentage at 60 percent for the October through May period. The Market Monitor asserts that SPP staff supported this proposal with analysis showing that the monthly average constraint limit expansion to accommodate annual ARRs or TCRs generally exceeded 10 percent, especially in the last eight months of the TCR year (i.e., the October through May period).[21] According to the Market Monitor, the analysis demonstrates that the mismatch in system capability percentages between the ARR allocation and TCR auction leads to an over-allocation of the transmission system and contributes to the ARR/TCR funding discrepancy.[22] The Market Monitor asserts that both the SPP Market Working Group and the Market Monitor approved a proposal to set the system capability assumption to 60 percent in the annual ARR allocation process.[23]

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[18] *Id.* at 7.

[19] *Id.* at 6-7, 10.

[20] The Market Monitor states that SPP staff identified this mismatch as a primary cause of TCR underfunding during the first TCR year in the Integrated Marketplace. *Id.* at 7.

[21] *Id.* at 9-10.

[22] *Id.* at 9.

[23] The Market Monitor states that it provided support through written comments and, after independent review, adopted the earlier recommendation in its 2014 State of the Market Report. *Id.* at 8.

The Market Monitor claims, however, that the proposal was changed to increase the October through May system capability percentage from 60 to 80 percent at the Markets and Operations Policy Committee level of the SPP stakeholder process. The Market Monitor asserts that this change was not supported with analysis and, therefore, it does not support the revised proposal.[24]

13. Xcel objects to the Market Monitor's request, as explained in its answer. Xcel states that the impetus behind SPP's filing was the recognition that underfunding of TCRs impaired the ability of load-serving entities to fully hedge congestion costs and made TCRs a less attractive investment for parties with purely financial interests. Xcel is concerned by the over-reliance on reductions in ARR allocations as a means to address the underfunding of TCRs, noting that this action could potentially impair the ability of load-serving entities to hedge their congestion costs.[25]

14. Xcel contends that the Market Monitor's request to further reduce ARR allocations fails to properly balance the interests of parties that view TCRs as a financial investment vehicle against the needs of holders of firm transmission rights to hedge their costs. Xcel asserts that the Market Monitor gives too much weight to the interests of TCR holders and insufficient weight to the interests of those that have paid for firm transmission rights on the SPP system. Xcel requests that the Commission approve SPP's proposed reduction of the ARR allocation percentage to 80 percent, which Xcel characterizes as a more balanced approach, until the impacts of the proposed 80 percent parameter can be assessed.[26]

15. Xcel notes that the most recent data on TCR underfunding suggests that the funding gap has been closing. Xcel provides a graph to demonstrate that, for the period of June through September of 2015, TCRs have been funded at a cumulative level of 99 percent. Xcel believes the data suggests that parity in system capability percentages used between the ARR and TCR processes may not be needed to address TCR underfunding. Xcel notes that other factors, such as treatment of counterflows, parallel flows, and flowgate modeling, may offset modeled reductions in capability and help bridge the funding gap.[27]

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[24] *Id.* at 2, 8-9.

[25] Xcel November 9, 2015 Answer at 3-4.

[26] *Id.* at 4.

[27] *Id.* at 4-5.

B. Deficiency Letter and Response

1. Deficiency Letter

16. In the deficiency letter, Commission staff requested additional information from SPP on several topics. Specifically, Commission staff requested: (1) an explanation for why SPP proposes modeling system capability at 80 percent during the October through May period in the annual ARR allocation process, rather than at 60 percent; (2) additional analysis to support the proposal; (3) an explanation of modeling enhancements SPP has pursued to address TCR underfunding and whether these enhancements have already begun to alleviate underfunding issues; (4) information on the expected impact on the ability of load and other transmission customers to hedge day-ahead congestion costs; and (5) clarifications regarding proposed calculations in sections 7.5.2[28] and 7.7[29] of Attachment AE of the Tariff.

2. Deficiency Response

17. In its deficiency response, SPP confirms that the proposal approved by the SPP Market Working Group called for modeling system capability during the October through May period at 60 percent in the annual ARR allocation process. SPP states that, later in the stakeholder process, a stakeholder proposed changing the percentage from 60 to 80 percent, based on the belief that moving from 100 to 60 percent was too "stringent." SPP notes that the Markets and Operations Policy Committee, as well as the SPP Board of Directors, approved this revised proposal. SPP believes that the change from 60 to 80 percent continues to mitigate the potential disconnect between the ARR and TCR processes. Additionally, SPP asserts that using 80 percent will provide a more gradual shift from the current market design and that a more incremental approach will facilitate future design enhancements. SPP also asserts that its proposal will result in the awarding of feasible ARRs—as well as a better-funded, more valuable TCR product—compared to the status quo.[30]

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[28] With regard to the proposed calculation in section 7.5.2, Commission staff questioned why it was necessary to include the months of June through September in a calculation that applied to the October through May period.

[29] With regard to the proposed calculation in section 7.7, Commission staff asked SPP to clarify that it intended to multiply the "annual ARR award" by a ratio, as the wording in the section was unclear.

[30] SPP December 23, 2015 Deficiency Response at 2-4.

18. SPP claims that conducting the analysis to support the 80 percent proposal, as requested by Commission staff, would be "extremely difficult, and the results may be of marginal value because they are based on assumptions that become more tenuous in the outer months of the forecasted period relative to the historical baseline data."[31] SPP requests that the Commission consider requiring an ex-post informational filing to report on the proposal's effectiveness in lieu of the requested ex-ante analysis.[32] Additionally, SPP states that while it has made improvements to its outage process and utilized new information regarding parallel flows and flow gates in its models, it has derived all the value it can from modeling enhancements relative to the goal of mitigating the allocation of infeasible rights. SPP asserts that, to obtain further benefits, it is necessary to implement changes to the allocation rules, which will complement the modeling enhancements already made.[33] SPP also believes that its current proposal strikes a reasonable balance between facilitating effective hedging of day-ahead congestion costs and mitigating the potential allocation of infeasible ARRs. SPP asserts that its proposal will provide similar, if not enhanced, hedging opportunities when compared to the current rules.[34]

19. SPP acknowledges that it is not necessary to include the months of June through September in the calculation to determine the number of ARRs obtained in the annual allocation that may be submitted for self-conversion during the two-round TCR auction process for the months of October through May. SPP proposes that it could revise section 7.5.2(1)(a)(i) of Attachment AE to remove references to system capability percentages used in the June through September period.[35] Further, SPP acknowledges that wording in section 7.7(1) of Attachment AE may be potentially ambiguous and proposes that it could revise this section to clarify that the annual ARR award should be multiplied by the quotient of the auction available transmission system capability percentage divided by the allocation available transmission system capability percentage.[36]

[31] *Id*. at 4.

[32] *Id.* at 4-6.

[33] *Id.* at 6-8.

[34] *Id.* at 8-9.

[35] *Id.* at 9-10.

[36] *Id.* at 10.

3. Comments

20. The Market Monitor maintains that using an 80 percent system capability assumption during the October through May period in the annual ARR allocation process is a suboptimal market design because it will create the same problems, although to a lesser degree, as the current 100 percent assumption.[37] While the Market Monitor concurs with SPP that—as interpreted by SPP—the requested analysis by Commission staff would be difficult and burdensome to conduct, the Market Monitor notes that SPP and the Market Monitor conducted less extensive analyses that supported the earlier proposal assuming 60 percent system capability in the October through May period. The Market Monitor asserts that the justifications and discussions held in support of the earlier proposal are still valid.[38]

21. Nonetheless, the Market Monitor requests that, if the Commission supports SPP's incremental approach, it approve the current proposal contingent on SPP eventually aligning the system capability assumptions used in the ARR and TCR processes.[39] The Market Monitor argues that this approach would allow market participants to observe market outcomes and infer what changes to expect when moving from 80 to 60 percent while assuring that the ARR and TCR processes eventually reach proper alignment.[40]

22. The Market Monitor notes that several options for mitigating the allocation of infeasible rights were discussed in the SPP stakeholder process. However, the Market Monitor states that SPP, after a lengthy and detailed review, originally decided that aligning the system capability assumptions used in the ARR and TCR processes (i.e., 100 percent in June, 90 percent from July through September, and 60 percent from October through May) was the best option for achieving market efficiency improvement and to address market participants' concerns.[41] The Market Monitor also reiterates its belief that SPP's current proposal will reduce, but not eliminate, infeasible ARRs, which then will have to be settled or self-converted in the monthly auctions.[42]

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[37] Market Monitor January 13, 2016 Comments at 5.

[38] *Id.* at 6-7.

[39] The Market Monitor requests that SPP include language in the Tariff providing for this eventual alignment. *Id.* at 7.

[40] *Id.*

[41] *Id.* at 8.

[42] *Id.*

IV. Discussion

A. Procedural Matters

23. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2015), timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the entities that filed them parties to this proceeding.

24. Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2015) prohibits an answer to a protest unless otherwise ordered by a decisional authority. We will accept Xcel's answer because it provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process.

B. Substantive Matters

25. We accept SPP's proposed Tariff revisions, subject to condition, as discussed below.[43] We find that, as noted by both SPP and the Market Monitor, adjustments to the allocation rules are a necessary step toward correcting the TCR underfunding problem. We view adjusting the system capability assumptions used to determine feasibility in the annual ARR allocation process as an important step toward reducing the potential for underfunding TCRs, thereby creating a more efficient TCR market. We accept SPP's proposal to reduce the system capability assumption for the July through September period in the annual ARR allocation process from 100 to 90 percent. This adjustment matches the system capability assumption used for the same time period in the annual TCR auction and should help alleviate the potential for TCR underfunding. However, we find that SPP has not demonstrated that its proposal to use 80 percent transmission system capability for the October through May period in the annual ARR allocation process is just and reasonable. In its deficiency response, SPP states that the proposed 80 percent figure for the October through May period was the result of a compromise to achieve a more gradual approach to addressing the problem of TCR underfunding. However, SPP does not provide analysis or evidence to support the 80 percent assumption proposed for use during the October through May period.

26. Based on the record in this proceeding, we find that it is appropriate for SPP to use a 60 percent system capability assumption for the October through May period in the annual ARR allocation process. As SPP explains in its deficiency response, there is a potential mismatch between rights allocated in the annual ARR allocation (currently

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[43] The Commission can revise a proposal under section 205 of the Federal Power Act as long as the filing utility accepts the change. *See City of Winnfield v. FERC*, 744 F.2d 871, 875-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The filing utility is free to indicate that it is unwilling to accede to the Commission's conditions by withdrawing its filing.

based on 100 percent of system capability) and the actual system capability that is realized over the applicable period.[44] The potential for infeasibility associated with such a mismatch, and the associated underfunding of TCRs, may be mitigated through using more conservative assumptions about system capability in the annual ARR allocation process (i.e., by using a reduced percentage of system capability). We find that using a more conservative approach that aligns the October through May system capability assumptions in the annual ARR allocation and TCR auction processes at 60 percent represents a reasonable approach to mitigating the potential for allocating infeasible rights and underfunding TCRs. This potential is greater during the October through May period because it represents the latest period in the annual ARR/TCR process, and correspondingly, uncertainties regarding changes in system topology and other factors are greater.[45]

27. Additionally, we find that using a 60 percent system capability assumption during the October through May period will better reduce the need to expand transmission constraint limits during the monthly processes, which contributes to the TCR underfunding problem. By awarding fewer infeasible ARRs during the annual allocation process, which are then carried forward to the monthly processes, SPP will not have to expand transmission constraint limits as frequently to accommodate infeasible ARRs. As noted by the Market Monitor, expanding limits can lead to situations where TCR market flows exceed day-ahead market flows for certain transmission paths, resulting in TCR underfunding.[46] Accordingly, we find that the record supports using a 60 percent system capability assumption during the October through May period of the annual ARR allocation process.

28. We are not persuaded by Xcel's assertion that the recent underfunding data provided in its answer demonstrates that it is unnecessary to use assumptions that align the system capability percentages used in the annual ARR and TCR processes. We find that the data presented by Xcel is inconclusive, as complete TCR funding information is not yet available for the full October 2015 through May 2016 period.[47]

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[44] SPP December 23, 2015 Deficiency Response at 2.

[45] As noted by SPP in its deficiency response, allocating fewer rights during this later period (by assuming less system capability is available) creates a "capacity buffer or reserve" to offset lost capacity due to unanticipated changes in system topology. *Id.* at 7.

[46] Market Monitor October 23, 2015 Comments at 7.

[47] Xcel references a slide from an October 20, 2015 presentation by the Market Monitor that provides a graph illustrating 99 percent cumulative TCR funding from June through September 2015. *See* Xcel November 9, 2015 Comments at 5.

29. Accordingly, we will require SPP to modify proposed section 7.3 of Attachment AE to specify that the transmission provider will make available 60 percent of the transmission system capability for the fall, winter, and spring seasons (i.e., the months of October through May) during the annual ARR allocation process. We will require SPP to make this change in a compliance filing due 30 days after the issuance of this order.

30. With regard to the revisions to section 7.5.2 of Attachment AE that SPP states it could make, we find that SPP's proposed removal of the months of June through September improves the calculation described in this section, which applies to the October through May period. We also find that SPP's revisions to section 7.7 of Attachment AE that it states it could make reduce potential ambiguity in the calculation to determine the ARR settlement for the annual TCR auction. Accordingly, we will require SPP to revise sections 7.5.2 and 7.7 of Attachment AE, consistent with its deficiency response, in a compliance filing due 30 days after the issuance of this order. Additionally, we note that SPP will need to revise the allocation percentage for the available transmission system capability for the fall, winter, and spring seasons in these sections in its compliance filing.

The Commission orders:

(A) SPP's proposed Tariff revisions are hereby accepted, effective January 28, 2016, subject to condition, as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) SPP is hereby directed to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.

By the Commission.

(S E A L)

Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.

Appendix: e-Tariff Designations

Docket No. ER16-13-000:

Southwest Power Pool, Inc., FERC FPA Electric Tariff, Open Access Transmission Tariff, Sixth Revised Volume No. 1, Att. AE (MPL) 7.3, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.3, 2.0.0, Att. AE (MPL) 7.5.2, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.5.2, 2.0.0, Att. AE (MPL) 7.7, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.7, 2.0.0.

Docket No. ER16-13-001:

Southwest Power Pool, Inc., FERC FPA Electric Tariff, Open Access Transmission Tariff, Sixth Revised Volume No. 1, Att. AE (MPL) 7.3, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.3, 2.1.0, Att. AE (MPL) 7.5.2, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.5.2, 2.1.0, Att. AE (MPL) 7.7, Attachment AE (MPL) Section 7.7, 2.1.0.