AmerenUE alleged violations in connection with Taum Sauk dam failure

A. Violations of 18 C.F.R. § 12.10(a), which requires licensees to report to the Regional Engineer any condition affecting the safety of a project or project works:

- AmerenUE failed to report the September 25, 2005 overtopping to the Commission.
- AmerenUE failed to report the unusual instrumentation readings observed on September 27, 2005.
- AmerenUE failed to report the failed system for anchoring the transducers used to measure the water level in the upper reservoir to the Commission.

B. Violations of 18 C.F.R. § 12.5, which requires licensees to use sound and prudent engineering practices in any action relating to the design, construction, operation, maintenance, use, repair or modification of a water power project or project works:

- AmerenUE added 0.4 foot to the programmable logic controllers’ measurement of the project’s water level to compensate for an inaccurate transducer reading.
- AmerenUE did not repair the loose transducers used to measure the water level in the upper reservoir.
- AmerenUE operated the Taum Sauk Project with water at 1596 feet above sea level, too close to the top of the upper reservoir’s parapet wall.
- AmerenUE raised the upper reservoir’s Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level, higher than the lowest point of the top of the parapet wall.
- AmerenUE added a one-minute delay after the Warrick probes were activated before the pumps were shut off.
- AmerenUE programmed the Hi and Hi-Hi Warrick emergency shutoff probes to operate in series rather than in parallel mode.
- AmerenUE did not program the Warrick probe to transmit an alarm when the Hi probe was activated.

C. Violation of 18 C.F.R. § 12.11, which requires licensees to report any modification of the project to the Commission:

- AmerenUE failed to report to the Commission that it raised the Warrick probes.

D. Violations of Article 20 of license Form L-11 for the Taum Sauk Project, which requires advance Commission approval of modifications of the project’s instrumentation:

- AmerenUE raised the Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level without prior Commission approval.
➢ AmerenUE added a one-minute delay to the activation of the Warrick probes without prior Commission approval.
➢ AmerenUE programmed the Hi and Hi-Hi Warrick emergency shutoff probes to operate in series rather than parallel mode without prior Commission approval.

E. **Violation of Article 27 of the license for the Taum Sauk Project, which requires Commission approval of a substantial alteration of the project:**

➢ AmerenUE raised the Warrick probes to 1597.4 feet and 1597.7 feet above sea level without prior Commission approval.