145 FERC ¶ 61,014
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman;
Philip D. Moeller, John R. Norris,
Cheryl A. LaFleur, and Tony Clark.

ISO New England Inc. and New England Power Pool Docket No. ER13-1877-000

ORDER CONDITIONALLY ACCEPTING TARIFF REVISIONS

(Issued October 3, 2013)

1. On July 1, 2013, ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) and the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL) Participants Committee (together, the Filing Parties) submitted proposed changes to the ISO-NE Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (Tariff) involving energy market enhancements intended to provide greater flexibility for market participants to structure and modify their supply offers in the day-ahead and real-time markets (Offer Flexibility Changes). We will conditionally accept the Offer Flexibility Changes, subject to a compliance filing, to become effective December 3, 2014, as requested.

## I. <u>The Filing</u>

2. The Filing Parties state that the New England region has experienced a marked increase in the proportion of its electric power that is generated by natural gas-fired resources.[1] The Filing Parties note that this increased dependence on natural gas-fired generation has challenged the existing gas and electric market structures and necessitated discussion at the regional and national levels about how best to address those challenges. The Filing Parties explain that the Offer Flexibility Changes are another step in a series

[1] For example, according to ISO-NE, in 1990, natural gas-fired generators produced approximately five percent of the electricity consumed in New England. In 2010, that figure was at 34 percent. ISO-NE's 2010 Annual Markets Report at 78. By 2012, the figure had grown to 51 percent. ISO-NE July 2012 paper, *Addressing Gas Dependence*, at 3.

of operational and market improvements that ISO-NE is working on with stakeholders to address these concerns.

3. The proposed Offer Flexibility Changes have six components.

### A. Real-Time Offer Changes

4. Under the current Tariff, market participants finalize and submit offers for the day-ahead energy market by no later than 10:00 a.m. on the day before a particular operating day. After the day-ahead market is cleared and the results posted, market participants may modify their offers during a half-hour period between 1:30 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. (known as the Re-Offer Period) on the day before the operating day. There is no opportunity to change the cost-related parameters of an offer after the Re-Offer Period. Some non-cost related offer parameters can be re-declared by a market participant in real-time to accurately reflect the physical characteristics of a resource.

5. Under the proposed Offer Flexibility Changes, market participants will be able to modify the cost-related parameters of a supply offer up until 30 minutes prior to the hour during the operating day and will be able to modify the energy blocks, start-up fee, no-load fee, fuel type, and the regulation supply offer price and quantity.[2] Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD)[3] units will be able to modify the energy blocks (price and quantity of energy) of the demand bid. The Filing Parties state that being able to update an offer in real time means that, when a resource's operating costs have changed to reflect real-time fuel or other costs, the operating costs can be reflected in the new offer, which makes it more likely that market participants' financial incentives and the requirement for resources to follow dispatch instructions are aligned.

### B. Offers That Vary By Hour

6. Under the current market rules, the cost-based parameters of offers generally are the same for every hour of a particular operating day. The proposed Offer Flexibility

[2] Market participants may do so after the initial Reserve Adequacy Analysis process is completed; ISO-NE conducts the initial Reserve Adequacy Analysis process to determine whether it is necessary from a reliability perspective to commit more resources in addition to those that were committed through the clearing of the day-ahead market.

[3] Capitalized terms not defined herein are intended to have the meaning given to those terms in the Tariff.

Changes would allow market participants to submit cost-related parameters of a supply offer, or a demand bid for a DARD, that may vary by hour, rather than requiring these parameters to be the same for all hours of an operating day. The Filing Parties state that allowing the cost-related parameters to vary by hour will have the same general benefits as being able to change offers in real time.

### C. Negative Offers

7. Under the current rules, an offer in the energy market may not be less than $0/MWh. The proposed Offer Flexibility Changes would allow market participants to submit offers as low as negative $150/MWh (referred to as the energy offer floor) for external transactions and the energy blocks for a supply offer, demand bid, increment offer, and decrement bid. The Filing Parties state that the lower offer floor accommodates the needs of market participants with resources that can operate economically (or can increase consumption) at very low energy prices and better reflects the full range of prices at which different types of resources become uneconomic. The Filing Parties explain that, from a market efficiency perspective, lowering the energy offer floor will allow resource output to be set through an economic dispatch process.[4]

### D. Self-Scheduling

8. Currently, a market participant self-schedules a generating resource by re-declaring the resource's Economic Minimum Limit to reflect the desired minimum output level of the resource. The proposed Offer Flexibility Changes eliminate the use of the Economic Minimum Limit as the mechanism through which a market participant indicates a desired minimum output level of a generating resource and instead use the term as a more static value based upon the physical design characteristics, environmental regulations, and licensing limits of the generating resource.[5] Under the proposed Offer Flexibility Changes, a market participant will be able to self-schedule a generating resource by submitting a request for a resource to be dispatched at a specific output level.

[4] Under the current rules, the output of all resources with a $0/MWh offer is modified administratively when necessary**,** rather than through an economic dispatch process. The Filing Parties state that setting the energy offer floor at a sufficiently low level will provide a strong incentive for all generating resources to follow dispatch down to their Emergency Minimum Limit to avoid excess generation conditions (a Minimum Generation Emergency).

[5] *See* Ethier/Parent Testimony at 13.

The Filing Parties state that, from an operational perspective, the existing practice of modifying a resource's Economic Minimum Limit has the disadvantage of reducing the resource's dispatchable range,[6] sometimes artificially creating a Minimum Generation Emergency and requiring system operators to take administrative actions and/or implement administrative pricing to resolve the situation. The proposed change would prevent resources from moving the Economic Minimum Limit when self-scheduling and, thus, would allow system operators to dispatch a resource to its Economic Minimum Limit before declaring a Minimum Generation Emergency.

### E. Appendix A/Mitigation Rules[7]

9. The Filing Parties propose conforming changes to the Appendix A mitigation rules, which they state are required to maintain consistency with the proposed changes that allow market participants to submit offers that vary by hour, change offers in real time, and submit offers as low as negative $150/MWh. As the proposed Offer Flexibility Changes would allow participants to submit offers that vary by hour and modify the cost-related parameters throughout the operating day, the Filing Parties propose that the Internal Market Monitor (IMM) develop hourly Reference Levels rather than Reference Levels that are fixed for an operating day.

10. As proposed, the hourly Reference Levels will incorporate fuel price information from market participants. Specifically, Reference Levels will be calculated using the lower of either a submitted fuel price from a market participant, or a price calculated by the IMM. Participant-submitted fuel price changes for the Reference Levels will not be reviewed by the IMM prior to submitting the change. The Filing Parties also propose three mechanisms intended to prevent market participants from entering fuel price adjustments as a means to avoid mitigation: (1) the IMM will set a limit on the fuel price it will use in calculating a resource's Reference Level based on available fuel price indices and market conditions and that is independent of any fuel price adjustment submitted by a market participant; (2) if a market participant enters a fuel price adjustment and simultaneously enters a new offer, the new offer must be within 10 percent of the Reference Level calculated based on the new fuel price; and (3) a market participant that enters a fuel price adjustment must submit documentation verifying that

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[6] The dispatchable range is the difference between the resource's Economic Minimum Limit and the Economic Maximum Limit.

[7] Market Monitoring, Reporting and Market Power Mitigation of Market Rule 1 of the Tariff.

the submitted fuel price is based on a fuel price quote, contract, or price from an electronic trading system. The Filing Parties state that a market participant that fails to submit verification will be excluded from submitting a fuel price adjustment for the applicable resource for two months for the first failure and six months for the second failure (lock-out provisions).

11. However, as explained in the testimony of Dr. Mario DePillis, Jr., an economist with the IMM,[8] a market participant can request a value to be added to the quote or price that reflects its expected fuel costs. The "adder" value must be submitted and approved by the IMM in advance using the consultation process described in section III.A.3 of the proposed Tariff changes. ISO-NE states that, if, for example, the market participant does not have an updated quote from a natural gas supplier, it could instead include an adder to its fuel quote or price that reflects the volatility observed in the intra-day natural gas market on the public trading platforms. In addition, ISO-NE notes that the market participant could apply the adder to reflect different natural gas purchase quantities.

12. The Filing Parties propose additional conforming changes to Appendix A. First, they propose making the period for which mitigation applies, once triggered, more flexible. Under the existing rules, mitigation continues until the end of an operating day, but, under the proposed revisions, mitigation may end before the end of an operating day under appropriate conditions. Second, they propose modifying certain mitigation calculations to reflect the potential variation in the period during which a resource may be mitigated. Third, they also seek to modify the local reliability commitment mitigation threshold so that it is only based on the existing 10 percent of low load cost threshold. The current $80/MWh threshold is proposed to be eliminated because, according to the Filing Parties, high and volatile fuel prices could otherwise result in mitigation being triggered inappropriately. Fourth, they plan to introduce limits, based on fuel prices, to the amount that start-up fees and no-load fees may be increased in real-time. Finally, they seek to eliminate the requirement that market participants with dual-fuel resources must submit offers based on the resource's least cost fuel, so that these market participants instead can manage the delivery and price risk associated with natural gas based on oil costs and can conserve oil by offering based on natural gas costs.

### F. Clarifying Changes

13. The Filing Parties propose clarification and clean-up changes, including: removing defined terms that are no longer applicable; adding defined terms for supply

[8] DePillis Testimony at 15-17.

offer parameters; and clarifying language related to supply offers, demand bids, and external transactions.

14. The Filing Parties request an effective date of December 3, 2014, and waiver of the 120-day advance notice requirement of 18 C.F.R. § 35.3 (2013). However, the Filing Parties seek a Commission determination by October 1, 2013, before stakeholders consider any proposed changes to other market rules related to the Offer Flexibility Changes at ISO-NE's October 8, 2013 stakeholder meeting.

## II. Notice of Filings and Responsive Pleadings

15. Notice of the filing was published in the *Federal Register*, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,051 (2013), with interventions and protests due on or before July 22, 2013.

16. Brookfield Energy Marketing LP; Calpine Corporation; Entergy Nuclear Power Marketing, LLC; Exelon Corporation; GDF SUEZ Energy North America, Inc.; H.Q. Energy Services (U.S.) Inc.; Northeast Utilities Service Company; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC and PSEG Power Connecticut LLC filed timely motions to intervene. The NRG Companies filed a motion to intervene out-of-time.[9] Capital Power;[10] Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA); New England Power Generators Association Inc. (NEPGA); and New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE) filed timely motions to intervene and comments. Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Mass DPU) filed a notice of intervention and comments. On July 31, 2013, ISO-NE filed an answer, and on August 6, 2013, NEPOOL filed an answer.

### A. Comments/Protests

17. NEPGA states that the Offer Flexibility Changes, and specifically the ability to vary and modify offers by hour, will significantly improve day-ahead and real-time price formation and efficiency. However, NEPGA and others[11] challenge the proposed

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[9] The NRG Companies are NRG Power Marketing LLC; GenOn Energy Management, LLC; Connecticut Jet Power LLC; Devon Power LLC; Middletown Power LLC; Montville Power LLC; Norwalk Power LLC; NRG Canal LLC; and NRG Kendall.

[10] Capital Power is CP Energy Marketing (US) Inc.; Bridgeport Energy, LLC; Rumford Power Inc.; and Tiverton Power LLC.

[11] Capital Power and EPSA support NEPGA's comments.

Appendix A mitigation revisions, arguing that they are unjustly and unreasonably punitive and could suppress market prices below the marginal cost of energy, thereby penalizing all resources, rather than enhancing operational reliability through improved price formation.

18. NEPGA asserts that denying market participants the ability to reflect actual fuel price exposure for real-time dispatch for a two- or six-month period based on a single failure to verify an anticipated fuel price is inefficient and punitive to the rest of the competitive market supply. NEPGA states that, if a market participant does not have an updated quote for a quantity greater than that quoted by a supplier or on a publicly-traded platform, or cannot obtain a quote for a price at the quantity the resource needs, the quote available to the market participant may not reflect its actual fuel costs. NEPGA states that, while allowing a value to be added to the quote or price that reflects its expected fuel costs is helpful, it is not a sufficient safeguard against penalizing market participants for basing their supply offers on their anticipated actual fuel costs. NEPGA asserts that it is unreasonable to expect that a market participant can predict with absolute precision all of the adders or adder methodologies that may be necessary to account for the myriad of possible reasons (and combination of reasons) described by the IMM for how a quote or trading platform price may differ from actual fuel costs. NEPGA states that instead a market participant might choose not to increase its supply offer to reflect its actual fuel costs if it has not predicted its need for an adder (and received approval from the IMM) in advance, potentially suppressing marginal prices and disrupting efficient economic dispatch – resulting in some of the harmful consequences the Offer Flexibility Changes are intended to remedy. NEPGA asserts that the proposed Appendix A revisions are unjust and unreasonable, because they effectively force market participants to choose between basing their supply offers on their actual fuel costs or risk a severe penalty for a single failure to document a fuel price consistent with an actual fuel price.

19. NEPGA also challenges the magnitude of the proposed penalty, noting that a two-month prohibition denies a market participant the opportunity to change its supply offer in 1,500 consecutive re-offer periods (25 opportunities per operating day) due to a market participant's one-time inability to document expected fuel costs, which can be extremely unpredictable. NEPGA states that none of the penalty provision triggers are acts of malice or attempts to exercise undue market power to avoid mitigation, but are instead a reflection of the limitations of the IMM's proposed mitigation scheme.

20. Finally, NEPGA states that, according to the IMM, the two- and six-month exclusion penalties are reasonable, in part, because "they correspond to a similar exclusion used in the New York market for participant-submitted fuel prices." NEPGA argues, however, that the New York Independent System Operator, Inc.'s (NYISO) market power mitigation measures differ significantly from those proposed by the IMM. Specifically, NEPGA states that the NYISO market monitor may impose two- and

six- month penalties where a market participant has, over a time period of at least one week, submitted inaccurate fuel type or fuel price information that was biased in the market participant's favor. NEPGA states that the Appendix A revisions would impose the same penalties as NYISO but for only a single transgression.[12] NEPGA states that the NYISO tariff exclusion penalties are not a proper benchmark for the IMM's proposed penalties because the NYISO exclusion penalties are intended to discourage and penalize more egregious supply offer behavior with a greater likelihood of adversely affecting efficient markets.

21. NEPGA and others argue that the Commission should require ISO-NE to change the proposed penalty provisions, with Capital Power adding that ISO-NE should submit compliance filings reporting how often the penalty provisions are triggered and how mitigation determinations are being handled.

22. NESCOE[13] states that it generally supports the Offer Flexibility Changes, positing that the revisions will ensure that the marginal cost of electricity is more closely aligned with the actual cost of production, by reflecting real-time fuel prices and other changes to operating costs. NESCOE states that the added flexibility will provide the region with another tool to address concerns related to New England's growing reliance on natural gas as a fuel source for electric generation, stating that the ability to vary and modify offers by hour will help bridge the timing gaps between the natural gas and electric markets.

23. NESCOE also asserts that the proposed changes should help address concerns expressed in *Dominion Energy Marketing, Inc.* that the Tariff lacks "flexibility to allow for cost recovery by resources that respond under extraordinary circumstances."[14] NESCOE states that, by providing an opportunity to revise offers to reflect the price of procuring fuel in real-time and other changed costs, the Offer Flexibility Changes should reduce the burden placed on resources to make section 205 filings to recover costs associated with dispatch for reliability reasons.

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[12] NEPGA Comments at 8.

[13] The Mass DPU states that it supports the Offer Flexibility Changes and concurs with NESCOE's comments, stating that these changes should enhance market efficiency and system reliability.

[14] *Dominion Energy Marketing, Inc.*, 143 FERC ¶ 61,233, at P 28 (2013).

24. Finally, NESCOE encourages and appreciates the commitment by ISO-NE to continue to monitor offer behavior to determine if a reduction to the negative offer floor price is warranted in the future.

### B. Answers

25. ISO-NE responds that the lock-out provisions will not result in over-mitigation or harm to the market. ISO-NE explains that, under the proposed provisions, a resource is only mitigated when a supply offer is well above a resource's Reference Level and the IMM finds that the market participant possesses market power.[15] Specifically, the IMM must determine that the market participant submitting the offers is a pivotal supplier, has a resource that is located in a constrained area or is dispatched for local reliability purposes, and has a price that exceeds its Reference Level by a specified amount.

26. ISO-NE also asserts that generators should not have unlimited authority to set References Levels for their resources. ISO-NE explains that generators are able to submit fuel price adjustments based on their fuel price expectations that will increase their Reference Levels, provided that their expectations can be substantiated by providing some reasonable explanation as to why they believe the expected fuel price will exceed the published fuel price index. ISO-NE contends that mitigation is intended to assure that market outcomes are competitive and that generators are responsible for knowing their own costs, developing reasonable estimates of expected costs, and reflecting those costs in their offers.[16]

27. ISO-NE further states that the lock-out provisions affect the ability of market participants to submit fuel prices used to determine Reference Levels, not those used by a market participant to formulate supply offers. ISO-NE explains that the Reference Level for a resource that will apply during a lock-out period will be based on published fuel price indices that reflect actual market data, trading volumes and prices submitted to the organizations that develop and publish the fuel indices.[17] In addition, "locked out" market participants are not precluded from engaging in prior consultation with the IMM to determine appropriate fuel prices to be used to calculate Reference Levels.

[15] *See* ISO-NE Answer at 6.

[16] ISO-NE Answer at 11.

[17] ISO-NE Answer at 6.

28. ISO-NE posits that imposing a two- to six-month lockout period is an appropriate consequence for having submitted unsupported fuel price adjustments since the potential harm from unjustified fuel price adjustments in the form of inappropriately high Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) is substantial. ISO-NE suggests that a lock-out is unlikely to impact overall market efficiency, explaining that day-ahead and intra-day fuel prices typically affect multiple market participants receiving fuel from the same sources (e.g., the same natural gas pipeline). ISO-NE theorizes that some market participants are likely to submit supply offers and fuel price adjustments reflecting those market conditions; this would result in LMPs being substantially the same as they would have been if a market participant subject to the lockout period had itself submitted higher supply offers that were not mitigated.[18]

29. In its answer, NEPOOL suggests that the package of mitigation provisions reasonably requires market participants to substantiate offers based on actual fuel price, and if there is an unjustified rejection of that substantiation by the IMM, the market participant has the opportunity to seek relief from the Commission by filing a complaint under Federal Power Act section 206.[19] NEPOOL requests the Commission approve the mitigation measures to minimize the risk for bidding conduct that could raise consumer costs to unreasonable or unjustified levels. NEPOOL also states that it was clear in stakeholder discussions that the dramatically increased flexibility to permit market participants to update their energy offers intra-day would be unacceptable to many NEPOOL members unless accompanied by meaningful mitigation measures.

## III. Discussion

### A. Procedural Matters

30. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2013), the notice of intervention and timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make the entities that filed them parties to this proceeding.

31. Pursuant to Rule 214(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d) (2013), the Commission will grant the late-filed motion to intervene given the party's interest in the proceeding, the early stage of the proceeding, and the absence of undue prejudice or delay.

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[18] *See* ISO-NE Answer at 8.

[19] NEPOOL Answer at 5 (referencing 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2006)).

32. Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2013), prohibits an answer to a protest unless otherwise ordered by the decisional authority. We will accept ISO-NE's and NEPOOL's answers because they have provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process.

### B. Commission Determination

33. We will conditionally accept the Offer Flexibility Changes, subject to ISO-NE submitting revised tariff records in a compliance filing, to become effective December 3, 2014. We find that the proposed revisions, modified as discussed below, will significantly improve flexibility for market participants to structure and modify supply offers in the energy markets, as well as provide ISO-NE with the tools to better manage the electric system and thereby help ensure reliability.

34. In rendering our determination, we note that NEPGA, Capital Power, and EPSA generally support the proposed Offer Flexibility Changes; they dispute only the proposed lock-out provisions. These parties assert that the two- and six-month lock-out penalties are disproportionate in magnitude, and the consequences of mitigation would not be limited to the specific market participant and commensurate with the specific supply offer behavior. We disagree. The proposed lock-out provisions do not prohibit a market participant from reflecting a more current fuel price in its supply offer, or prevent the market participant from consulting with the IMM. The lock-out provisions are intended to incentivize market participants to submit fuel price adjustments for their Reference Levels only when there is a reasonable explanation or documentation supporting the adjustment. We agree with NEPOOL that the proposed Offer Flexibility Changes represent a balance of interests. Because the fuel price adjustment mechanism provides market participants with the latitude to increase a resource's Reference Level without prior review, it is appropriate for a market participant to be subject to a lock-out period if the IMM determines that the participant cannot substantiate or justify its fuel price adjustment.

35. We note, however, that there are a few potential inconsistencies between ISO-NE's intended application of the proposed revisions, including the lock-out provisions, and the actual proposed Tariff language. Accordingly, our acceptance is conditioned upon ISO-NE submitting revised tariff records in a compliance filing that reconciles the proposed Tariff language with ISO-NE's statements. In its answer, ISO-NE states that, during the lock-out period, "the Reference Levels for the resource would be determined by the IMM based on a published day-ahead fuel price index."[20] The proposed Tariff

[20] ISO-NE Answer at 5.

provisions, however, do not specify what type of pricing information the IMM will use to calculate the hourly Reference Levels for resources that are locked-out – i.e., whether the IMM would use a day-ahead price index or real-time (or operating day) price information. We find that, since the IMM will be calculating hourly Reference Levels that incorporate updated information, the IMM also should calculate the Reference Levels for locked-out resources based on updated information, instead of using the day-ahead price index. Accordingly, ISO-NE must submit clarifying Tariff revisions reflecting that approach.

36. Further, while ISO-NE states that the IMM "must develop hourly Reference Levels rather than Reference Levels that are fixed for an Operating Day,"[21] proposed Tariff section III.A.3.3 as drafted states that "Reference Levels will be made available on a daily basis." ISO-NE must submit a compliance filing with Tariff language clarifying that the IMM will make the hourly Reference Levels available to individual resources. The proposed Tariff revisions, as modified, should use updated information for Reference Levels for locked-out resources to help prevent inaccurate market price signals.

37. As to NEPGA's comparison of the NYISO market mitigation measures with the Filing Parties' proposed mitigation measures, such comparisons are irrelevant here. It is well-established that there can be more than one just and reasonable process,[22] and we see no reason to require NYISO and ISO-NE to implement the same mitigation mechanisms. Having found that the Filing Parties have proposed mitigation rules that appropriately accommodate the needs and characteristics of the ISO-NE region, we need not analyze how the rules compare with those implemented by NYISO.[23]

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[21] ISO-NE Transmittal at 14.

[22] *See, e.g.*, *Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.*, 127 FERC ¶ 61,109, at P 20 (2009); *New York Indep. Sys. Operator*, *Inc*., 126 FERC ¶ 61,320, at P 40 (2009) ("there can be more than one just and reasonable planning process and RTOs and ISOs [Independent System Operators] are not required to have identical planning processes").

[23] *See ISO New England Inc.*, 114 FERC ¶ 61,315, at P 33 (2006) ("Under the FPA, if we find that ISO-NE has successfully supported the justness and reasonableness of its [filing], we must approve it. We cannot, under those circumstances, consider alternatives to what is proposed by ISO-NE") (citing *Cities of Bethany v. FERC*, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 917 (1984)).

38. With respect to Capital Power's request that the Commission require ISO-NE to submit reports to the Commission on how the penalty provisions are being implemented, we will not impose such a reporting requirement at this time. However, we expect ISO-NE to monitor the effects of the Offer Flexibility Changes and to be prepared to report to the Commission how these changes have improved or not improved the ISO-NE market.

<u>The Commission orders</u>:

(A) The Commission hereby conditionally accepts the Offer Flexibility Changes, subject to a compliance filing, to become effective on December 3, 2014, as requested, as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) ISO-NE is hereby directed to submit revised tariff records in a compliance filing within sixty (60) days of the date of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.

By the Commission.

<u>( S E A L )</u>

Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.